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Historical Society Papers.

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VOLUME VII.

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JANUARY TO DECEMBER, 1879.

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RICHMOND, VA.:  
REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,  
*Secretary Southern Historical Society.*

GEO. W. GARY, PRINTER,  
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
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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., January, 1879.

No. 1.

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**JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN OF 1862.**

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Address Delivered before the Virginia Division, A. N. V., October 31st,  
1878, by Colonel William Allan, late Chief of Ordnance,  
Second ("Stonewall") Corps, A. N. V.

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[PUBLISHED BY UNANIMOUS REQUEST OF THE ASSOCIATION].

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After the disastrous termination of Braddock's campaign against Fort Duquesne, in the summer of 1756, Colonel George Washington, to whom was entrusted the duty of protecting the Alleghany frontier of Virginia from the French and Indians, established himself at Winchester, in the lower Shenandoah Valley, as the point from which he could best protect the district assigned to him. Here he subsequently built Fort Loudoun, and made it the base of his operations. A grass-grown mound, marking the site of one of the bastions of the old fort, and Loudoun street, the name of the principal thoroughfare of the town, remain to recall an important chapter in Colonial history.

It was this old town that Major-General T. J. Jackson entered on the evening of November 4, 1861, as commander of the Valley

district, and his headquarters were established within musket-shot of Fort Loudoun. He had been made Major-General on October 7 for his services at the first battle of Manassas, and was now assigned to this important command because of the expectations formed of his capacity, and because of his acquaintance with the country. His district embraced the territory bounded north by the Potomac, east by the Blue Ridge, and west by the Alleghanies. Born and reared in Western Virginia, and filled with a patriot's devotion to the land of his birth, he had manifested a strong desire to be employed in the operations in that region, and had cherished the ambition of freeing his former home from hostile domination. The Confederates, during the summer, had in that region been unsuccessful. General Robert Garnett had been forced to retreat by General McClellan, and had then met defeat and death at Corrick's Ford on Cheat river, July 13th. This gave the Federals control of the greater part of Virginia west of the Alleghanies, and the subsequent efforts of Generals Floyd and Wise, and still later of General Lee, availed only to prevent further encroachments of the enemy—not to regain the lost territory.

When, therefore, General Jackson assumed command of the Valley of Virginia, the enemy had possession of all the State north of the Great Kanawha and west of the Alleghanies, and had pushed their outposts into that mountain region itself, and in some cases eastward of the main range. Thus, General Kelly had captured Romney, the county seat of Hampshire, forty miles west of Winchester, and now occupied it with a force of 5,000 men.\* This movement gave the Federals control of the fertile valley of the south branch of the Potomac. Another, though much smaller force, occupied Bath, the county seat of Morgan, forty miles due north of Winchester, while the north bank of the Potomac was everywhere guarded by Union troops. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad was open and available for the supply of the Federal troops from Baltimore to Harper's Ferry, and again from a point opposite Hancock westward. The section of this road of about forty miles from Harper's Ferry to Hancock, lying for the most part some distance within the Virginia border, had been interrupted and rendered useless by the Confederates, but this gap was now supplied by the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which was open all the way from Cumberland, Maryland, to Georgetown in the District of Columbia.

\* Rosecrans' testimony before "Committee on the Conduct of the War," volume III, 1865, page 14.



The plan of operations, that Jackson had conceived for regaining West Virginia, was to move along the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the turnpikes parallel to it, and thus enter Western Virginia at the northeastern end. In this way he could turn the left flank of the enemy's forces, place himself on their communications, and force them to evacuate or fight under circumstances of his own selection. Having seen how his predecessors had been hampered in trying to operate from Staunton westward, by the difficult and inaccessible nature of the country, composed almost entirely of mountains destitute of supplies, and penetrated by nothing but indifferent wagon roads, he was anxious to try a mode of approach which, if more exposed to the enemy, had the advantage of being easier, of lying through a much more populous and cultivated region, of affording to some extent the use of a railroad for supplies, and which would soon place him in the midst of some of the most fertile parts of West Virginia. In order to carry out this scheme he asked for his old brigade, which had been left at Manassas, and that all the forces operating along the line of the Alleghanies southwest of Winchester, and lately commanded by General Lee, should be concentrated under his command. This would have given him 15,000 or 16,000 men, the least force with which he thought it possible to undertake so bold an enterprise.

His wishes were complied with in part. His own brigade was promptly sent to him, and one of the brigades of Loring's troops (General Loring had succeeded General Lee) reached him early in December. Subsequently two more brigades under General Loring himself were added, but all these troops only increased the small force of 3,000 State militia which he had assembled in the district itself to about 11,000 men.\* The greater part of General Loring's force did not arrive at Winchester until Christmas, thus preventing any important movements during November and December.

But meantime Jackson was not idle. He spent the time in organizing, drilling and equipping the militia and the scattered cavalry commands, which he consolidated into a regiment under Colonel Ashby; and in sending expeditions against the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, by breaking which he annoyed the enemy and interrupted an important line of communication.†

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\* Dabney's Life of Jackson, page 257.

† Jackson was employed from December 16th to December 31st in an expedition against Dam No. 5 on the Potomac. Here Captain (now Governor) Holliday, of the Thirty-third Virginia, and Captain Robinson, of the Twenty-seventh Virginia, volunteered, with their companies, to go into the river and cut away the cribs. This was done in the cold water under an annoying fire from the enemy on the Maryland bank.

By the last week in December all the troops that the War Department thought it judicious to spare him had arrived, and though the season was far advanced, he determined at once to assume the offensive. The winter had so far been mild, the roads were in excellent condition, and though his force was not large enough for the recovery of West Virginia, important advantages seemed within reach.

The forces and positions of the enemy opposed to Jackson at the beginning of 1862 were as follows: General Banks, commanding the Fifth corps of McClellan's army, with headquarters at Frederick, Maryland, had 16,000 effective men,\* the greater part of whom were in winter quarters near that city, while the remainder guarded the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to Williamsport. General Rosecrans, still holding command of the Department of West Virginia, had 22,000 men scattered over that region,† but was concentrating them on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. He says in his testimony (Report on Conduct of War, 1865, volume III): "On the 6th of December, satisfied that the condition of the roads over the Alleghanies into Western Virginia, as well as the scarcity of subsistence and horse-feed, would preclude any serious operations of the enemy against us, until the opening of the spring, I began quietly and secretly to assemble all the spare troops of the department in the neighborhood of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, under cover of about 5,000 men I had posted at Romney, with the design of obtaining General McClellan's permission to take nearly all these troops and suddenly seize, fortify and hold Winchester, whereby I should at once more effectually cover the northeastern and central parts of Western Virginia, and at the same time threaten the left of the enemy's position at Manassas, compel him to lengthen his line of defence in front of the Army of the Potomac, and throw it further south."

This plan of Rosecrans was anticipated and foiled by Jackson's movements. On the first of January, 1862, the latter left Winchester at the head of between 8,000 and 9,000 men,‡ and moved towards Bath, in Morgan county. The fine weather of the preceding month changed on the very first night of the expedition, and

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\* General Banks says that he had 17,500 men in all, or "16,000 effective men." See his testimony before the Committee on Conduct of the War, 1863, part II, page 414.

† Rosecrans' testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War, 1863, part I, page 202.

‡ On January 10th, Jackson reported the entire force in his district to General J. E. Johnston as 10,178 infantry and 648 cavalry. He had at that date 24 guns, having lost two at Hanging Rock, January 7th.

a terrible storm of sleet and snow and cold set in, which for the next three weeks subjected the troops to the severest hardships, and finally forced their commander to suspend his forward movement. At first the troops marched cheerfully on in spite of cold and sleet. Bath was evacuated, but General Lander, who within a day or two had superseded Rosecrans, hurried reinforcements to Hancock, in time to prevent Jackson from crossing the Potomac.\* Jackson having made a demonstration against Hancock, done what damage was possible to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and placed himself between Lander at Hancock and Kelly at Romney, moved toward the latter place as fast as the icy roads would permit. While Jackson was on the road, a part of Kelly's force made a reconnoissance towards Winchester, and at Hanging Rock, twelve miles from Romney, surprised and defeated a force of Confederate militia, of some 500 or 600 men, taking two guns. But alarmed at Jackson's movements, Kelly did not attempt to follow up the advantage, and hastily retired from Romney on January 10th. Jackson entered it on the 14th, and though the weather and roads grew worse held to his intention of advancing further. He aimed at Cumberland. Preparations were at once begun for a movement on New Creek (now called Keyser), but when the orders to march were given, the murmuring and discontent among his troops, especially among those which had recently come under his command, reached such a pitch that he reluctantly abandoned the enterprise and determined to go into winter-quarters. Leaving Loring and his troops at Romney, he returned with his own old brigade to Winchester, January 24th, and disposed his cavalry and militia commands so as to protect the whole border of the district.

This expedition, though it had cleared his district of the foe and effectually broken up all plans of the enemy for a winter campaign against Winchester, was disappointing to Jackson, as well as to the public. Though believing that results had been obtained which outweighed all the suffering and loss, he was conscious that the weather, and the lack of cordial support, had prevented the accomplishment of far more important ends. But this did not abate his self-reliance, nor diminish his clear-sightedness. The discontent among his troops left at Romney resulted on the 31st of January in an order from the Secretary of War, sent without consultation, to withdraw Loring from that place. Jackson obeyed the order,

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\* One of Banks' brigades was sent to aid Lander at Hancock. See Banks' testimony, above cited.



and at once resigned, on the ground that such interference by the Department at Richmond, with the details of military affairs in the field, could only lead to disaster. After explanations, and upon the urgent request of Governor Letcher and General J. E. Johnston,\* he withdrew the resignation. Subsequently, there was no desire on anybody's part to interfere with him.

For the next month Jackson remained quietly at Winchester. General Loring and all his troops that were not Virginian were ordered elsewhere; and in order to induce re-enlistment, furloughs were freely granted. The Confederate force was in this way reduced to about four thousand men, exclusive of militia.

With the 1st of March opened the great campaign of 1862 in Virginia, in which Jackson was to bear so prominent a part. In other sections of the Confederacy fortune favored the Federal cause, and the Union armies were on the full tide of success. On the 8th of February Roanoke Island fell, on the 16th Fort Donelson, on the 26th Nashville, and on the 27th the evacuation of Columbus, Kentucky, was begun.

These successes made the Federal Administration impatient to push forward operations in Virginia. At the urgent representation of General McClellan, President Lincoln had yielded his favorite plan of campaign—an advance against the Confederate lines at Manassas—and had reluctantly consented to the transfer of the Army of the Potomac to Fortress Monroe, and its advance thence on Richmond. Before he would allow McClellan, however, to begin the transfer, the Potomac river below Washington must be cleared of Confederate batteries, the Baltimore and Ohio railroad must be recovered and protected, and all the approaches to Washington must be made secure.†

To fulfill a part of these conditions, Banks' and Lander's commands were ordered forward, and on February 24th General Banks occupied Harper's Ferry. Soon after, McClellan began the movements on his other wing, that were preparatory to an attack on the Confederate batteries along the lower Potomac. These indications of activity announced to General Johnston that the time had come for carrying out his plan, already determined upon, of retreating behind the Rappahannock. On the 7th of March Johnston began the withdrawal of his army, and by the 11th all the infantry and artillery east of the Blue Ridge had reached the new position.

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\* See Johnston's Narrative, page 88; Dabney's Life, page 278, &c.

† See McClellan's report.



Jackson meanwhile remained at Winchester, watching closely the advance of Banks, and doing what was possible to impede it. General Johnston thus describes the duty assigned to him: "After it had become evident that the Valley was to be invaded by an army too strong to be encountered by Jackson's division, that officer was instructed to endeavor to employ the invaders in the Valley, but without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to keep him from making any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he might be compelled to fight."\*

At this time Jackson's entire force did not amount to 4,000 men exclusive of the remnants of the militia brigades, which were not employed any more in active service. It consisted of the five regiments of his old brigade, now under Garnett, of three regiments and one battalion under Burks, and of two regiments under Fulkerson. He had also five batteries and Ashby's regiment of cavalry. General Banks had his own division, under Williams, and Shields' (late Lander's)† division, now incorporated in his corps. Two brigades of Sedgwick's were also with him‡ when he crossed the Potomac. On the 1st of April the strength of Banks' corps, embracing Shields, is given by General McClellan as 23,339, including 3,652 cavalry, *excluding* 2,100 railroad guards.§ If Sedgwick's brigades continued with him in his advance on Winchester, his entire force was over 25,000.

Jackson sent his stores, baggage and sick to the rear, but continued to hold his position at Winchester to the last moment.

Banks occupied Charlestown on 26th February, but only reached Stephenson's, four miles north of Winchester, on March 7th. Here Jackson drew up his little force in line of battle to meet him, but the Federals withdrew without attacking. The activity of Ashby, and the boldness with which Jackson maintained his position, impressed his adversary with greatly exaggerated notions of his strength. Banks advanced in a cautious and wary manner, refusing to attack, but pushing forward his left wing, so as to threaten Jackson's flank and rear. By the 11th of March this movement had gone so far that it was no longer safe for the Confederates to hold Winchester. Jackson remained under arms all day, hoping for an

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\* Johnston's Narrative, page 106.

† General Lander died at his camp at Pawpaw, March 2d, and General Shields succeeded to his command.

‡ McClellan's report.

§ McClellan's report—Rebellion Record, companion volume I, page 546.

attack in front, but none was made, and late in the afternoon he ordered trains and troops into camp, near the south end of the town. By some mistake the trains went on six miles further and the troops had to follow. Jackson, not aware of this, called a council of his chief officers—the first and last time, it is believed, that he ever summoned a council of war—to meet after dark in Winchester, and proposed to them a night attack upon Banks. His proposition was not approved, and he learned then for the first time that the troops were already six miles from Winchester and ten from the enemy. The plan was now evidently impracticable, and he withdrew from the town, which was occupied by the Federals on the next day, March 12. The Confederates continued to retreat slowly to Woodstock and Mount Jackson, forty miles in rear of Winchester, and Shields' division was thrown forward in pursuit to Strasburg on the 17th.

The retirement of Jackson, and the unopposed occupation of the lower Valley by Banks, relieved General McClellan of all fears in that direction, and induced him, in pursuance of President Lincoln's requirement that Manassas Junction and the approaches to Washington from that direction be securely held, to send the following instructions to Banks on March 16th:

"Sir—You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, entrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets out to the front.

"Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas, and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications to the Valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running order, entrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley. \* \* \* Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction and Warrenton itself, and some \* \* \* more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria railroad."\*

In compliance with these instructions, Shields' division was recalled from Strasburg, and Williams' division began its movement toward Manassas on the 20th of March.

On the evening of the 21st Ashby reported that the enemy had evacuated Strasburg. Jackson, divining that this meant a withdrawal toward Washington, at once ordered pursuit with all his available force. The whole of his little army reached Strasburg

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\* McClellan's report.

on the afternoon of the 22d, the greater part after a march of twenty-two miles. Meantime Ashby was following close behind the retreating enemy, and late in the afternoon of the 22d, as Jackson was entering Strasburg, Ashby was attacking the Federal pickets one mile south of Winchester. After the skirmish, Ashby camped for the night at Kernstown, three miles south of Winchester. General Shields, who commanded the troops Ashby had attacked, and who was himself wounded in the skirmish, had displayed but a small part of his force, and this fact, combined with information gotten within the Federal lines, misled the Confederates. The last of Williams' division of Banks' corps had left on the morning of the 22d for Manassas, but Shields' division of three brigades still remained. The reports brought out led Ashby to believe that all but one brigade had gone, and that it expected to leave for Harper's Ferry the next day.\* This information, transmitted to Jackson, caused the latter to push on with all haste the next morning. At daylight he sent three companies of infantry to reinforce Ashby and followed with his whole force. He reached Kernstown at 2 P. M., after a march of fourteen miles.†

General Shields had made his dispositions to meet attack, by advancing Kimball's brigade of four regiments and Daum's artillery to the vicinity of Kernstown. Sullivan's brigade of four regiments was posted in rear of Kimball, and Tyler's brigade of five regiments, with Broadhead's cavalry, was held in reserve. Ashby kept up an active skirmish with the advance of Shields' force during the forenoon.

But though thus making ready, the Federal generals did not expect an attack in earnest. Shields says he had the country in front and flank carefully reconnoitred during the forenoon of the 23d of March, and the officer in charge reported "no indications of any hostile force except that of Ashby." Shields continues: "I communicated this information to Major-General Banks, who was then with me, and after consulting together, we both concluded that Jackson could not be tempted to hazard himself so far away from his main support. Having both come to this conclusion, General Banks took his departure for Washington, being already under orders to that effect. The officers of his staff, however, remained behind, intending to leave for Centreville in the afternoon."‡

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\* Shields' report—*Rebellion Record*, volume IV; Ashby's reports.

† Jackson's report. *Confederate Official Reports*.

‡ Shields' report.



When Jackson reached Kernstown his troops were very weary. Three-fourths of them had marched thirty-six miles since the preceding morning. He therefore gave directions for bivouacking, and says in his report: "Though it was very desirable to prevent the enemy from leaving the Valley, yet I deemed it best not to attack until morning. But subsequently ascertaining that the Federals had a position from which our forces could be seen, I concluded that it would be dangerous to postpone the attack until the next day, as reinforcements might be brought up during the night."

Jackson therefore led his men to the attack. His plan was to gain the ridge upon which the Federal right flank rested, turn that flank and get command of the road from Kernstown to Winchester in the enemy's rear. He gained the top of the ridge, but Shields was able to hold him in check until Tyler's brigade and other troops could be hurried to that flank, when Jackson in turn became the attacked party. For three hours of this Sunday afternoon the sanguinary and stubborn contest continued. The left half of the Confederate line was perpendicular to the ridge, the right half, which was mainly composed of artillery, ran along the ridge to the rear, and was thus at right angles to the other part. The brunt of the Federal attack was borne by the centre, near the angle presented by that part of the line. Fulkerson's brigade, holding the extreme Confederate left, firmly maintained its position, but the centre was thinned and worn out by the persistent Federal attacks, until General Garnett, whose brigade was there, deeming it impossible to hold his position longer, ordered a retreat. This of course caused a retreat of the whole, which was effected with the loss of two disabled guns, and from 200 to 300 prisoners.

Jackson's whole force at this time consisted of 3,087 infantry, of which 2,742 were engaged in the battle of Kernstown; of twenty-seven guns, of which eighteen were engaged, and of 290 cavalry. General Shields states his force at 7,000 of all arms. The total Confederate loss was nearly 700—the Federal is put by General Shields at less than 600.\*

Weary and dispirited was the little army which had marched fourteen miles in the morning to attack a force more than double its own, and which had for three hours wrestled for victory in so vigorous a fashion as to astonish and deceive the enemy. Baffled and overpowered, it slowly retraced its path for six miles more,

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\* Jackson's and Shields' reports.



and sank to rest. In the fence corners, under the trees, and around the wagons, the soldiers threw themselves down, many too tired to eat, and forgot in profound slumbers the toils, dangers and disappointments of the day. Jackson shared the open-air bivouac with his men, and found the rest that nature demanded on some fence rails in a corner of the road. Next morning he crossed to the south side of Cedar creek, and gradually retired before the advancing enemy once more to Mount Jackson.

The bold attack of Jackson at Kernstown, though unsuccessful, led to many important results. Its first effect was the recall of the Federal troops then marching from the Valley towards Manassas. General Shields says: "Though the battle had been won, still I could not have believed that Jackson would have hazarded a decisive engagement so far from the main body without expecting reinforcements; so to be prepared for such a contingency, I set to work during the night (after the battle) to bring together all the troops within my reach. I sent an express after Williams' division, requesting the rear brigade, about twenty miles distant, to march all night and join me in the morning. I swept the posts and routes in my rear of almost all their guards, hurrying them forward by forced marches to be with me at daylight. \* \* \* \* General Banks, hearing of our engagement on his way to Washington, halted at Harper's Ferry, and with remarkable promptitude and sagacity, ordered back Williams' whole division, so that my express found the rear brigade already *en route* to join us. The General himself returned forthwith, and after making me a hasty visit, assumed command of the forces in pursuit of the enemy. This pursuit was kept up \* \* \* until they reached Woodstock."

Thus the design of McClellan to post Banks' corps at Centreville (see letter of March 16th) became impracticable, and that body of over 20,000 troops was thought necessary to guard against the further movements of Jackson's 3,000 and the imaginary reinforcements with which they supplied him. This battle too, no doubt, decided the question of the detachment of Blenker's division of 10,000 men from McClellan, and its transfer to Fremont, recently placed in command of the Mountain Department, which embraced West Virginia. While *en route* from Alexandria to join Fremont, Blenker's division was to report to Banks, and remain with him as long as he thought any attack from Jackson impending.\* A

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\* McClellan's report.

few days later, the sensitiveness of the Federal Government to the danger of Washington, excited anew by Jackson's movements, led to the detachment of McDowell's corps.

McClellan had left over 70,000 men\* for the defence of Washington and its approaches, and yet, after Kernstown, President Lincoln felt so insecure, that on April 3d he countermanded the order for the embarkation of McDowell's corps, and detained it to replace Banks in front of Washington, and so deprived McClellan of the finest body of troops in his army.

Thus Jackson's bold dash had effected the object of General Johnston in leaving him in the Valley, in a way far more thorough than either of them could have expected.

The next month was to Jackson one of comparative inaction. Having slowly retreated to the south bank of the Shenandoah near Mount Jackson, he spent the next few weeks in resting and recruiting his forces. The militia of the adjoining counties had already been called to the field, but this resource was superseded on the 10th of April by the conscription act. The time for reorganizing the regiments was near at hand. New officers were to be elected. The ranks were filling up under the impetus given to volunteering by the conscription bill. The weather during the first half of April was very raw and cold, and during the whole month was exceedingly rainy. All these causes rendered quiet very acceptable to the Confederates.

Nor was the enemy in haste to disturb them. Banks was on April 4th placed in independent command of the Department of the Shenandoah, and McDowell of the country between the Blue Ridge and the Rappahannock, while Fremont was in command from the Alleghanies westward. These were all made independent of McClellan and of each other. General Banks followed Jackson but slowly. He reached Woodstock on April 1st, and having pushed back Ashby's cavalry to Edinburg, five miles beyond, he attempted no further serious advance until the 17th. He then moved forward in force, and Jackson retired to Harrisonburg, where he turned at right angles to the left, and crossing the main fork of the Shenandoah at Conrad's store, took up his position at the western base of the Blue Ridge mountains, in Swift Run Gap. This camp the Confederates reached on the 20th of April, and here they remained through ten days more of rain and mud.

Meantime, the advance of McClellan up the peninsula had be-

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\*McClellan's report.

gun in earnest. General J. E. Johnston had transferred the mass of his army to the front of Richmond, and had taken command there in person. Ewell's division alone remained on the Rappahannock, to watch the enemy there, and to aid Jackson in case of need. This division was now near Gordonsville, and a good road from that point through Swift Run Gap placed it within easy reach of Jackson.

The latter, conscious of his inability with five or six thousand men (his force had nearly doubled since Kernstown by the return of furloughed men and by new enlistments) to resist in the open country the advance of Banks, had availed himself of the nature of the country to take a position where he could be attacked only at great disadvantage, and yet might threaten the flank and rear of the advancing column, if it attempted to pass him. The main Shenandoah river covered his front, a stream not easily fordable at any time, and now swollen by the spring rains. The spurs of the mountains as they run out towards this river afford almost impregnable positions for defence; his flank could only be turned by toilsome and exposed marches, while good roads led from his rear to General Ewell. Thus secure in his position, Jackson at the same time more effectually prevented the further advance of the Federal column than if he had remained in its front; for he held the bridge over the Shenandoah, and was but a day's march from Harrisonburg, and should Banks threaten to move forward towards Staunton, he was ready to hurl the Confederate forces against his enemy's flank and rear. General Banks at Harrisonburg was in the midst of a hostile country, and already one hundred miles from the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, with which a long line of wagon communication had to be maintained. To push on to Staunton, with Jackson on his flank and rear, was virtually to sacrifice his present line of communication, with no practicable substitute in view; to attack the Confederates on the slopes of the mountains, with even a greatly superior force, was to risk defeat.

On the 28th of April Jackson applied to General Lee, then acting as Commander-in-Chief under President Davis, for a reinforcement of five thousand men, which addition to his force he deemed necessary to justify him in marching out and attacking Banks.

Next day he was informed that no troops could be spared to him beyond the commands of Ewell and of Edward Johnson, the latter of whom was seven miles west of Staunton, at West View, with a brigade.

Jackson at once decided upon his plan of campaign, and the very next day began to put it in execution. This campaign, so successful and brilliant in its results, and now so renowned, shows in its conception the strong points of Jackson's military genius—his clear, vigorous grasp of the situation—his decision, his energy, his grand audacity. It recalls the Italian campaign of 1796, when Napoleon astonished, baffled, defeated the armies of Beaulieu, Wurmser and Alvinzy in succession. Jackson was now with about 6,000 men at the base of the Blue Ridge, some thirty miles north-east of Staunton. Ewell with an equal force was in the vicinity of Gordonsville, twenty-five miles in his rear, and east of the mountains. Edward Johnson was seven miles west of Staunton with 3,500 men,—such the Confederate position. On the other hand, Banks, with the main body of his force of about 20,000 men, occupied Harrisonburg, twelve or fifteen miles in Jackson's front. Schenck and Milroy, commanding Fremont's advance of 6,000 men, were in front of Edward Johnson, their pickets already east of the Shenandoah mountain, and on the Harrisonburg and Warm Springs turnpike. Fremont was preparing to join them from the Baltimore and Ohio railroad with near 10,000 men, making the total of Fremont's movable column some 15,000.\* McDowell with 30,000 men had drawn away from the upper Rappahannock and was concentrating at Fredericksburg. This movement of McDowell had released Ewell, and left him free to aid Jackson, who, with a force of about 16,000 men (including Ewell and Edward Johnson), had on his hands the 35,000 under Banks and Fremont. The Warm Springs turnpike afforded Banks a ready mode of uniting with Milroy and Schenck, in which case Staunton would be an easy capture. Fremont was already preparing to move in that direction. Jackson determined to anticipate such a movement if possible, by uniting his own force to that of Johnson, and falling upon Milroy while Ewell kept Banks in checks. Then he would join Ewell, and with all his strength attack Banks.

To accomplish this Ewell was ordered to cross the mountain and occupy the position Jackson had held for ten days at Swift Run Gap, thus keeping up the menace of Banks' flank. As Ewell approached, Jackson left camp on the 30th of April, and marched up the east bank of the Shenandoah to Port Republic. No participant in that march can ever forget the incessant rain, the fearful mud, the frequent quicksands which made progress so slow and

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\* See Fremont's report.



toilsome. More than two days were consumed in going fifteen miles. Meantime Ashby was demonstrating against the enemy, and keeping Jackson's line close to prevent information from getting through. At Port Republic the army turned short to the left, and leaving the Shenandoah Valley altogether crossed Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge, and marched to Mechum's River station on the Virginia Central railroad. Thence by road and rail it was rapidly moved to Staunton, and by the evening of May 5th it had all reached that point. The movement by this devious route mystified friends as well as foes. One day is given to rest, and on the next Jackson hurries forward, unites Johnson's troops with his own, drives in the Federal pickets and foraging parties, and camps twenty-five miles west of Staunton. On the morrow (May 8th) he pushes on to McDowell, seizes Sitlington's hill, which commands the town and the enemy's camp, and makes his dispositions to seize the road in rear of the enemy during the night. But Milroy and Schenck have united, and seeing their position untenable, make a fierce attack in the afternoon to retake the hill or cover their retreat. For three or four hours a bloody struggle takes place on the brow of Sitlington's hill. The Federals, though inflicting severe loss, are repulsed at every point, and at nightfall quietly withdraw.\* They light their camp fires, and in the darkness evacuate the town. They retreat twenty-four miles to Franklin, in Pendleton county, where they meet Fremont advancing with the main body of his forces. Jackson follows to this point; has found it impossible to attack the retreating foe to advantage, and now deems it inadvisable to attempt anything further in this difficult country, with his 10,000 men against Fremont's 14,000 or 15,000. Screening completely his movements from Fremont with cavalry, he turns back (May 13th), marches rapidly to within seventeen miles of Staunton, then turns towards Harrisonburg, and dispatches General Ewell that he is on his way to attack Banks with their united forces.

Meantime, important changes have taken place in the disposition of the Federal troops in the Valley. McClellan is calling for more troops, and complaining that McDowell is withheld. The latter having gathered Abercrombie's and other scattered commands from the country in front of Washington into a new division to replace one sent to McClellan, now lies at Fredericksburg, impatient to take part in the movement on Richmond. Banks, hearing of

\* Schenck's report—*Rebellion Record*, volume V. He puts his total loss at 256. Jackson's loss was 461; see his report.

Ewell's arrival in the Valley, fears an attack from him and Jackson combined, and retires from Harrisonburg to New Market.

Jackson's inaction for some weeks, and now his movement to West Virginia, reassures the Federal Administration, and Shields, with more than half of Banks' force, is detached at New Market, and ordered to Fredericksburg to swell McDowell's corps to over 40,000 men.\* Banks is left with only some 7,000 or 8,000, and falls back to Strasburg, which he fortifies.† He assumes a defensive attitude, to hold the lower Valley, and to cover the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.

These movements of the enemy, which had taken place while Jackson was after Milroy, had nearly disarranged Jackson's plans. Upon the march of Shields towards Fredericksburg, General J. E. Johnston, commanding-in-chief in Virginia, thought it time to recall Ewell to meet the new danger thus threatened, and the orders reached Ewell while Jackson was yet one day's march short of Harrisonburg. After conference with Ewell, Jackson took the responsibility of detaining him until the condition of affairs could be represented to General Johnston, and meantime they united in a vigorous pursuit of Banks.‡

Ashby has followed close on Banks' heels, and now occupies his outposts with constant skirmishing, while he completely screens Jackson. The latter, having marched rapidly to New Market, as if about to follow the foe to Strasburg to attack him there, suddenly changes his route, crosses the Massanuttin mountain to Luray, where Ewell joins him, and pours down the narrow Page Valley by forced marches towards Front Royal. This place is about one hundred and twenty miles (by Jackson's route) from Franklin, and the Confederates reached it on May 23d, ten days after leaving Franklin. Front Royal is held by about one thousand men under Colonel Kenly, of the First Maryland Federal regiment, who has in charge the large stores there gathered, and the important railroad bridges on the Shenandoah. This force also covers the flank and rear of Banks' position at Strasburg. Kenly is taken by surprise, makes what resistance he can, is forced across the bridges he vainly attempts to destroy, and flies towards Winchester. Jackson, too

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\* McDowell says his corps at this time "consisted of the divisions of McCall, King and Ord. \* \* \* There were about 30,000 men altogether. Then General Shields came with about 11,000 men, making my force about 41,000 men." He had also 100 pieces of artillery. See McDowell's testimony before the Committee on Conduct of the War, part I, 1863, page 267.

† Shields left New Market May 12th.

‡ Dabney's Life of Jackson, page 359.

impatient to wait for his tired infantry, places himself at the head of a few companies of cavalry, and pushes after the foe. He overtakes, attacks and disperses Kenly's force, and in a few moments four-fifths of it are killed, wounded or prisoners.\* Exhausted nature can do no more. Weary and footsore the army lies down to rest.

General Banks, amazed at this irruption, by which his flank is turned and his communications threatened, begins during the night a precipitate retreat from Strasburg to Winchester. Jackson anticipates this, and presses on the next morning to Middletown, a village between Strasburg and Winchester, to find the road still filled with Federal trains and troops. Capturing or scattering these in every direction, he follows on after the main body, which has already passed him towards Winchester. He overhauls them in the afternoon, pushes Banks' rear guard before him all night, and having given but one hour to rest, at daylight on the 25th of May reaches Winchester, to find the Federal forces drawn up across the approaches to the town from the south and southeast.† The main part of Banks' army occupies the ridge on which Kernstown had been fought, but at a point two miles further north, while another part holds the Front Royal road, on which Ewell with a part of his division is advancing. A vigorous attack is at once made by the Confederates, which for a short time is bravely resisted, but the Federal lines begin to yield, and seeing himself about to be overwhelmed, Banks retreats through Winchester. Jackson presses closely, and the Federals emerge from the town a mass of disordered fugitives, making their way with all speed towards the Potomac. The Confederate infantry follows for several miles, capturing a large number of prisoners, and had the cavalry been as efficient but few of Banks' troops would have escaped.‡ Banks halts on the north side of the Potomac, and Jackson allows his exhausted men to rest at Winchester.

Thorough and glorious was Jackson's victory. In forty-eight hours the enemy had been driven between fifty and sixty miles, from Front Royal and Strasburg to the Potomac, with the loss of nearly one-half of his strength. His army had crossed that river a disorganized mass. Hundreds of wagons had been abandoned or burnt. Two pieces of artillery and an immense quantity

\* See Confederate official reports; also Camper & Kirkley's *History of the First Maryland Regiment (Federal)*.

† See Banks' and other Federal reports—*Rebellion Record*, volume V, page 52.

‡ See Jackson's and Ewell's reports.

of quartermaster, commissary, medical and ordnance stores had fallen into the hands of the victor. "Some twenty-three hundred prisoners" were taken to the rear when Jackson fell back, besides seven hundred and fifty wounded and sick paroled and left in the hospitals at Winchester and Strasburg, making a total of about 3,050.\*

A day is given, according to Jackson's custom, to religious services and thanksgiving, and another to rest, and on the third he is again moving towards Harper's Ferry, in order, by the most energetic diversion possible, to draw away troops from Richmond. How well he effected this, a glance at the Federal movements will show.

As above stated, the quiet that succeeded Kernstown, the advance of Banks far into the Valley and the movement of Jackson to West Virginia, had calmed the apprehensions of the Federal Administration for the time in regard to Washington, and the urgent requests of McClellan and McDowell, that the latter's corps should be sent forward from Fredericksburg towards Richmond, were listened to. Shields was detached from Banks and sent to McDowell, and on May 17th the latter was ordered to prepare to move down the Fredericksburg railroad to unite with McClellan before Richmond. On Friday, May 23d, the very day of Jackson's attack at Front Royal, President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton went to Fredericksburg to confer with General McDowell, found that Shields had already reached that point, and determined, after consultation, that the advance should begin on the following Monday (May 26th).† McClellan was informed of the contemplated movement and instructed to assume command of McDowell's corps when it joined him.‡ This fine body of troops moving from the North against the Confederate capital, would have seized all the roads entering the city from that direction and would have increased McClellan's available force by from forty to fifty per cent. There was strong reason to expect that this combined movement would effect the downfall of Richmond.

The Federal President returned to Washington on the night of the 23d to await the result. He there received the first news of Jackson's operations at Front Royal the preceding afternoon. The first dispatches indicated only an unimportant raid, and McDowell was directed by telegraph to leave his "least effective" brigade at

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\* Jackson's report.

† See McDowell's testimony before referred to.

‡ See McClellan's report.



Fredericksburg,\* in addition to the forces agreed upon for the occupation of that town. Later, on the 24th, the news from Banks became more alarming, and General McDowell was dispatched that "General Fremont had been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance of the line of the Manassas Gap railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in co-operation with General Fremont, or in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes with his movement, it is believed that the force with which you move will be sufficient to accomplish the object alone." \* \* The following was sent to McClellan at 4 P. M. on May 24th: "In consequence of General Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push on Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw Fremont's force and part of McDowell's in their rear." Signed, A. Lincoln.

Next day the news from Banks seem to have greatly increased the excitement in Washington. The following telegrams were sent to General McClellan, May 25th, by President Lincoln:

"The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Banks before him, in precisely what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and south, in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly." A later one reads—"Your dispatch received. Banks was at Strasburg with about six thousand men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d a Rebel force of seven to ten thousand men fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely, crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th (yesterday) pushed to get north of Banks on the road to Winchester. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a

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\* See McDowell's testimony.

battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with ten thousand, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks; also that another force of ten thousand is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare as we are here, it will be all we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. We have about 20,000 men of McDowell's force moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg. Both of these movements are intended to get in the enemy's rear. One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry. The rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling on the militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one yet at that point. This is now our situation. If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be utterly helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have.\*"

The exaggerations of this dispatch show the panic produced. Jackson had no troops at Orleans, or anywhere east of the Blue Ridge (except a little cavalry), and his entire force, which was all with him, was about 16,000 men.†

This dispatch shows, however, that Jackson was for the time not only occupying all the troops in and around Washington, together with Fremont's forces, but was completely neutralizing the 40,000 under McDowell, and thus disconcerting McClellan's plans.

But if the skill, celerity and daring of Jackson are illustrated in his movement against Banks, these qualities shine out far more brilliantly in his retreat from the Potomac and in his battles at Port Republic. He moved to Harper's Ferry on the 28th of May, and spent the 29th in making demonstrations against the force that had been rapidly gathered there, but which was too strongly posted to be attacked in front. Time did not allow a crossing of the river

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\* For foregoing dispatches see McDowell's testimony and McClellan's report.

† Dabney's Life, page 364. Major Dabney was at this time Chief-of-Staff to General Jackson.

and an investment of the place. The large bodies of troops which the Federal Administration was hastening from every direction to overwhelm him were already closing in.

McDowell, with 20,000 men, was hurrying towards Front Royal and Strasburg, and Fremont, now awake to the fact that his enemy had pushed him back into the mountains, and then slipped away to destroy his colleague, was moving with his 14,000 or 15,000 men towards Strasburg. General Saxton had 7,000 Federal troops\* at Harper's Ferry, and Banks was taking breath with the remnant of his command (some 3,000 or 4,000 men) at Williamsport, Maryland. Thus over 40,000 men were gathering to crush Jackson, whose strength was now not over 15,000. On the morning of May 30th he began his retreat, by ordering all his troops except Winder's brigade, Bradley Johnson's Maryland regiment and the cavalry, to fall back to Winchester. Nor was he an hour too soon, for before he reached that town McDowell's advance had poured over the Blue Ridge, driven out the small guard left at Front Royal and captured the village.

The condition of affairs when Jackson reached Winchester on the evening of May 30th, was as follows: the Federals were in possession of Front Royal, which is but twelve miles from Strasburg, while Winchester is eighteen.† Fremont was at Wardensville, distant twenty miles from Strasburg, and had telegraphed President Lincoln that he would enter the latter place by 5 P. M. on the next day.‡ The mass of Jackson's forces had marched twenty-five miles to reach Winchester, and his rear guard, under Winder (after skirmishing with the enemy at Harper's Ferry for part of the day), had camped at Halltown,§ which is over forty miles distant from Strasburg!

The next day, Saturday, May 31st, witnessed a race for Strasburg, which was in Jackson's direct line of retreat, but it was very different in character from the race of the preceding Saturday. Orders were issued for everything in the Confederate camp to move early in the morning. The 2,300 Federal prisoners were first sent forward, guarded by the Twenty-first Virginia regiment; next the long trains, including many captured wagons loaded with stores; then followed the whole of the army, except the rear guard under Winder.

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\* Saxton's report—*Rebellion Record*, volume V.

† McDowell's testimony.

‡ Fremont's report.

§ Jackson's and Winder's reports.

Jackson reached Strasburg on Saturday afternoon without molestation and encamped, thus placing himself directly between the two armies that were hastening to attack him. Here he remained for twenty-four hours, holding his two opponents apart until Winder could close up, and the last of the long trains could be sent to the rear. Winder, with the Stonewall brigade, had marched thirty-five miles on Saturday, and by Sunday noon had rejoined the main body. Meantime Shields and McDowell had been bewildered at Front Royal by the celerity of Jackson's movements, and had spent Saturday in moving out—first towards Winchester, and then on other roads, and finally in doing nothing.\* Fremont had stopped five miles short of Strasburg on Saturday night, and on Sunday was held in check† by Ashby, supported by part of Ewell's division. On Sunday McDowell, despairing of "heading off" Jackson, sent his cavalry to unite with Fremont at Strasburg in pursuing the Confederates, and dispatched Shields' division up the Luray Valley,‡ with the sanguine hope that the latter might, by moving on the longer and worse road, get in the rear of Jackson, who with a day's start was moving on the shorter and better!

On Friday morning Jackson was in front of Harper's Ferry, fifty miles in advance of Strasburg; Fremont was at Moorefield, thirty-eight miles from Strasburg, with his advance ten miles on the way to that place; Shields was not more than twenty miles from Strasburg (for his advance entered Front Royal, which is but twelve miles distant, before midday on Friday), while McDowell was following with another division within supporting distance. Yet by Sunday night Jackson had marched a distance of between fifty and sixty miles, though encumbered with prisoners and captured stores, had reached Strasburg before either of his adversaries, and had passed safely between their armies, while he held Fremont at bay by a show of force, and blinded and bewildered McDowell by the rapidity of his movements.

Then followed five days of masterly retreat. The failure of McDowell to attack him at Strasburg caused Jackson to suspect the movement of his forces up the Page or Luray Valley.§ McDowell himself did not go beyond Front Royal, but sent Shields' division to follow Jackson. The road up the Page Valley runs along the east side of the main Shenandoah river, which was then impassable, except at the bridges. Of these there were but three in the

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\* McDowell's testimony.

† Fremont's report.

‡ McDowell's testimony.

§ Jackson's report.



whole length of the Page Valley—two opposite New Market, but a few miles apart, and a third at Conrad's store, opposite Harrisonburg. Jackson promptly burned the first two, and thus left Shields with an impassable river between them, entirely unable to harass his flank or impede his march. Having thus disposed of one of the pursuing armies, he fell back before Fremont by moderate stages, entrusting the protection of the rear to the indefatigable Ashby. As Fremont approached Harrisonburg on the 6th of June, Jackson left it. Instead of taking the road via Conrad's store to Swift Run Gap, as he had done when retreating before Banks in April, he now took the road to Port Republic, where the branches of the main Shenandoah unite. He next sent a party to burn the bridge at Conrad's store, which afforded the last chance of a union of his adversaries north of Port Republic. The bridge at the latter place, together with a ford on the South river—the smaller of the tributaries which there form the Shenandoah—gave him the means of crossing from one side to the other—of which by the destruction of the other bridges he had deprived his enemies.

And now came the crowning act of his campaign. When his enemies were already closing in on his rear with overwhelming force, he had with wonderful celerity passed in safety between them. He had continued his retreat until they were now drawn one hundred miles from the Potomac. A large fraction of his pursuers had given up the chase, and were off his hands. Banks had only come as far as Winchester. Saxton from Harper's Ferry had only followed the rear guard under Winder for part of one day, and had then gone into camp, "exhausted," as he states. McDowell, with two divisions, had remained at Front Royal when Shields moved towards Luray—the latter officer undertaking with his one division to "clean out the Valley." Hence Jackson had now but Fremont's forces, about equal to his own in number, pressing on his rear, while Shields was making his toilsome way up the Page Valley, and was a day or two behind.

By laying hold of the bridges he had placed an impassable barrier between his two pursuers, and now he occupied the point where their two routes converged. No further to the rear would the Shenandoah serve as a barrier to their junction, for south of Port Republic its head waters are easily fordable. Here, too, was Brown's Gap near at hand, an easily defended pass in the Blue Ridge, and affording a good route out of the Valley in case of need.

In this position Jackson determined to stand and fight his adversaries in detail.

On Friday, June 6th, the foot-sore Confederates went into camp at different points along the five miles of road that intervened between Port Republic and Cross Keys, the latter a point half way between the former village and Harrisonburg. The skirmish on that day, in which Fremont's cavalry was severely punished, is memorable, because in it fell Turner Ashby—the generous, the chivalric, the high-souled knight, who, as commander of his horse, had so faithfully and gloriously contributed to Jackson's achievements. The next day was given to rest; and sorrow for the loss of Ashby replaced all other feelings for the time. But brief the time for sorrow. War gives much space to the grand emotions that lead to heroic doing or heroic bearing, but is niggardly in its allowance to the softer feelings of sadness and grief. As Ashby is borne away to his burial, all thoughts turn once more to the impending strife. Fremont was advancing. He had been emboldened by the retreat of the Confederates, and failing to comprehend the object of Jackson's movements, pushed on to seize the prey, which he deemed now within his grasp. His troops were all up by Saturday night, and his dispositions were made for attack on Sunday morning, June 8th.

But though Fremont was thus close at hand, while Shields, detained by bad roads, with his main body, was yet fifteen or twenty miles off, on the east side of the river, yet the opening of the battle on Sunday was made by a dash of Shields' cavalry under Colonel Carroll into Port Republic. They had been sent on, a day's march in advance, and meeting but a small force of Confederate cavalry, had driven them pell-mell into Port Republic, dashed across South river after them, seized and for a few minutes held the bridge over the latter stream. Jackson had just passed through the village as they entered it. Riding rapidly to the nearest troops north of the bridge, he directed one of Poague's guns and one of Taliferro's regiments (Thirty-seventh Virginia) on the bridge, quickly retook it, captured two cannon, and drove these adventurous horsemen back.\* They retired two or three miles with their infantry supports, and as the bluffs on the west side of the river command the roads on the east side, a battery or two kept them inactive for the remainder of the day.

It was at this time that Shields, from Luray, was dispatching Fremont as follows:†

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\* See Jackson's, Winder's, Taliaferro's and Poague's reports.

† Fremont's report.

June 8th—9½ A. M.

"I write by your scout. I think by this time there will be twelve pieces of artillery opposite Jackson's train at Port Republic, if he has taken that route. Some cavalry and artillery pushed on to Waynesboro' to burn the bridge. I hope to have two brigades at Port Republic to-day. I follow myself with two other brigades from this place. If the enemy changes direction, you will please keep me advised. If he attempts to force a passage, as my force is not large there yet, I hope you will thunder down on his rear. Please send back information from time to time. I think Jackson is caught this time. Yours, sincerely,

JAMES SHIELDS.

Meanwhile, Fremont had marshaled his brigades and was pressing on in brilliant array to "thunder down" on his adversary's rear. To General Ewell and his division had Jackson assigned the duty of meeting the foe. His other troops were in the rear, and nearer to Port Republic, to watch movements there, and to assist General Ewell if necessary. Ewell was drawn up on a wooded ridge near Cross Keys, with an open meadow and rivulet in front. On a parallel ridge beyond the rivulet Fremont took position. The Federal general first moved forward his left, composed of Blenker's Germans, to the attack. They were met by General Trimble, one of Ewell's brigadiers, with three regiments of his brigade. Trimble coolly withheld his fire until the Germans were close upon him. Then a few deadly volleys and the attack is broken, and the Federal left wing bloodily and decisively repulsed.\* That sturdy old soldier General Trimble, having been reinforced, presses forward, dislodges the batteries in position in his front, and threatens the overthrow of Fremont's left wing. While this last is not accomplished, the handling Blenker has received is so rough as completely to paralyze the remainder of Fremont's operations. The attack on centre and right become little more than artillery combats, and by the middle of the afternoon Fremont withdraws his whole line.† Ewell's force was about six thousand, and his loss two hundred and eighty-seven.‡ Fremont's force twice as great, and his loss over six hundred and fifty.§

About the time of Fremont's repulse, General Tyler, with one of Shields' infantry brigades, reached the position, near Lewiston, to which Colonel Carroll had retired in the morning; but so strong was the position held by the Confederate batteries on the west bank

\* Trimble's report.

† Ewell's report.

‡ Fremont's report.

§ Fremont's report.



of the river, that Tyler felt it impossible to make any diversion in favor of Fremont, and with his force of 3,000 men remained idle.\*

Jackson, emboldened by the inactivity of Shields' advance, and the easy repulse of Fremont, conceived the audacious design of attacking his two opponents in succession the next day, with the hope of overwhelming them separately.† For this purpose he directed that during the night a temporary bridge, composed simply of planks laid upon the running gear of wagons, should be constructed over the South river at Port Republic, and ordered Winder to move his brigade, at dawn, across both rivers and against Shields. Ewell was directed to leave Trimble's brigade and part of Patton's to hold Fremont in check, and to move at an early hour to Port Republic, to follow Winder. Taliaferro's brigade was left in charge of the batteries along the river, and to protect Trimble's retreat, if necessary. The force left in Fremont's front was directed to make all the show possible, and to delay the Federal advance to the extent of its power. The Confederate commander proposed, in case of an easy victory over Shields in the morning, to return to the Harrisonburg side of the river and attack Fremont in the afternoon. In case however of delay, and a vigorous advance on Fremont's part, Trimble was to retire by the bridge into Port Republic and burn it, in order to prevent his antagonist from following.

Jackson urged forward in person the construction of the foot bridge and the slow passage of his troops over the imperfect structure. When Winder's and Taylor's brigades had crossed, he would wait no longer, but moved forward towards the enemy; and when he found him ordered Winder to attack. The Federal General Tyler had posted his force strongly on a line perpendicular to the river—his left especially in a commanding position, and protected by dense woods. Winder attacked with vigor, but soon found the Federal position too strong to be carried by his brigade of 1,200 men. Taylor went to his assistance, but met with a stubborn resistance and varying success. Winder was forced back until other troops came up, and enabled him once more to go forward. Jackson, finding the resistance of the enemy so much more stubborn than he had expected, and that his first attack had failed, determined to concentrate his whole force, and give up all intention of recrossing the river. He therefore sent orders to Trimble and Taliaferro to leave Fremont's front, move over the bridge, burn it, and join the main body of the army as speedily as possible. This was

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\* Tyler's report.

† Dabney's Life.

done. Before his rear guard had arrived, however, a renewed attack in overwhelming force on Tyler had carried his position, captured his battery, and compelled him to retreat in more or less disorder. The pursuit continued for eight miles; 450 prisoners and six guns were captured, and 275 wounded paroled in the hospitals near the field. I have seen no official statement of the Federal loss, but the above was, of course, the greater part of it. Jackson's total loss was 876.\*

Fremont had advanced cautiously against Trimble in the afternoon, and had followed, as the latter withdrew and burnt the bridge. By this last act Fremont was compelled to remain an inactive spectator of the defeat of Tyler.

General Fremont thus describes the scene when he reached the river: "The battle which had taken place upon the further bank of the river was wholly at an end. A single brigade" (in fact two) "sent forward by General Shields had been simply cut to pieces. Colonel Carroll \* \* had \* \* failed to burn the bridge. Jackson, hastening, across had fallen upon the inferior force, and the result was before us. Of the bridge nothing remained but the charred and smoking timbers. Beyond, at the edge of the woods, a body of the enemy's troops was in position, and a baggage train was disappearing in a pass among the hills. Parties gathering the dead and wounded, together with a line of prisoners awaiting the movement of the Rebel force near by, was all in respect to troops of either side now to be seen."

Thus the day ended with the complete defeat of the two brigades under Tyler. Gallant and determined had been their resistance, and Jackson's impetuosity had made his victory more difficult than it otherwise would have been. In sending in Winder's brigade before its supports arrived, he had hurled this body of troops against more than twice their number. Taylor next attacked, but the repulse of Winder enabled the Federal commander to concentrate his forces against Taylor, and drive him from the battery he had taken. It was then that Jackson renewed the attack with the combined forces of three brigades, and speedily forced the enemy from the field. The Confederate trains had been moved in the course of the day across South river towards Brown's Gap, and during the afternoon and night the Confederates returned from the battlefield and pursuit, to camp at the foot of this mountain pass. It was midnight before some of them lay down in the rain to rest.

\* See reports of Jackson and his subordinates; also of General Tyler, *Rebellion Record*, volume V, page 110.

This double victory ended the pursuit of Jackson. Fremont on the next morning began to retreat, and retired sixty miles to Strasburg. Shields, so soon as his broken brigades rejoined him, retreated to Front Royal, and was thence transferred to Manassas.

The battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic closed this celebrated campaign. Just three months had passed since Jackson, with about 4,000 troops badly armed and equipped, had fallen back from Winchester before the advance of Banks with 25,000 men. So feeble seemed his force, and so powerless for offence, that when it had been pushed forty miles to the rear, Banks began to send his force towards Manassas, to execute his part of "covering the Federal capital" in McClellan's great campaign. While a large part of the Federal troops is on the march out of the Valley, and their commander is himself *en route* from Winchester to Washington, Jackson, hastening from his resting place by a forced march, appears most unexpectedly at Kernstown, and hurls his little army with incredible force and fury against the part of Banks' army which is yet behind. He is mistaken as to the numbers of the enemy. Three thousand men, worn by a forced march, are not able to defeat the 7,000 of Shields'. After a fierce struggle he suffers a severe repulse, but he makes such an impression as to cause the recall of a strong force from McClellan to protect Washington. The Federal Administration cannot believe that he has attacked Shields with a handful of men.

Falling back before his pursuers, he leaves the main road at Harrisonburg, and crossing over to Swift Run Gap he takes a position in which he cannot be readily attacked, and which yet enables him so to threaten the flank of his opponent, as to effectually check his further progress. Here he gains ten days' time for the reorganization of his regiments (the time of service of most of which expired in April), and here, too, the return of furloughed men and the accession of volunteers nearly doubles his numbers.

Finding that no more troops could be obtained beside those of Ewell and Edward Johnson, he leaves the former to hold Banks in check, while he makes a rapid and circuitous march to General Edward Johnson's position, near Staunton.

Uniting Johnson's force with his own, he appears suddenly in front of Milroy, at McDowell, only eight days after having left Swift Run Gap. He has marched one hundred miles and crossed the Blue Ridge twice in this time, and now repulses Milroy and Schenck, and follows them up to Franklin. Then finding Fremont



within supporting distance, he begins on May 13 to retrace his steps, marching through Harrisonburg, New Market, Luray, Ewell, joining him on the road and swelling his force to 16,000 men, and on May 23 suddenly appears at Front Royal (distant, by his route, nearly one hundred and twenty miles from Franklin), and surprises and completely overwhelms the force Banks has stationed there. Next day he strikes with damaging effect at Banks' retreating column, between Strasburg and Winchester, and follows him up all night. At dawn he attacks him on the heights of Winchester, forces him from his position and drives him in confusion and dismay to the Potomac with the loss of immense stores and a large number of prisoners. Resting but two days, he marches to Harper's Ferry, threatens an invasion of Maryland and spreads such alarm as to paralyze the movements of McDowell's 40,000 men at Fredericksburg, and to cause the concentration of half of this force, together with Fremont's command, on his rear. The militia of the adjoining States is called out; troops are hurried to Harper's Ferry in his front; more than 40,000 troops are hastening under the most urgent telegrams to close in around him. Keeping up his demonstrations until the last moment—until, indeed, the head of McDowell's column was but twelve or fourteen miles from his line of retreat, at a point nearly fifty miles in his rear—he, by a forced march of a day and a half, traverses this distance of fifty miles and places himself at Strasburg. Here he keeps Fremont at bay until his long line of prisoners and captured stores has passed through in safety and his rear guard closed up. Then he falls back before Fremont, while by burning successively the bridges over the main fork of the Shenandoah he destroys all co-operation between his pursuers. Having retreated as far as necessary, he turns off from Harrisonburg to Port Republic, seizes the only bridge left south of Front Royal over the Shenandoah, and takes a position which enables him to fight his adversaries in succession, while they cannot succor each other. Fremont first attacks and is severely repulsed, and next morning Jackson, withdrawing suddenly from his front and destroying the bridge to prevent his following, attacks the advance brigades of Shields and completely defeats them, driving them eight or ten miles from the battlefield.

A week of rest, and Jackson, having disposed of his various enemies, and effected the permanent withdrawal of McDowell's corps from the forces operating against Richmond, is again on the march, and while Banks, Fremont and McDowell are disposing their broken

or baffled forces to cover Washington, is hastening to aid in the great series of battles which during the last days of June and the early ones of July, resulted in the defeat of McClellan's army and the relief of the Confederate capital.

I have thus tried to give you, fellow-soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia, an outline of one of the most brilliant pages of our history. Time has not permitted me to dwell on the great deeds which crowded these few months, nor to characterize in fitting terms of panegyric the mighty actors in them. I have attempted nothing beyond a simple and carefully accurate statement of facts. This may help to clear away from one campaign the dust and mould which already gather over the memories of our great struggle. It may do more. It may, by touching the electric chord of association, transport us for the time into the presence of the majestic dead; and of the mighty drama, the acting of which was like another and a higher life, and the contemplation of which should tend to strengthen, elevate, ennoble. It is wise in our day—it is wise always—to recur to a time when patriotism was a passion; when devotion to great principles dwarfed all considerations other than those of truth and right; when DUTY was *felt* to be the sublimest word in our language; when sacrifice outweighed selfishness; when “human virtue was equal to human calamity.” Among the heroes of that time Jackson holds a splendid place—an illustrious member of a worthy band—aye, a band than which no land in any age can point to a worthier!

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**Report of the Battle of Averysboro', North Carolina, by General W. B. Taliaferro.**

[We are indebted to our gallant friend General Taliaferro, for his original report of this important battle. So far as we are able to ascertain this is the only copy extant.]

HEADQUARTERS TALIAFERRO'S DIVISION,  
CAMP NEAR SMITHFIELD, N. C.,  
April 4th, 1865.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. B. ROY, *A. A. General*:

Colonel—I have the honor to make a brief report of the operations of my division on the 15th and 16th ultimo, near Averysboro', North Carolina:

On the morning of the 15th, Rhett's brigade was encamped near Smith's house, at the intersection of the Fayetteville and Raleigh road with the road leading to Smith's ferry, on the Cape Fear river, and Elliott's brigade half a mile higher up, at another cross road leading to the same ferry. On the previous evening the enemy, who had advanced as far as Silver run, were reported by the cavalry to have retired a distance of four miles below that point, and our troops had received orders from the Lieutenant-General commanding to remain in camp for the day and rest after their fatiguing marches. About 8 o'clock A. M. I was informed by Lieutenant-General Hampton that the infantry of the enemy were pushing our cavalry back, when I at once selected a position for Rhett's brigade near Smith's house, in rear of an open field on the right of the road, and extending across the road to the left into a body of woods, thus concealing my dispositions from the enemy, and proceeded to erect in my front such hasty breastworks as the scanty means at my command permitted. I threw forward a strong skirmish line a few hundred yards in front of this position, and ordered up some of my field pieces to support the main line—my object being only to check temporarily the advance of the enemy until our baggage trains should be beyond the reach of danger, when I designed to retire Rhett's brigade upon Elliott's.

The Lieutenant-General commanding, as soon as he was notified of the advance of the enemy, rode to my front, and directed me to advance still further my picket line, which being done, we struck the enemy some half a mile in the front of my position, our cavalry having been retired to the right and left.



I threw a few shells into the woods in front of my skirmish line, but except an occasional slight demonstration along that line, nothing of consequence occurred during the rest of this day.

I regret to have to report, however, that Colonel Rhett, of the First South Carolina artillery, commanding this brigade, mistaking a body of the enemy's cavalry for a party of our's of this arm, rode in advance of the picket line, to communicate with them, and was made prisoner.

I was directed by Lieutenant General Hardee, that in the event that the enemy moved forward in the morning, I should hold the position occupied by Rhett's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Butler, First South Carolina infantry, until it was no longer tenable, and then fall back upon the position occupied by Elliott's brigade, which I had placed in position behind a narrow swamp some two hundred yards in rear of the first line—which second line was to be held by my division as long as practicable; after which I was to retire upon an extended line, being prepared for defence by light works, some six hundred yards in rear, and which was in part occupied by General McLaws' division. At seven o'clock on the 16th the enemy advanced in considerable force, and the cavalry pickets, which had been re-established, retiring, he soon appeared in my front and advanced to the attack.

Our skirmishers, under the command of Captain Hugenin, First South Carolina infantry, received the advance very handsomely, and retired with coolness, contesting the ground well, to the main line. On the right of my line, and well advanced, the houses and grounds of Smith's plantation were occupied by two companies of the First South Carolina artillery, who held the position with great determination.

The enemy now established batteries over a rising ground beyond the swamp in our front to the left of the main road, and shelled our lines with great determination and vigor, and made several successive attempts upon our lines with their infantry, chiefly pushing our left—in all of which they were met with a gallant resistance, and were repulsed.

About eleven o'clock he severely pressed our left and threatened to turn it; at the same time he massed additional troops, extending his line to our right, finally lapping and turning it, when, in consequence of the heavy attack, and the impossibility of extending our line, already deployed to its fullest extent, I directed the troops to be withdrawn to the line held by Elliott's brigade, which was ac-

complied, under the circumstances, with remarkable coolness and with little loss. The fighting was severe during the entire morning, and men, as well as officers, displayed signal gallantry. Our loss was heavy, including some of our best officers.

The light pieces used by me here consisted of two twelve-pound howitzers, of Le Garden's New Orleans battery, and one twelve-pound Napoleon, of Stewart's South Carolina artillery, which were admirably served, and which operated with decided result upon the enemy's infantry and opposing battery. The ground was so soft from the heavy rains that it was with difficulty the pieces could be manœuvred, while the concentrated fire upon them was terrible—nearly every cannoneer of both sections being killed or wounded, while nine of Le Garden's and every horse of Stewart's, except one, were killed. Spare horses had been ordered from the rear, but did not arrive before it was found necessary to withdraw from the line; and the roads being so deep and heavy from the rains and the passage of baggage trains, they could not be withdrawn by hand—so that two of the guns had to be abandoned—not, however, until all the ammunition to the last shell had been expended upon the enemy. Sergeant Ginbert, of Le Garden's battery, deserves special mention here for his gallantry and energy. After this the enemy made several demonstrations along the new line now held by my division, attacking with considerable determination, but were always handsomely and successfully resisted.

About one o'clock it was ascertained that the enemy was moving a large force to our left, in the direction of Black river, which his immense superiority in numbers enabled him to do without much weakening his lines in our front. To meet this demonstration, I determined to move my division back to the main line selected by General Hardee, which was done with no difficulty and little loss, where I was directed to hold that part of the line which lay on the right and left of the main road, the division of Major-General McLaws connecting with me on the left, and Major-General Wheeler's cavalry, dismounted, on my right.

The enemy shelled this new position at intervals during the day, and assailed it with infantry several times unsuccessfully. Their artillery fire was returned by my pieces.

Heavy skirmishing continued along my line until eight o'clock at night, when my troops were withdrawn and resumed the march with the main body of General Hardee's command, leaving Gen-

eral Wheeler's cavalry (dismounted) temporarily occupying our abandoned works as their skirmish line until near daybreak.

The officers and men of my command fought admirably. Although unaccustomed to field fighting, they behaved as well as any troops could have done. The discipline of garrison service, and of regular organizations, as well as their daily exposure for eighteen months past to the heavy artillery of the enemy, told in the coolness and determination with which they received and returned the heavy fire of this day. I take pleasure in especially mentioning Brigadier-General Stephen Elliott and Colonel W. B. Butler, commanding brigades; Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, Second South Carolina artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Yates, First South Carolina regiment artillery; Major Blanding, First artillery; Major Warley, Second South Carolina artillery; Major ———, Twenty-third Georgia battalion; Captain Matthews and Lieutenant Boag, Manigault's battalion; Captain King, First South Carolina artillery, and regret that I have not the names of many who distinguished themselves, nor of those gallant officers who yielded up their lives in their country's service on this occasion. I hope to forward a complete list with the reports of the subordinate commanders.

To my personal staff is due the testimony of my appreciation of their gallantry and efficiency. Major P. W. Page, my Adjutant-General, was severely, and Captain Reid, Aid-de-Camp, slightly wounded, whilst faithfully and ably discharging their duty; Captain Matthews, Engineer Officer; Captain Penin Kemp, Lieutenant Henry C. Cunningham, Ordnance Officer, temporarily with General Elliott, and Lieutenant George Harrison, Signal Officer, gallantly and well seconded my efforts during the two days of our engagement with the enemy at Averysboro'.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM B. TALIAFERRO,  
*Commanding Taliaferro's division.*

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**'General Ruggles' Amended Report of the Battle of Shiloh.**

[The following documents concerning the battle of Shiloh were not published among the reports printed by order of the Confederate Congress. General Ruggles' *original* report was printed, but the amended report and the accompanying letters were not, and have never been in print in any form so far as we know. The additions to the original report are indicated by being enclosed in brackets. Those interested in this great battle will be glad to get this important addition to its official history.]

**Letter from General Ruggles.****1192339**

FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA,  
HEADQUARTERS COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI, April 7th, 1863.

To General BRAXTON BRAGG, *Confederate States Army*:

General—I have the honor to transmit for your consideration some official statements from officers commanding field batteries, and others possessing personal knowledge, touching the events connected with the closing scenes of the battle of Shiloh, on Sunday evening, the 6th of April, 1862, viz:

First. A letter from Colonel Smith P. Bankhead, artillery, Provisional army, dated December 16th, 1862.

Second. A letter from Captain L. D. Sandidge, Division Inspector, dated January 24th, 1863.

Third. A letter from Colonel S. S. Heard, late Colonel Seventeenth regiment, Louisiana volunteers, dated March 18, 1863.

Fourth. A letter from Captain James C. Thrall, artillery, Confederate States Provisional army, dated April 1st, 1863.

By reference to my own official report of that period in the battle, specially referred to, the following statement will be found, viz:

“As the enemy finally gave way, I directed the movement of the Second brigade towards the right, along the crest of the ridge following the line of the enemy's continued resistance, and sent a section of Ketchum's battery into action on a road leading towards Pittsburg, in a position overlooking the broken slope below, to reply to batteries nearly in front and in the forest to the right, with which the enemy swept a large circuit around, sending also Colonel Smith's Louisiana Crescent regiment (Third brigade) to support this battery, then harassed by skirmishers, and to seize the opportunity to charge the enemy's position. I then put a section of guns in position on the road leading along the ridge still farther to the right, which was soon forced to retire under the concentrated fire of the enemy's artillery.

“Discovering the enemy in considerable numbers moving through

the forest on the lower margin of the open field in front, I obtained Trabue's and Stanford's light batteries, and brought them into action, and directed their fire on masses of the enemy then pressing forward towards our right, engaged in a fierce contest with our forces then advancing against him in that direction.

"For a brief period the enemy apparently gained ground, and when the conflict was at its height these batteries opened upon his concentrated forces, producing immediate commotion, and soon resulted in the precipitate retreat of the enemy from the contest.

"At this moment the Second brigade and the Crescent regiment pressed forward and cut off a considerable portion of the enemy, who surrendered."

I have also to remark that a hasty glance at your manuscript report (at Richmond) disclosed no special notice of that particular period of the battle corresponding with its importance, and I therefore have the honor to request that you will amend your report so far as to do justice to those troops who participated in one of the controlling conflicts of that eventful day.

It is due to myself to state that subsequently enfeebled health, the constant pressure of official business, the sickness of my staff officers and the haste enjoined in making my official report, even before the subordinate reports could be obtained, deprived me of the means of retracing circumstantially many of the most notable events of the day, and, as subsequent investigation discloses, did not do full justice to the occasion.

In view of this fact, I now have the honor to transmit, for your consideration, an amended report of that portion of the battle, and to request that you will forward it and the accompanying papers, including this letter, to the Adjutant-General for the files of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL RUGGLES, *Brigadier-General*.

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### Report of General Ruggles.

HEADQUARTERS RUGGLES' DIVISION, SECOND CORPS,  
ARMY OF MISSISSIPPI,  
CORINTH, MISSISSIPPI, April 25, 1862.

To Major G. G. GARNER, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Sir—I have the honor to submit the following report of the services of my division at the battle of Shiloh, Tennessee, on the 6th and 7th instants.

On Sunday morning, the 6th instant, at daybreak, the three brigades comprising my division occupied the position in line of battle, in double column at half distance, which had been under the orders of the previous day indicated, extending from the Bark road on the right toward Owl creek on the left, a distance of some two miles. Major-General Hardee's advance, extending from the Bark road a short distance towards my left, constituted the first line.

About sunrise I sent orders to the commanders of brigades to advance with deploying intervals, taking the first as the brigade of direction.

Soon afterwards, receiving orders from Major-General Bragg, I directed Colonel R. L. Gibson's first brigade to march by the right flank across the Bark road and then advance in support of the first line as previously ordered. I then made dispositions as rapidly as possible to insure conformity on the part of the other brigades of my division with this change of plan.

The commander of the Third brigade, Colonel Preston Pond, had been already directed to throw one regiment of infantry and a section of Captain Ketchum's guns into position on the Owl Creek road, and prevent the enemy turning our left flank. Four companies of cavalry, under Captains J. F. Jenkins (commanding), A. Tomlinson, J. J. Cox and J. Robins, covered our right and left flanks.

Returning from a rapid supervision along the line, when approaching the Bark road, the enemy opened fire from point to point in rapid succession, driving back some troops of the first line.

The Washington artillery, under Captain Hodgson, was then brought forward, and two howitzers and two rifled guns, commanded by Lieutenant Slocumb, with two guns under Captain Skoop, were put in position on the crest of a ridge near an almost impenetrable boggy thicket ranging along our front, and opened a destructive fire in response to the enemy's batteries, then sweeping our lines at short range. I also sent orders to Brigadier-General Anderson to advance rapidly with his second brigade, and as soon as he came up, I directed a charge against the enemy, in which some of the Sixth Mississippi and Second Tennessee joined. At the same time, I directed other troops to move rapidly by the right to turn the enemy's position beyond the swamp, and that the field artillery follow as soon as masked by the movement of the infantry. Under these movements vigorously executed, after a spirited con-



test, the enemy's whole line gave way, and our advance took possession of the camp and batteries against which the charge was made. I then sent orders to Colonel Pond to advance rapidly the Third brigade, swinging to the right, meeting the development of the enemy's line of fire sweeping the camps on the left and to prevent surprise on his left flank. Subsequently, I sent orders to Col-Looney, Thirty-eighth Tennessee regiment, and the section of Ketchum's battery, then on the Owl Creek road, to conform to these movements. In the meantime, the First brigade (Gibson's), united with Brigadier-General Hindman's advance, after having driven the enemy from their camp on our right, engaged in repeated charges against the enemy's new line, now held on the margin of an open field swept by his fire. The enemy's camps on our left being apparently cleared, I endeavored to concentrate forces on his right flank in this new position, and directed Captain Hodgson's battery into action there. The fire from this battery and a charge from the Second brigade put the enemy to flight. Even after having been driven back from this position, the enemy rallied and disputed the ground with remarkable tenacity, for some two or three hours, against our forces in front, and his right flank, where cavalry, infantry and artillery mingled in the conflict.

As the enemy finally gave way, I directed the movement of the Second brigade towards the right along the crest of the ridge following the line of the enemy's continued resistance, and sent a section of Ketchum's battery into action on a road leading towards Pittsburg, in a position overlooking the broken slope below, to reply to batteries nearly in front and in the forest to the right, with which the enemy swept a large circuit around; sending also Colonel Smith's Louisiana Crescent regiment (Third brigade) to support this battery, then harassed by skirmishers, and to seize the opportunity to charge the enemy's position. I then put a section of guns, [commanded by First Lieutenant James C. Thrall, belonging to Captain George T. Hubbard's Arkansas battery], in position on the road leading along the ridge still farther to the right, which was soon forced to retire under the concentrated fire of the enemy's artillery.

Discovering the enemy in considerable numbers moving through the forest on the lower margin of the open field in front, I obtained Trabue's and Stanford's light batteries and brought them into action, and directed their fire on masses of the enemy then pressing forward towards our right engaged in a fierce contest with our forces then advancing against him in that direction.

[I directed my staff officers at the same time to bring forward all the field guns they could collect from the left towards the right as rapidly as possible, resulting in the concentration of the following batteries, commencing on the right and extending to the left:

First. Captain Trabue's Kentucky.

Second. Captain Burns' Mississippi.

Third. Lieutenant Thrall's section of Captain Hubbard's Arkansas.

Fourth. Captain Sweat's Mississippi.

Fifth. Captain Triggs' and

Sixth. Captain Roberts' Arkansas.

Seventh. Captain Rutledge's.

Eighth. Captain Robinson's (twelve-pounder Napoleon guns) Alabama.

Ninth. Captain Stansford's Mississippi.

Tenth. Captain Bankhead's Tennessee.

Eleventh. Captain Hodgson's Washington artillery, Louisiana, extending in succession to the left towards the position already designated as occupied by Captain Ketchum's (Alabama) battery].

For a brief period the enemy apparently gained ground, and when the conflict was at its height these batteries opened upon his concentrated forces [enfilading Prentice's division on his right flank], producing immediate commotion and soon resulted in the precipitate retreat of the enemy from the contest.

At this moment the Second brigade and the Crescent regiment pressed forward and cut off a considerable portion of the enemy [comprising Prentice's division], who surrendered to the Crescent regiment [of my command, then pressing upon its rear].

Subsequently, while advancing towards the river, I received instruction from General Bragg to carry forward all the troops I could find; and while assembling a considerable force ready for immediate action, I received from Colonel Augustin notice of General Beauregard's orders to withdraw from the further pursuit; and finding soon afterwards that the forces were falling back, I retired with them just as night set in to the open field in rear; and as I received no further orders, I directed General Anderson and Colonel Gibson to hold their troops in readiness, with their arms cleaned and cartridges supplied for service, the next morning.

For the movement of the Third brigade during the day, sweeping the left around towards the enemy's centre, and the position held during the night, reference is made to the report of Colonel Pond, the brigade commander.

On the morning of the 7th, at about 6 o'clock, a message from Colonel Pond gave notice that the enemy was in his front in force, and that he would endeavor to hold him in check until he should receive reinforcements. My First and Second brigades moved immediately to the field and joined Colonel Pond in his position.

Some time afterwards, Colonel Pond's brigade was ordered to the right, and Colonel Gibson's then occupied the left, with a part of which, and some two companies of cavalry, we made the attempt to charge the enemy's right flank and silence a battery there, in which we only partially succeeded, with Colonel Fagan's First Arkansas regiment, owing to the exhausted condition of the infantry and fruitless attempt of the cavalry.

We succeeded, however, after having silenced and dislodged the battery, in maintaining a position well advanced upon the enemy's flank until recalled and moved to the centre and left of our line, where the conflict raged most fiercely for some hours, with varying fortune, until on the approach of night our troops were withdrawn from the field.

In falling back, I commanded the artillery, infantry and cavalry constituting the second line, or rear guard, of the movement.

In these successive conflicts, covering a period of nearly two days, the troops in my division displayed almost uniformly great bravery and personal gallantry, worthy of veterans in the cause.

The regiments were remarkable for their steadiness in action, the maintenance of their organization in the field, and their good conduct generally, from the beginning to the end of these battles.

In consequence of the hurried nature of my report, I shall not enter into details touching the personal conduct of many officers and men distinguished for their gallantry, or the special and signal services of regiments—commending, however, the reports of brigade, regimental and independent company commanders, in all particulars, to special consideration.

It gives me pleasure to acknowledge the services on the field, promptly and gallantly rendered, of Captain Roy M. Hooe, Assistant Adjutant-General, and First Lieutenant M. B. Ruggles, Aide-de-Camp, throughout the successive conflicts; of Lieutenant L. D. Sandidge, Acting Assistant Inspector-General the greater part of both days; of Major John Claiborne, Chief Quartermaster a part of the first day; of Surgeon F. W. Hereford, Chief Surgeon, slightly wounded, who rendered important services on the field until the wounded required his professional services; of Major E. S. Ruggles,



Volunteer Aid-de-Camp until disabled in the left arm, by the explosion of a shell, near the close of the first day; of Captain G. M. Beck, Volunteer Aid-de-Camp; and of Colonel S. S. Heard, Louisiana volunteers, who volunteered and rendered important services in the field on both days, and of Doctor J. S. Sandidge, who volunteered professionally, and although partially disabled by being thrown against a tree, accompanied me to the end of the contest.

Major Hallonquist, Chief of Artillery, rendered me important services during a part of the second day.

I have to regret the loss of Lieutenant Benjamin King, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, killed during the first day, and of Private Munsel W. Chapman, of the Seventh Louisiana volunteers, my secretary; and of Corporal Adam Cleniger, and Private John Stenaker, of Captain Cox's cavalry, who were killed while serving as couriers under my immediate orders.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL RUGGLES, *Brigadier-General C. S. A.*

Official:

R. M. HOOE, *A. A. G.*

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**Letter from Colonel Bankhead.**

JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, December 16th, 1862.

Captain—In reply to your communication of the 8th instant making inquiry "as to the part your (my) battery took in the bombardment of Prentice's division, late Sunday evening, at the battle of Shiloh," and further, "by whose order the batteries were ordered up to their respective positions," and how many there were and by whom commanded, I have the honor to state, for the information of Brigadier-General Ruggles:

That at about 2 o'clock P. M. of the 6th April, I had been compelled to fall back from a position on the extreme left of our line, opposite a field near where Prentice's camp was afterwards discovered to be; and under orders from Major-General L. Polk, retired my battery about two hundred yards through the woods skirting the field.

As I retired, I was informed that a general attack was contemplated and then being organized by our troops upon the enemy, to the right of my position; and it was conjectured that the enemy had made his last stand before being driven to the banks of the river.

In a short time the musketry firing on my right opened briskly, and increased in volume until it was evident that all our troops were engaged and that the enemy were making a most determined stand, with a force sufficient to hold our people in check and occasionally to stagger them.

At this juncture my battery was ordered by a staff officer to the edge of the field near Prentice's camp, and to a position sweeping his rear approaches, and from which I had previously retired. As I went into action Captain Stanford formed on my right. I found the Washington artillery already in position on my left and firing rapidly.

Captain Robinson's twelve-pounder battery formed on the right of Stanford, with Captain (since Major) Rutledge on his right, and some one or two other batteries still further to the right, but by whom commanded I am not now able to state.

The effect of this tremendous concentrated fire was very evident. The reserves, which could be plainly seen going up to Prentice's relief, fell back in confusion under the shower of shot, shell and canister that was poured upon them, whilst our infantry, encouraged by such heavy artillery support, rushed forward with a shout and carried the position.

I regret that I cannot state the name of the staff officer ordering me up, or to whose staff he belonged. All I have been enabled to ascertain, upon consultation with battery commanders touching this remarkable concentration of artillery, is that it was not the result of accident, but under and by the direction of one controlling mind, as batteries were brought up from various portions of the field and directed to this particular position.

I have made repeated inquiry of officers of the artillery and staff officers to ascertain by whose order this movement was executed, and the only reliable information I have received was communicated to me by Lieutenants A. H. Polk and William B. Richmond, Aids to Major-General Polk, who state that they felt assured it was executed under the direction of Brigadier-General Ruggles, as they saw him at that time on our extreme left engaged in ordering up batteries for some position along the line.

I have the honor to remain, Captain, your obedient servant,

SMITH P. BANKHEAD, *Colonel Artillery, P. A. C. S.*

**Letter from Captain Sandidge.**

COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI, January 25th, 1863.

To Brigadier-General RUGGLES :

General—Being cognizant of many inquiries made by officers of the artillery who participated in the memorable battle of Shiloh relative to artillery practice, &c., and particularly concerning the effect our artillery had in forcing Prentice's division to fall back in a direction which compelled his ultimate surrender, I will, with your permission, make a short statement of a few facts which occurred under my own observation respecting the latter idea—i. e., concerning the artillery fire and Prentice's division.

I conceive a few remarks on this topic necessary from the fact that so few of our officers are aware under whose direction that especial concentration of artillery was made, which seemed to my mind to have such a controlling influence over the line of march taken by General Prentice's command in his retrograde movement. Late Sunday evening, the first day of the fight, after our forces had compelled Prentice's troops to commence a rapid retreat, I rejoined you just beyond an open space, known as the enemy's parade ground, I think, and found myself, as I afterwards ascertained, in the wake of the retreating enemy; at this point, however, a desperate stand was made by them, and they succeeded in checking our infantry, and were apparently intending to hold the ground they then occupied till they could be reinforced. At this juncture—about 3 o'clock P. M., as near as I can recollect—I received from you a verbal but positive order to bring up all the artillery I could find, and post it between the Wood's road, running between the parade ground above mentioned, and a small cleared field in front, through the centre of which passed a small brook densely crowded with large shrubbery, in which large numbers of the enemy had taken refuge, to the serious discomfort of our troops, who, for the time, were unable to dislodge them. I immediately placed a section of some battery, either Bankhead's or Stanford's, I do not recollect which, in position, and was on the point of bringing more guns in position when, suggesting the propriety of endeavoring to throw in the gap between the right of our line and the left of the adjoining infantry as large an infantry force as we could obtain, I was directed to ride to the rear and bring up the debris of several disorganized infantry regiments; and other officers



of the staff, under your personal direction and supervision, collected all the guns of three or four batteries along the position referred to, on the crest of the hills overlooking the field, and when I returned to rejoin you, after an unsuccessful attempt to forward the men referred to, I found the enemy, being unable to withstand the destructive cannonade which you had directed against them, had fallen back rapidly through the field over the hills beyond, where, finding themselves cut off by portions of our division, and being threatened on the flank by General Polk, they threw down their arms.

I have no doubt, had they been reasonably reinforced when they had checked our advancing troops, they could certainly have broken our lines had not you concentrated all the artillery you could obtain at that point, which was weakest. Even then I feared serious demonstrations would be made before sufficient infantry could be obtained to support the artillery, which alone was then stemming the tide hurled against us. No one who observed the effects of that firing could but be argeeably surprised at its result.

I have the honor to remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. D. SANDIDGE, *C. S. A.*,

*Captain and A. I. G., First District, Department M. and E. La.*

Official :

R. M. HOOE, *A. A. G.*

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#### Letter from Colonel S. S. Heard.

RAYMOND, MISSISSIPPI, March 18th, 1863.

To Captain HOOE, *A. A. G., Columbus, Mississippi :*

Captain—In reply to your communication of 31st January, 1863, concerning the effect our artillery had in forcing Prentice's division to fall back in a direction which compelled his ultimate surrender at the battle of Shiloh, on the 6th of April, 1862, and as to whom I conceive to be the controlling genius at that point on that occasion.

With those who participated at that point there can certainly be but one opinion, and as long as I remained in the service I never heard but one opinion expressed.

Between twelve and one o'clock on Sunday, we had carried all the enemy's encampments except Prentice's. At this time, however, the enemy made a desperate stand, two hundred or three hundred paces east of the last encampment and about north of the open space known to us as the enemy's parade ground. For two hours our success at that point appeared doubtful. I was ordered by General Ruggles immediately to bring up the artillery. When I reported the artillery, the General ordered it into position two hundred or three hundred paces lower down the ridge, northeast of the parade ground. Our guns opened upon the enemy with great success from that position, which created great confusion in the

enemy's lines; they soon gave way and were hotly pursued by our troops. From that point other guns were brought and put in position lower down the ridge, by order of General Ruggles, at the southwest corner of a small cleared field, when the ground north and east of the cleared land were covered with bushes and small saplings, in which the enemy had made a stand, the General ordered the artillery to fire upon them, which they did, and very soon they returned our fire with some effect. The General now ordered the Seventeenth and Nineteenth regiments, of Louisiana volunteers, with some other infantry regiments, to march by the right flank in the direction of the Tennessee river. In the meantime I was ordered by the General to reinforce, at that point, the artillery there. By the time we got our guns in position, we heard the report of musketry, which we justly concluded was that of our troops sent in that direction. We also saw troops from north and east of the small field marching in a south direction, as we supposed, to reinforce their friends. Our guns opened fire upon them at that juncture with such unparalleled effect, that in less time than twenty minutes they were in full retreat towards Prentice's encampment, and in less than one hour Prentice and his friends were brought to the General as prisoners. The General and his staff were sitting on their horses at the north end of the small cleared field, near where several bales of hay had been set on fire by the explosion of our guns while shooting at the enemy across the field, when the General received Prentice, and other prisoners captured at the same time with Prentice. These are my reasons, Captain, for saying that General Ruggles was the controlling genius on that occasion.

He himself conceived the plan of concentrating the artillery at those different points before mentioned, which we all believed was the cause of Prentice and his command surrendering at the time they did. I made no notes on the occasion, and only write from recollection, and I no doubt have omitted many things that occurred during that part of the day that would be highly creditable to General Ruggles' talent, capacity and gallantry as displayed on the field on that day.

I am, Captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. S. HEARD,

*Ex-Colonel Seventeenth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers,*

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**Letter from Captain James C. Thrall.**

COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI, April 1st, 1863.

To Captain L. D. SANDIDGE, A. A. A. and I. G., *Columbus, Mississippi:*

Captain—You requested me a few days ago to make a statement relative to the bombardment of General Prentice's division late Sunday evening, April 6th, 1862, at the battle of Shiloh; also to state what battery I then belonged to, and what other batteries were

in the engagement, and by whom commanded. I have the honor to state as follows: At that time I was First Lieutenant, commanding the right section of an Arkansas battery, commanded by Captain George T. Hubbard, in Brigadier General Cleburne's brigade, Major-General W. J. Hardee's corps. About 10 o'clock P. M. I was moving on the right of General Hardee's lines with my section, when I came to a ravine and was about to have some trouble crossing, when I was met by one of Major-General Polk's staff officers, who directed me to move to my right to a road, in order that I might move forward without any difficulty, which I did, as rapidly as possible, and came into action on the left of Captain Bankhead's battery. My position being a bad one, in a dense thicket, I was compelled to fall back, followed by Captain Bankhead. I soon moved forward with my section, by order of Major-General Polk, when I was met and placed in position by yourself, with directions to throw some shot through a log-house and some spherical case at some bales of cotton that were in the edge of a field, where there was quite a number of the enemy concealed. At this time there was no other battery engaged at this point. Brigadier-General Ruggles then directed me to move to my right and throw some shell into a thicket across the field. I had fired but about three or four rounds, when a rifle battery replied to me most handsomely, and it being a little more than I felt disposed to contend with, General Ruggles ordered me to move my section up to my right, where I was joined by Captain Burns' Mississippi battery. I heard General Ruggles say that it was his intention to concentrate as much artillery as possible at this point, to prevent General Prentice from being reinforced from the river. As soon as I had replenished the limber-chests of my guns from my caissons, General Ruggles ordered me back to my former position. Captain Burns' Mississippi battery formed on my right. Captain Sweat's Mississippi battery or Captains Triggs' and Roberts' Arkansas batteries formed on my left. There were other batteries further to my left, but I am unable to state by whom they were commanded. The concentration of artillery at this point proved very effective. The reinforcements that were going to the relief of General Prentice not being able to withstand the shower of shot, shell and schrapnell that was poured upon them, fell back in confusion towards the river, which resulted in the surrender of General Prentice, with his division.

In reference to the concentration of artillery at this point. I feel assured that it was done by the direction of Brigadier-General Ruggles, from the fact that I saw him place other batteries into position besides my own, and his staff officers were actively engaged in bringing up batteries from different portions of the field.

I have the honor to remain, Captain, your obedient servant,

JAMES C. THRALL, *Captain of Artillery.*

Official :

R. M. HOOE, A. A. G.



Letter from General Ruggles.

FIRST DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA,  
HEADQUARTERS COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI, April 8th, 1863.

To General S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector-General* :

General—I have the honor to transmit duplicates of papers already sent to General Bragg, touching amended reports of the battle of Shiloh, and to request that my amended report be substituted for the original in the publication ordered by Congress, in the event that the report sent General Bragg should not reach Richmond in time for that purpose.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding District.*

Letter from Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,  
TALLAHOMA, TENNESSEE, April 21st, 1863.

Brigadier-General RUGGLES, *Commanding, &c., Columbus, Mississippi* :

General—By direction of the General Commanding, I enclose a copy of his endorsement upon your amended report of the battle of Shiloh, which he this day forwards to the War Department. The General desires me to express his gratification that in your statement of certain facts you have awarded the credit for certain special acts of gallantry to troops of your command to whom it belongs, but who have had counter claims raised by the reports of other Generals. He is especially pleased that you have corrected material discrepancies in the report of General Polk.

I am, General, your obedient servant,

J. STODDARD JOHNSTON, *A. D. C.*

Official: R. M. HOOE, *A. A. G.*

*Endorsement.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,  
TALLAHOMA, TENNESSEE, April 21st, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded with the request that this be substituted for Brigadier-General Ruggles' report. The facts he states are not within my personal knowledge, as I was at the time on a distant part of the field, but he is sustained by his subordinate commanders and a mass of other testimony, and justice to his command entitles his request to consideration.

BRAXTON BRAGG, *General Commanding.*

Official: J. STODDARD JOHNSTON, *A. D. C.*

Official: R. M. HOOE, *A. A. G.*

I hereby certify that the foregoing are copies of official records.

DANIEL RUGGLES.

Fredericksburg, Virginia, March 25th, 1875.

# Editorial Paragraphs.

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THE LEE MAUSOLEUM AT LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA, has been put under contract, and the corner-stone was laid on the 28th of November. Professor J. J. White presided, Rev. Dr. W. N. Pendleton (the life-long friend of Lee and his Chief of Artillery during the war) offered the prayer, United States Senator R. E. Withers made an admirable address, and Hon. J. R. Tucker introduced General Joseph E. Johnston as "the life-long companion of Lee, his fellow-cadet at West Point, his sharer in the struggles, glories and disappointments of the unfortunate South, and the greatest surviving General of the war."

In few, but very fitting, words General Johnston acknowledged the compliment paid him, spoke with pride of the fact that he *was* the "companion and friend of our beloved Lee from youth till God took him away," and expressed his gratitude to the committee of the Memorial Association for giving him the privilege of being present "to witness and participate in this token of regard for Virginia's noblest son." General Johnston then proceeded to deposit in the box in the corner-stone various appropriate articles; and the ceremonies being over, and the benediction pronounced, the crowd dispersed with three cheers for General Johnston.

The occasion was one of deep interest. We regretted that we were unable to accept a kind invitation to be present, and that our limited space admits of only this meagre notice.

But we avail ourselves of the occasion to make a brief statement of the origin and objects of the Lee Memorial Association. The very day on which General Lee died this association was organized by Confederate soldiers met in Lexington to do honor to the memory of our great chieftan.

The Association has acted from the beginning in strictest regard to the wishes of the Lee family. Mrs. Lee herself suggested as the artist Mr. Edward V. Valentine, of Richmond, whose bust of General Lee made the year before his death had given such entire satisfaction. Mrs. Lee also approved of Valentine's design of the recumbent figure. The completed figure in marble has not only given the highest satisfaction to all concerned, but has been pronounced by competent critics one of the finest works of art in the world. The Mausoleum is to contain this splendid creation of Valentine's genius—this fitting monument to deck the tomb of Lee. The Association have raised in all \$22,000, and they now need only \$5,000 to complete the Mausoleum. Surely the bare announcement that this small sum is all that is necessary to *complete* this splendid monument will at once bring contributions from every quarter. We would be glad to receive and forward any sums which could not be as conveniently sent to the treasurer, C. M. Figgatt, Esq'r, Lexington, Virginia.

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IF ANY ONE FAILS TO RECEIVE THIS NUMBER, ask if he has paid his subscription FOR 1879 or notified the Secretary of a purpose to do so soon. And please let our friends exert themselves to swell our list of new subscribers.

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OTHER Paragraphs and Book Notices crowded out.



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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., February, 1879.

No. 2.

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**Reminiscences of the Campaign of 1864 in Virginia.**

By General WILLIAM F. PERRY.

**No. 1.**

[We are anxious to get material for the history of the campaign of 1864, and are glad to be able to publish this sketch of the battle of the Wilderness, by General Perry, and to have the assurance that he will follow it up by other sketches of the same campaign.]

It was my fortune to command Law's brigade of Field's division, Longstreet's corps, during the greater part of the year 1864—first as its senior colonel, and afterwards as its permanent commander. The report which was made in August of the part taken by my command in the great military operations of May and June, will doubtless never see the light. The copy which I retained was lost during the retreat to Appomattox. The brigade happened on several important occasions to be thrown at critical points where much depended upon its behavior; and under circumstances where no eyes but those of its immediate commander were upon it, it performed deeds that deserve, at least, to be rescued from oblivion. It is from a desire to render, even at this late day, a merited tribute to the



highest soldierly qualities uniformly displayed, and in the hope of contributing something not wholly void of interest to the archives of the Southern Historical Society, that these reminiscences have been penned. Writing from memory, after the lapse of fifteen years, I shall not be expected to give details with the accuracy of an official report, or even to recall the names of many of those whose gallantry entitled them to honorable mention.

The following was the composition of the brigade when the campaign began:

The Fourth Alabama regiment, commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles (afterwards Brigadier-General).

The Fifteenth Alabama, under Colonel William C. Oates.

The Forty-fourth Alabama, under Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Jones.

The Forty-seventh Alabama, under Major J. M. Campbell.

The Forty-eighth Alabama, under Major J. W. Wigginton.

The brigade numbered not exceeding fifteen hundred men rank and file.

#### BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

When General Grant began his advance from Culpeper, two divisions of General Longstreet's corps, Kershaw's and Field's, were in the neighborhood of Gordonsville, having recently arrived from east Tennessee. The march began on the 4th of May, I believe, about 2 o'clock. After dark on the evening of the 5th the troops went into camp nearly ten miles, as the road ran, from the point on the Plank road at which General A. P. Hill's corps had been engaged that evening. About midnight the men were aroused by marching orders, and the corps moved off, Kershaw's division in front. It was probably 2 o'clock A. M. when my brigade left camp.

The progress made before light was slow. The night was dark, and we seemed to be on a narrow country road. As it grew light the speed of the men was quickened. At sunrise firing was heard in the distance, and about the same time the direction of our march changed almost at a right angle to the left. The distance to the scene of the engagement was now probably about five miles, and it was traversed with the greatest possible speed.

The first visible sign of battle that we encountered was the field hospital, through the depressing scenes of which our line of march lay. We were now on the Orange plank-road, and began to meet the wounded retiring from the field. At first there were few; but

soon they came in streams, some borne on litters, some supported by comrades, and others making their way alone. Close behind them were the broken masses of Heth's division, swarming through the woods, heedless of their officers, who were riding in every direction shouting to gain their attention.

The brigades, pressing on with increasing speed, lapped each other, and now in some places filled the road with a double column of march. The only encouraging feature of the situation was the manner in which the men bore up under the depressing influences around them. They were just now rejoining their old comrades and idolized commander, after a separation of eight months. They saw that this reunion had occurred at a crisis when lofty qualities were in demand and great things were to be done; and they rose with the emergency. The stronger the pressure upon them, the greater the rebound and the firmer their resolution seemed to become. They urged the retreating soldiers to reform—come back—and aid them in beating the enemy. In a tone that indicated the belief that such an announcement was of itself sufficient to inspire renewed hope and courage, they informed them that they were "Longstreet's boys," returned to fight with them under "Old Bob." Their stern resolution rose into enthusiasm when a retreating soldier shouted, "Courage, boys, Longstreet's men are driving them like sheep." Kershaw then had reached the field, and gone into action, and they knew well what to expect of him. He had arrived, like De Saix at Marengo, in one of those great crises, which few men are ever called upon to meet twice in a lifetime. Heth was far to the rear; the last battalion of Wilcox had broken just as the head of his column reached the point where stood General Lee, like a pillar of cloud, the only remaining obstacle to stay the surging billows that were steadily rolling onward and now near at hand. At a double quick step, under fire and almost in the face of the foe, that four thousand men form line in the dense woods and attack with such fury that more than thirty thousand veterans recoil before them.

But the column of Field was now pressing up, Anderson's Georgia brigade in front. It was deployed on the right of the road, where the enemy were in greatest numbers, and had made greatest progress. Next came Gregg's brigade of Texans, hardly five hundred strong. It was thrown into line in the presence of General Lee on the left of the road. I shall not attempt to describe the scene—rising to the moral sublime—between this brigade and Gen-

eral Lee, or the baptism of fire and of blood that awaited it. Of these history has already taken charge.

Benning's Georgia brigade next arrived, numbering not over one thousand men. It passed over the ground stained by the blood of the heroic Texans. Being a larger brigade, it produced more impression; but its advance exposed its right flank to a deadly fire from the troops south of the road. This checked its progress and inflicted upon it great loss. I soon had occasion to learn, too, that heavy masses were pressing by and beyond its left.

Next came the brigade with which this paper has more immediately to do. I was ordered to form to the left of the road also, in what seemed an old field, containing thirty acres or more. As the column wheeled into line, it passed immediately by a large group of horsemen, consisting chiefly of the corps and division commanders and their officers of the staff. But the central figure of that group—and the central figure of that larger group of famous men which the war between the States brought to the attention of mankind—was General Lee. The conception of his appearance in my mind to this day is that of a grand equestrian statue, of colossal proportions. His countenance, usually so placid and benign, was blazing with martial ardor. The lamb in his nature had given place to the lion, and his spirit seemed transfused through every one who looked upon him. It was impossible not to feel that every man that passed him was, for the time being, a hero. The formation was completed at a double quick step, and the instant that the last company sprung into line the forward movement began.

The open ground in front sloped gradually downward for two or three hundred yards, and then, by an abrupt declivity, it descended to a narrow swamp or morass, which, beginning near the Plank road, extended northward in a direction nearly parallel to my line. Beyond the morass the ground rose with a moderately steep ascent for several hundred yards, and was covered with trees and a scattering undergrowth.

At the command the men moved forward with alacrity, and with increasing speed, to the brow of the steep declivity referred to. Here the center and left regiments found themselves confronted by dense masses of the enemy, some of them across the morass and not fifty yards distant, some crossing it and others still beyond. My front rank fired a volley without halting, and the whole line bounded forward with their characteristic yell. The enemy were



evidently taken by surprise. The suddenness of our appearance on the crest, the volley, the yell and the impetuous advance caused them to forget their guns. They returned only a scattering fire and immediately gave way.

While descending the slope, and just before the occurrence mentioned, I became aware, from the direction of the balls which passed, that a force of the enemy had crossed the morass, ascended the heights and occupied a body of woods at the farther limit of the open ground, two hundred yards or more beyond my extreme left. I immediately sent an order to Colonel Oates, commanding the Fifteenth regiment, the largest and one of the best in the brigade, "to change direction in marching"—that is, to wheel his battalion to the left while advancing, so as to face the woods—and to attack furiously. No farther attention was given to the matter until the main line had encountered and routed the enemy, and was crossing the swamp. Feeling then that the utmost importance attached to the success of Colonel Oates' movement, and that the safety of the brigade might be compromised by an advance far to the front, while a force of the enemy—I knew not how large—was upon my flank and rear, I hastened, almost at full speed, to that part of the field, and came in sight just in time to witness the successful execution of one of the most brilliant movements I have ever seen on a battlefield. The order had been received amidst the indescribable clangor of battle. The attention of a line of men over two hundred yards long had been gained; they had been wheeled through an arc of at least sixty degrees, had traversed the intervening open ground, had entered the woods at a charge and were driving its occupants—more than twice their number—in the wildest confusion before them; and but little more than five minutes had elapsed since the giving of the order!

Colonel Oates says, in writing to me: "I learned from prisoners taken that the force I encountered was the Fifteenth New York regiment, that had been stationed at Washington City, and used as heavy siege artillerymen during the greater part of the war, and that they numbered between one thousand and twelve hundred men. I had in the engagement not over four hundred and fifty officers and men. I lost two men killed and eleven wounded. I never did understand how it was that I lost so few. I always attributed it to two things: first, that the troops of the enemy were not veterans—they were unused to battle; and, secondly, the rapidity and boldness of my movement, and the accuracy of the fire of my men."

Feeling now perfectly secure as to my flank, I sent word to Colonel Oates to rejoin the brigade, and hastened to the main line. I found that the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth regiments had moved obliquely to the left, where the enemy appeared to be in largest numbers, thus producing a considerable gap between the former and the Forty-seventh on its right. These two regiments had crossed the morass, and were pressing steadily up the hill, firing as they advanced. The two right regiments were not in sight. They had obeyed orders in keeping closed upon the Plank road, and were there hotly engaged, as will be seen hereafter.

On returning to the line, I first struck the Forty-fourth Alabama, the second regiment in size in the brigade. Colonel Jones had been wounded, and the command had devolved upon its youthful Major, George W. Carey. The line was well closed up. The gallantry of Major Carey was very conspicuous, as was usual. His commanding form was in front of the centre of his line, his countenance ablaze, the flag in his left hand, and his long sword waving in his right. Moving to the left, I found the Forty-eighth giving evident signs of faltering. Many of the men were leaving the ranks and taking shelter behind the trees. The fire was severe, but the enemy, being a little back of the crest of the hill, sent most of their balls over our heads. At this critical moment the gallant Fifteenth appeared upon the left. Colonel Oates, finding no enemy in his immediate front, swung his regiment round to the right, and delivered a single volley up the line which confronted us, and the work was done. The enemy instantly disappeared, and the heights were carried. I was now solicitous in regard to the Fourth and Forty-seventh regiments, but my horse having been killed under me in rear of the Forty-fourth, I was unable to go to them in person. Captain Terrell, was, however, sent, and reported them in the condition hereafter described by Colonel Bowles. The enemy had been driven back on the right of the road, and the firing had ceased. The long gap in my line had taken care of itself admirably. As the undergrowth was dense, the enemy had probably failed to observe it.

I never had the means of ascertaining the strength of the force which we had encountered. The division of General Wadsworth was there, probably supported by other troops. General Wadsworth himself was killed on the Plank road by the Fourth Alabama. They covered a front of at least a half mile, and consisted of several lines. An officer of Heth's division, Colonel Jones, whom I met

by accident after the war, informed me that a number of his wounded were left on the field in the morning, and were borne back after the ground was recovered, and that they all concurred in the statement that six or seven lines of battle had advanced over them, and had been rolled back by a single line of Alabamians. It is possible that the peril of their situation acting upon their imagination magnified the number.

The conduct of the officers and men had been above all praise; but fortune had been very lavish in her favors to us. It was fortunate that the nature of the ground was such that we burst like a thunderclap upon the enemy and turned them into flight, before they had time to inflict any injury, or to see that there were no supporting lines behind us. It was fortunate that the success of Colonel Oates had been so complete in his movement on the extreme left of the enemy; and that the regiments had moved forward in diverging lines, thus extending our front so as to equal that of the opposing force. It was fortunate that, in ascending the hill beyond the swamp, the men had been screened, to a considerable degree, from the enemy's fire by the nature of the ground; and, finally, that the Fifteenth regiment had arrived on the left at the crisis of the engagement, and delivered its decisive blow.

I have been somewhat minute in my account of what the left regiments of my brigade did that morning, because no one else, who had a right to speak, witnessed it; or, so far as I am aware, has ever heard of it to this day. The only accounts I have seen of the battle on the left of the Plank road conveyed the impression that the attacks of Gregg and Benning left little or nothing for Law's brigade to do but to march up and occupy the ground which had been won. No one is to blame for this, for no one knew any better. Those two able men and brave officers were my comrades in arms and my personal friends. They are both sleeping in the tomb, one of them a martyr to the lost cause. I would be among the last on earth to "abate the tithe of a hair" from their merited honor. With their gallant comrades, they accomplished everything that was possible, and still, for the reason that their lines were too short, left untouched and unshaken the greater part of the dense masses that were pressing steadily forward, some of which, themselves unseen, would in a few minutes have been in point blank range of General Lee and "Traveler."

But I seem to have forgotten the noble old Fourth and its younger companion, the Forty-seventh. I did not see them during the en-



gagement, but, fortunately, have before me an account of the fiery ordeal through which they passed, written by Colonel Bowles, the gallant commander of the Fourth. I give it in his own language, making some unimportant abridgments.

After describing the formation of the line in the open field and in the presence of General Lee, he says: "Soon after entering the woods, my skirmish line encountered the enemy and opened fire. The main line soon came up, and I ordered a charge. The men advanced firing. After going about one hundred yards, we came upon the enemy's advanced line of works, made of logs. Here my men fired about ten rounds, when the enemy ceased firing and advanced upon me. We met them with a counter charge, Major Campbell following with the Forty-seventh. We advanced two hundred yards or more through a hailstorm of lead, and found ourselves on a second line of logs. The Plank road was in view all the time. We had been here but a short time when it became evident that the enemy south of the Plank road had passed our right flank, and a heavy fire from that direction was soon opened. About the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Scruggs came to me and reported that the Forty-seventh had given way, and that the enemy were pressing by my left flank also. I immediately ordered a retreat. The enemy saw it and advanced rapidly, delivering a severe fire. We reached the first line of works referred to above, and my men were quickly reformed, the Forty-seventh taking position on my left. The enemy had reformed also, and were evidently preparing to advance upon us. I resolved to anticipate them, and ordered the Fourth and Forty-seventh to charge. They obeyed with as much gallantry as soldiers ever displayed on the battlefield. The enemy gave way, and we again found ourselves on the advanced line of works. About this time a Federal officer came up the road within a few steps of my right, and was shot from his horse. It proved to be General Wadsworth, of the United States regulars. Soon afterwards the Twentieth Georgia regiment moved up and formed in rear of my right, parallel to the road. It was hardly in position before the enemy, just across the road and in full view, opened a deadly fire upon it and drove it away. By this time my ranks were terribly thinned. The position was evidently untenable, owing to the presence of the enemy upon the right. I therefore ordered a retreat, and fell back to the first line of works. Here I was soon afterwards joined by the Forty-seventh Alabama and the Twentieth Georgia regiments, which had reformed farther to the rear. Shortly after-

wards General Field approached and said: 'this is all of my command that I can find.' I was soon afterwards ordered to the left, passed General Perrin's brigade of Alabamians forming line on the crest, and rejoined you with the Fifteenth, Forty-fourth and the Forty-eighth. In this engagement and that which followed late in the evening, I lost considerably over half my men, among them Major W. M. Robbins wounded."

This graphic account of Colonel Bowles explains the severe loss of the Texas and Georgia brigades on the same ground, and the impossibility of holding an advanced position on the Plank road until the Federal troops on the south of it had been driven back.

On gaining the crest with my center and left regiments, I sent a staff officer to General Lee with instructions to say that I had driven back several lines of the enemy, and had carried the heights beyond the swamp; but that in the event of an attack, which I thought probable, we should be outflanked and enveloped. I was guilty of the irregularity of reporting directly to the Commander-in-Chief, because I did not know where General Field was to be found, and was communicating knowledge that I thought General Lee ought to have at once. Word was brought back that I should shortly be relieved. Judging from this reply that General Lee supposed that my command had exhausted its strength and needed to be withdrawn, and knowing well that he would have need of every soldier at the front who could fire a gun, I sent Captain L. R. Terrell, Assistant Adjutant-General, to say that the men had supplied themselves with ammunition from the boxes of the enemy, that they were still able to do good fighting, and that I only needed to have my flanks protected.

In momentary expectation of an attack, I continued to occupy my extended line, until a staff officer of General Perrin, of Anderson's division, reported to me for advice as to where his command should be established. It was placed in position next to the road, my line contracting and moving to the left, to give room. It was then that the Fourth and Forty-seventh were sent for to rejoin their comrades. General Perrin's brigade barely had time to complete its formation before the expected attack came. The fighting was heavy for a short time, especially toward the right; but the enemy were soon repulsed, and made no farther effort at this point during the day. A Florida brigade, of Anderson's division, now arrived, and I received orders to drop to the rear of the two and act as a support. The three brigades mentioned constituted from this time forward the only troops on the left of the road.

General Lee's line was now thoroughly established, and the ground lost in the early morning had been completely recovered. The forces as they arrived on the field had been handled with consummate skill, and right nobly had they responded to the demands upon them. Language can hardly do justice to their conduct. They had arrived in the midst of confusion and apparent disaster. Their lines had been formed under fire, and in the very presence of the enemy moving forward in dense array and perfect order. Such had been the urgency of the crisis that single brigades, and sometimes regiments, as their formation was completed in succession, assailed the foe with almost resistless fury. And now, within less than two hours from the time that the head of their column had reached the field, two small divisions, numbering in all nine thousand men, had met and rolled back in confusion eight full divisions of the enemy, constituting one-half of General Grant's vast army!\* I do not think a parallel can be found in the history of modern warfare.

It was now nearly nine o'clock in the morning. The great struggle was still to come. The Federal lines were some distance in front of the Brock road, the most direct route to Spotsylvania Courthouse and to Richmond. They had even taken the precaution to construct upon it a triple line of fortifications. Situated as the armies were, it was the obvious policy of each commander to double back the wing of the opposing force. The success of General Grant would have opened an unobstructed road to Richmond, and might have been decisive of the campaign. That of General Lee might have ended as did the battle of Chancellorsville a year before. It would at least have interposed his army between General Grant and his objective point. The arrival of Longstreet's corps and Anderson's division defeated the plan of Grant, and threw him on the defensive. The effort of General Lee was still to come. The plan of attack was made known by officers of the staff to the brigade commanders on the left. It was to throw a force upon the flank and rear of Hancock, and at the same time advance our right and assail his front, so as to roll up and press back his entire left wing towards Fredericksburg. Instructions were also given that the left brigades conform their movements to those of the troops on their right, holding back, however, so as to constitute a sort of movable pivot upon which the whole line might wheel. It is evident that the successful execution of such a movement

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\* His own corps of four divisions, two divisions of Burnside's corps, and two of Warren's.



would not only have disposed of Hancock for the day, but would have thrown a powerful force perpendicular to General Grant's centre and right wing, already confronted by General Ewell.

There is a lull all along the line. It is the ominous stillness that precedes the tornado. Three brigadas under Mahone—a dangerous man—are already in position for the flank attack, whose spectre seems to have been haunting Hancock from the beginning. No wonder, it was so near Chancellorsville. A yell and a volley announce the opening of the tragedy. The din of battle rolls eastward; the enemy are giving way. It is a moment pregnant with momentous results, and to those of us not engaged one of intense anxiety. The left brigades begin to move forward. Already they have made considerable progress; and still eastward roll the fiery billows of war. Can it be possible that we are on the eve of a great victory? But the fire begins to slacken; the advance movement ceases. What can be the cause? Has that single line of attack expended its strength? Oh, for a fresh division, to be hurled upon that shattered, reeling flank! But no; there are no reserves. Heth has not yet reorganized, and Wilcox has moved far to the left to open communication with Ewell. The firing ceases, and the victory, almost won, slips from our grasp.

When Hancock's left had been shattered and driven back, General Longstreet conceived the design of attacking the right flank, also, of the Federal forces south of the Plank road. Their entire line had been so disorganized as to render the success of such an attack almost a certainty. He was riding down the road in company with General Jenkins, at the head of his splendid brigade—the largest in Field's division, and one of the largest in the army—and had almost reached the point where the blow was to be struck. But the evil genius of the South is still hovering over those desolate woods. We almost seem to be struggling against destiny itself. Another needless mistake, like that which a year before, almost on the same ground, had cast "ominous conjecture" upon the success of our cause, now strikes him down upon whom, for the time, every thing depends. General Longstreet is dangerously wounded, and General Jenkins is killed. The command of the corps and that of the brigade devolve respectively upon General Anderson and Colonel Bratton, who, unacquainted doubtless with the situation, and ignorant of the plan to be executed, can of course do nothing.

It does not fall within the scope of this paper to give an account

of the events on the south of the road farther than they were connected with the movements of my own command. The report of General Hancock, however, although the uglier features of his situation are doubtless toned down, proves how near we were to a great victory. He says that Frank's brigade was swept away; that Mott's division was thrown into confusion; that he endeavored to restore order, and reform his line of battle by throwing back his left, so as to rest it upon the Brock road; that he was unable to effect this, owing to the partial disorganization of the troops; and finally that it was thought advisable to withdraw the troops and reform in the breastworks. But for the misfortune to Longstreet, it is probable he would have had a lively time reforming. Mr. Swinton, as quoted by Mr. Leigh Robinson, writes: "It seemed indeed that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in the very torrent and tempest of the attack, it suddenly ceased, and all was still." And again: "But in the very fury and tempest of the Confederate onset, the advance was of a sudden stayed by a cause at the moment unknown. This afterwards proved to have been the fall of the head of the attack."

The three brigades on the left now remained inactive for several hours. There were no troops in communication with General Perry's left. There was a gap—I know not how wide—between him and the troops of General Wilcox, sent in that direction after the arrival of Longstreet's corps. Though not charged with the care of this exposed flank, I felt solicitude enough in regard to it to send an officer with a squad of men to act as videttes. This occurred, I suppose, about twelve o'clock. Some time afterwards, information was received which strengthened my apprehensions, and caused me to send Colonel Oates in that direction with his own and the Forty-eighth Alabama regiment. After three o'clock, I received information which induced the belief that a formidable attack from that quarter was impending. I communicated to General Lee the information I had received, and began to move the remainder of my brigade in that direction. Unfortunately a staff officer, at this juncture, approached and informed me that a general advance would begin in a few moments, and instructed me to keep well closed upon the brigades in front. This was the attack upon the enemy's breastworks in the evening, in which our comrades in arms, Jenkins' brigade, bore so conspicuous a part. This order caused me to hesitate in considerable perplexity as to what I ought to do. At length, the indications growing more threatening toward the left, I

resolved, without regard to orders, to make the movement before contemplated. I found Colonel Oates with his two regiments facing the enemy, and protected by a pile of logs. His line was nearly at right angles to that of General Perry, who, I was surprised to see, had not changed his front. His left was projecting toward the enemy, a hundred yards or more beyond Colonel Oates. The skirmishers were already firing. There was a gap between Colonel Oates' right and General Perry's line. This was hastily filled with the Fourth Alabama, now hardly one hundred strong, and the other two regiments were hurried to the left of the Forty-eighth. The position was a strong one. I had no fear in regard to an attack in front, but felt sure that the line was too short to meet the advancing force. Captain L. R. Terrell was sent in haste to General Lee to explain the situation and ask for help, and I hastened to General Perry to induce him to change his front, so as to bring his brigade in alignment with mine. This would have doubled the front presented to the enemy, and extended me far enough to the left to give my flank the protection of the swamp, which has been frequently mentioned. It would probably have thrown one battalion across and down it, so as to deliver a flank fire upon the enemy as they advanced upon our front. General Perry readily consented. Five minutes' time was sufficient for the movement, but even that was denied us. Before the movement could be begun, the storm burst upon us with the greatest fury. The part of the Florida brigade which projected to the front, melted away, the men falling indiscriminately with mine. The fire of the enemy was returned with the greatest spirit, and the soldiers exhibited a sort of exultant confidence—a feeling which I was far from sharing with them. They seemed anxious to charge the enemy. An advance movement was actually begun without orders at one time by the Fifteenth, and at another, I believe, by the Forty-fourth. Captain Terrell returned with the tidings that reinforcements would soon arrive; but would they be in time? The ammunition of the men began to be exhausted. The direction of the firing to the left indicated that my worst apprehensions were likely to be soon realized. I hastened thither, and arrived in time to find the Forty-seventh doubling back and the enemy pouring round its flank. I endeavored to steady and reform it with its front so changed as to face them, but they were too near at hand and their momentum was too great. Nothing was left us but an inglorious retreat, executed in the shortest possible time and without regard to order.



It was the first time since its organization, and, until it folded its colors forever at Appomattox, it was the last, that the brigade ever was broken on the battlefield.

But the promised reinforcement came. It was not in time to save us from a great mortification; but it was in time to retrieve the disaster. It was Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's division. It swooped down upon the enemy in the midst of their exultation and confusion, and swept them away like chaff. I was hardly near enough, and was too busily engaged in reforming my men, to witness the achievement, and only knew that the enemy disappeared like an apparition, and subsequently learned the cause. The Florida brigade had narrowly escaped capture by falling back precipitately with my own. General Perry was severely wounded, and never rejoined his command.

Shortly after my brigade was reformed, General Heth moved up with a part, at least, of his division, and the two commands advanced together over the ground which had been the scene of our discomfiture, and far beyond. The extended lines of breastworks which the enemy had constructed, and various other indications, proved that the attack upon our flank had been made with a heavy force. They were troops of Burnside's corps, probably one or both of the divisions with which he had reinforced Hancock the night before. Considering their numbers, their effort has always seemed to me a feeble one. They had been preparing for the attack several hours, had stopped to fortify, and then advanced slowly and timidly upon the exposed flank of a small force. When their attack came, they were held in check a long while by twelve hundred men, and were finally driven away by a single brigade. But they were gone. Profound silence reigned in those deep woods, which had so lately echoed with the thunder of battle. Night had come; the roar of the strife had ceased on the right. The forged thunder-bolt, aimed by a master's hand, still remained to be delivered from Ewell's left, to close the first act of the bloody drama of 1864, and to consign the battle of the Wilderness to history.

When the Muse of history shall have done her complete work, the conflict on the Orange plank-road that day will be set down as one of the most remarkable in the annals of warfare. Fifteen thousand men, half exhausted by a rapid march, press the head of their column upon a field already occupied by fifty thousand veterans, completely organized, ably commanded and drawn up in

dense array and perfect order. Nine thousand of them form line in the face of the foe at 7 o'clock, immediately assume the offensive, and roll back that mighty host a fourth of a mile in an hour. Pausing to recover breath, to adjust their lines, and to await the arrival of their comrades, they again attack at 9 o'clock, and again press back the foe, disorganized and shattered, to "reform behind their breastworks." Cheated out of a complete victory by the fall of their leader, they pause to recover their exhausted strength. At 4 o'clock they summon their energies for a final assault upon that triple line of fortifications. The result serves to indicate how easy the victory would have been at 9 o'clock, before time had been allowed to reform. Let an eye witness, the correspondent of the *New York World*, tell the story: "Mott's division fell back in confusion; Stevenson's division gave way confusedly, compelling the left center to fall back some distance. One of its regiments was captured almost in a body. There was imminent danger of a general break. \* \* Stragglers for the first time streamed to the rear in large numbers, choking the roads, and causing a panic by their stampede. It was even reported at headquarters that the enemy had broken entirely through."\*

But again capricious Fortune snatches the victory from their grasp. Neither a Jackson nor a Longstreet is there to seize the critical moment, and by a general advance to overwhelm the foe, now tottering on the verge of ruin. The assailing force is not supported. They reach the limit of endurance; their progress ceases. At length, assailed in flank, they sullenly retire.

And now, after the almost superhuman exertions which they have put forth, those frowning lines still confront them; that coveted prize, the road to Richmond, is still in possession of the foe. The victory which they have gained becomes a shadow in their grasp; but the glory which they have won neither disaster nor overthrow, nor years of humiliation and suffering, nor time itself, can ever dim. Many a day of toil and night of watching, many a weary march and tempest of fire, still await those grim and ragged veterans; but they have taught the world a lesson that will not soon be forgotten, and have lighted up the gloom of that dark forest with a radiance that will abide so long as heroism awakens a glow of admiration in the hearts of men.

W. F. PERRY.

GLENNDALE, KENTUCKY.

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\* Quoted by Mr. Leigh Robinson.

**Gettysburg.**

By Major-General LAFAYETTE McLAWS.

[We know that some of our readers have grown weary of the Gettysburg discussion, but on the other hand we have assurances from every quarter that the papers on this great battle have been of deep interest and *invaluable* as "material for the future historian." The following paper, by the commander of a division in Longstreet's corps, was read some months ago before the *Georgia Historical Society*, and should have been promptly admitted into our series had it been sent to us originally.

We print it just as we have received it, albeit the distinguished soldier who wrote it might probably have modified certain portions of it had he had opportunity of reading our series before preparing it.]

After the battle of Chancellorsville, General Hooker's army returned to its position on the Washington side of the Rappahannock, and that of General Lee reoccupied its old grounds opposite Hooker, on the Richmond side, in and around Fredericksburg.

As it was evident that the Federal army could not be attacked as it stood, except under great disadvantages, it was determined to turn its flank and to transfer the war into the enemy's country.

Accordingly, on the 3d of June, 1863, my division moved from its camps in and around Fredericksburg, and took position at Culpeper Courthouse. Hood's division followed mine and then came Ewell's corps—Hill's corps being left to watch the movements of Hooker's army, with orders to follow our movements so soon as Hooker could be manœuvred out of his position.

Shortly after our arrival at Culpeper, Hooker's cavalry made such a sudden and unexpected irruption across the Rappahannock, that, though driven back with loss, they captured General Stuart's headquarters with all his orders and correspondence, and forced General Lee to display his infantry or partially to do so. From both these sources General Hooker was satisfied that General Lee was on the move, and it was a reasonable presumption that he was trying to turn his flanks, in order to try the issue of battle on the same grounds, and under the same circumstances, that he had defeated General Pope's army at the second Manassas.

Accordingly, General Hooker concentrated his army so as to cover Washington, and be prepared to give front to General Lee, let him come from what direction he might.

General Lee's army was at this time very much scattered, his advance being over one hundred miles or more from Hill's corps,



still at Fredericksburg. But General Hooker, who must have been aware of this, did not attempt to take advantage of the situation.

When Hooker withdrew from Hill's front at Fredericksburg that officer moved with his corps, following the rear of General Lee's army, and, passing Longstreet, advanced into Maryland; while Longstreet, marching more leisurely, moved to the east of the mountains, so as to still further confirm the notion that it was General Lee's intention to attack on Virginia soil. Reaching Ashby's Gap, Longstreet's corps turned west, and crossing the Shenandoah pushed on after Ewell, who was then in Pennsylvania.

I recollect the evening. We had waded the Shenandoah and had just gone into camp on the other side, when a courier or staff officer dashed into my camp with orders for my division to recross the river and hurry back into Ashby's Gap, as the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, had driven Stuart's cavalry into the gap and it was apprehended their advance would seize the gap. The fording was deep, up to the arm pits of the shorter men, but the command went forward with great alacrity, and meeting great numbers of the cavalry coming to the rear and crossing the river on their horses, while the infantry were getting wet to take their places. The greeting the cavalry received was anything but complimentary. The night on the mountain was very uncomfortable, being cold and wet. But the next morning one of my brigades crossed over to the eastern side of the mountain as far as a small village some miles from the gap, where an advance of the enemy, both cavalry and infantry, had encamped. As our men appeared the enemy disappeared, and the brigade rejoined the division. The cavalry again advanced, and the division, recrossing the Shenandoah, continued its march and waded the Potomac at Williamsport, on the Maryland shore.

The wading across the Potomac was very deep and the men were very wet, and, as there was a quantity of whiskey in the city, a gill apiece was given to each man that wanted it, and in justice to my division I will assert that I never heard of any one refusing it. The consequence was that the men were all in good humor, and as my division halted a considerable time, the men roamed over the village. While sitting on my horse near a large brick building called the Washington Bank (I think that was the name) Captain G. B. Lamar, my aid-de-camp, rode up and informed me that the United States flag was being waved from the upper story of the bank building, and as there were a good many men of Hood's and my division

in town who were under the influence of liquor, he was apprehensive that some insult might be offered to the family within the house unless the flag was withdrawn before I left. I therefore directed him to knock at the front door and tell some responsible person within of the circumstance and give them my request that the flag be withdrawn, at least until the command had passed on. Captain Lamar did as directed, and afterwards told me that the lady of the house had answered his knock, and on being told his reason for coming, turned very pale, and, clasping her hands, assured him that the flag was being displayed by some young persons without her knowledge. Captain Lamar told her that there was no harm done, but to prevent any being done, he requested that the flag be taken in, and it was done at once. This reminds me of an incident that happened while on the march through Frederick City on our previous campaign of invasion. General Howell Cobb's brigade, a very large and fine one indeed, was marching with a band of music playing through the streets—the General at the head of his column—when two ladies appeared on a balcony waving two small flags. The General, a gallant gentleman as he was, with the ladies as in war, pulled off his hat and bowed to them with great courtesy, his men cheering in unison; but presently the cheering was succeeded by a burst of laughter from the rear, and as the General turned to find out the cause, the men shouted, "Why, General, those are Federal flags!" The General, not at all disconcerted, replied at once: "Never mind, boys, that is not the first time I have pulled off my hat to that flag!" and the men cheered more than before, and the column went on in the best of humor. I mention this to show with what little unworthy and ungenerous feeling our men went into the invasion, and scorned to give offense or insult where it could not be resented.

But to resume the march. My division finally went through Chambersburg and into camp about a mile beyond. The country was thickly settled and finely cultivated, with some excellent gardens. I recollect one near my headquarters which abounded with vegetables, and the sight was so tantalizing that finally a party of my command came and asked if I would not negotiate for some of them. Accordingly, I paid a formal visit to the lady of the mansion, where the garden was, and telling her the purpose of my visit asked if she would sell some or all her vegetables—informing her, however, that we had but Confederate money wherewith to pay, but if she preferred it I would give her a certificate of what was

taken. She replied that from what she had heard of the way the Federal troops treated our people she thought we had a right to take without asking. I told her that, without discussing that question, it was sufficient to say that General Lee had forbidden us to plunder. She then said that she gave her permission for us to take anything we wanted, and at my request she went herself and gave her vegetables away. I had her name in a little memorandum book, where I jotted down daily occurrences, but it has passed away from my memory.

While in camp I heard that General Ewell was in Carlisle and York, and had gone, or portions of his command had, towards Harrisburg, and had marched where he pleased without opposition.

On the 30th June my command was put in march towards Gettysburg, and camped, I think, at or near Greencastle, receiving orders to march the next day.

We had heard the day before or heard it here that Ewell's corps had been ordered to return to the main command, because General Lee had been informed that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and was marching northward. And before moving, on the first, I received orders to follow in rear of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which had been detached from the corps to conduct Ewell's trains west of the mountains, while the rest of the corps came by the shortest route to General Lee's headquarters.

Accordingly I had my division ranged alongside of the road to Gettysburg by eight o'clock on the 1st of July, in the order of march, and had not been long in place before Johnson's division appeared. After it had passed I went to Major Fairfax, of General Longstreet's staff, and asked if I should follow the troops or wait until Ewell's train had passed. Fairfax rode to General Longstreet to find out, and shortly returned with directions to wait until the train had passed. As the train appeared to be a very long one I had its rate of travel timed as it passed over a known distance, and computed its length to be over fourteen miles.

At any rate it was not until after four o'clock that it had passed, and I then took up the line of march to the front. About five o'clock, as we rose the hills between our camp of the morning and Gettysburg, we heard distinctly the sound of cannon, and a cheer went from the column, while the men quickened their pace to the music of the guns. The march was continued, and about ten P. M. I met General Longstreet in the road, and he informed me there had been an engagement; General Heth was wounded; the enemy



driven back with a loss of 5,000 prisoners. He then directed me to go into camp at the water course, then some miles distant, which I reached a little after twelve at night, and camped or rather rested. Some time after my arrival I received orders from General Longstreet to continue the march at four A. M., but the order was afterwards countermanded, with directions not to leave until sunrise. The march was continued at a very early hour, and my command reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg early in the morning. Just after I arrived General Lee sent for me—as the head of my column was halted within a hundred yards of where he was—and I went at once and reported. General Lee was sitting on a fallen tree with a map beside him. After the usual salutation, General Lee remarked: "General, I wish you to place your division across this road," pointing on the map to about the place I afterwards went to, and directing my attention to about the place across the country from where we were, the position being a commanding one; "and I wish you to get there if possible without being seen by the enemy." The place he pointed out was about the one I afterwards went to, and the line he marked out on the map for me to occupy was one perpendicular to the Emmettsburg road. He finally remarked: "Can you get there?" or "can you do it?" I replied that I knew of nothing to prevent me, but would take a party of skirmishers and go in advance and reconnoitre." He said "Major Johnston, of my staff, has been ordered to reconnoitre the ground, and I expect he is about ready." I then remarked, "I will go with him." Just then General Longstreet, who, when I came up, was walking back and forth some little distance from General Lee, and hearing my proposition or request to reconnoitre, spoke quickly and said: "No, sir, I do not wish you to leave your division," and then, pointing to the map, said: "I wish your division placed so," running his finger in a direction perpendicular to that pointed out by General Lee. General Lee replied: "No, General, I wish it placed just perpendicular to that," or "just the opposite." I then reiterated my request to go with Major Johnston, but General Longstreet again forbade it. General Lee said nothing more, and I left them, and, joining my command, put it under cover under a line of woods a short distance off. General Longstreet appeared as if he was irritated and annoyed, but the cause I did not ask. When I rejoined my command I sent my engineer officer, Lieutenant Montcure, to go and join Major Johnston, and gave him instructions what to observe particularly, as he was an officer in whom I had

confidence, but was ordered back. I then reconnoitred myself for my own information, and was soon convinced that by crossing the ridge where I then was, my command could reach the point indicated by General Lee, in a half hour, without being seen. I then went back to the head of my column and sat on my horse and saw in the distance the enemy coming, hour after hour, on to the battle ground.

At length—my recollection is that it was about 1 P. M.—Major Johnston, of General Lee's staff, came to me and said he was ordered to conduct me on the march. My command was at once put in motion—Major Johnston and myself riding some distance ahead. Suddenly, as we rose a hill on the road we were taking, the Round Top was plainly visible, with the flags of the signal men in rapid motion. I sent back and halted my division and rode with Major Johnston rapidly around the neighborhood to see if there was any road by which we could go into position without being seen. Not finding any I joined my command and met General Longstreet there, who asked, "What is the matter?" I replied, "Ride with me and I will show you that we can't go on this route, according to instructions, without being seen by the enemy." We rode to the top of the hill and he at once said, "Why this won't do. Is there no way to avoid it?" I then told him of my reconnoissance in the morning, and he said: "How can we get there?" I said: "Only by going back—by countermarching." He said: "Then all right," and the movement commenced. But as General Hood, in his eagerness for the fray (and he bears the character of always being so), had pressed on his division behind mine so that it lapped considerably, creating confusion in the countermarch, General Longstreet rode to me and said: "General, there is so much confusion, owing to Hood's division being mixed up with yours, suppose you let him countermarch first and lead in the attack." I replied: "General, as I started in the lead, let me continue so;" and he replied, "Then go on," and rode off.

After very considerable difficulty, owing to the rough character of the country in places and the fences and ditches we had to cross, the countermarch was effected, and my troops were moving easily forward along a road with fences on the side not giving room enough for a company front, making it necessary to break files to the rear, when General Longstreet rode up to me, and said: "How are you going in?" and I replied, "That will be determined when I can see what is in my front." He said: "There is nothing in your

front; you will be entirely on the flank of the enemy." I replied, "Then I will continue my march in columns of companies, and after arriving on the flank as far as is necessary will face to the left and march on the enemy." He replied, "That suits me," and rode away. My head of column soon reached the edge of the woods, and the enemy at once opened on it with numerous artillery, and one rapid glance showed them to be in force much greater than I had, and extending considerably beyond my right. My command, therefore, instead of marching on as directed, by head of column, deployed at once. Kershaw, a very cool, judicious and gallant gentleman, immediately turned the head of his column and marched by flank to right, and put his men under cover of a stone wall. Barksdale, the fiery, impetuous Mississippian, following, came into line on the left of Kershaw, his men sheltered by trees and part of a stone wall and under a gentle declivity. Besides the artillery firing, the enemy were advancing a strong line of skirmishers and threatening an advance in line. I hurried back to quicken the march of those in rear, and sent orders for my artillery to move to my right and open fire, so as to draw the fire of the opposite artillery from my infantry. I will here state that I had in my division about six thousand, aggregate—which, I think, is over the mark.

Well, six thousand men standing in line would occupy over a mile, and in marching in the manner and over the roads we came they would extend a mile and a half. So you will perceive that to form line of battle by directing troops across the country broken by fences and ditches requires considerable time, and it was difficult, from the same causes, to get the artillery in position.

While this was going on I rode forward, and getting off my horse, went to some trees in advance and took a good look at the situation, and the view presented astonished me, as the enemy was massed in my front, and extended to my right and left as far as I could see.

The firing on my command showed to Hood in my rear that the enemy was in force in my front and right, and the head of his column was turned by General Longstreet's order to go on my right, and as his troops appeared, the enemy opened on them, developing a long line to his right even, and way up to the top of Round Top. Thus was presented a state of affairs which was certainly not contemplated when the original plan or order of battle was given, and certainly was not known to General Longstreet a half hour previous.



As I have already stated, General Longstreet had informed me just previous to my arriving in view of the enemy's position, that I would arrive entirely on their flank, and he wished me to march into my position in column of companies, and when well on the enemy's flank to face or form line to the left and march down upon them. General Kershaw in his report says, his brigade being at the head of my column, that General Longstreet came to him while marching, and told him that his (General Longstreet's) desire was, that he (Kershaw) should attack the enemy at the peach orchard, turn his flank and extend along the cross road with his left resting towards the Emmettsburg road. You can see by the accompanying map what a very different state of affairs existed from what General Longstreet must have thought really did, as it would simply have been absurd for General Kershaw to have attempted to do as he was required or desired.

General Hood writes that his orders were to place his division across the Emmettsburg road, form line and attack; but that from a rapid reconnoissance he saw that if he made the attack according to orders he should first be compelled to attack and drive off the advanced line of battle, to pass over a very broken, rocky character of country, which would scatter his men very much, and that his division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy, posted on the crest of the high range of which Round Top was the extreme left, and that he would be subjected to a destructive fire in flank and rear as well as in front. As bad as he represents the difficulties to be overcome, if he attempted to carry out his orders, I would have been in a worse position if I had attempted to carry out mine, as the main body of the enemy was directly in my front, and the enemy's numerous batteries were posted in front of me in the peach orchard and to its rear. General Hood says he reported that it was unwise to attack up the Emmettsburg road as ordered, and urged that he be allowed to turn Round Top and attack the enemy in flank and rear, but that General Longstreet returned answer: "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road."

That he went again, and reported that nothing was to be gained by such an attack, and the answer was: "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road."

That during these intervals of time he had continued to use the batteries against the enemy, and it seemed to his more extended reconnoissance that the position occupied by the enemy was natu-

rally so strong, so nearly impregnable, that, independently of their flank fire, they could repel his attack by throwing stones down the mountain; and that a third time he dispatched a staff officer to explain more fully in regard to the situation, and to suggest that he (General Longstreet) come in person and see for himself, and that his Adjutant-General, whom he sent the last time, returned with the same message: "General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road;" and almost simultaneously Colonel Fairfax, of Longstreet's staff, rode up and repeated the order.

While this was going on an order came from General Longstreet, borne by Major Latrobe, such is my recollection, asking why did I not charge, "as there was no one in my front but a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery." I told the officer that I would charge so soon as my division was formed for it; that the enemy was in great force in my immediate front, with numerous artillery, and extended far to the right. In a very short time after this the order was repeated, and I informed the officer again that the enemy was so strong in my front that it required careful preparation for the assault, or it necessarily would be a failure; that the opposite artillery was numerous, and it was necessary to break its force by the fire of our artillery; that as soon as it opened, and my men were all up, I would move forward, but requested that he come to the front and see for himself.

Not long after the order came peremptorily for me to charge, the officer representing that General Lee was with General Longstreet, and joined in the order, and I got on my horse and sent word that in five minutes I would be under way. But while collecting my staff to send the orders for a simultaneous move of the whole line, a courier dashed up with orders for me to wait until Hood got into position. I suppose by this time Hood's protests against attempting to charge up the Emmettsburg road had been received, and hence the delay. I sent to communicate with Hood at once in order to follow his movement. General Longstreet then came up in person and I met him. His first words were, "Why is not a battery placed here?" pointing to the place where the road by which we marched reached the edge of the open space in front. I replied, "General, if a battery is placed there it will draw the enemy's artillery right among my lines formed for the charge and will of itself be in the way of my charge, and tend to demoralize my men." His reply was only a peremptory order for a battery, and it was sent forward, placed in that position, and its fire at once drew the enemy's

fire of artillery upon it, cutting the limbs of the trees in abundance, which fell around my men, and the bursting shells and shot wounded or killed a number whilst in line formed for the advance, producing a natural feeling of uneasiness among them. I got on my horse and rode among them directing them to lie down, so as to escape as much as possible from the shot and shell which were being rained around us from a very short range. All this happened within fifteen or twenty minutes. Under cover of their fire the enemy were making strong demonstrations of an advance, and General Barksdale two or three times came to me and said, "General, let me go; General, let me charge!" But, as I was waiting General Longstreet's will, I told General Barksdale to wait and let the enemy come half way and then we would meet on more equal terms.

Hood had been in the meanwhile moving towards the enemy's left, but he never did go far enough to envelop the left, not even partially. It was said at the time, on the field, that he would have done so, but his guides and scouts, who had been around to the enemy's left in the morning, had gotten confused on their return with the division and missed carrying the head of column far enough to the right, and it became heavily engaged before Hood intended it, and being pressed on his left sent to me for assistance, and the charge of my division was ordered. General Kershaw, with his South Carolina brigade, leading, followed by Semmes with his Georgia brigade; then Barksdale, and Wofford last. The two last had been mixed up with the batteries which had been placed among their lines, and were temporarily delayed in extricating themselves therefrom. So much was it the case with one of Wofford's regiments that it did not get out to join the brigade until it had gone about one hundred yards. Coming on at a double quick the whole line as it advanced became heavily engaged, Kershaw and Semmes acting together on the right. These brigades gave mutual assistance, contending against odds which would have enveloped them, but Wofford's brilliant advance struck the attacking force in their flank and the enemy gave way, pursued by the whole line.

Barksdale, who, as I have said, had been exceedingly impatient for the order to advance, and whose enthusiasm was shared by his command, was standing ready to give the word, not far from me, and so soon as it was signified to me, I sent my aid-de-camp, Captain G. B. Lamar, Jr., to carry the order to General Barksdale, and



the result I express in Captain Lamar's words: "I had witnessed many charges marked in every way by unflinching gallantry—in some I had had the honor of participating when in the line with the First Georgia regulars—but I never saw anything to equal the dash and heroism of the Mississippians. You remember how anxious General Barksdale was to attack the enemy, and his eagerness was participated in by all his officers and men, and when I carried him the order to advance his face was radiant with joy. He was in front of his brigade, hat off, and his long white hair reminded me of the 'white plume of Navarre.' I saw him as far as the eye could follow, still ahead of his men, leading them on. The result you know. You remember the picket fence in front of his brigade? I was anxious to see how they would get over it and around it. When they reached it, the fence disappeared as if by magic, and the slaughter of the 'red breeched zouaves' on the other side was terrible!"

My whole line, or nearly all, reached the stone wall at the foot of the Little Round Top, and established itself temporarily there. A portion of Wofford's brigade occupied a position really in rear of the enemy's line on the left. So much so that General Bryan, then colonel of the Sixteenth Georgia, states that he would not allow his men to take possession of a battery from which the men had been driven, which was immediately in front of his regiment and distant about one hundred yards, for fear they would be captured.

But the whole line was so advanced and being without support on their flank, it was ordered to retire by General Longstreet, and I formed a new line, running from the peach orchard diagonally towards Round Top, from which it was concealed by the mass of woods in our front, which was held as far as half way across the wheat field by my skirmishers.

At the commencement of the charge, General Longstreet went forward some distance with Wofford's brigade, urging them on by voice and his personal example to the most earnest efforts. The troops needed no outside impulse, but his conduct was gallant and inspiring. I have no doubt but that when General Longstreet became suddenly aware of the true status of affairs, that instead of the head of his column debouching from the woods on the flank of the enemy (recollect the head of the column was conducted by General Lee's staff officer), they were suddenly confronted with superior forces, in position and ready for the fight; and besides extending far away to his right, he was very much disconcerted and

annoyed, principally because it was evident at a glance that the plan of battle, so far as his forces were concerned, could not be carried out. For instead of attacking or moving with his forces down the Emmettsburg road; his lines perpendicular to it, leaving the enemy to either retire or change their front to meet his attack or to be attacked in turn in their flank by others of our troops joining in as we advanced (Hood and myself), the whole of our attack was against the front of the enemy, in position, prepared to receive us. The question then arises, was it General Longstreet's duty, or would he have been justified, when he became aware that General Lee's order could not be obeyed, that the reconnoissance on which they were based had been faulty, and that he had therefore given those orders under mistaken or false information, to have halted his command, and going back to General Lee, inform him of the true status of the enemy, and that his order of attack should be changed, as it was not the best under the circumstances?

Longstreet's two divisions were not strong enough to cover the front of attack, much less envelop the flank, and he should have been reinforced before making the assault he did.

You will find, as I proceed, that General Longstreet had been ordered to partially envelop the enemy's left and drive it in with his command. But the officer who had made the reconnoissance, and was appointed to lead his troops by the necessary route, to carry out the order, carried Longstreet's leading division not on the flank, but in the immediate presence of a superior force, and so close that he could not withdraw in order to march farther to the left without serious complications. It is true he could have waited, but he was, as I understood it, urged to the assault.

If Pickett's division had been with mine following it, I believe that Round Top could have been captured from my side, and we could have established ourselves there. But if Longstreet was waiting for Pickett, he was not allowed to wait long enough, because General Lee did not think the enemy's left was occupied so strongly as it was, even at that late hour, and was not made aware of the great natural strength of the enemy's position. If General Longstreet had taken the responsibility to report that the positions in his front were naturally so strong and were so strongly occupied that his force could not accomplish the important results that were expected, and insisted on a delay until his whole force was concentrated and a more thorough examination made, I do not think the battle would have been fought at all, but that General Lee

would have manœuvred to force an attack upon himself. Nor have I a doubt but that if the corps had moved boldly in position by eight or nine o'clock in the morning, as it could have done beyond question, that Round Top could have been occupied without any very considerable difficulty; *provided*, those positions were not occupied in force by the enemy until after twelve o'clock, as is *now* asserted. But as the information up to three o'clock or three and a half was so faulty as to create the impression in both General Longstreet's and General Lee's minds that the left was not then occupied in any force, I am very much inclined to the belief that it is not known whether those positions were held in force at ten o'clock in the morning of the second or were not occupied until much later in the day, and that the arguments concerning the delay in attacking of Longstreet's corps, so far as the enemy's non-occupation of Round Top and vicinity is concerned, is based in a great measure on information received from publications since the war.

When I had the brief interview with General Lee before mentioned, he did not appear to be particularly anxious that Longstreet should occupy the left. He certainly was in no hurry for it, for both Hood's and my division were put under cover, and remained resting within a half a mile of where I left him, and he went off, if he did, with a full knowledge that they were not in motion. My information at the time was that he was not decided positively as to the main point of attack, but was waiting for information. Of course I do not know what his real intentions were, as I cannot boast of his having taken me into his confidence; but I believe he gave his orders for the movement of Longstreet's assault based on information obtained very early in the morning.

I do not take it upon myself to say that General Longstreet is to be blamed for not disobeying his orders to attack when he became aware that, contrary to expectations, the enemy was in great force in his immediate front. For, as I understood Major Latrobe, General Lee was with him when the enemy had opened on my division, thus disclosing their immediate presence, and but a short while after Hood's reports must have been received; and if, under those circumstances, Longstreet had not engaged, there were some, I am grieved to say, in the army who would have ascribed his conduct to the worst of motives, or who might have done so—and his orders were positive—and the greater the danger there is in obeying an order, the more imperative is it upon an officer's honor to do his



best to carry it out. I therefore only assert my belief that if the attack had been delayed much better results would have followed.

General Lee, in his report, says: "Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of Hood and McLaws on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in." General Hill was directed to threaten the enemy's centre, to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing and to co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack. General Ewell was directed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.

General Hill reports: "General Longstreet was to attack the left flank of the enemy and *sweep down his line*, and I was directed to co-operate with him with such of my brigades from the right as could join in with his troops in the attack." He further gives it as his understanding of Longstreet's position by saying: "The corps of General Longstreet was on my right and in a line, being nearly at right angles to mine." I have no doubt he reports Longstreet's position not from what he saw, but from what he knew were the orders of General Lee, that Longstreet should occupy, for my line was but an extension of his on the right, and even Hood, away to my right, never got positions at right angles. He may have tried to get that way, but did not succeed.

General Hill further says: "Soon after McLaws moved forward, General Anderson moved forward the brigades of Wilcox, Perry and Wright in echelon." And that would have been all right if Longstreet had enveloped the enemy's left, and "driving it in," had "swept down his line," but he did not. So the echelon attack was a mistake.

I have shown, I believe, that Longstreet never did obtain a position, when the enemy's left was partially enveloped, and never did "drive it in," nor was he able to "sweep down his line," and finally, in making the attempt he did, he was so hard pressed that my division, instead of joining Hood, as he swept down the enemy's line, was ordered in making a direct attack on the enemy's front, and both Hood and myself had as much as we could attend to to prevent our flanks being turned.

I have stated that General Lee must have given his orders for the attack based upon false information, or perhaps it would be better to say wrong information. I am unable to find out who ever did reconnoitre the left, excepting that Major Johnston was ordered to so. This I know, for General Lee himself told me.

But when Major Johnston, who was conducting my division, came suddenly in view of Round Top, with the enemy's signal flags waving thereon, he appeared equally astonished as I was; and, therefore, if General Lee was relying on his report, he was misinformed as to the true condition of affairs.

I had been forbidden to reconnoitre; so had my engineer officer. General Longstreet had not done it, and General Lee had not; and therefore it must have been that Major Johnston had gone there early in the morning, and not seeing any one had so reported, and if after that time a different state of affairs was known by anybody to exist, it had not been reported to either General Lee or General Longstreet; at least it appears so. All this resulted from defective and deficient organization of our staff corps; not from anybody's fault, but from the force of circumstances. We read since the war that there was an abundance of reconnoitering on our left, but very little, if any, on our right.

The night of the 2d was spent in reorganization and attending the wounded, as I had one Brigadier-General (Barksdale) killed, one (General Semmes) mortally wounded, and many colonels and officers of less rank killed and wounded.

The Chief Surgeon reported that I had lost in killed, wounded and missing twenty-three hundred and forty.

One company, numbering thirty-seven, had, by the bursting of a shell in its front as it went into the charge, lost thirty men—six killed, leaving but seven unhurt.

I will read here a short extract from General Longstreet's account of the charge of the divisions of Hood and myself, as he was in position to see general results untrammelled by attention to details:

"Before pursuing this narrative further, I shall say a word or two concerning this assault. I am satisfied that my force, numbering hardly thirteen thousand men, encountered during that three and a half hours of bloody work, not less than sixty-five thousand of the Federals, and yet their charge was not checked nor their line broken until we ordered them to withdraw. Mr. Whitelaw Reid, writing a most excellent account of this charge to the *Cincinnati Gazette*, says: 'It was believed from the terrific attack that the whole Rebel army, Ewell's corps included, was massed on our centre and left, and so a single brigade was left to hold the rifle pits on the right and the rest hurried across the little neck of land to strengthen our weakening lines.' He describes, too, the haste with which corps after corps was hurried forward to the left to check the advance of my two-thirds of one corps.

General Meade himself testifies (see his official report) that the Third, the Second, the Fifth, the Sixth and the Eleventh corps, all of the Twelfth except one brigade, and part of the First corps, engaged my handful of heroes during that glorious but disastrous afternoon. I found that night that 4,529 of my men, more than one-third their total number, had been left on the field. History records no parallel to the fight made by these two divisions on the 2d of July at Gettysburg."

In the early morning of the 3d my new line was carefully revised. Kershaw and Semmes' brigades towards the Round Top, and the others extending diagonally towards the peach orchard—all concealed by the woods from the batteries on the hills. My skirmish line was to the front, commanding half way across the wheat field, which is shown on the map.

We lay undisturbed by the enemy. The exertion and excitement of the previous day had been tremendous, and excepting burying parties, those engaged in attending to the wounded and collecting and stacking arms, my division was resting.

What the next move was to be was unknown to me. My troops were in close proximity to the enemy, and my front was covered with woods.

If the enemy had determined to commence the offensive, my command would become engaged at very short notice, and I therefore stayed with it.

I was not notified that it was in contemplation even to make any further attack by either Hood's or my division, nor was I informed that it was the intention to assault the enemy's centre with Pickett's division, with the assistance of troops from other corps. I was not told to be ready to assist, should the assault be successful, nor instructed what to do should the assault fail and the enemy advance. I contented myself with reconnoitering my ground and vicinity in all the directions necessary for movement in any emergency, and took my position among my troops. I became early aware that the artillery was concentrating along my rear, on the crest occupied by my line before I advanced, and that not only the corps artillery but the guns from Hill's corps and others were preparing for a grand opening. And when the numerous guns opened, shaking the very earth between the opposing armies, the shot and shell from the batteries on our right poured over my command: those of the enemy crossing ours, going in opposite directions, but all bent on the same mission of destruction.

Not a shot, as I can remember, fell among my men. We were



resting entirely undisturbed, excepting now and then a bomb shot would come from Round Top, fired at some of us moving about, and got in view of the batteries, in mere wantonness, as the chance of hitting was very small, and they did not care to waste a shell on one, two or three. The enemy appeared to be waiting the assault to follow the storm of shot and shell. Of course there was not a soldier in either army of any experience who did not know that an assault was to be made somewhere, and the shells, as they bursted over the enemy's lines, gave of themselves a pretty sure indication to them that it was on their centre that the shock was to be given. Not only was that a sign, but undoubtedly they could see our preparations from every prominent signal station from Round Top on their left to the Cemetery on their right, and disposed their forces, stationed their reserves, and made all other needful preparations to meet the shock, and to meet it at the exact portion of their lines it was made. The forces of the enemy were on a crest overlooking our position, the hill, known as Cemetery Hill, declining to their rear, so that they could move their troops without being seen by us, whilst our movements were plainly visible for fully a mile distant on an average along our entire front; and down the main roads for a mile further all between the armies was swept by artillery. I sat on my horse watching the shells passing over me, now bursting over artillery, now over the enemy's lines and then suddenly against Round Top, until it became monotonous, as the results could but be conjectured. But finally, during a temporary lull in the artillery fire, my attention was attracted by seeing a number of my command, among them General Wofford on horseback, looking intently down our lines towards Gettysburg, and I rode in that direction and saw the advancing Confederates moving to the charge on the enemy's centre. The sight was magnificent, it was grand, as it stirred all the highest and deepest emotions of our nature, of admiration for the splendid bearing and courage of our Southern men, mingled with a heartfelt prayer for the most fortunate results; but of reasonable hope of real success, based on what one could see, there was none. I had had some such feelings aroused many years before, during the siege of Vera Cruz, when looking at a number of strong ships, well manned and equipped, having on board our sick, our ammunition and supplies and our soldiers' wives, being driven by the irresistible force of a norther against a sandy shore. Their destruction as ships was a foregone conclusion, and the only thing we who saw them coming

could do, in our blind bewilderment, was to "pray that God would have mercy on the crew." The irresistible force which operated here was the military honor to obey his orders, which actuated the leader of the charge, that noble, chivalrous, fearless, high-toned gentleman and old army officer, General George E. Pickett, and the pride and courage of the Army of Northern Virginia, which made them eager to try to do whatever General Lee ordered.

It was a charge upon the enemy's centre, made by Pickett's division and Heth's, advancing in two lines; Pickett on the right, Wilcox's brigade marching in rear of Pickett's to guard that flank, and Heth's division was supported by Lane's and Scales' brigades under General Trimble. I was far in advance of the main Confederate line, and could see along both the advancing Confederates and those of the enemy lying couchant to resist their charge.

Our troops moved steadily under a heavy fire, the main attack being against the left centre of the enemy. The enemy's artillery, which had slackened just previous to the charge, now reopened with renewed energy, whilst our batteries slackened theirs because of decreased ammunition, which enabled the enemy to move their infantry from other portions of the field, reinforcing their front and moving to attack the flanks of the assailing force. But in spite of all this, the first line of the enemy was reached by our men and taken possession of, a large number leaping over and dashing at the second line, a great number sheltering themselves behind the stone walls or fortifications of the first line. But all this was but momentary, for the enemy, rushing their reinforcements, overpowered our men; the most advanced, or most of them, threw down their arms and surrendered, as also did many behind the first line captured. The rest fled in confusion, and what is known as Pickett's charge was over, with no results but the exemplification of the spirit and daring of our people. The enemy did not pursue, but rested content with the success so miraculously given to them. I looked around on my command, very few of whom were aware of the tremendous sacrifice that had been consummated. They were all in place, and needed but to be called to be ready, and seeing no necessity for arousing them I said not a word, but let them rest on.

General Lee, in his report, says, in reference to this charge of Pickett's:

"The general plan was unchanged (that is, the plan of the 2d). Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to

attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time." I never heard that such was even contemplated. Again, he continues: "General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him;" and then goes on to relate the causes of his failure, one of them being because the projected attack on the enemy's left had not been made, thus enabling him to occupy his right with a largely superior force; and again, he says (I quote exactly): "General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced; his operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was therefore reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned."

If General Longstreet did not attack early on the 3d, as General Lee says he was ordered to do, his reasons for not doing so appear to have been perfectly satisfactory to General Lee; and as the same causes were in existence when Pickett's charge was made, it is not to be disputed that General Lee could not have expected Longstreet's two right divisions to take part in that charge.

In his account of what is known as Pickett's charge, General Lee says—and as General Lee's report was published before his death, and was uncontradicted, or was not disputed, I take it for granted that what he there says, in regard to his own orders and his own intentions, etc., cannot now be questioned:

"The troops moved steadily on under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery against the enemy's left centre, whose batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply or render the necessary support to the attacking party. *Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place*, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering from the concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill on the left."

It was about this stage in the charge that I saw the advance. It is intimated here by General Lee that if he had known that our artillery ammunition was so exhausted as to be unable to reply at the critical moment, that the charge would not have been made.



Who did know it? Whose duty was it to know it, and whose duty was it to report the fact to General Lee? And why was it not done?

General Pickett, if he had known it, would never, under the circumstances, have demurred to the charge. He would have died first.

General Lee does not say anything about General Longstreet not advancing his two divisions. If you will observe this map, which is a copy of the one carefully prepared by the Federals since the war, showing the positions of the Federal troops, you will observe that the largest mass of Federal troops seem to have been on that day—the 3d of July—posted between my left and Pickett's right, and at the place or near it where Longstreet's two corps—Hood's and mine—would have had to have attacked, if it had been intended they should, in order to have been of service in aiding Pickett's charge.

All along from Main Round Top on to Little Round Top and to its foot and extending to their right, the enemy's lines had been fortified during the previous night and strengthened with additional troops, rendering the few places which were assailable with some chances of success on the 2d entirely unassailable with any prospect of accomplishment on the 3d. So it would have been of no use to Pickett for Hood and myself to have made a direct assault on our direct front. But we would have had to have attacked about where you see that mass of troops is lying, or was, and in attempting it we would have exposed our flanks and rear to artillery and infantry fire, besides the resistance of the tremendous force which would meet us in front. The right of Pickett and my left were by no means in close proximity. There was a gap of a half mile between—it looked so to me—and I therefore do not believe that we could have effected anything, and if we had been repulsed as Pickett was, which would not have been at all improbable under the circumstances as above stated, and the enemy had then advanced their whole line, the consequences might have been more serious than they proved to be. I therefore do not think that it was ever expected by General Lee that Hood's and my division should take part in the charge unless we had been moved round and enveloped the enemy's left; and yet without more help than we had—more co-operation—it is difficult to conceive how Pickett could have been expected to be successful against the whole Federal army.

Those writers who have attempted to lay the blame upon Longstreet's corps for the non-success of the battle, either on the 2d or 3d, I believe are entirely ignorant of the difficulties which his troops had to encounter. This can be ascribed but to the want of proper reconnoissance having been made before the general plan of attack had been determined on; and it was assumed then, from hasty reports, made probably by persons not skilled in such matters, that there was not much to be overcome, and this erroneous opinion was never corrected. The enemy's forces occupied a line along the crest of Cemetery Hill, including Round Top and Little Round Top, which, from Crup's Hill on their extreme right to Round Top, was about three miles long. The Confederates partially enveloped Crup's Hill and extended in a continued line around to extreme left, and about a mile distant from the enemy's line.

The enemy are said to have had one hundred thousand men. Let us assume, for the comparison, that they were all infantry in both armies. Now, three miles is  $5,280 \times 3 = 15,840$  feet. A man in close ranks is allowed two feet of space; he takes more in the fight. Thus in a space of three miles a double rank containing 15,840 would form one line of battle without intervals. Thus the enemy could have formed over six lines of battle, one behind the other, concentric. This hill or ridge on which they were posted was, as I have before stated, higher than the one we had been on, and descended from the crest to their rear, as it did toward's us. They were thus enabled to move their troops from one point to another without being seen by us. The Confederates, so I read, had 60,000 men, and occupied, I believe, a curve five miles long; five miles is  $5,280 \times 5 = 26,400$  feet, or 26,400 men it would take to occupy our line shoulder to shoulder; two lines would take 52,800 men, or not quite two lines and a third; or the enemy could have put three lines of battle in position and then have had 52,480 men in reserve, or a force in reserve nearly equal to Lee's army. The enemy were compact and protected, and had free intercourse between their forces and signal stations everywhere, in every commanding position. They could see all over our positions and commanded all the approaches with a powerful artillery, and yet our army attacked them in detached masses at different points, widely separated, and not acting in conjunction. Why it was so, or whose fault it was, I do not pretend to assert; but that it was so, no one will deny. As a further illustration of this, I will, with your per-

mission, read a short account of an assault made by A. R. Wright's brigade of Georgians, Hill's corps, Anderson's division:

*Official Report of Wright's Brigade.*

GETTYSBURG, July, 1863.

On the morning of the 1st of July moved my brigade from its camp, near Fayetteville, Pennsylvania, in the direction of Gettysburg. Between 4 and 5 o'clock P. M. the brigade reached a position near Gettysburg, where it remained until next morning. About seven o'clock on the morning of the 2d of July, I received orders to move my brigade by the right flank, following Perry's brigade, and occupied a position (on Seminary Ridge) previously held by Davis' brigade of Heth's division. About twelve o'clock I was informed by Major-General Anderson that an attack upon the enemy's line would soon be made by the whole division, commencing on our right by Wilcox's brigade, and that each brigade of the division would begin the attack as soon as the brigade on its immediate right would commence the movement. I was instructed to move simultaneously with Perry's brigade on my right, and informed that Posey's brigade on my left would move forward upon my advancing. About 5 o'clock P. M. the signal was given by Wilcox and Perry on my right advancing. I immediately ordered forward my brigade against the strong position of the enemy, on a range of mountains, distant a mile or a mile and a half, and separated from us by open plains, intersected by numerous post and rail fences, farm houses and barns. This ground was swept by the enemy's artillery posted along the Emmettsburg road and on the crest of the heights on McPherson's farm, a little south of Cemetery Hill. My men moved forward until reaching within musket range of the Emmettsburg road, where we encountered a strong body of infantry, posted under cover of the fences parallel with that road. Just in rear of this line was the advanced batteries of the enemy, raking the whole field. Just before reaching this position I had observed that Posey's brigade on my left had not advanced, and fearing that if I proceeded much further with my left flank entirely unprotected that I might become involved in serious difficulties, I dispatched my aid-de-camp, Captain Bell, with a message to Major-General Anderson. To this message he replied, "Press on"—he had ordered Posey in on my left and would reiterate the order. I immediately charged upon the enemy and drove him in great confusion upon a second line, formed behind a stone fence, some hundred yards in rear of the Emmettsburg road. Having gained the Emmettsburg road, we again charged upon the enemy posted behind the stone fence. Here the enemy made considerable resistance, but were finally forced to retire. We were now within a hundred yards of the crest of the heights, which were lined with artillery, supported by a strong body of infantry. My men, by a well directed fire, shoot down the cannoneers from



their guns, and leaping the stone fence charge up to the top of the crest, and drive the enemy's infantry into a rocky gorge on the eastern slope of the heights, some hundred yards in rear of the enemy's batteries. We were now complete masters of the field. Just as we had carried the enemy's last and strongest position, it was discovered that the brigade on our right (Perry's) had not advanced across the turnpike, but had actually given away, and was rapidly falling back to the rear, while on our left we were entirely unsupported—the brigade (Posey's) ordered to our support having failed to advance. My advanced position and the unprotected condition of my flanks invited an attack. The enemy immediately passed a heavy body of infantry—under cover of a high ledge of rocks and stunted undergrowth—from the gorge, and emerging from the ridge upon my right, equi-distant from the stone fence and the Emmettsburg turnpike; while a large brigade advanced from the woods on our left, and, gaining the turnpike, moved rapidly along that road to meet the force upon my right and rear. The enemy's converging lines were rapidly closing upon our rear. No supports could be seen coming to our assistance. With painful hearts we abandoned our captured guns, prepared to cut our way through the closing lines in our rear. This was effected in tolerable order, but with immense loss. The enemy rushed to his abandoned guns as soon as we began to retire, and poured a severe fire of grape and cannister into our thinned ranks as we slowly retired down the slope and into the valley below. I continued to fall back until I reached a slight depression, a few hundred yards in advance of our line of the morning. Finding that the enemy was not disposed to advance, a line of skirmishers was thrown out, and a little after dark my command moved to the position taken in the morning.

I have not the slightest doubt but that I should have been able to have maintained my position on the heights and secured the captured artillery if there had been a protecting force on my left, or if the brigade on my right had not been forced to retire. We captured over twenty pieces of artillery, which we were compelled to abandon.

Of our sixteen hundred and odd that went into the fight, five hundred and fifty-four were all that answered afterwards—over one thousand men of a small brigade killed, wounded or captured.

I do not recollect an instance in ancient or modern warfare where so small a body of troops, entirely unsupported, as this brigade was, has accomplished so much. Charging through an open field for more than a mile; attacking a superior force posted on a mountain; climbing the side of the mountain; driving the enemy from behind a stone wall; shooting the gunners and capturing the cannon; then, when surrounded, literally cutting their way out; retiring in good order, preventing the enemy from pursuing them. This Wright's brigade has done, and the few surviving heroes may well be proud of their achievement. Although I knew their char-

acter, well knew they were capable of doing what any other troops dare do, I was surprised at the vigor of their attack, and the tenacity with which they held their ground. \* \* \*

A. R. WRIGHT, *Brigadier-General, etc.*

No one can believe that General Lee contemplated any such disjointed action, but must be convinced that he had given orders for such co-operation as would in all probability have produced better results, or having left it to the judgment of his lieutenants whether to attack or not, they misunderstood their orders or did not exercise that independent judgment in carrying them out which was expected of them. But to continue.

As I have stated previously, the enemy did not pursue Pickett. If they had, I would have at once called to arms and prepared to act as the emergency called for—either attack the advance against Pickett, or, if the whole line of the enemy advanced, would have retired to my position of the 2d, before the charge, and defended that line. The enemy did not pursue, because perhaps of the presence in their front of the tremendous artillery fire that would have been concentrated on their advance, and more probably because of the presence on their immediate flank of Longstreet's two divisions.

But a short while after Pickett's charge was over and while my men were at rest, as I have described, a staff officer of General Law, in command of Hood's division (General Hood having been wounded), came to me from General Law, asking that I send one of my brigades to take the place of one of his in line that had been detached to act against cavalry. I directed him to tell General Law that as Pickett had been utterly routed, he must close on the centre and cover his vacant space as he best could, as I could not spare a brigade. Just after the officer had gone, Colonel Sorrel, General Longstreet's Adjutant-General, rode up, and I proceeded to inform him of General Law's request and my instructions to him. He said: "Never mind that now, General; General Longstreet directs that you retire to your position of yesterday. Retire at once, and I will carry the order to General Law to retire Hood's division." I commenced to discuss the necessity of the order, as the advanced position I held was important, and had been won after a deadly struggle; that the order was given no doubt because of Pickett's repulse, but as there was no pursuit there was no necessity of it. Before concluding, Colonel Sorrel, interrupting, said:

"General, there is no discretion allowed, the order is for you to retire at once." I rode rapidly around, and directing some brigades to retire by head of regiments up ravines and others in line; and as they came from under the woods which concealed them from Round Top, the batteries up there opened on them, but by quickening the pace the aim was so disturbed that no damage was done. I halted the brigades as they came into position, and in a short while my line was re-established in the position of the day before. As we came in the enemy advanced clouds of skirmishers coming—I suppose their lines of battle behind—I strengthened my skirmishers and drove or kept them back of the peach orchard, so that I could rest undisturbed on my new line, and then went to my new position, and was sitting on my horse watching the enemy, when Major Johnston, of General Lee's staff, the same who had conducted my column the day before, rode up and remarked: "General, you have your division under very fine control!" I asked him what he meant. "Why," he said, "your orders are obeyed so promptly." "What is there strange about that?" I asked. "Have you not been repulsed and are retreating?" "No, sir," I replied. "I have not been engaged to-day. I am but taking up this position by order of General Longstreet." He apologized, saying that he thought I had been engaged and had been forced to retire, etc. Not long after this Colonel Sorrel came to me and asked if I could retake the position I had just abandoned. I demurred most decidedly to the suggestion under the circumstances, and asked why he made the inquiry. "Because," he said, "General Longstreet had forgotten that he had ordered it, and now disapproved the withdrawal." "But, Colonel Sorrel," I said, "recollect that you gave me the order." "Yes, sir," he said, "and General Longstreet gave it to me."

I was informed afterwards by General Benning, of Hood's division, that he never had been informed of my withdrawal, neither had General DuBose, and their commands had, in consequence, to run for it to get away, by reason of the sudden advance of the enemy on their flanks after I withdrew. They were under the orders of General Law.

As Pickett's repulse ended the battle of Gettysburg, the order for the withdrawal of Longstreet's advance was eminently proper, as otherwise it would have been left in a very precarious position, and it showed military foresight in Colonel Sorrell, even if he had used his own judgment in giving the order. My recollection is that this retreat was made about 2 o'clock P. M.



The enemy made no attempt to advance against my part of the line after it had been re-established, and the two armies remained quiet during the remainder of the day—that is, on the right and as far as I could see to my left.

General Bryan, who succeeded to the command of Semmes' brigade, has informed me that on the 3d of July himself and General Benning got an order to join in an assault on Round Top, but that both refused to obey. I knew nothing of the order, nor can I conceive who gave it.

My division was withdrawn from the battle-ground with the rest of the army, and retired via Monterey and Falling Waters across the Potomac into Virginia, without any hindrance from the enemy.

It may be remarked, in conclusion, that no one as yet has seemed disposed to give blame to General Lee—I mean no one who was under his command—but no matter what order he gave, or what resulted from it, if even disaster followed, it has been the disposition to believe that the cause was not in the order but in the execution of it by subordinates. This resulted in a great measure from that nobility of soul which caused General Lee to be willing to take the blame on himself and not to try and throw it on others.

He was one of those chosen few in the world, so richly endowed with that Divine quality which made men follow him, attach themselves to him, and do his bidding without question; that he never had to contend against the machinations of the ambitious, the envious or the mischievous. No matter whether in victory or defeat he had no defection from him, and to the last his commands were obeyed without a murmur. This great respect and confidence which all had in him prevented or disarmed even a desire to criticise his orders.

And no matter how we may at this day discuss the causes of our failure at Gettysburg, it remains the general opinion that if General Lee's orders had been obeyed all would have been well, and that they were not, resulted from causes beyond his control.

And it is due to General Lee to believe that in those instances where his orders seem now to have been defective, he would, if living, be able to supply such information concerning them as would make them plain.

In this connection I think the following extract from a report made by Colonel Allan, of General Ewell's staff, evidently an unprejudiced and capable gentleman, is worthy of serious consid-

eration. It comes from one who represents that great and gallant soldier who succeeded the immortal Stonewall, and whose corps was on the left of our army. Colonel Allan says:

"The Confederate line was a long one, and the perfect co-operation in the attack needed, to prevent General Meade, whose line was a short one, from using the same troops at more than one point, was difficult of attainment.

"Two of the corps commanders, Hill and Ewell, were new in their places.

Longstreet's attack on the Federal left on the 2d was delayed beyond the expected time, and was not promptly seconded by Hill and Ewell when made.

"Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert—Johnson, Early, Rodes acting in succession.

"General Lee always expressed the strongest conviction that had the Confederate corps attacked General Meade simultaneously on either the 2d or 3d, he would have succeeded in overthrowing the Federal army; that he had used every effort to insure concert of action, but had failed. He said that he had consulted Ewell, and told him if he could not carry his part of the line, he would move his corps to the right of Longstreet, and threaten the Federal communications with Baltimore; but upon the statements of General Ewell and Johnson that the positions in their front could be carried, he did not change his plan. He urged concert of action on the 3d, but Johnson's division fought and suffered in the morning alone, and Pickett's attack in the afternoon was unsupported. There was nothing foolish in Pickett's attack had it been executed as designed. Pickett carried the works before him; had Pettigrew and Wilcox moved with him, and Hill and Ewell vigorously seconded this onset, General Lee never doubted that the Federal army would have been ruined."

But although that battle was against us, and although the war was against us, and we lost all save our honor, we have been taught a lesson which I hope we will profit by. We are taught that the pluck of the South, when well directed, though with very few resources to back it, has wrestled with great chances of success against the most powerful combinations in war that perhaps was ever made against any people; and now that the war is over, let us again concentrate those inborn energies, that pluck, to the accomplishment of success in all the arts of peace that go to make a people prosperous and happy, and the habits of endurance which our heavy adversity has taught us will be but stepping stones to our success over all rivals.

**Pettigrew's Charge at Gettysburg.**

By General B. D. FRY.

OFFICE OF SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY,  
RICHMOND, VA., December 8th, 1878.

General B. D. FRY:

My Dear Fry—Although the battle of Gettysburg has during the year past been very much discussed, no proper exposition has been made of the part which was borne in the final charge by the brigades that day commanded by General Pettigrew. Swinton and other writers have created the impression that Pickett's division alone reached, in order of attack, the position held by the enemy. You are the senior surviving brigadier who was with Pettigrew that day, and with you rests the opportunity to vindicate the good name of those troops and the fair fame of Pettigrew, who was one of the most cultivated, accomplished and chivalrous commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia.

I hope, therefore, you will contribute to the records of this Society your narrative of the final charge at Gettysburg.

Sincerely and always your friend,

DABNEY H. MAURY,  
*Chairman Executive Committee Southern Historical Society.*

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In the numerous accounts of the battle of Gettysburg heretofore published, the writers have generally referred to the last effort made by the Confederate troops as "Pickett's charge," and in almost every instance have conveyed the idea that no troops but Pickett's division took an active part in that fierce and tremendous struggle. Disclaiming any intention to detract in the least from the glory won on that day by the gallant Virginia division, or its heroic commander, who had then been for more than twenty years one of my most valued friends, I may be permitted to say that some injustice has been done to the division commanded by General Pettigrew.

As colonel of the Thirteenth Alabama infantry, I was attached to Archer's brigade of Heth's division. That brigade opened the battle on the morning of July 1st, and during the fighting which immediately ensued General Heth was wounded, and the com-



mand of the division devolved upon Brigadier-General Pettigrew. General Archer was captured, and I succeeded him in command of the brigade.

During the forenoon of the 3d, while our division was resting in line behind the ridge and skirt of woods which masked us from the enemy, Generals Lee, Longstreet and A. P. Hill rode up, and, dismounting, seated themselves on the trunk of a fallen tree some fifty or sixty paces from where I sat on my horse at the right of our division. After an apparently careful examination of a map, and a consultation of some length, they remounted and rode away. Staff officers and couriers began to move briskly about, and a few minutes after General Pettigrew rode up and informed me that after a heavy cannonade we would assault the position in our front, and added: "They will of course return the fire with all the guns they have; we must shelter the men as best we can, and make them lie down." At the same time he directed me to see General Pickett at once and have an understanding as to the *dress* in the advance. I rode to General Pickett, whose division was formed on the right of and in line with ours. He appeared to be in excellent spirits, and, after a cordial greeting and a pleasant reference to our having been together in work of that kind at Chapultepec, expressed great confidence in the ability of our troops to drive the enemy after they had been "demoralized by our artillery." General Garnett, who commanded his left brigade, having joined us, it was agreed that he would dress on my command. I immediately returned and informed General Pettigrew of this agreement. It was then understood that my command should be considered the centre, and that in the assault both divisions should allign themselves by it. Soon after the two divisions moved forward about a hundred paces, and the men lay down behind our line of batteries. The cannonade which followed has been often and justly described as the most terrible of the war. In it my command suffered a considerable loss. Several officers were killed and wounded, with a number of the rank and file. I received a painful wound on the right shoulder from a fragment of shell. After lying inactive under that deadly storm of hissing and exploding missiles, it seemed a relief to go forward to the desperate assault. At a signal from Pettigrew I called my command to attention. The men sprang up with cheerful alacrity, and the long line advanced. "Stormed at with shot and shell," it moved steadily on, and even when grape, canister, and musket balls began to rain upon it the gaps were quickly

closed and the alignment preserved. Strong as was the position of the enemy, it seemed that such determination could not fail. I heard Garnett give a command to his men which, amid the rattle of musketry, I could not distinguish. Seeing my look or gesture of inquiry, he called out, "I am dressing on you!" A few seconds after he fell dead. A moment later—and after Captain Williams and Colonel George had been wounded by my side—a shot through the thigh prostrated me. I was so confident of victory that to some of my men who ran up to carry me off I shouted, "Go on; it will not last five minutes longer!" The men rushed forward into the smoke, which soon became so dense that I could see little of what was going on before me. But a moment later I heard General Pettigrew, behind me, calling to some of his staff to "rally them on the left." The roll of musketry was then incessant, and I believe that the Federal troops—probably blinded by the smoke—continued a rapid fire for some minutes after none but dead and wounded remained in their front. At length the firing ceased, and cheer after cheer from the enemy announced the failure of our attack. I was of course left a prisoner.

As evidence of how close was the fighting at that part of the line, I saw a Federal soldier with an ugly wound in his shoulder, which he told me he received from the spear on the end of one of my regimental colors; and I remembered having that morning observed and laughingly commented on the fact that the color-bearer of the Thirteenth Alabama had attached to his staff a formidable-looking lance head. All of the five regimental colors of my command reached the line of the enemy's works, and many of my men and officers were killed or wounded after passing over it. I believe the same was true of other brigades in General Pettigrew's command.

It is probable that Pickett's division, which up to that time had taken no part in the battle, was mainly relied upon for the final assault; but whatever may have been the first plan of attack, the division under Pettigrew went into it as part of the line of battle, and from the commencement of the advance to the closing death grapple, his right brigade was the directing one. General Pettigrew, who I know was that day in the thickest of the fire, was killed in a skirmish a few days later. No more earnest and gallant officer served in the Confederate army.

B. D. FRY.

MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, December 14th, 1878.

## A Correction of Dr. McKim's Paper.

By Colonel J. R. WINSTON.

It seems almost impossible to get the facts of battles. Writers of the very highest standing make different statements about the same transaction. Rev. Dr. McKim, in sketch of Steuart's brigade on third day at Gettysburg, says (*Southern Historical Society Papers*, June, 1878, pages 298-9): "Daniel's brigade remained in the breastworks during and after the charge, and neither from that command nor from any other had we any support." Now, I know that Daniel's brigade went into the fight on General Steuart's line; as we went in I passed General Steuart, and as I came out (badly wounded) I again passed him. He stopped me and talked with me about my wounds. A portion of Daniel's brigade—some of the Forty-fifth North Carolina regiment—never did get behind breastworks, although they were exposed to two lines of works of the enemy. I can bear fullest testimony to the gallantry of General Steuart and his brave regiments of Virginians, Marylanders and Carolinians on that ensanguined field. They were indeed heroes. I claim this for Daniel's brigade also, without the addition. Of course it is to be presumed that General Daniel acted in obedience to orders (*idem*).

Dr. McKim says Steuart lost, in killed, wounded and missing, 680 men. The consolidated reports of the Army of Northern Virginia make the losses as follows in these two brigades:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Steuart's, . . .	51	250	301
Daniel's, . . .	135	643	778

Daniel lost very few men on that campaign except killed and wounded.

MILTON, N. C.



### **An Alleged Proclamation of President Lincoln.**

The following statement in reference to an alleged proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, said to have been prepared but never published, has been going the rounds of the press.

The letter from Judge Campbell, which we append, shows the inaccuracy of at least a part of the "unwritten history," and we doubt not that a thorough sifting would prove that the whole story is a *canard*. Who can give us additional facts?

[From Washington letter to New York Sun.]

In the dark and uncertain days preceding the outbreak of the rebellion there was much doubt in the mind of Mr. Lincoln regarding the disposition of the people North of the recognized dividing line between freedom and slavery to sustain aggressive measures for the preservation of the Union. State after State had seceded, and no demonstration had been made at the North to counteract the force of such movements at the South. On the contrary, there were public men who openly advocated a division of the Union into such parts as would suit geographical lines and their own interests and ambition. Notably, Mr. Hendricks favored a northwestern confederacy; some New Yorkers saw in the confusion of the times an opportunity to make their city the Venice of America; and some Californians thought a republic on the Pacific, with San Francisco for its commercial and political capital, would develop into mighty proportions before the end of the century. Horace Greeley had advocated in the *Tribune* peaceable separation and boldly proclaimed: "Let the erring sisters go in peace." The *Indianapolis Journal*, in the West, inspired by an ambition to "take a position," occupied the same ground. The Northern States sent peace commissioners to Washington to plead with the South for a peaceable solution of the difficulties and a maintenance of the Union. The Government, under Mr. Buchanan, did nothing to repress the military preparations making in the South, and when Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated there were nine States defying his authority and ready for war. His administration had a most formidable opposition in the two remaining States that seceded, and in those also that attempted to do so. His support at the North, in the event of war, he regarded as uncertain, and anarchy appeared inevitable.

In this condition of affairs commissioners appointed by Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, appeared on the scene, and through Judge Campbell, then late of the Supreme Court, who had resigned on the secession of Louisiana, commenced a negotiation for the surrender to that State of the Government forts and property within its limits. The commissioners were also aided by Dr. Todd,

of Kentucky, a brother of Mrs. Lincoln, who was in harmony with the views and actions of the South Carolinians. He was a temporary habitant at the White House, and acquired information in a private way that no one could have obtained in an official capacity, and which was made use of as time and circumstances required. The negotiations of South Carolina with the Government failed—not because of an indisposition to entertain the proposition submitted, but on account of the precipitate action of South Carolina troops in bombarding Fort Sumter. This made a peaceable dissolution of the Union a matter of impossibility and war an inevitable necessity.

While these negotiations were pending, however, a proclamation had been prepared recognizing the fact of the secession of certain States, and virtually acknowledging their independence, surrendering to them stated powers of the General Government over property and places within their limits, and guaranteeing them peaceable possession of the same on conditions specified. This proclamation had the sanction of Mr. Wade, of Ohio, and was in accordance with Mr. Greeley's frequently expressed views. With the appearance of the proclamation was to be an editorial in the Washington and New York papers sustaining the action of the administration. This was also prepared and held ready for use when the occasion demanded it. But the action at Fort Sumter changed all this, and a proclamation was issued instead for 75,000 men for three months to suppress rebellion; and war was thus accepted by an unwilling Government and people.

The proclamation calling for troops is a matter of history; that previously prepared looking to peace is not, and its existence must be proved from other sources than official records. The evidence on which it rests is the following statement: Mr. A. T. Cavis, a proof-reader at the Government printing office, is a gentleman of intelligence and culture, and of undoubted veracity. He is a native of Pennsylvania, but went to South Carolina in 1847, and remained until after the war. Previous to and during the war he was editor of the South Carolina *Guardian*, published at Columbia. His position gave him acquaintance and association with the State authorities, and he speaks from personal knowledge regarding the matters herein stated.

The proclamation looking to a peaceful separation of the States was obtained by Dr. Todd while at the White House, and by him given to Governor Pickens. It is not known how he came in possession of it, and it is not necessary to inquire into that now. But that he had the original draft of the proclamation, that it and the editorial designed to accompany its publication were written on official paper bearing the impress "Executive Mansion," is undoubtedly true. The proclamation and editorial were shown by Governor Pickens to Mr. Cavis, and by the latter published in his paper, the South Carolina *Guardian*. In the burning of Columbia by Sherman's troops the office and files of the *Guardian* were de-

stroyed, and there is no copy of the paper extant containing these documents. The original papers, however, are in the possession of Mrs. Pickens, at Edgefield, South Carolina, who has carefully preserved all the books and manuscripts collected by her late husband.

This is a most important and interesting fact connected with the unwritten history of the rebellion. It shows how difficult it was even for the most sagacious men to "read the signs of the times," and the events following proved that the people knew more than their rulers and assumed leaders.

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*Letter from Judge Campbell.*

NEW ORLEANS, 11th December, 1878.

Dr. J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society :*

My Dear Sir—Your letter of the 4th instant, inclosing a printed copy of a letter addressed to the New York *Sun* and published as containing "unwritten war history," and requesting some explanation on the subject, has been received.

The letter represents that after the inauguration of President Lincoln Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, appointed commissioners to visit Washington city, and who opened negotiations with the President, through me, for the surrender of the forts and property of the United States within that State; that there was a fair prospect of success and of a peaceable dissolution of the Union as the result of the negotiations, but the precipitate action of South Carolina troops in bombarding Fort Sumter made such a dissolution impossible and a war inevitable. The letter says I had previously resigned the office of judge of the Supreme Court of the United States because of the secession of Louisiana.

I have no information that will support any portion of this statement as matter of fact. I had no connection with commissioners appointed by Governor Pickens, and do not remember that he appointed any to visit President Lincoln. I conducted no negotiations with President Lincoln to effect a dissolution of the Union at that time, and have no reason to believe that he would have entertained such a proposition at any time. I remained a member of the Supreme Court of the United States until after the surrender of Fort Sumter. My only intercourse with the Executive Department of the United States having reference to the surrender of forts and property was that which Justice Nelson and myself had with Secretary Seward in March, 1861, and which continued on my part until the bombardment of Sumter. The facts in respect to this intercourse I have communicated to the Society, and were published in one of the earliest of its numbers. The determination of President Lincoln to abandon Fort Sumter voluntarily had been changed prior to the bombardment, and the bombardment



was superinduced by his attempt to supply it with provisions, thereby to overcome the necessity for yielding it.

The bombardment was ordered by the Confederate Government, at Montgomery, and was not the result of any precipitancy on the part of the South Carolina troops.

Very respectfully yours,

JOHN A. CAMPBELL.

We may simply add to the above that the efforts that have been made by Northern writers—that shine out conspicuously in the school “histories” and garnish their “religious” literature—to prove that the South “fired the first gun” and forced the North into a *war of defence*, are all utter perversions of the facts. The truth is that the whole aim and policy of the South was peace, not war—to be let alone, not to attack the North—and that when at last Major Anderson violated the agreement to “preserve intact the military status” by moving from Moultrie into Sumter—and Mr. Seward violated his solemnly-plighted word to the Confederate commissioners by attempting to reinforce and provision Sumter, and thereby convert it into a fortress for the subjugation of Charleston—“the first gun” had been virtually fired by the United States Government, and the reduction of the fort was *as purely an act of self-defence and self-preservation* as is to be found in all history. Indeed, the annals of no people struggling for independence afford an example of a more complete *defensive* war than was ours, nor a more stainless record than we can show in the conduct of the great struggle. And we may proudly await the verdict of history in the full confidence that it will be that of England’s accomplished scholar (Professor P. S. Worsley), who said, in his beautiful stanzas dedicating to General R. E. Lee his translation of the *Iliad*:

“Ah, realm of tombs!—but let her bear  
This blazon to the last of times:  
No nation rose so white and fair,  
Or fell so pure of crimes.”

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**Official Correspondence of Confederate State Department.**

[We have a number of letters of interest connected with the Confederate mission to Canada, &c., which have never been published, and we present below our first installment of them. Northern writers have been very abusive of "Holcombe and his co-conspirators"; but no one who knew personally our "our silver-tongued orator," or competent to appreciate his chivalric character, could doubt for a moment that he was very high above any taint of dishonor. We would cheerfully submit to the world as settling this point his most confidential letters.]

*Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
RICHMOND, 24th February, 1864.

Hon. J. P. HOLCOMBE, *Special Commissioner, &c., Richmond:*

Sir—You will receive herewith the sum of eight thousand dollars, of which five hundred dollars are in gold coin and the remainder in a bill of exchange for 1,546£. 7s. 10d., equivalent to seven thousand five hundred dollars, counting the pound sterling at \$4.85. This amount is placed in your hands to enable you to accomplish the objects set forth in my letter of the 19th instant.

You will appropriate five thousand dollars of the amount now paid to you, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to defraying the expenses incurred in carrying out the instructions of the Department. The remaining three thousand dollars are paid in compensation of your personal services and to provide for your personal expenses.

If the time occupied in the mission confided to you shall exceed six months, counting from the date of your commission, a further compensation will be allowed you at the rate of five hundred dollars per month.

You will be expected to furnish vouchers to this Department for the disbursement of the five thousand dollars. As this sum is furnished by the President from the secret service fund, your accounts will not pass through the Treasury, but will be settled in this Department. For any sum you may pay out of these five thousand dollars under circumstances or for purposes that do not permit your taking receipts, you will furnish a certificate on honor, which will be received as sufficient voucher. Your traveling expenses will be at your own charge, except in cases where the Government may be able to furnish transportation. You will be pro-

vided with transportation to Halifax, but on your return you will provide for yourself unless fortunate enough to meet with a Government vessel coming home, in which case no charge for passage will be made against you.

In addition to the duties confided to you by the instructions of the 19th instant, I have now, at the instance of the President, to add another.

We are informed that several hundred of the officers and men enlisted in our service who were captured by the enemy, are now in Canada, having escaped from prison; that they are without means of returning home, although anxious to resume service. The Government fully recognizes the duty of aiding these unfortunate public servants to reach their posts of duty, and can only regret that it was not sooner informed of their condition. You are requested to make in Canada and Nova Scotia the requisite arrangements for having passage furnished them via Halifax to Bermuda, where they will receive from Major Walker, the agent of the Department of War, the necessary aid to secure their passage home. Colonel Kane, from whom we have just learned the facts, suggests that a proper agent be employed at Montreal, who shall give public notice that he is authorized to furnish passage to the Confederacy of all officers and men heretofore enlisted in its service who desire to return to their homes; that the applicants be sent down the Saint Lawrence and round to Halifax by water, as the cheapest conveyance, and from Halifax to Bermuda. In Halifax you will find the mercantile house of B. Weir, to which you can apply with confidence for any advice or assistance in making these arrangements.

The whole number of escaped prisoners is supposed not to exceed four hundred, and it is not probable that all will make application.

You will receive herewith a letter of credit on Liverpool for twenty-five thousand dollars, which we presume to be enough for the present, and which you will use as may be needed for this purpose; and you are requested to send as early news as convenient of the prospect of restoring our fellow-citizens to their country, the number likely to come, and whether a further sum of money is necessary for the purpose.

It would be advisable, before acting in this matter, to inform the British colonial authorities of your design, in order to obviate any misrepresentations of our enemies, who will assuredly endeavor to



create the false impression that we are recruiting for our armies in British territory. You will explain that you are instructed scrupulously to avoid any breach of public or municipal law, and that your sole purpose is, as above explained, to aid our own people to return to their homes.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State.*

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*Letter from Hon. J. P. Holcombe.*

WILMINGTON, February 29, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A. :*

My Dear Sir—The Caledonia will not get out before to-morrow night, and I avail myself of the delay to write you unofficially a few lines. On inquiry of Mr. Power, I learn that it will be easy to prove Locke's residence (and probably citizenship) for many years in South Carolina, and he gives the name of a witness, which I enclose. It may be well to have his testimony taken and forwarded to me at Halifax.

In a Nassau paper received by the Lucy, just in, I observe a paragraph to the effect that Judge Stewart, of the Admiralty Court, had finally disposed of the Chesapeake by ordering a restoration of the ship and cargo to the original owners on payment of the costs in court. I think it probable that the colonial authorities will disclaim all authority to entertain any application for indemnity and refer me to the home Government. In the event of its being deemed unadvisable to institute any proceedings, appellate or otherwise, in the Court of Admiralty, this will present a contingency not embraced in my present instructions. I will, of course, make the earliest practicable report of the facts after my arrival at Halifax.

I find the Caledonia will be crowded with passengers sailing by order of the Government. Parr has agreed to wait and take his chance in the next vessel that goes out.

I hope Captain Lalor may be able to get out, but there seems no principle upon which a right to precedence is ascertained beyond priority, and I am fearful of the result.

I have been so fortunate as to secure a copy of Saturday's *Sentinel*, but have not yet read the interesting article it contains.

With great esteem, I am, &c., &c.,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

*Letter from Hon. J. P. Holcombe.*

SAINT GEORGE'S, March 12th, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A. :*

Sir—I avail myself of the earliest opportunity to inform you of the circumstances which have delayed my departure from this port. The Caledonia crossed the bar at Wilmington about ten o'clock on Tuesday night, the first of March. With the exception of that night and the succeeding day, we had fine weather, but the speed of the vessel was so much less than had been anticipated that we did not reach this island until Sunday night. The Caledonia, in a rough sea, with no more cargo than a few days' coal, would not average more than four knots and a half an hour. I ascertained, after her arrival here, that the unloading of her cargo, taking on coal for Halifax, and some repairs, would detain her until about the 15th of March, and that the British mail steamer for Halifax would leave here on Friday, the 18th. I thought that as under the most favorable circumstances I could only save a day or two of time, and in all probability would lose it during the voyage by taking the Caledonia, it would be best to save the Government the heavy expense and hazard of my trip in that vessel, and to take my passage for next Friday in the Alpha.

Captain Lalor being very solicitous to arrive in England at the earliest day, and finding that he would save nearly a week's time by going to Saint Thomas and thence to Southampton, I furnished him with oral instructions, with the money to pay his passage.

A slip which I inclose indicates the position taken by Judge Stewart in the Chesapeake, and upon which I should be gratified to have your opinion.

I remain, with great respect,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

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*Letter from Hon. J. P. Holcombe.*

HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA, April 1st, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A. :*

Sir—In the communication which I had the honor to transmit from Bermuda, I explained the reasons which induced me to turn the Caledonia over to her owners, and to engage my passage to Halifax in the British mail steamer Alpha. From what has since

transpired, it is certain that if I had escaped capture upon the Caledonia, there would have been no saving of time at all commensurate with the heavy expense to the Government which the employment of that vessel would have involved. The Alpha did not reach this port until the 23d of March, having been delayed for two days by a severe storm which it encountered soon after leaving the Gulf Stream. Upon my arrival I learned that the prisoners, whose delivery had been demanded by the United States under the extradition treaty, had been released by the judicial authorities of New Brunswick upon habeas corpus; and although new warrants are out for their arrest, it is not probable they can be executed. The most embarrassing phase which this case could assume would be presented for solution by the surrender of these men. Whatever may be the light in which the captors of the Chesapeake should be regarded according to the strict rules of law, the Government and people of the Confederate States cannot be indifferent to their fate. They imperilled life and liberty in an enterprise of great hazard, which they honestly believed was invested with the sanction of law, and to which, as a body, I have reason to think, they were mainly impelled by a generous sympathy with our cause. Whilst, therefore, in exercising the discretion confided to me, I have determined at least for the present to interpose no claim to the Chesapeake as prize of war on behalf of the Confederate States, I have endeavored to observe a diplomatic reticence as to the view which our Government may ultimately take of that transaction. I can imagine the existence of circumstances under which the Government, to save these brave and innocent men from a cruel and unrighteous doom, might claim the benefit of principles which it would not think it judicious to assert if the only interest at stake was one of property.

As to the Chesapeake, I find that she had been surrendered to her original owners without the almost invariable requisition of bail to answer prospective demands.

The reasons which induced the judge to depart from the established course of admiralty practice are contained in the opinion (of which I send you a copy). Taking the opinion and the conduct of the magistrate himself during the progress of the cause (of which I also transmit a history) together, I do not believe any judicial proceeding has taken place in a British court for a century and a half so discreditable to its dignity, its intelligence or its justice.



But notwithstanding my indignation at the offensive and unworthy bearing of Judge Stewart, I am not willing, after a full examination of the facts of this case, to commit the Government to interference with it in any form.

The moral weight which should attach to its interposition would be impaired by advancing a claim, which it is almost certain would be allowed neither by the British courts nor the British Government, and which we could sustain only by affirming principles doubtful in law and equivocal in morals. The facts upon which my opinion rests are these: Of the party actually engaged in the capture—fourteen or fifteen in number—only one has any claim to the character of a Confederate citizen or belonging in any way to service; this was the Second Officer, H. A. Parr, who, although born in Canada, had lived for the last seven years in Tennessee. The Lieutenant-Commanding, John C. Braine, I have ascertained beyond doubt, had been released from Fort Warren on the application of the British Minister, on the allegation of being a British subject. This, indeed, is the substance of his own admission; nor has he since been within the Confederacy.

Although he states that he had been in our military service at an earlier period, the declaration is probably untrue, and would not be received to contradict the deliberate and solemn allegation by which he obtained his liberty. He is, I think, estopped from claiming—what, in truth, I do not believe he ever possessed—the Confederate nationality. Passing over for the present the consideration of what effect Parker's connection with this enterprise may have upon its character, it appears to have been a capture made for the benefit of the Confederacy by a body of men, without any public authority, and who, with the single exception of a subordinate officer, were British subjects.

I do not think such a case can be brought within the application of the principle, perfectly well settled, and which in a war like the present our Government ought never to yield, that the citizen of a belligerent State, with or without a commission, may capture enemies' property at sea. That doctrine (as may be seen in the elaborate discussion of the opinions of British and foreign jurists by Judge Story, in the case of the *Ship Emulous*, 1 Gall. Rep., 563, 55; 8 Cranch, 110—a discussion which Mr. Phillimore pronounces perfectly exhaustive) is founded upon the hostile relations which the mere declaration of war creates between citizens of the contending States. A commission would appear to me indispen-

sable to enable a belligerent to claim for itself the benefit of captures made in its behalf by citizens of a neutral State. Parr's position may be, and in all probability is, very different from that of his associates; but it does not seem to me to have been sufficiently commanding to impress on the enterprise his own nationality. The question then recurs, whether the legal complection of this capture can be altered by Parker's connection with it, assuming that his Confederate character can be established by proof. In the absence of all facilities for investigation (the law library of the Province, to which I have access, being very meagre), I am not free from all doubt as to the correctness of my conclusions upon this point. The letters of marque, I am disposed to think, attach only to the vessel, and confer authority upon the master, whoever he may be, for the time being. They do not confer upon the commander a personal authority, which will survive the destruction of his ship (unless in reference to a prize which she may have captured) and enable him to act as a commissioned officer wherever he may be found. If I am correct in this, Parker can only be regarded as a private citizen of the Confederacy, with no right, such as he assumed, to enlist men or appoint officers in its service; and as he was not present when the Chesapeake was taken, the character of the capture must be determined by that of persons on board at the time.

If, however, I am mistaken in my view of the law upon this point (which I would be very glad to find), there is another principle which, whilst it would not affect the captors with any crime in the eye of public law, would no doubt be appealed to in order to deprive us of the fruits of the capture—I mean that enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of *L'Aneistad De Rues*, 5 Wheat, 385; the *Belle Corunes*, 6 Wheat, 152; *La Conception*, *ibid*, 235; *La Santissima Trinidad*, 7 Wheat, 283 and 9, to wit: that where a prize has been taken by any agency created in violation of neutral sovereignty, it will, if brought voluntarily within the neutral jurisdiction, be restored to the original owners. I do not know that the case of the *Chesapeake* can be brought within the range of any exception to this principle. The evidence contained in the report of the trial at Saint Johns (of which I send a copy) discloses a clear violation by Parker of the British foreign enlistment act; and upon this ground alone I apprehend that any claim we might advance to the *Chesapeake* would be defeated.

The conduct of the captors after the capture, in peddling the cargo in violation of the revenue laws of the Province, and the appropriation of a portion of the proceeds by some of them to their own use, and all the developments which have been made as to the motives and character of Braine, are calculated to throw so much suspicion and discredit around the whole transaction, that I should deem it unwise, even were the law supposed to be in our favor, without weightier reasons than now exist, to compromise the Confederacy by assuming its responsibility.

I cannot close this communication without bringing to the attention and notice of the Government the generous sympathy and liberal contribution in every matter in which the interests of the company were supposed to be involved, of some prominent gentlemen in this city, and especially of Dr. Almon, Mr. Keith, Mr. Weir and Mr. Ritchie. They have given money, time and influence without reserve, as if our cause had been that of their own country. I feel that I shall not transcend the spirit of my instructions in tendering Mr. Ritchie, of this city, and Mr. Gray, of Saint Johns, on behalf of the Confederacy, some compensation for professional services which were rendered most faithfully and laboriously and with no other object than to advance our cause. I feel that the gentlemen whose names I have given are entitled to some special acknowledgment from our Government of their handsome conduct, and I am certain it would be most highly appreciated by them, and would exercise a happy influence in this community.

It was so late before I could procure all the documents upon which to rest my action, that I am unable to embrace in this letter several matters I desire to bring to your attention.

With the highest consideration,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

P. S.—It may not be improper to add that the conclusions which I have reached are in accordance with the judgment of our most discreet and intelligent friends in this place.

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**The Death of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart.**

The circumstances attending the wounding and death of the "Flower of Cavaliers" (General J. E. B. Stuart) ought to be put in permanent form for the use of the future historian, for no history of the Army of Northern Virginia would be complete which did not give large space to the chivalric deeds of this great soldier.

Among our most precious memories of those stirring times are those which cluster around the person and character of Stuart. We remember him as he led an infantry charge on the outpost in the autumn of 1861—as he appeared at his headquarters on his red blanket on Munson's hill, with a kindly word and a cordial grasp for even the private soldier—as all through the campaigns which followed he appeared at the head of his column or in the heat of battle always gay, quick and daring—and especially do we love to recall him amid the sweets of social intercourse or sitting a deeply interested listener in the meetings of our Chaplains' Association at Orange Courthouse. We were present when he took leave of his devoted wife at the opening of the campaign of 1864, saw him several times amid those bloody scenes in the Wilderness, and wept with the whole army when the sad news came that the great cavalryman had fallen—that the "Chevalier Bayard" of the Confederacy had yielded up his noble life in defending our capital from imminent danger.

We would be glad to have from some competent hand a sketch of that last campaign of Stuart's, and a detailed account of the circumstances immediately connected with his fall. Meantime we give below the very interesting account of his last moments, which appeared at the time of his death in the *Richmond Examiner*:

No incident of mortality, since the fall of the great Jackson, has occasioned more painful regret than this. Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, the model of Virginian cavaliers and dashing chieftain, whose name was a terror to the enemy, and familiar as a household word in two continents, is dead—struck down by a bullet from the foe, and the whole Confederacy mourns him. He breathed out his gallant spirit resignedly, and in the full possession of all his remarkable faculties of mind and body, at twenty-two minutes to eight o'clock Thursday night, at the residence of Dr. Brewer, a relative, on Grace street, in the presence of Drs. Brewer, Garnett, Gibson, and Fontaine, of the General's staff, Rev. Messrs. Peterkin and Kepler, and a circle of sorrow-stricken comrades and friends.

We learn from the physicians in attendance upon the General, that his condition during the day was very changeable, with occasional delirium and other unmistakable symptoms of speedy dissolution. In the moments of delirium the General's mind wandered, and, like the immortal Jackson (whose spirit, we trust, has joined), in the lapse of reason his faculties were busied with the details of his command. He reviewed, in broken sentences, all his glorious campaigns around McClellan's rear on the Peninsula, beyond the Potomac, and upon the Rapidan, quoting from his orders and issuing new ones to his couriers, with a last injunction to "make haste."

About noon, Thursday, President Davis visited his bedside, and spent some fifteen minutes in the dying chamber of his favorite chieftain. The President, taking his hand, said, "General, how do you feel?" He replied, "Easy, but willing to die, if God and my country think I have fulfilled my destiny and done my duty." As evening approached the General's delirium increased, and his mind again wandered to the battlefields over which he had fought, then off to wife and children, and off again to the front. A telegraphic message had been sent for his wife, who was in the country, with the injunction to make all haste, as the General was dangerously wounded. Some thoughtless but unauthorized person, thinking probably to spare his wife pain, altered the dispatch to "slightly wounded," and it was thus she received it, and did not make that haste which she otherwise would have done to reach his side.

As the evening wore on, the paroxysms of pain increased, and mortification set in rapidly. Though suffering the greatest agony at times, the General was calm, and applied to the wound with his own hand the ice intended to relieve the pain. During the evening he asked Dr. Brewer how long he thought he could live, and whether it was possible for him to survive through the night. The Doctor, knowing he did not desire to be buoyed by false hopes, told him frankly that death, that last enemy, was rapidly approaching. The General nodded and said, "I am resigned if it be God's will; but I would like to see my wife. But God's will be done." Several times he roused up and asked if she had come.

To the Doctor, who sat holding his wrist and counting the fleeting, weakening pulse, he remarked, "Doctor, I suppose I am going fast now. It will soon be over. But God's will be done. I hope I have fulfilled my destiny to my country and my duty to God."

At half-past seven o'clock it was evident to the physicians that death was setting its clammy seal upon the brave, open brow of the General, and told him so; asked if he had any last messages to give. The General, with a mind perfectly clear and possessed, then made dispositions of his staff and personal effects. To Mrs. General R. E. Lee he directed that his golden spurs be given as a dying memento of his love and esteem of her husband. To his staff officers he gave his horses. So particular was he in small things, even in the dying hour, that he emphatically exhibited and

illustrated the ruling passion strong in death. To one of his staff, who was a heavy-built man, he said, "You had better take the larger horse; he will carry you better." Other mementoes he disposed of in a similar manner. To his young son he left his glorious sword.

His worldly matters closed, the eternal interest of his soul engaged his mind. Turning to the Rev. Mr. Peterkin, of the Episcopal Church, and of which he was an exemplary member, he asked him to sing the hymn commencing—

"Rock of ages cleft for me,  
Let me hide myself in thee,"

he joining in with all the voice his strength would permit. He then joined in prayer with the ministers. To the Doctor he again said, "I am going fast now; I am resigned; God's will done." Thus died General J. E. B. Stuart.

His wife reached the house of death and mourning about ten o'clock on Thursday night, one hour and a half after dissolution, and was of course plunged into the greatest grief by the announcement that death had intervened between the announcement of the wounding of the General and her arrival.

The funeral services, preliminary to the consignment to the grave of the remains of General Stuart, were conducted yesterday afternoon in Saint James' Episcopal Church, corner of Marshall and Fifth streets—Rev. Dr. Peterkin, rector. The *cortege* reached the church about five o'clock, without music or military escort, the Public Guard being absent on duty. The church was already crowded with citizens. The metallic case containing the corpse was borne into the church and up in the centre aisle to the altar, the organ pealing a solemn funeral dirge and anthem by the choir.

Among the pall-bearers we noticed Brigadier-General John H. Winder, General George W. Randolph, General Joseph R. Anderson, Brigadier-General Lawton and Commodore Forrest.

Among the congregation appeared President Davis, General Bragg, General Ransom, and other civic and military officials in Richmond. A portion of the funeral services according to the Episcopal church was read by Rev. Dr. Peterkin, assisted by other ministers, concluding with singing and prayer.

The body was then borne forth to the hearse in waiting, decorated with black plumes and drawn by four white horses. The organ pealed its slow, solemn music as the body was borne to the entrance, and whilst the *cortege* was forming—the congregation standing by with heads uncovered. Several carriages in the line were occupied by the members of the deceased General's staff and relatives. From the church the *cortege* moved to Hollywood Cemetery, where the remains were deposited in a vault, the concluding portion of the affecting service read by Rev. Dr. Minnigerode, of Saint Paul's Church, and all that was mortal of the dead hero was shut in from the gaze of men.



Doctor Brewer, the brother-in-law of General Stuart, has furnished us with some particulars obtained from the General's own lips of the manner in which he came by his wound. He had formed a line of skirmishers near the Yellow Tavern, when, seeing a brigade preparing to charge on his left, General Stuart, with his staff and a few men, dashed down the line to form troops to repel the charge. About this time the Yankees came thundering down upon the General and his small escort. Twelve shots were fired at the General at short range, the Yankees evidently recognizing his well-known person. The General wheeled upon them with the natural bravery which had always characterized him, and discharged six shots from his revolver at his assailants. The last of the twelve shots fired at him struck the General in the left side of the stomach. He did not fall, knowing he would be captured if he did, and nerving himself in his seat, wheeled his horse's head and rode for the protection of his lines. Before he reached them his wound overcame him, and he fell, or was helped from his saddle by one of his ever-faithful troopers, and carried to a place of security. Subsequently, he was brought to Richmond in an ambulance. The immediate cause of death was mortification of the stomach, induced by the flow of blood from the kidneys and intestines into the cavity of the stomach.

General Stuart was about thirty-five years of age. He leaves a widow and two children. His oldest offspring, a sprightly boy, died a year ago while he was battling for his country on the Rapahannock. When telegraphed that his child was dying, he sent the reply, "I must leave my child in the hands of God; my country needs me here; I cannot come."

Thus has passed away, amid the exciting scenes of this revolution, one of the bravest and most dashing cavaliers that the "Old Dominion" has ever given birth to. Long will her sons recount the story of his achievements and mourn his untimely departure.

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

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WE ADD SIXTEEN PAGES TO THIS NUMBER, and should be very glad to make it a permanent addition; but *that* depends on the status of our subscription list, and we beg our friends to send us promptly names and money.

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RENEWALS have been coming in with some degree of briskness, but many of our friends have neglected this important matter. Ask your neighbor if he has renewed, and send us some *new* names.

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REPORTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1864-5 are especially desired. The Archive Bureau at Washington lacks many of the most important of these reports, and our files also are very defective for these years. There were none of the battle reports later than May, 1863, published by the Confederate Congress; many of the reports for 1864-5 had never been sent to the War Department, and hence the great deficiency. But we are satisfied that many of these reports are still scattered through the country in the hands of the officers who prepared them or of others, and we beg our friends to make diligent inquiries and to endeavor to secure them for us. Remember that where parties are unwilling to surrender *originals*, we will receive them *as a loan* until copies can be made both for our office and the Archive Bureau in Washington.

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A CHROMO OF THE INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS at Montgomery, well executed from a photograph taken at the time, has been presented us by the general agent, Mr. Joseph Hurd, Prattsville, Ala., from whom it can be obtained.

It is said to be from the only photograph of that important event extant, and many will be glad to preserve in their homes this historical picture.

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### Book Notices.

*Life of Commodore Josiah Tattnall.* By Colonel Charles C. Jones, Jr. Savannah: Morning News Printing House.

We are indebted to the accomplished author for a copy of this very interesting biography of one whose gallant service for fifty years was an honor to the flag he bore, and whose death, after a well-spent life of nearly four score years, was so widely lamented.

The book gives a detailed and very interesting account of his ancestry, birth, school days in England; and his long and distinguished service in the United States navy until the secession of Georgia carried his allegiance with

his State, and caused him to resign his commission and enter the Confederate service.

His gallant service in command of the naval defences of South Carolina and Georgia is detailed, and then follows an account of his command of the iron-clad *Virginia* (*Merrimac*) after the wounding of Captain Buchanan. In this exceedingly interesting part of the narrative, official letters and reports of great historic value are given, and it is conclusively shown that the boasted "victory" of the *Monitor* over the *Virginia* is all a romance; but that, on the contrary, after the first encounter the *Monitor* avoided coming to close quarters with her more powerful antagonist, and declined the gaze of battle thrown down to her.

The circumstances under which Commodore Tattnall afterwards destroyed the *Virginia*, to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy, are detailed, and he is fully exonerated from all blame in the premises. His subsequent career in the Confederate service, his life after the war, and his death, are all vividly portrayed—the whole making a book of rare interest and great historic value.

Colonel Jones has done his work admirably, and the general *get up* of the book reflects great credit on both printers and binders.

*Memoirs of the War of the Southern Department.* By Henry Lee. A new Edition with Revisions and a Biography of the Author. By R. E. Lee. New York: University Publishing Company.

We are indebted to the publishers for this admirably gotten up edition of a standard work, which should be in every library. "Light Horse Harry" wielded a graceful pen, and his story of the campaign in the "Southern Department" is one of deep interest. But the volume now possesses a greatly enhanced value by the addition of the brief biography of his father by General R. E. Lee. This is prepared with a skillful arrangement of material, a delicacy of feeling, and a real power of narration which at the same time charms the reader and deepens the general regret that the distinguished author was not spared to complete his own memoirs of the second war for independence, which the whole world would have read with intensest interest, and received as *settling* all statement of facts which it might have given.

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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., March, 1879.

No. 3.

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### General Garland's Report of the Battle of Seven Pines.

[The following, from an original MS. in the handwriting of General Garland himself, was not published among the Confederate reports, and so far as we know has never before been in print. We publish it not only in accordance with our rule to give preference to *original* reports, but as giving the account of a great battle officially prepared by as gallant a soldier as ever drew sword in the cause of right.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION,  
June 3d, 1862.

Major J. W. RATCHFORD, *Assistant Adjutant-General, &c.:*

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this brigade in the battle of Saturday, the 31st ultimo.

The brigade had been on outpost duty upon the Williamsburg road for four days and nights previous to this engagement, during which portions of it had been sent forward three times to make reconnoissances, which brought on skirmishes with the enemy. Working parties had been engaged also night and day in cutting artillery roads and preparing defences. During the latter portion

of these four days the Fourth North Carolina (Major Grymes commanding) was sent to our assistance. I mention these circumstances to let it appear, in justice to my command, that their previous labors had been heavy and wearisome when they were assigned to lead the advance on the left of our attacking forces and bring on the engagement which followed.

In obedience to your orders for making the attack, I formed my brigade in the open field in front of our previous position on the left of the Williamsburg road in the following order, to wit: Fifth North Carolina, Colonel McRae—180 rank and file; Thirty-eighth Virginia, Colonel Edmonds—350 ditto; Twenty-third North Carolina, Colonel Christie—350 ditto; Twenty-fourth Virginia, Major Maury—450 ditto; Second Florida, Colonel Perry—435 ditto. The Second Mississippi battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, 300 strong, were deployed as skirmishers along the edge of the woods in front of the brigade, with general orders to keep one hundred and fifty yards in advance. The foregoing estimate makes the total strength of the brigade on that day 2,065, exclusive of Captain Bondurant's battery, left subject to Major-General Hill's own orders—since, being compelled to advance by the main road on my extreme right, I could not superintend it. In the foregoing order, upon hearing the signal the line of skirmishers promptly advanced into the woods in front, and the brigade followed, moving by the right flanks of regiments at deploying distance and taking direction from the right, which was ordered to keep in a short distance of the Williamsburg road.

Meanwhile, General Featherston's brigade (Colonel Anderson commanding) moved a quarter of a mile in rear as a support, whilst General Rodes and General Raines moved in corresponding position on the opposite side of the road.

My line of skirmishers had advanced only a few hundred yards when they encountered that of the enemy. The difficulties of the ground were almost insurmountable. The recent rains had formed ponds of water throughout the woods with mud at the bottom, through which the men waded forward knee-deep and occasionally sinking to the hips in boggy places almost beyond the point of extrication. The forest was so thick and the undergrowth so tangled that it was impracticable to see the heads of the several regiments as they moved forward, and the deploying intervals were in consequence very imperfectly preserved. Still all pushed onward with alacrity—so fast, indeed, that when the skirmishers became heavily

engaged, the regiments pressed upon their heels, and the fire became hot along our whole front before emerging from the woods. The regiments were brought into line of battle to support the skirmishers, who, without retiring behind them to reform, became in many places intermingled in their ranks, and so continued throughout the day. We drove the enemy before us out of the woods back into the abatis, where they had several regiments drawn up behind a fence to support them. I am of opinion that the line of skirmishers upon our right, on the opposite side of the road, did not advance so rapidly as our own, for Major Wilson, of the Second Mississippi battalion, reports that the right of our advancing line was subjected to a fire both from the front and flank. We had now reached the edge of the wood, where the abatis impeded our further advance, and the troops were under heavy fire. Sending my Aid, Lieutenant Halsey, my Adjutant-General, Captain Meem, and a courier to order the several regiments of the centre and left to move by the left flank, as previously concerted, and endeavor to turn the obstacles in front, I repaired to the right of my line to give the same orders. I now learned that Colonel McRae, suffering from previous illness, had been compelled to retire in a state of utter physical exhaustion. I had relied much upon his services in looking after the right of our long line in the woods. A portion of his regiment I found temporarily confused from causes no way reflecting upon their gallantry, and I assisted Major Sinclair to rally them, and they again went forward under his command (see his report). I also assisted Colonel Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina, to reform and send forward a portion of his regiment, which had halted under the impression that some order had been given to retire (see that report). About the same time, Major Maury having fallen, I assisted in keeping the Twenty-fourth Virginia to its place, some embarrassment and delay having been produced by his fall. During this time I was without any staff or couriers, having dispatched my Aid and Adjutant-General to carry orders, and my unemployed couriers were either wounded, dismounted or separated from me in going through the woods.

Hurrying forward in person to the abatis, I found that as the regiments emerged from the woods they overlapped each other as they deployed, and being thus in many places huddled together, were suffering terribly from the enemy's fire. The regimental commanders who had received my orders to move by the left flank were unable to effect the movement in good order under the galling



fire. The alternative was adopted to push the regiments forward through the abatis against the enemy, which was done—the Second Florida on the left and in advance; the Thirty-eighth Virginia now next on its right, only a little behind. I have mentioned the reasons which caused the other regiments to be not quite so far up at this time. But they were readily reformed (stragglers excepted), and went forward either by themselves or with other regiments now coming up to their support. I should have sent back earlier for the supporting brigade to hurry up to our support, but, as already mentioned, had no messenger to send, and could not leave for that purpose myself. I trusted to Colonel Anderson's intuition as an accomplished soldier to perceive that we were hotly engaged, and, as I anticipated, he arrived upon the field just at the proper time.

Meanwhile, my regiments had advanced more or less into the abatis—the Second Florida and Thirty-eighth Virginia up to the fence and driving away the gunners and killing the horses from a section of artillery near the road. We were losing heavily, especially in field and company officers. Within the space of a few minutes the Twenty-fourth Virginia had lost its only field officer wounded (Major Maury); the Twenty-third North Carolina all its field officers wounded or disabled and eight out of ten company commanders, and seventeen out of twenty-nine officers killed or wounded; the Second Florida two field officers and ten out of eleven company commanders killed or wounded; the Thirty-eighth Virginia, its colonel temporarily disabled, but who again took the field. The entire brigade of five regiments and a battalion was in front of the fight receiving the first shock of the enemy's force with only six field officers—two regiments without any—two more with one apiece. Add to this the list of casualties amongst company officers, shown in the returns, and it is not surprising that regimental lines were not accurately preserved. Yet nothing occurred to the disparagement of the general reputation of the troops. There were stragglers, few or many, as upon all other occasions, of course. The supporting brigade advancing at this opportune moment, and the passage of lines being a fete in tactics which had never been practiced by any of us, large fragments of those regiments, who were left without field or company officers, were joined in and continued forward with that brigade. The regiments with field officers remaining (the Second Florida and Thirty-eighth Virginia, especially) preserved a more distinct organization. I as-

sisted Major Wilson to collect some of the Second Mississippi battalion, and sent them on the left of the Twenty-eighth Georgia. Passing to the right where Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, before being wounded, had attached some of his companies to the Fourth North Carolina, I kept on the right with this mixed command up to the earthwork and rifle pits, placing them to hold the rifle pits and use them in reverse.

Arriving there, my horse, which had been shot at an earlier hour, became now so disabled that I was compelled to abandon him—accepting the use of Captain Mannings' until required by him to go after ordnance. I then mounted an artillery horse, which was twice struck with musket balls whilst I was upon him. Finding Major-General Hill, my division commander, near me, I reported to him, and rendered assistance for a time in conducting the reinforcements now arriving to their positions, and in rallying such regiments or parts of regiments as wavered anywhere on our part of the line. My own command now upon the field was intermingled in the manner already stated to a large extent with Colonel Anderson's brigade. The Second Florida and Thirty-eighth Virginia, having continued in the fight until a late hour, were sent back, under orders to supply their exhausted ammunition, about the same time with the Forty-ninth Virginia. These orders were given to them by Captain Meem, my Adjutant-General, upon learning that they were without a supply, and the orders were ratified by me. Riding back at the request of General Hill to communicate with General Wilcox, whose brigade was coming up, I found that Colonel Smith, Forty-ninth Virginia, had been directed by General Longstreet to join these regiments with his own and carry them back to the front. I of course resumed command of them myself, and now take especial pains in justice to them to call attention to their good conduct. The Second Florida captured the colors of the Eighth New York and forty-five or fifty prisoners, with several horses; was leading the advance and with other troops clearing men and horses from the section of artillery planted near the road, which the enemy never afterwards regained. The regiment kept in the fight up to the enemy's camp on the left. (See Colonel Perry's report of their action, part of which I saw and all of which I believe to be correct.)

The Thirty-eighth Virginia captured the marker's flag of the 104th Pennsylvania (Ringgold regiment) and nine prisoners, including one captain, and kept well up in the fight with or near the

Second Florida, retiring under orders as above stated. The casualties of these two regiments were heavy, as shown by the reports—those of the Second Florida especially so, being about forty-five per cent. of their force engaged, and the Thirty-eighth Virginia not much less.

Late in the afternoon I succeeded in separating and reorganizing my command, and held it under orders in reserve. Sleeping upon the field of battle, this brigade, along with Colonel Anderson's, was held in reserve on Sunday, the 1st instant, and was not engaged, there being no need for its services.

I am happy to be able to bear testimony to the gallantry and good conduct of all the field officers of the brigade. The unusual list of casualties amongst them shows that they were at their posts of duty and of danger. We have to mourn the loss of Major G. W. Call, Second Florida, and Major E. G. Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina—the latter mortally wounded, and since reported dead. These were gallant gentlemen and chivalrous soldiers. Colonel McRae, Fifth North Carolina, being compelled to retire, as already stated, from exhaustion, Major Sinclair acted very handsomely in supplying his place. Colonel Christie and Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston were both disabled while doing handsome service—Colonel Christie's horse being shot under him, and, in falling, throwing his rider against a tree, which bruised him severely; Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston being severely wounded at a later hour; Lieutenant-Colonel Pyles, Second Florida, being severely wounded in the gallant discharge of his duties; Major Call already killed, and ten out of eleven company commanders of the Second Florida killed or wounded. The position of Colonel Perry was critical and dangerous. He discharged his duty with signal honor to himself and to my perfect satisfaction. Colonel Edmonds, Thirty-eighth Virginia, had his horse wounded under him and himself struck with a fragment of spent shell, causing a painful contusion, yet he left the field only for a short space and returned to his command, which he led in the most handsome manner. Lieutenant-Colonel Whittle, Thirty-eighth Virginia, had his horse shot three times, and, being dismounted, fought gallantly forward on foot, doing everything in his power to contribute to the result of the day. Major Joseph R. Cabell, Thirty-eighth Virginia, also had his horse shot under him, and charging considerably in advance of his regiment, was the second man to place his hand upon a piece of the enemy's artillery and claim it as our own. The first man



was an officer of the Second Florida, killed soon afterwards, perhaps Captain Flagg. Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor and Major Wilson, of the Second Mississippi battalion, did their whole duty throughout the day, and succeeded in reforming parts of their line of skirmishers into bodies and carrying them into the fight. I regret that circumstances did not afford their fine battalion the best opportunity for separate action on that day. Major Maury, Twenty-fourth Virginia, had his horse shot and himself soon after wounded at an early hour, whilst gallantly leading his regiment into the fight. We felt his absence throughout the day. I refer to the list of casualties as a roll of honor for our company officers without reiterating names.

The following officers and men are brought to my attention in the reports of regimental commanders, who claim for the survivors the badge of honor to be awarded under general orders, to wit:

*Thirty-eighth Virginia.*

Captain E. W. Carrington (dead); Captain S. S. Lucke (dead); Lieutenant S. A. Swanson (dead); Lieutenant William Norman (dead); Lieutenant Charles Scott (dead); Color-Bearer R. McDowell (dead).

Company A—Sergeants Gardner and Turner (dead).

Company D—Privates L. P. H. Tarpley and Neal Gilbert.

Company E—Sergeant Shackelford.

Company G—Privates Robert Holmes, Alexander Gilchrist, John D. Algood, Giles A. Burton, James Wilson, James R. Bugg and R. D. Riggins; Corporal Hugh N. Weatherford.

Company I—Privates Eli D. Sizimore, Thomas L. Sizimore, Anderson Solomon, Robert W. Vaughan, Richard Wilson, John B. Gold and James Belcher.

Company K—Sergeants G. W. Morrison and C. C. Marshall; Privates John Burlington, E. H. Estes, R. J. Hatcher and John R. Billings; Corporal R. C. Fortune (killed).

(The officers commanding Companies A, B, E and F are now absent, wounded; they may have names to present hereafter.)

*Second Florida.*

Company A—Sergeant Riley (distinguished both at Seven Pines and at Williamsburg); Corporal Rasson; Musician Cushman; Privates Bradley, Bryant, Hooper, Kennedy and Reed (special case).

Company B—Lieutenants Jenkins and Thompson; Privates Finley, Crosby, Colson, Tidwell, Parker and Malphus; Sergeant Williams, Color-Bearer.

Company C—Corporal J. B. Cason; Privates Gathegan, Wilkinson, Cone and Miller.

Company D—Lieutenant Parker (who captured the colors of the Eighth New York); Sergeant Stephens; Privates Rawls, Morrison and Waller.

Company E—Captain McCaslin; Lieutenant Reynolds (dead); Sergeant Roberts; Corporals Howard and Cross; Private Burleson.

Company F—Captain Pooser (killed); Privates Irvin (killed), Tillinghast, Pooser and Butler.

Company G—Captain Flagg (killed); Lieutenants Brown and Wright, and Sergeant Roberts—wounded; Private Masters.

Company H—Lieutenant Carlisle; Privates Papy (killed), Halman (wounded), A. Dupont and Crabtree.

Company I—Corporal Belate (wounded).

Company K—Captain Butler (killed).

Company L—Captain Perry (killed); Privates Herndon, Dampier, Horton and Wilder.

*Fifth North Carolina.*

Lieutenant J. M. Taylor, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant J. A. Jones.

Company E—Sergeant J. M. Miller, Color-Bearer; Corporals L. Bain and Benjamin Rollins.

Company H—Sergeant James Goodman (for gallantry here and Williamsburg).

*Second Mississippi Battalion.*

Company A—Private Sutton; Company B—Private Willis; Company C—Private Williams; Company G—Sergeant Weeks; Company H—Private Hankinson.

The field officers of the Twenty-fourth Virginia and the Twenty-third North Carolina being all absent, their lists of merit have not yet been forwarded.

Captain Bondurant reports the fine conduct of Orderly Sergeant J. L. Moore and Private Joseph Blankenship.

In this connection it is proper to say that the Jeff. Davis artillery Captain Bondurant, proceeded under orders from General Hill down the road to support the advance of the infantry; until encountering a heavy fire, they were ordered to find a position to

the right of the road, where Captain Bondurant delivered a telling fire, first with two and then with all six pieces. Later in the afternoon he was ordered up near the captured works to relieve Captain Carter and rake the road. He reached that ground in time to render handsome service in playing upon the enemy's reinforcements coming up the road. The loss of the battery was Private Knight, killed; Privates J. A. Meek and James Spinner, wounded; twelve horses killed or disabled.

I must not omit to acknowledge the valuable services of Captain Gardner, Assistant Adjutant-General upon General Early's staff, who volunteered to render me his assistance. I assigned him to duty with the Twenty-fourth Virginia, with whom he went into the fight, exhibiting both coolness and discretion.

In concluding this report, it becomes my duty to pay the last tribute of respect to the memory of my Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain J. Lawrence Meem, whose conspicuous gallantry won the admiration of all who saw him, and added to the laurels which he had gathered at Williamsburg and on previous fields. At a late hour he was instantly killed. By his death the service is deprived of a gifted young officer and society of a favorite whom we shall long deplore.

My Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant D. P. Halsey, having attracted universal applause throughout my entire command by his handsome behavior, was rallying a disordered regiment and leading it forward with their colors in his hand, when he received a dangerous wound in the head, which will deprive me of his valuable services for a long time to come.

Having thus most imperfectly reported the operations of my command, I forward herewith the reports of the subordinate commanders and complete lists of casualties, showing the loss of the brigade to be—

Killed outright,	.	.	.	.	.	.	98.
Wounded,	.	.	.	.	.	.	600
Missing,	.	.	.	.	.	.	42
Grand total,							740

Half of the missing supposed by regimental commanders to be killed or wounded.

I have the honor to be, Major, your obedient servant,

S. GARLAND, JR.,

*Brigadier-General, commanding Third Brigade, Hill's Division.*



*Succinct Statement of Loss.*

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
General staff, . . . . .	1	1	—
Fifth North Carolina, . . . . .	1	26	—
Twenty-fourth Virginia, . . . . .	12	86	9
Thirty-eighth Virginia, . . . . .	16	117	14
Twenty-third North Carolina, . . . . .	18	145	6
Second Florida, . . . . .	37	152	9
Second Mississippi Battalion, . . . . .	12	71	4
Jeff. Davis Artillery, . . . . .	1	2	—
	<hr/> 98	<hr/> 600	<hr/> 42

J. R. CABELL,

*Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.*

June 6th, 1862.

**The Second Battle of Manassas.**

By Colonel ROBERT M. MAYO.

[We cheerfully give place to the following sketch as relating important events which came under the personal observation of a gallant officer and reliable gentleman, and as meeting the rule of publication upon which we have acted: *Let the history be written, as far as possible, by those who made it.*]

It is said that after General Grant had finished reading Sherman's book on the late war, he remarked that before reading that book he had imagined that *he* had taken some part in the war, but that he had now discovered that he was mistaken. So we of Jackson's corps had supposed that we did a little towards the repulse of the Federals in their attack on our lines on the 30th of August, 1862, at Manassas, and we would still be laboring under that delusion but for the kindly information from General Longstreet, that his artillery did the whole work.

For the sake of some of our Northern brethren whose eyes may fall upon this article, I could well wish that some other than General Longstreet had made this discovery, as, since that gentleman has gotten on the *right side* in politics, anything that we poor Southerners may say in contradiction of his promulgations is set down at the North as a "Rebel lie." But I propose that what I am

going to say in just praise of that most gallant charge of Reno's division, to which General Longstreet's article has done gross injustice, shall be a setoff to any suspicion of a want of "*true loyalty*" on my part.

It may be considered very presumptuous for one who rose to no higher rank than that of Colonel to contradict the assertions of a Lieutenant-General; and I should probably not dare to do so, were it not that I have an ocular proof of what I am going to state in the shape of the scar of a wound on my right hand, which is staring me in the face as I write this, and which was received in *retaking* our lines which had been *broken* by Reno's men after *they* had been "*repulsed*" by General Longstreet's artillery.

The *facts* of the case are about as follows:

The lines of Jackson and Longstreet formed a considerably re-entrant angle, and the artillery was placed on a hill just between the two corps. The Federals, in advancing to attack Jackson, were exposed for more than half a mile to the fire of this artillery. Jackson's troops were in two lines—the front occupying the line of the uncompleted railroad, and the second being in a wood about a quarter of a mile or less in rear of the first. My regiment belonged to Field's brigade (of A. P. Hill's division), which was just in rear of the Louisiana brigade and the Stonewall brigade. The former was stationed at a very deep cut of the railroad, and the latter just where the cut ran out, and where there was but little protection. The cut was too deep to fight from, and the Louisiana brigade took position beyond it, behind the dirt which had been thrown out and which formed an excellent breastwork.

Reno's men, advancing under the fire of our artillery, fought the Louisianians until the ammunition of the latter was exhausted, and then drove them back into the deep cut, where they were fighting with stones, when relieved by our brigade. The Stonewall brigade, not having the same protection as the Louisiana brigade, was broken and scattered through the woods. It was then that the second line was ordered forward to retake the position. I do not know how much more of our first line was broken, and I am confining myself to what I know of my own personal knowledge and what I saw with my own eyes.

The charge of the Federals on this occasion was not surpassed in gallantry by any that was made during the war—not even by Pickett at Gettysburg.

To have passed through such a fire of artillery, which almost en-

filaded their line, and to have broken the Stonewall brigade, composed of troops equal to Napoleon's Old Guard, was an act of gallantry not to be surpassed by any troops of any army.

As my brigade advanced through the woods to retake the position, the minnie balls were rattling like hail against the trees, and as we debouched into the field through which the railroad cut ran, nothing could be seen between us and the smoke and fire of the enemy's rifles except the tattered battle-flag of the Louisiana brigade; the staff of this was stuck in the ground at the edge of the cut, and the brigade was at the bottom of it throwing stones.

About midway between the woods and the cut I received a wound in the hand; but before we reached the cut, the enemy, who had been terribly punished, commenced to retreat, or, I may say, to fly in great disorder.

We were ordered to halt at the cut; but some of the command, among whom was Major Poinsett Tayloe, of my regiment, with a considerable number of the men, did not hear the order, and continued the pursuit for some distance beyond.

As soon as the battle was over I went to the rear to have my wound dressed, and having found the "field hospital," I slept that night with one of the surgeons under a wagon.

The next day Dr. W. A. Spence (our brigade surgeon) and I rode over the whole battlefield together. So thick were the enemy's dead along those portions of the line where they had fought, that I found myself mentally repeating, as I rode along, those lines which Campbell puts into the mouth of Lochiel—

"Though my perishing ranks be strewn in their gore  
*Like ocean weeds heaped on a surf-beaten shore.*"

They lay peculiarly thick just in front of the railroad cut; in some instances one on the top of another, and up almost to the very edge of the cut. These were all killed by *minnie balls*.

Especially for the purpose of ascertaining what destruction had been done by our artillery, the Doctor and I rode over the ground which had been commanded by it. Several hundred yards in front of the railroad cut and near a small persimmon tree, we found four bodies which were lying together and had evidently been killed by the same shell. On a hill about three-quarters of a mile from our guns we found another body that had been killed by the artillery. These *five* were all that we could find, and we wondered at the time, and often spoke of it afterwards, how so many men



could march such a long distance under the fire of so many guns and yet so few of them be killed.

Our brigade, on the day of this fight, was commanded by Colonel Brockenbrough of the Fortieth Virginia, General Field having been severely wounded on the day before. We had but little difficulty, and lost very few men, in retaking the line, as the enemy had lost very heavily and had become considerably scattered in their fight with the Louisiana and Stonewall brigades.

ROBERT M. MAYO,  
*Late Colonel Forty-Seventh Virginia Infantry.*

HAGUE, Westmoreland County, Virginia.

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### The Battle of Aversboro'.

By Captain GRAHAM DAVES.

[We take pleasure in publishing the following *addendum* to General Taliaferro's report, and we are quite sure that there was no intentional omission of proper reference to the services of the gallant North Carolinians.]

NEWBERN, NORTH CAROLINA, January 28th, 1879.

*To the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society:*

Sir—General Taliaferro's report of the battle of Aversboro' [not *Averysboro'* as printed], published in the January number of the *Historical Papers*, makes no mention of a battalion of North Carolina troops conspicuous in that action—suffering the loss, among others, of its commanding officer—and which, so far as known to the writer, was the only body of North Carolina infantry actively engaged in the battle in question.

The following notice is not unmerited, and is intended to supply merely what seems to be an omission—not to reflect in any way upon the General or his report.

The battalion, upwards of two hundred muskets strong, under command of its senior officer, Captain Armand L. de Rosset, of Wilmington, North Carolina, had been assigned to General Stephen Elliott's brigade a day or two before the engagement. Not a great many of the officers at Aversboro' had had much experience in infantry field fighting. Captain de Rosset was one of the few who had, he having served with distinction, as an officer of the Third

North Carolina infantry, in the Army of Northern Virginia through the campaigns of both 1862 and 1863, in which he was twice wounded, first at Sharpsburg, and again at Chancellorsville.

On the morning of the 16th of March, at Averasboro', the battalion was moved to the left of Rhett's brigade, which held the left of our line. During the fighting of that morning, as described by General Taliaferro, Captain de Rosset, finding his men slowly pressed back, asked Colonel W. B. Butler, commanding Rhett's brigade, for orders; explaining that General Elliott was too far away, on the extreme right, to report to in the emergency. Colonel Butler replied: "I have no orders to give you;" his answer being evidently prompted by a not unnatural reluctance to give orders to troops under fire not a part of his command and not ordered to report to him. In the handling of his own brigade Colonel Butler evinced great skill and excellent judgment, and his praises were in every mouth. Turning then to an officer commanding a Georgia battalion on his right—probably the Twenty-third—Captain de Rosset advised that the two commands charge and retake the position from which they had been forced. This was determined upon, but in the act of giving orders for the formation for the movement, Captain de Rosset fell, almost at Colonel Butler's feet, shot through the lungs, as was supposed, mortally wounded. Even in that situation he rallied a few men, who had broken, before being carried to the rear.

When the army moved on towards Bentonville, Captain de Rosset, with the other dangerously wounded, was left and fell into the hands of the enemy. They, finding it impossible to remove him, first relieved him of all superfluous personalty, and then paroled him. Kind friends came to him from Raleigh, passing through the lines of both armies under a safe conduct obtained from General Beauregard by the writer; and, contrary to all expectation, their gentle nursing effected his recovery.

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**The Last Telegrams of the Confederacy.**

The following were among the last telegrams ever sent by President Davis or the Secretary of War. We have the originals, written in pencil and in the autographs of these distinguished leaders, and shall preserve them in our archives as memorials of those last sad days which closed our grand struggle for independence. Neither of these telegrams have ever been published in any form, so far as we know:

CHARLOTTE, N. C., April 24, 1865.

General J. E. JOHNSTON, *Greensboro', N. C.:*

The Secretary of War has delivered to me the copy you handed to him of the basis of an agreement between yourself and General Sherman. Your action is approved. You will so inform General Sherman; and if the like authority be given by the Government of the United States to complete the arrangement, you will proceed on the basis adopted.

Further instructions will be given as to the details of negotiation and the method of executing the terms of agreement when notified by you of the readiness on the part of the General Commanding the United States forces to proceed with the arrangement.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Official: M. H. CLARK,  
*Chief Clerk Executive Office.*

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CHARLOTTE, N. C., April 24, 1865.

General J. E. JOHNSTON, *Greensboro', N. C.:*

The President has written a telegram approving your action and the agreement of the 18th instant. I presume you have or will receive it to-day.

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,  
*Secretary of War.*

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CHARLOTTE, N. C., 24th April, 1865.

General B. BRAGG, *Charleston, S. C.:*

I hope even the small force with you will be effective in preventing those irregularities to which I suppose you refer, and that your presence will secure good administration, now so important in the care and transportation of supplies. I expect to join you in a few days.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.



**Operations of Second South Carolina Regiment in Campaigns of 1864 and 1865.**

By Colonel WILLIAM WALLACE, Commanding.

At sunrise on the morning of the 6th of May, we were marching by the right flank along the Plank road when suddenly we heard firing; heard the minnie balls whistling and falling amongst us; saw our troops running rapidly to the rear, and learned that the enemy had surprised and routed them. Kershaw's division formed line in the midst of this confusion, like cool and well trained veterans, as they were, checked the enemy and soon drove them back. The Second regiment was on the left of the Plank road, near a battery of artillery, and, although completely flanked at one time by the giving way of the troops on the right, gallantly stood their ground, though suffering terribly; they and the battery keeping up a well directed fire to the right oblique until the enemy gave way. General Lee now appeared on our left, leading Hood's brigade. We rejoined our brigade on the right of the Plank road, and again advanced to the attack. As we were rising a wooded hill we were met by one of our brigades flying in confusion, the officers in vain endeavoring to rally their men. We met the enemy on the crest of the hill and again drove them back. We were soon relieved by Jenkins' brigade, under command of that able and efficient officer, General Bratton, and ordered to march to the rear and rest. We had scarcely thrown ourselves upon the ground when General Bratton requested that a regiment should be sent him to fill a gap in the lines which the enemy had discovered and were preparing to break through. I was ordered to take the Second regiment and report to him. A staff officer showed me the gap, when I double-quickened to it and reached it just in time, as the enemy were within forty yards of it. As we reached the point we poured a well directed volley into them, killing a large number and putting the rest to flight. General Bratton witnessed the conduct of the regiment on this occasion, and spoke of it in the highest terms. The enemy, up to this time, had been routed at all points, and General Longstreet was just advancing to give the finishing stroke to the victory, by cutting them in half, when he was unfortunately wounded by our own men.

Our regiment lost severely by this battle. Colonel Kennedy was again wounded and the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Gaillard killed,

both early in the action, when fighting near the battery. The command of the regiment consequently devolved upon myself as the only field officer present. The 7th was spent in burying the dead and marching slowly towards the right. At night we made a forced march towards Spotsylvania Courthouse, near which point we arrived at daylight and slept till sunrise, when we were aroused and double-quickened about a mile. We had just been placed in position by General Stuart, of the cavalry, when the enemy advanced to the attack, thinking they would meet nothing but cavalry. We opened a terrific fire upon them which killed a great many and drove the rest back in confusion. They soon returned, however, bringing artillery to bear upon our frail breastworks of rails. The men stood their ground, however, and again drove them back with great slaughter. General Stuart remained with our regiment during the entire action, sitting on his horse amidst a storm of bullets, laughing and joking with the men and commending them highly for their courage and for the rapidity and accuracy of their fire. Poor fellow! he left us after the fight was over, and, to the regret of all, we heard a few days after of his death. The rest of the army soon came up and fortified the heights which we held that morning. The battle raged with great fury for several days, but Grant, finding that he could not reach Richmond by that route, rolled on towards the Pamunkey. He made a feint at Northanna bridge, but finding Lee ready for him, continued his march for the Peninsula.

The regiment did good service at this point, four companies holding the bridge successfully against a large force of the enemy.

Grant still rolling on by his left flank, Lee marched by his right to be ready to confront him whenever he should offer battle. This he did again at Cold Harbor, about the 1st of June. One brigade, under the lamented Colonel Keitt, was sent out to reconnoitre and came upon the enemy in large force, strongly entrenched. Keitt was killed and the brigade suffered severely. A few skirmishers thrown out would have accomplished the object of a reconnoissance and would have saved the lives of many brave men. Our troops, finding the enemy entrenched, fell back and began to fortify. Soon our line was established and the usual skirmishing and sharpshooting commenced. That same afternoon, being on the extreme left of Kershaw's division, I received orders to hasten with the Second regiment to General Kershaw's headquarters. I found the General in a good deal of excitement. He informed me that our line had been broken on the right of his division, directed me to hasten

there and if I found a regiment of the enemy flanking his position to charge them. I hurried to the point indicated, found that our troops, to the extent of a brigade and a half, had been driven from their works and the enemy in possession of them. I determined to charge, however, and succeeded in driving them from their position with but little loss. Our regiment numbered one hundred and twenty men. The enemy driven out consisted of the Forty-eighth and One-hundred-and-twelfth New York. We captured the colors of the Forty-eighth, took some prisoners and killed many whilst making their escape from the trenches. We lost in this charge one of our most efficient officers, Captain Ralph Elliott, a brother of General Stephen Elliott. He was a brave soldier and a most estimable gentleman.

The regiment was at the siege of Petersburg and did good service there. They threw up breastworks under a heavy fire, and held them for eight days until relieved. The regiment was then held in reserve at Petersburg and was thrown continually to the extremities of the line to resist the flank movements of the enemy. It was afterwards sent to the Valley and operated there under General Early for several months, sharing his victories and defeats. It was then ordered back to the lines in front of Richmond, and was marched almost every night in midwinter, the ground covered with snow, to some threatened point, and was at last sent to South Carolina, in January, 1865, to aid in defending its native State from the invasion of Sherman. But they were marched to Charleston whilst Sherman was burning Columbia, evacuated that place with scarcely an enemy in sight, and were conducted in ignominious retreat into North Carolina, while Sherman, unresisted, was destroying the vitals of their State. The regiment was engaged in the two small battles in North Carolina—Bentonville and Averasboro'. They were small affairs and merely intended as temporary checks to the enemy. General Joe Johnston, I believe, never had any other object in view. The regiment was reorganized at Smithfield, North Carolina, by the consolidation of the Twentieth with it. It retained its name and colors. It had five hundred men present for duty. Its officers were William Wallace, Colonel; J. D. Grahame, Lieutenant-Colonel, and J. S. Leaphart, Major. The regiment remained at Smithfield for some weeks, reorganizing and drilling, and then marched to join General Lee. At Raleigh we heard rumors of his surrender, which were not believed; but soon



after they were confirmed by stragglers from his army, whom we met on our march. We soon after surrendered to General Sherman at Greensboro', and, being paroled, returned home.

WILLIAM WALLACE,  
*Colonel Second South Carolina Regiment.*

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**Report of General Harris Concerning an Incident at the Battle of the Wilderness.**

HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE, December 2d, 1864.

Lieutenant-General R. H. ANDERSON :

General—Your note, inquiring about an incident which happened on the evening of the sixth of May last, in the Wilderness, during the advance of my brigade, is received. The main facts related by you are true. The enemy were moving by the flank with the apparent intention of getting in rear of the brigades of Davis, Perry and Law, when my brigade suddenly encountered them. They halted, came to a front and fired one volley, which wounded Colonel Manlove and four or five of my men.

My command then fired, gave a yell and charged, driving the enemy with ease, killing thirty or forty, including one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, a captain and inspector of ordnance on General Burnside's staff; wounding many and capturing ninety or one hundred, including one colonel.

Hoping this incomplete narration of facts will prove satisfactory, I am, General, with high respect, your obedient servant,

W. H. HARRIS, *Brigadier-General.*

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**Official Correspondence of Confederate State Department.***Letter from Mr. Benjamin.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

RICHMOND, 20th April, 1864.

Hon. JAMES P. HOLCOMBE, &amp;c., &amp;c.:

Sir—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your dispatch of the 1st instant, giving the result of your investigation into the facts connected with the capture of the steamer Chesapeake and the action of the British Colonial authorities in relation to the vessel and cargo and the parties concerned in the capture; also inclosing the printed pamphlet and newspapers containing reports of the judicial proceedings and decisions.

A careful examination of the whole subject has brought this Government to the same conclusion as has been reached by yourself, and we cannot hesitate to admit that the facts as now established present the case in an aspect entirely different from that in which we viewed it on the representations made by the parties engaged.

In the instructions prepared for your guidance in the conduct of this business, it was carefully pointed out that they were based on the supposition of the truth of the following facts:

First. That John C. Braine and Henry A. Parr were citizens of the Confederate States, enlisted in its military service, had been prisoners in the hands of our enemies, and that having escaped to New Brunswick, they there devised a stratagem for the capture of an enemy's vessel on the high seas, which was successfully carried out by the seizure of the Chesapeake.

Second. That acting exclusively as belligerents in the public service of their country, they touched at a point or points in the British Colonial possessions for the sole purpose of procuring the fuel indispensable to making the voyage to a Confederate port.

Third. That there had been no violation of the neutrality, nor of the sovereign jurisdiction of Great Britain, by any enlistment, real or pretended, of British subjects on British territory for service in the war waged by us against the United States.

It now appears from your own inquiries into the facts and from the judicial proceedings that we were led into error, and that the truth is as follows:

First. That the expedition was devised, planned and organized in a British Colony by Vernon G. Locke, a British subject, who, under the feigned name of Parker, had been placed in command of the Privateer Retribution by the officer who was named as her commander at the time of the issue of the letters of marque.

Second. That Locke assumed to issue commissions in the Confederate service to British subjects on British soil, without the slightest pretext of authority for so doing, and without being himself in the public service of this Government.

Third. That there is great reason to doubt whether either Braine, who was in command of the expedition, or Parr, his subordinate, is a Confederate citizen, and the weight of the evidence is rather in favor of the presumption that neither is a citizen, and that the former has never been in our military service.

Fourth. That Braine, the commander of the expedition, after getting possession of the vessel and proceeding to the British Colonies, instead of confining himself to his professed object of obtaining fuel for navigating her to a Confederate port, sold portions of the cargo at different points on the coast, thus divesting himself of the character of an officer engaged in legitimate warfare.

Although at the period of your departure from Richmond we had no reason to doubt the statements made, it was considered imprudent to act on them without further inquiry, and your instructions were therefore closed with the following sentences:

"Before closing these instructions it is proper to add that they are based on the statement of facts which precedes them, but our sources of information are not perfect enough to permit entire reliance. You will be able on arrival at Halifax to ascertain whether there be any important divergence between the facts as they really occurred and those assumed in this dispatch. In such event you will exercise a prudent discretion in your action, and be at liberty to modify your conduct, or even to abstain altogether from any interference with the matter. While desirous of upholding to the full extent the rights and interests of our country, we wish particularly to avoid the presentation of demands not entirely justified by the principles of public law and international morality."

I have the directions of the President to intimate to you his satisfaction with your exercise of this discretion. The encroachment on the sovereign jurisdiction of Her British Majesty over her Colonial possessions in North America, and the violation of the neutrality proclaimed by Her Majesty, as disclosed in the judicial proceedings, are disclaimed and disapproved by this Government.



While we maintain and shall continue to uphold the right and duty of every citizen of the Confederate States and every foreigner enlisted in their service to wage warfare, openly or by strategem, upon the vessels of our enemies on the high seas, whether armed or not, we distinctly disclaim and disavow all attempts to organize within neutral jurisdiction expeditions composed of neutral subjects for the purpose of carrying on hostilities against the United States. The capture of the Chesapeake, therefore, according to the facts now disclosed, so far from forming the basis of any demand on the part of this Government, is disclaimed.

The President is much gratified that the superior judicial authorities of New Brunswick have rejected the pretensions of the Consul of the United States that the parties engaged in this capture should be surrendered under the Ashburton treaty for trial by the courts of the United States on charges of murder and piracy. The case as presented seems to be simply that of men who, sympathizing with us in a righteous cause, erroneously believed themselves authorized to act as belligerents against the United States by virtue of Parker's possession of the letters of marque issued to the Privateer Retribution. They may possibly have been conscious that they were acting in opposition to the policy and wishes of their Government; but no reason exists for supposing that they entertained any such motives as would justify their being charged with a graver misdemeanor than disobedience to Her Majesty's proclamation and to the foreign enlistment law of Great Britain.

It may not be without good effect that you should communicate to the Attorney-General of the Province, in the same unofficial manner in which you communicated the instructions relative to the return of our escaped prisoners, the views above expressed and the conclusion reached by this Government.

The President has not read without marked gratification your warm tribute to the generous gentlemen whose sympathies in our cause have been evidenced in so effective and disinterested a manner.

He begs that you will to each of them, Dr. Almon, Mr. Keith, Mr. Weir and Mr. Ritchie, address officially a letter in his name, returning his thanks and those of our country for testimonials of kindness, which are appreciated with peculiar sensibility, at a juncture when the Confederacy is isolated by the action of European governments from that friendly intercourse with other nations

which it knows to be its rights, and of which it is conscious it is not undeserving.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State.*

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*Letter from Mr. Holcombe.*

HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA, April 26th, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A.:*

Sir—Nothing has transpired since the date of my last dispatch to alter my convictions of the impolicy of any intervention by the Confederate States in the affair of the Chesapeake. I have conversed freely on the subject with eminent legal gentlemen both in official position and out of it. They generally express regret that through the folly and misconduct of the captors the Chesapeake was not secured to the use of the Confederacy. They think, however, that the courts, if required to pass upon the character of the transaction, would have been compelled to regard it as in fact a capture by British subjects never enlisted in our service by any person having authority so to do; or, if otherwise, then enlisted in violation of the neutrality laws. It is morally certain the home Government would not, under the circumstances, allow a claim for compensation for the surrender of the vessel by the judicial authorities. And I cannot but think that the presentation of such a claim by our Government and its rejection—the case being one, as all must admit, very doubtful both in law and in morals—would impair its public prestige and weaken the moral weight which might attach to its interposition upon future and more important occasions.

None of the captors have as yet been taken under the new warrants. It would embarrass the Government here, as much as it would the Confederate Government, to have the solution of this question forced upon them, in reference to the captors. Whatever may be the strict legal character of the transaction, public opinion would not tolerate their treatment as pirates, whether by proceedings against them as such on the part of the Colonial authorities, or by their extradition to the United States.

For the reasons stated in dispatch number four I shall remain here until the return of the next Bermuda boat, about the middle

of May, when I hope to hear that the course I have taken in this matter meets with your approbation and that of the President.

I remain, &c., &c.,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

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*Letter from Mr. Holcombe.*

April 28, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A.:*

Sir—The season has thus far rendered it impracticable to forward the arrangements for returning home our escaped prisoners. The ice has just begun to move in the Saint Lawrence, and it will be from the middle to the last of May before the navigation will be open. Land carriage at this time through Canadian territory is out of the question, not only on account of its expense, but the extremely limited facilities which it would afford for transportation. I wrote, indeed, upon my arrival, to some of our friends at Montreal to send in that way any who might be reached conveniently and who were anxious to reach the Confederacy as early as possible. I have authorized a gentleman in Montreal, who is highly recommended, Mr. S. Cromwell, to go at once as far as Windsor, and advise our friends of the existence of means to send back our soldiers to their posts, and to bring in some forty or fifty, who are reported at that point, to take passage on the first boat from Montreal or rather Quebec to Picton. I have also authorized the expenditure, if necessary, of one thousand dollars at different points to relieve cases of entire destitution, where there was no doubt as to the wish and purpose to get back into the service as soon as possible. I feel some apprehension that an effort may be made to capture our men when collected in large numbers on sailing vessels, whilst coming to Halifax, on the high seas. I see no mode of avoiding the difficulty, however, and I do not know that the risk would be materially increased, whilst the expense would be greatly diminished, by sending them directly to Bermuda from Quebec. Please let me hear at once from you on this point, for the unavoidable delay in collecting them along such an extensive frontier will give me an opportunity, at least to some extent, of acting under your specific instructions upon this matter. The accommodations of the regular mail steamer from Halifax to Bermuda are not very extensive, and it makes only a round trip in a month. The expense of subsisting them here, as well as the liability of men in their condition to be



involved in some disturbance when collected in large numbers, renders it very expedient, if thought safe, to send them directly on from Quebec to Bermuda and even also to Nassau. I cannot hear with any certainty as to probable number, but unless I receive instructions which impose upon me other duty by the next steamer from Bermuda, I purpose going in person probably over the whole line as far as Windsor, with a view of making some final arrangements.

My impression, derived from some experience already at this place, is, that of the large number who as escaped Confederates are appealing to public sympathy for material aid, there are some impostors—some who have never been in the service, but are shirking duty, and some who would be very glad for help here, but are in no haste to return home. The number of those who will go back to service is entirely conjectural. Knowing how much in this hour of agony we need men, I shall use most expedition in my power.

I am, &c.,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

*Letters from Hon. Jacob Thompson.*

WILMINGTON, N. C., May 2, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State*:

Sir—Mr. Clay did not arrive until after dark last evening, and he delivered to me your letter with its inclosures. Herewith you will find my receipt for the bills forwarded by you. We shall sail to-day at one o'clock in the "Thistle," which is considered by shippers as a safe boat, for Halifax; touches at Bermuda on the 13th instant, and the voyage thence to Halifax usually occupies four days. With no untoward event we will reach Canada by the 20th instant.

I am, &c.,

J. THOMPSON.

SAINT GEORGE'S, BERMUDA, May 10th, 1864.

To Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

Sir—We reached this port safely this morning. While we were chased by a blockade vessel for five hours on our way out, yet we escaped with no further interruption than being forced to leave

our true course for that length of time. I am informed to-day the steamer for Halifax is not expected to leave Saint George's before Monday the 16th instant.

I am, &c.,

J. THOMPSON.

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*Telegrams.*

WILMINGTON, N. C., April 29, 1864.

To Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN :

Arrived this morning. Six thousand bales of cotton burnt last night, which will delay all boats until Monday or Tuesday.

J. THOMPSON, *care E. Salomon.*

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WILMINGTON, N. C., May 2, 1864.

To Hon J. P. BENJAMIN :

Mr. Clay delivered me your letter with inclosures last night.

J. THOMPSON.

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WILMINGTON, May 3, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN :

We think copies of President's message would serve our purpose. If you agree, send them. We can't go till Thursday.

J. THOMPSON,  
C. C. CLAY, JR.

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*Letter from William J. Almon.*

HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA, May 26, 1864.

To Hon. JAMES P. HOLCOMBE, *Special Commissioner of C. S. A.:*

My Dear Sir—Allow me to express the extreme gratification I experienced upon the receipt of your letter conveying to me the thanks of the President of the Confederate States for the sympathy and kindness he has heard I have manifested towards the Southern cause.

I feel that this honor which he has conferred on me, though undeserved by any acts of mine, yet I trust is not wholly undeserved, if the sympathy I feel for the Confederacy is considered.

I feel assured that ere long public opinion, both in Great Britain and her Colonies, will act on our Government and compel it to

acknowledge the nationality of the South, which a very large majority of our people have already done.

I am, dear sir, yours very truly,

WILLIAM J. ALMON.

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*Letter from Mr. Holcombe.*

HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA, May 27, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A.:*

Sir—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your dispatch of 20th April, communicating the opinion of the Government upon the affair of the Chesapeake, after a full report of all the facts connected with its capture.

I learn with great satisfaction that the exercise of the discretion confided to me over that subject has met with your approbation and that of the President. I shall now devote myself exclusively to the duty of sending home as rapidly as possible such of our escaped prisoners as may be willing to return. There are now twelve in Halifax, nine of whom will go on in the British mail steamer which leaves to-day for Bermuda, and the remaining three, with some others that are expected in the *Constance*, in about ten days or two weeks hence. The first party is composed of very intelligent and high spirited young men belonging to Morgan's command, and will be a valuable accession at this time. Their representations lead me to fear that the apprehensions intimated in my last will be more than confirmed by the developments of the future. Colonel Kane was greatly mistaken in his estimate of the number in Canada and of those willing to return. I shall proceed at once as far west at Windsor, and endeavor to stimulate them to discharge their duty to their country in this hour of her trial. Besides transportation, I shall offer (what they are very solicitous to procure) such clothing as they may actually need. I fear we cannot expect more than a hundred, however, at the utmost.

I have written to the Governor-General of British North America, informing him of my instructions to respect not only the rules of international law, but the municipal law of Her Majesty's empire.

On reaching Canada I will write more fully.

With the highest consideration, I remain yours, &c.,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.



### The Wounding and Death of General J. E. B. Stuart—Several Errors Corrected.

The following comes from a source entitled to the very highest consideration, and will be read with mournful interest by all who feel—and who does not?—an interest in the minutest details concerning the career and death of our “Flower of Cavaliers”:

In the last number of the *Historical Papers*—that for February 1879—I find an article entitled “The Death of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart.”

In the main it is true, yet there are several errors that should be corrected ere it becomes a part of *history*.

In speaking of the dispatch sent to his wife these words occur: “Some thoughtless but unauthorized person, thinking probably to spare his wife pain, altered the dispatch to ‘slightly wounded,’ and it was thus she received it, and did not make that haste which she otherwise would have done to reach his side.”

This is *entirely* a mistake. The circumstances were these: as soon as possible after General Stuart reached Richmond, the evening of the 11th May, a telegram was written by Major H. von Borcke, and sent, as he supposed, to Mrs. Stuart, who was at Colonel Edmund Fontaine’s, near Beaver Dam station. It was found to be impossible to send it direct, as all communication had been cut off both by way of what was then the Central railroad and telegraph line and by the Fredericksburg railroad. Some delay was thus occasioned, and the dispatch was not actually on its way until the next morning; then it was sent by way of Lynchburg and Gordonsville, and some difficulty attended its transmission by the line.

Colonel Fontaine, with several members of his family, and Mr. Stuart were that morning (the 12th) at the depot doing all in their power to relieve the many wounded and dying who had been started to Richmond by General Lee, but captured by the Yankees while on their way and left by them at Beaver Dam, two days before. While there, at about twelve o’clock, Colonel Fontaine received the dispatch, which read as follows: “General Stuart has been seriously wounded; come at once.” Colonel Fontaine hurried the party home, but did not tell Mrs. Stuart of it; after she reached her own room, the sad news was lovingly broken to her by his gentle and compassionate wife. Colonel Fontaine had made some arrangement for an engine and car to carry Mrs. Stuart and her little children to Ashland, that road not having been destroyed between those points, and at a few minutes after one o’clock they started—there not having been one moment’s delay.

The Rev. Dr. Woodbridge, who had been visiting his son, a member of General Stuart’s command, reached Beaver Dam the

morning, and at once offered to escort Mrs. Stuart in her sad journey. Mr. Charles Carter, of Hanover county, proved himself also the kind and attentive friend.

Some two hours or more were consumed in reaching Ashland, for the engineer was a volunteer. At that place a new difficulty presented itself. How was the party to go from there to Richmond? Fortunately, an ambulance had just been made ready for the trip, in which one or more wounded cavalry officers were going; these most courteously insisted upon Mrs. Stuart using it. Under the circumstances Dr. Woodbridge accepted it for her, and in a few minutes they were on their way.

The roads were very bad, and soon after leaving Ashland a heavy storm gathered, and it became dark and threatening, with constant and terrifying flashes of lightning; but still they pushed on. Frequently on the way soldiers were met, and each time the same question was asked by Dr. Woodbridge, "Any news from General Stuart?" Almost invariably the answer was, "No; but we heard his wound was not serious,"—so that the anxious hearts of the poor wife and friend were encouraged to hope for the best.

About eight o'clock they reached the Chickahominy, and found to their distress that the Confederate cavalry had destroyed the bridge. In the rain and dark, after some little detention, a cavalry picket was found not far off, who directed the driver to a ford a mile or two lower down. This difficulty was surmounted in time, and once more they were traveling on the turnpike towards Richmond.

Just before reaching the suburbs of the city they were delivered from what might have been a most distressing accident. It was so very dark, it now being after ten o'clock and still storming, that neither the driver nor Dr. Woodbridge saw the dark masses of horses and men lying along the roadside; but suddenly they became aware of a horseman being directly in front of their horses' heads. When the noise of the moving vehicle ceased, he was heard to say, "Who's there?—stand!" Dr. Woodbridge discovered he was a sentinel on duty, and at once told him his errand and who were in the ambulance, when he exclaimed: "Thank God! my cap snapped twice when you did not answer my repeated challenge,"—and then added, "We are Lomax's men."

Not until half-past eleven o'clock did they reach Dr. Brewer's residence, on Grace street, and then a certain quiet resting on all about the house instantly impressed them, and words were not necessary to convey to the quick perceptions of an anxious and devoted wife the sad intelligence awaiting her.

During that day, in his longing desire to once more see his dear ones, this noble man had done what he had never before consented to do—use spirits as a stimulant, hoping thus to delay, for a few hours, what he well knew to be inevitable. But God's will must be done, and for a wise purpose, no doubt, this last hope was denied.

A second error occurs in the latter part of the article, in regard to General Stuart's age. He was born in Patrick county, on the 6th of February, 1833; died 12th of May, 1864, being thirty-one years, three months and six days old.

A third error is in reference to the death of his child. He left two children—a son, who bears his father's name, and a baby daughter, only seven months old, to whom he had given the name "Virginia," named for the State in whose defence he yielded up his life.

The child he lost was a daughter, "Flora." She died November 3, 1862, when the Confederate cavalry were for fourteen consecutive days fighting untiringly, holding in check the whole of Pleasanton's cavalry, supported heavily by infantry, who were covering McClellan's march across to Fauquier, when McClellan was superseded by Burnside, before the army moved to Fredericksburg.

The loss of this dearly loved child was a great blow to him, greatly increased by his utter inability to be with her; but in his letters he expressed the most beautiful Christian resignation and his perfect willingness to meet the same great change whenever his Maker should call.

The world knows little of the circumstances which led to and immediately followed the wounding of General J. E. B. Stuart, at Yellow Tavern, in May, 1864.

Some have pretended to tell "what they saw"; but the truth has been painfully distorted. The account given below was written by Major H. B. McClellan to Mrs. Stuart, not long after the General's death. The incidents of the charge in which the General received his wound were related to the Major by Captain Dorsey, of the Maryland company, First Virginia cavalry, who was by the General's side at the time. Major A. R. Venable, a member of the staff, was with him also almost immediately afterwards, and remained by him until the last.

Major McClellan says:

"We reached the vicinity of the Yellow Tavern that morning about ten o'clock, and found that we were in advance of the enemy's column, and in time to interpose between it and Richmond. Not knowing what force we had there, the General was uncertain whether to place himself at once between the enemy and the city, or to take a position on his flank, near the Yellow Tavern—the latter he preferred if he could be satisfied that we had a sufficient force in the trenches to defend Richmond. To ascertain this he sent me to see General Bragg. When I returned to him about two o'clock, I found that a heavy engagement had taken place, and, that after driving in a portion of our line, the enemy had been heavily repulsed. When I found the General there was a lull in the fight, and we sat quietly near one of our batteries for more than an hour, resting and talking. About four o'clock the enemy suddenly threw a brigade of cavalry, mounted, upon our extreme left, attacking our whole line at the same time. As he always did, the



General hastened to the point where the greatest danger threatened—the point against which the enemy directed the mounted charge. My horse was so much exhausted by my severe ride of the morning that I could not follow him, but Captain Dorsey gave the particulars that follow.

“The enemy’s charge captured our battery on the left of our line, and drove back almost the entire left. Where Captain Dorsey was stationed—immediately on the Telegraph road—about eighty men had collected together, and among these the General threw himself, and by his personal example held them steady while the enemy charged entirely past their position. With these men he fired into their flank and rear, as they passed him, in advancing and in retreating, for they were met by a mounted charge of the First Virginia cavalry and driven back some distance. As they retired, one man, who had been dismounted in the charge and was running out on foot, turned, as he passed the General, and, discharging his pistol, inflicted the fatal wound. When Captain Dorsey discovered that he was wounded, he came at once to his assistance and endeavored to lead him to the rear; but the General’s horse became so restive and unmanageable that he insisted upon being taken down and allowed to rest against a tree. When this was done Captain Dorsey sent for another horse. While waiting for this horse, the General ordered him to leave him alone and return to his men and drive back the enemy; said that he feared he was mortally wounded and could be of no more service. Captain Dorsey told him that he could not obey that order—that he would sacrifice his life rather than leave him until he had placed him out of all danger. The situation was a dangerous one. Our men were sadly scattered, and there was hardly a handful of men between that little group and the advancing enemy. But the horse arrived in time; the General was lifted on to him and led by Captain Dorsey to a safer place. There, by the General’s order, he gave him into charge of Private Wheatly, of his company, and returned to rally our scattered men. Wheatly procured an ambulance, placed the General in it with the greatest care, and supporting him in his arms, he was driven from the field. As he was being brought off, he spoke to our men, whom he saw retreating, and said: ‘Go back! go back! and do your duty as I have done mine, and our country will be safe. Go back! go back! I had rather die than be whipped.’ \* \* I was hastening toward the part of the field where I heard he had been wounded, when I met the ambulance bringing him out. The General had so often told me that if he were wounded I must not leave the field, but report to the officer next to him in rank, that I did not now presume to disregard his order; and the more so, because I saw that Dr. Fontaine, Major Venable, Lieutenant Garnett, and several of his couriers, were attending him. I remained with General Fitz Lee until the next morning, when he sent me to the city to see General Bragg, and I had an opportunity to spend an hour with my General. More than any brother did I love him; greater loss I have never known.”



Thus closes the sad account from which we have copied, and as we read character it proves that the gay, dashing soldier possessed such worth as not only to attract, but to retain the affection of those with whom he was most intimately associated. May his deeds be long cherished by those who love the cause for which he so willingly laid down his life.

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**General Van Dorn's Operations between Columbia and Nashville in 1863.**

By Colonel EDWARD DILLON.

[The following letter was not intended for publication, but gives so vivid a description of the important events of which it treats that we print it just as it was received.]

MORGANTON, N. C., June 16, 1877.

General D. H. MAURY, *Richmond* :

Dear General—I take advantage of a few hours' detention here to say, in reply to your inquiry of the 12th instant, that while my memory is not fresh as to all the details of General Van Dorn's operations between Columbia and Nashville, Tennessee, in 1863, or as to the precise composition of his command at that time, yet I remember that it contained the brigades of Forest, Jackson, Armstrong, Whitfield and Cosby, numbering, perhaps, 7,000 effective cavalry and artillery; and I can no doubt give you with tolerable accuracy the main features of the transactions to which you refer.

General Van Dorn arrived at Columbia early in February, 1863, and shortly thereafter (perhaps in March) took up his headquarters at Spring Hill, protecting the left of General Bragg's army, and operating against the Federal line of communication so effectively as to confine the enemy closely to their fortified positions at Nashville, Brentwood, Franklin, Triune and other points. Vexed at Van Dorn's frequent attacks and constantly increasing proximity to their lines, the enemy repeatedly moved out in force from their strongholds, but could never be coaxed far enough from them to justify any vigorous attack till some time in May, when General Coburn came out of Franklin with about 5,000 men, and was enticed to a point near Thompson station, where, after a sharp engagement, he surrendered in time to prevent a simultaneous attack in front and rear—Forest's brigade having gotten behind him. On

the day following Forest was sent with his own and Armstrong's brigade to attack Brentwood (believed to have been weakened in order to replace the captured garrison of Franklin), and succeeded in beating and capturing the force there (about 1,200), together with a large number of horses and many arms of different kinds. Out of this affair came an altercation between Van Dorn and Forest, which is worthy of note as characteristic of both.

Forest had reported his success to Van Dorn, who had in turn reported to Bragg; and he being in need of just such things as Forest had captured, directed Van Dorn to send them forthwith to him. This order of Bragg was repeated by Van Dorn to Forest, who replied that he did not have the captured property, and could not comply with the order. I always supposed that Forest's and Armstrong's men appropriated most of the captured property at the moment of capture.

To this Van Dorn said: "Either your report to me was incorrect or your command is in possession of the property, and you must produce and deliver it up."

Forest replied indignantly that he was not in the habit of being talked to in that way, and that the time would come when he would demand satisfaction. Van Dorn said, quietly: "My rank shall be no barrier; you can have satisfaction at any time you desire."

Forest passed his hand thoughtfully across his brow and replied, with a good deal of dignity and grace: "I have been hasty, General, and am sorry for it. I do not fear that anybody will misunderstand me, but the truth is you and I have enough Yankees to fight without fighting each other, and I hope this matter will be forgotten." Van Dorn said: "You are right, General, and I am sure nobody will ever suspect you of not being ready for any kind of a fight at any time; I certainly am willing to drop the matter, and can assure you that I have no feeling about it; but I must insist that my orders shall be obeyed as long as I am your commander; let us drop the subject, however, as I have work for you to do."

The conversation then turned on the subject of a Federal raid which had just been reported to Van Dorn by scouts, and Forest, being ordered to intercept it, left Van Dorn's presence—I think they never met again—to perform the most wonderful feat in the history of that remarkable man—I refer to the capture of Streight and his command. Very shortly after the departure of Forest, General Granger, having reinforced Franklin, moved out with a force of about 10,000 infantry and a large body of cavalry and artillery, and Van Dorn retired before him, hoping to repeat the ope-

ration against Coburn; but finding Granger's force larger than was at first supposed, he determined to assume the defensive and take position behind Rutherford's creek, a tributary of Duck river, with which it unites only a few miles below Columbia. Accordingly he formed his command on the left bank of the creek, which at that point is about four miles from the river at Columbia, and for some distance is nearly parallel with the river, intending to receive Granger's attack there; but heavy rains having fallen on an already swollen river, it became past fording in a few hours, and Van Dorn deemed it imprudent, under the circumstances, to risk an engagement between the creek and the swollen river, in which, if beaten, he would probably both lose his command and leave Columbia exposed. He therefore decided to turn up the river to a bridge twenty miles distant, cross and return down the river by a forced march to cover Columbia, before the enemy could cross, he (Van Dorn) having forty miles to move and they only four. This bold and dexterous movement was accomplished in spite of the fact that the enemy, seeing his position, pressed vigorously upon Van Dorn's right to force him into the fork; but finding that he had extricated himself and reached Columbia before any preparation could be made by them to cross, they retired immediately, seeming to fear that their absence from Franklin might tempt so daring and expeditious an opponent as Van Dorn to precede them to that point. Van Dorn at once resumed his position at Spring Hill, and his assassination followed very quickly. My recollection is that during the few months of his brilliant career in Tennessee he captured more men than he had in his own command. I may not be entirely accurate in all I have said, but substantially it is correct. If, however, you want to be minute you had better send this to General Forest or General Jackson, either of whom can verify it or correct any inaccuracy of my memory, if it be at fault. It is deeply to be regretted that the details of Van Dorn's plans and actions as a cavalry commander in Tennessee, or while covering Pemberton's retreat before Grant to Grenada, and in the signal affair at Holly Springs, fraught as the latter was with results more momentous than those involved in any action of its kind of which I ever knew or heard, should be lost to the history of cavalry; but I fear to trust my memory, and must confine myself to these brief outlines, hoping that some one of those who followed him whose memory is better than mine may yet do justice to a cavalier whose feats when written out must give him a place beside the greatest of those who in time past have ridden to victory and immortality.

Yours truly,

E. DILLON.



**General Hampton's Report of the Battle of Trevelylian's Depot and Subsequent Operations.**

[Not only our gallant cavalymen who rode with Hampton, but all interested in the truth, will thank us for printing the following report, which was not published by the Confederate authorities and is not in the Archive Bureau at Washington.

General Sheridan stated that he drove Hampton from the field and pursued him until he "took refuge behind strong fortifications and heavy infantry supports at Gordonsville" (twelve miles distant from Trevelylian's). We knew at the time that there were *no fortifications and no infantry* at Gordonsville, and that instead of Sheridan's driving Hampton in that direction he was himself driven in just the opposite direction. But the report of the chivalric Hampton settles all of those questions].

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION CAVALRY,  
July 9th, 1864.

To Lieutenant-Colonel TAYLOR, *Assistant Adjutant-General* :

Colonel—Having notified the General-Commanding, on the morning of the 8th June, that Sheridan, with a heavy force of cavalry and artillery, had crossed the Pamunkey, I was ordered to take one division in addition to my own and follow him. Supposing that he would strike at Gordonsville and Charlottesville, I moved rapidly with my division so as to interpose my command between him and the places named above, at the same time directing Major-General Fitz. Lee to follow as speedily as possible. In two days' march I accomplished the object I had in view—that of placing myself in front of the enemy—and I camped on the night of the 10th in Green Spring Valley, three miles beyond Trevelylian's station on the Central railroad, whilst General Fitz. Lee camped the same night near Louisa Courthouse. Hearing during the night that the enemy had crossed the Northanna at Carpenter's ford, I determined to attack him at daylight. General Lee was ordered to attack on the road leading from Louisa Courthouse to Clayton's store, whilst my division would attack on the road from Trevelylian's station to the same point. By this disposition of my troops I hoped to cover Lee's left and my right flank; to drive the enemy back, if he attempted to reach Gordonsville by passing to my left, and to conceal my real design, which was to strike him at Clayton's store after uniting the two divisions. At daylight my division was ready to attack at Trevelylian's—Butler's and Young's brigades being held for that purpose, whilst Rosser was sent to cover a road on my



left. Soon after these dispositions were made, General Lee sent to inform me that he was moving out to attack. Butler was immediately advanced and soon met the enemy, whom he drove handsomely until he was heavily reinforced and took position behind works. Young's brigade was sent to reinforce Butler and these two brigades pushed the enemy steadily back, and I hoped to effect a junction with Lee's division at Clayton's store in a short time. But whilst we were driving the enemy in front, it was reported to me that a force had appeared in my rear. Upon investigation I found this report correct. The brigade which had been engaging General Lee having withdrawn from his front, passed his left and got into my rear: This forced me to withdraw in front and to take up a new line. This was soon done, and the brigade which had attacked me in rear (Custer's) was severely punished, for I recalled Rosser's brigade, which charged them in front, driving them back against General Lee, who was moving up to Trevylian's, and capturing many prisoners. In this sudden attack on my rear, the enemy captured some of my led horses, a few ambulances and wagons and three caissons. These were all recaptured by General Rosser and General Lee; the latter taking in addition four caissons and the headquarter wagon of Brigadier-General Custer. My new line being established, I directed General Lee to join me with his command as soon as possible. The enemy tried to dislodge me from my new position but failed, and the relative positions of the opposing forces remained the same during the night. The next day at 12 M. General Lee reported to me, and his division was placed so as to support mine in case the enemy attacked. At 3.30 P. M. a heavy attack was made on my left, where Butler's brigade was posted. Being repulsed, the enemy made a succession of determined assaults, which were all handsomely repulsed. In the meantime General Lee had, by my directions, reinforced Butler's left with Wickham's brigade, whilst he took Lomax's brigade across to the Gordonsville road so as to strike the enemy on his right flank. This movement was successful, and the enemy, who had been heavily punished in front, when attacked on his flank, fell back in confusion, leaving his dead and a portion of his wounded on the field. I immediately gave orders to follow him up, but it was daylight before these orders could be carried out, the fight not having ended until 10 P. M. In this interval the enemy had withdrawn entirely, leaving his dead scattered over the whole field, with about 125 wounded on the ground and in temporary hospitals. We captured,

in addition to the wounded, in the fight and the pursuit 570 prisoners. My loss in my own division was 59 killed, 258 wounded and 295 missing; total 612. Amongst the former I have to regret the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel McAllister, Seventh Georgia, who behaved with great gallantry, and Captain Russel, of the same regiment, who was acting as Major. In the list of wounded were Brigadier-General Rosser, who received a painful wound in the first day's fight whilst charging the enemy at the head of his brigade, and whose absence from the field was a great loss to me; Colonel Aiken, Sixth South Carolina, who had borne himself with marked good conduct during the fight; Lieutenant-Colonel King, Cobb legion, who was wounded in a charge, and Major Anderson, Seventh Georgia. The enemy in his retreat crossed the river at Carpenter's ford and kept down on the north bank of the stream. As he had a pontoon train with him, which enabled him to cross the river at any point, I was forced to keep on the south of the rivers so as to interpose my command between him and Grant's army, which he was seeking to rejoin. During several days, whilst we marched on parallel lines, I constantly offered battle, which he studiously declined, and he followed the northern bank of the Mattaponi and the Pamunkey until he gained the shelter of his gunboats on the latter at the White House, where he crossed during the night. Here he met a strong reinforcement with ample supplies, and after resting a day he moved down the river, thence across the country to the Forge bridges, where he crossed the Chickahominy. Chambliss' brigade, which had joined me two days previous, attacked him at this point and drove him some distance. Fearing that he might pass up the James river, through Charles City Courthouse and Westover, I took position that night so as to cover the roads from Long bridge to the latter place. The next morning, the 24th June, he drove in my pickets at Samaria church and advanced beyond Nance's shop. I determined to attack him, and to this end I ordered Brigadier-General Gary, who had joined me that morning, to move from Salem church around to Smith's store and to attack on the flank as soon as the attack in front commenced. General Lee left Lomax to hold the river road and brought Wickham to join in the attack. The necessary arrangements having been made, General Gary advanced from Smith's store and took position near Nance's shop. The enemy had in the meantime thrown up strong works along his whole line and his position was a strong one. As soon as Gary had engaged the enemy, Chambliss was thrown for-

ward, and, by a movement handsomely executed, connected with him, and the two brigades were thrown on the flank of the enemy. At the same moment the whole line, under the immediate command of Major-General Fitz. Lee, charged the works of the enemy, who, after fighting stubbornly for a short time, gave way, leaving his dead and wounded on the field. This advance of our troops was made in the face of a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry and it was most handsomely accomplished. As soon as the enemy gave way I brought up the Phillips and the Jeff. Davis legions, mounted, ordering them to charge. This they did most gallantly, driving the enemy for three miles in confusion. Robbins' battalion and the Twelfth Virginia cavalry were mounted and participated in a part of this charge, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Massie, commanding the latter, was wounded, whilst gallantly leading his men over the works of the enemy. The enemy were completely routed and were pursued to within two and one-half miles of Charles City Courthouse—the pursuit lasting till 10 o'clock at night. We captured 157 prisoners, including one colonel and twelve commissioned officers, and the enemy left their wounded, amounting to quite a large number, scattered over the ground upon which we had fought. My loss was six killed and fifty-nine wounded in my own division. The reports of losses from the other commands have not been sent to me. Sheridan retreated to Wyanoke Neck in order to cross the James river under protection of the gunboats, and I, in accordance with instructions from the General-Commanding, moved on the 26th June to the Pontoon bridge, with a view to cross and join the army on the south side of the James river. This closed my operations, which had for their object the defeat of Sheridan's movement in our rear.

The recent publications of the enemy, together with some of their orders which have been captured, show that Sheridan's object was to destroy Gordonsville and Charlottesville, with the railroad near those places; to unite with Hunter in his attack on Lynchburg, and, after the capture of that place, to move their joint forces to the White House on the Pamunkey, from which point they could join Grant or threaten Richmond. Sheridan was defeated at Trevilian's; was punished in the skirmishes at the White House and Forge bridges, and was routed at Samaria church. We captured 852 prisoners, whilst his loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. I beg to express my entire satisfaction at the conduct of officers and men in my command. Major-General Fitz. Lee co-operated



with me heartily and rendered valuable assistance. Brigadier-General Butler, who commanded my division a part of the time, General Rosser and Colonel Wright, in my own command, all discharged their duties admirably. The same may be said of Colonel Dulaney, who succeeded to the command of Rosser's brigade after General Rosser was wounded.

Brigadier-General Chambliss with his brigade rendered most efficient service, as did Brigadier-General Gary, both of these commands contributing largely to the success at Samaria church. The subordinate officers have sustained their superiors well, and the men could not have behaved better than they did. The artillery, under Major Chew, was admirably handled and did good service. I am under obligations to my staff for the very able assistance they gave me, and I take pleasure in expressing not only my obligations but my thanks to them. When the General-Commanding takes into consideration the disparity in numbers of the troops engaged, the many disadvantages under which my men labored, their hard marches, their want of supplies, their numerous privations, and the cheerfulness with which these were borne, he will, I trust, be satisfied with the results accomplished.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

WADE HAMPTON, *Major-General.*

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**Letters of General R. E. Lee.**

Anything that pertains to the life or character of our Great Chieftain is read with deep interest by our people, and we propose giving from time to time some of his hitherto unpublished letters. Those which follow were written after the war to his friend W. W. Corcoran—the great philanthropist and liberal benefactor of the South—and will have for our readers a double value:

LEXINGTON, VA., 26 February, 1868.

My Dear Mr. Corcoran—I sympathize most deeply in the great sorrow that has fallen upon you and your house,\* and trust that He, from whom it comes, may in His mercy give you strength to bear it, and enable you to say His will be done.

I know how hard it is for you to feel this sentiment; to relinquish her who has been your pleasure, your comfort and your link with the future; but think of the peace, the surpassing happiness, she enjoys, and the grief and suffering she has escaped.

I remember with peculiar pleasure her last visit to us at Arlington, and the recollection of her will always bring me happiness.

I hope you will visit the mountains of Virginia this summer, and it would give me great pleasure if you will come and see us at Lexington. I can assure you of a cordial welcome and the sympathy of early friends.

Most truly yours,

R. E. LEE.

Mr. W. W. CORCORAN.

WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, 14 August, 1869.

My Dear Sir—I gratefully acknowledge the receipt of eight hundred and five dollars, the proceeds of the concert given by Madam Wieller, Mrs. McDowell, Misses Jones and Heald and Hon. Blaque Bey for the benefit of the Episcopal church in Lexington, Virginia, and in the name of the vestry present their sincere thanks to those who so kindly undertook and so successfully executed it, as well as to all those who generously patronized it.

Besides the material aid which this sum will give to the church, the sympathy it extends to the congregation trying to maintain and enlarge it, will encourage them to continue their efforts until they shall finally succeed.

To you, sir, who have been so instrumental in procuring this aid and in eliciting this sympathy, I offer my cordial thanks.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *Vestryman Grace Church.*

W. W. CORCORAN, Esq.,

*Chairman Finance Committee, White Sulphur Springs.*

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\*On the death of Mrs. Eustis, daughter of Mr. Corcoran.

LEXINGTON, VA., 23d September, 1869.

My Dear Mr. Corcoran—I am sure that you will be gratified to know that the proceeds of the concert given at the White Sulphur Springs for the benefit of the Episcopal church at this place, have enabled it to pay its last debt, and that the congregation, released from the burden that has oppressed them for years, and full of gratitude to those who have relieved them, for the reasons set forth in the annexed appeal, have determined to enlarge the church, and for this purpose have collected among themselves over \$1,000.

I send you the appeal, not to solicit any additional contribution from you, who have already so generously aided us, but that you may be apprized of our efforts and be able to satisfy other friends as regards our purpose who may desire to assist us.

Wishing you a long life and a full measure of happiness,

I am most truly yours,

R. E. LEE.

Hon. W. W. CORCORAN.

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LEXINGTON, VA., 2 October, 1869.

My Dear Mr. Corcoran—I am exceedingly obliged to you for your interest in Washington College and for your desire to have assigned to it the claim of Mr. Peabody upon the State of Virginia. Mr. Russell wrote to me from Baltimore on the subject, and said that he was expecting you on the following day, when he hoped the matter would be arranged. One point he wished to ascertain, the corporate name of the college, and as he requested me to address my reply to New York, which will be too late for him to use, provided the assignment is made in Philadelphia, I will repeat the name to you in case you should require to know it. It is simply "Washington College, Virginia."

I hope Mr. Peabody will send the papers of assignment to you, for I would prefer your taking charge of the matter to any one else. As I stated to you before I shall be as much obliged to Mr. Peabody for his kind intentions to the college in the event of its receiving nothing as though it had; for the moral effect will be the same, and it will mark his approval of a college founded by Washington and evince his wish for its success. But if the endowment of the college could be enlarged it would add greatly to our usefulness and to our means of aiding the destitute youth of the South. We shall have this year over fifty beneficiaries, and if we could afford it would have more, so great is the poverty of the people. On this account I hope the fund will be realized.

Mrs. Lee and my daughters unite with me in kind regards, in which Colonel White joins,

And I remain, most truly yours,

R. E. LEE.

Hon. W. W. CORCORAN.



LEXINGTON, VA., 9th October, 1869.

My Dear Mr. Corcoran—I have received this morning your note of the 7th instant, transmitting the assignment of Mr. Peabody of his claim against Virginia, with a copy of Mr. Russell's note to you. I am truly grateful to Mr. Peabody for his generous gift to Washington College, which, I hope, will result in much good to the people of the State and in honor to him; and I am greatly thankful to you and Mr. Russell for your interest and kind offices in the matter. Will you add to my obligations by giving me your advice as to how to proceed to realize the donation? I do not propose to indulge in intemperate haste, nor do I think it advisable to approach the Legislature before it is organized, under the constitution which has been adopted, for general business—it being understood to be now in session for a specific purpose and for the fulfillment of the laws of Congress on the subject of reconstruction. I wish, also, in presenting the claim not to offend the sentiment of the people, and to obtain the aid of the leading men of the State. Perhaps it would be well to wait for Mr. Peabody's memorial and other papers, or shall I endeavor to obtain them from the files of the Legislature at Richmond?

With true regard, sincerely yours,

R. E. LEE.

Hon. W. W. CORCORAN.

LEXINGTON, VA., 26th January, 1870.

My Dear Mr. Corcoran—I am very sorry that I cannot attend the funeral obsequies of Mr. Peabody. It would be some relief to witness the respect paid to his remains and to participate in commemorating his virtues; but I am unable to undertake the journey. I have been sick all the winter and am still under medical treatment. I particularly regret that I shall not have the pleasure of seeing you. Mr. Cyrus McCormick, Colonel Christian and Major Kirkpatrick, trustees of Washington College, will represent it on the occasion. They will assemble at Mr. McCormick's house, No. 40 Fifth Avenue, New York, and will probably not leave before the end of this week. I wish you would join them, as I know they would be happy of your company. Please remember me to Mr. Thornton and Mr. and Mrs. Russell.

With great regard,

R. E. LEE.

Hon. W. W. CORCORAN.

HOT SPRINGS, VA., 23d August, 1870.

My Dear Mr. Corcoran—It has been a source of regret to me this summer that I have been unable to enjoy your company while you were in the mountains. As you have left the *White*, I presume

your visit to Virginia for this season is near its close and I see no prospect of my meeting with you. I hope that you have been benefited by your visit to the mountains and will return to your home refreshed and strengthened. My best wishes accompany you wherever you are. I have been trying the effects of these waters, by the advice of Dr. Buckler, and cannot now perceive much change in my rheumatic symptoms, though I will only have been here a fortnight to-morrow. I purpose leaving here Monday next, 29th, for Staunton, for the purpose of attending a meeting of the stockholders of the Valley Railroad Company. They have been disappointed in obtaining from the county of Augusta its subscription to the road, and have to devise ways and means of making up its quota of \$300,000 before they can receive the benefit of the subscription of the city of Baltimore and of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. They have an impression that, as president of the company, I can assist them, and I have been so strongly urged on the subject, that, if elected, I will accept and serve them as well as I can. I do not think they ought, however, to put me on these "forlorn hope" expeditions. I have served my turn.

I have watched, with much anxiety, the progress of the war between France and Germany, and without going into the merits of the question at issue, or understanding the necessity of the recourse to arms, I have regretted that they did not submit their differences to the arbitration of the other Powers, as provided in the articles of the treaty of Paris of 1856. It would have been a grand moral victory over the passions of men, and would have so elevated the contestants in the eyes of the present and future generations as to have produced a beneficial effect. It might have been expecting, however, too much from the present standard of civilization, and I fear we are destined to kill and slaughter each other for ages to come. You have, in addition, personal anxieties in the result, and the natural feeling lest your children should be mixed up in its complication. As far as I can read the accounts, the French have met with serious reverses, which seem to have demoralized the nation and are therefore alarming. Whatever may be the issue, I cannot help sympathizing with the struggles of a warlike people to drive invaders from their land.

Wishing you all health and every happiness,

I am, most truly and sincerely, yours,

R. E. LEE.

Mr. W. W. CORCORAN.

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**Letter from General Hampton on the Burning of Columbia.**

We propose at some future day to publish in full the facts concerning the burning of Columbia, and to fix beyond all controversy the responsibility for that outrage upon the laws of civilized warfare. But in the meantime we put on record the following letter which General Wade Hampton addressed to Senator Reverdy Johnson and which he read in the United States Senate at the time:

WILD WOODS, MISSISSIPPI, April 21, 1866.

TO HON. REVERDY JOHNSON, *United States Senate*:

Sir—A few days ago I saw in the published proceedings of Congress that a petition from Benjamin Kawles, of Columbia, South Carolina, asking compensation for the destruction of his house by the Federal army in February, 1865, had been presented to the Senate, accompanied by a letter from Major-General Sherman.

In this letter General Sherman uses the following language:

"The citizens of Columbia set fire to thousands of bales of cotton rolled out into the streets, and which were burning before we entered Columbia. I, myself, was in the city as early as 9 o'clock, and I saw these fires, and knew that efforts were made to extinguish them, but a high and strong wind kept them alive.

"I gave no orders for the burning of your city, but, on the contrary, the conflagration resulted from the great imprudence of cutting the cotton bales, whereby the contents were spread to the wind, so that it became an impossibility to arrest the fire.

"I saw in your Columbia newspaper the printed order of General Wade Hampton, that on the approach of the Yankee army all the cotton should thus be burned, and from what I saw myself I have no hesitation in saying that he was the cause of the destruction of your city."

This same charge, made against me by General Sherman, having been brought before the Senate of the United States, I am naturally most solicitous to vindicate myself before the same tribunal. But my State has no representative in that body. Those who should be her constitutional representatives and exponents there are debarred the right of entrance into those halls. There are none who have the right to speak for the South; none to participate in the legislation which governs her; none to impose the taxes she is called upon to pay, and none to vindicate her sons from misrepresentation, injustice or slander.

Under these circumstances I appeal to you, in the confident hope you will use every effort to see that justice is done in this matter.

I deny, emphatically, that any cotton was fired in Columbia by my order.



I deny that the citizens "set fire to thousands of bales rolled out into the streets."

I deny that any cotton was on fire when the Federal troops entered the city.

I most respectfully ask of Congress to appoint a committee, charged with the duty of ascertaining and reporting all the facts connected with the destruction of Columbia, and thus fixing upon the proper author of that enormous crime the infamy he richly deserves.

I am willing to submit the case to any honest tribunal. Before any such I pledge myself to prove that I gave a positive order, by direction of General Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired; that not one bale was on fire when General Sherman's troops took possession of the city; that he promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately, systematically and atrociously.

I, therefore, most earnestly request that Congress may take prompt and efficient measures to investigate this matter fully. Not only is this due to themselves and to the reputation of the United States army, but also to justice and to truth.

Trusting that you will pardon me for troubling you,

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WADE HAMPTON.

We add the following brief report of the proceedings of the Senate on the presentation of the letter of General Hampton, as showing the spirit of the times:

Mr. Sherman said he could not allow this charge of this most impudent Rebel against the whole army to be entered upon the records without some answer. The charge of General Sherman in relation to the burning of Columbia was in an official report, and was fully sustained by reports of other officers. General Sherman did not charge that Wade Hampton gave an explicit order on the subject, but simply that his previous order in relation to the burning of cotton, &c., led to that result. Mr. Sherman read from various official reports to confirm the charge against General Hampton.

Mr. Fessenden objected to the practice of taking up the time of the Senate in reading letters addressed not to the Senate but to individual Senators, and especially on matters pertaining to private controversies between persons not members of the Senate.

Mr. Johnson moved the reference of General Hampton's letter to the Committee on Military Affairs, or he was willing to have it lie on the table.

Mr. Fessenden hoped it would not be referred or ordered to lie on the table, but that the Senate would refuse to receive it.

Mr. Conness said that a man who would attempt to destroy the Government of the United States would certainly not hesitate to

burn a city. He hoped the letter of Wade Hampton would not be received or considered at all by the Senate.

Mr. Johnson then withdrew the letter of General Hampton.

Times have changed since 1866. General Sherman, in his Memoirs published in 1875, maintains that Columbia was burned by accident and not by design, and makes this most remarkable admission [Memoirs, volume II, page 287]: "In my official report of this conflagration I distinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did so pointedly to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was in my opinion a braggart, and professed to be the special champion of South Carolina."

In other words General Sherman coolly admits that he deliberately made in his official report a false charge against a soldier opposed to him in order to injure him with his own people. We expect at the proper time to show that this admission is fatal to some other statements made by "the General of the Army."

But, fortunately, the character of Wade Hampton was always above reproach, and now, after a career which has made him the idol of his people and the admiration of the world, he goes to take his seat on the floor of that Senate which in '66 denied him the simplest justice.

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

GENERAL WILLIAM PRESTON, of Lexington, has been elected Vice-President of our Society for Kentucky, to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation of General S. B. Buckner, who wrote that while feeling the deepest interest in the Society and its work, his frequent absence from home precluded him from giving us the active co-operation desirable.

He warmly advised the election of General Preston, whom he regarded as every way fitted for the position. To his gallant and distinguished services as a soldier, General Preston adds high character, wide influence and that chaste oratory which seems to be the natural inheritance of the Prestons, and we doubt not that we have committed the interests of the Society in Kentucky into most worthy hands.

THE KENTUCKY BRANCH of the Southern Historical Society was organized at Lexington, on the 9th of December, by the election of the following officers :

Acting President—General William Preston.

Vice-Presidents—James O. Harrison, J. Stoddard Johnston, General John S. Williams, General Basil W. Duke and General Joseph Lewis.

Secretary—James A. Headly.

Treasurer—Major R. S. Bullock.

Executive Committee—Prof. J. D. Pickett, Colonel W. C. P. Breckinridge, Major H. B. McClellan, J. R. Morton, Esq.; Major John R. Viley, J. Soule Smith, Esq.; F. K. Hunt, Esq.; Major P. P. Johnston, Major B. G. Thomas, J. P. Metcalf, Esq.; G. W. Ranck, Esq.; Colonel C. C. Morgan, Lee Bradley, Esq., and James A. Grinstead, Esq.

The following plan of organization was adopted :

This Society shall be known as the Kentucky branch of the Southern Historical Society, and its object is to collect for the archives of the Parent Society such historical material relating to the Confederate war as can be secured in the State of Kentucky.

It shall be located at Lexington, Kentucky, and shall hold meetings at least once each year.

Membership in the Parent Society shall entitle persons to membership in this Society.

The officers shall consist of one acting president, five vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer, and an executive committee, who shall hold their offices for one year or until their successors are elected.

The executive committee shall consist of fifteen members, with power to increase its members, and five of its members shall constitute a quorum.

The officers of this Society shall ex-officio be members of the executive committee.

The executive committee is charged with the general direction and management of the interests and work of this Society; has authority to adopt rules for its own government (not inconsistent with this plan), and shall at the annual meeting submit a report of its proceedings to this Society.

The acting president, and in his absence the executive committee, shall have the authority to call meetings of this society whenever it is thought best.



Admirable addresses were made on the occasion by Mr. J. K. Morton, General William Preston, General George D. Johnston and Colonel W. P. C. Breckinridge.

The organization goes into operation under most flattering auspices, and we shall expect to have good reports from it.

There have been also steps taken for the organization of a similar society in Louisville, and the details of that organization are being matured by gentlemen who have it in hand. If there could be a union of the Louisville movement with the Lexington society into one *State* organization, with *local* associations at Louisville, Lexington, and other points in Kentucky, it would be best, but we are entirely willing to leave the matter to the good judgment of our friends in Kentucky. And we confidently look for such practical co-operation as shall not only extend our membership, and circulate our publications in Kentucky, but bring us also important contributions to our archives, and especially valuable material for a history of the war in the West and Southwest.

We hope that other States also will move in the matter of forming auxiliary Societies. Let us push the good work, while the men who *made the history* live to tell it.

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SKETCHES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST are solicited at this office. We have written to a large number of officers who served in the armies of the West to send us such material, and are very anxious to secure full discussions of the campaigns and battles of the gallant soldiers of those armies.


To several letters asking why we do not publish more *Western* material, we have returned the ready reply : *Because our brethren of that section have not sent it to us.* We have the official reports of battles published by the Confederate Congress; but as a rule we must confine our publications to *original* matter, and we again beg our friends in the West to send it to us. *Let those who made the history tell it.* We expect to publish in our next issue General Breckinridge's report of the battle of Chickamauga.

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OUR BOOK NOTICES are crowded out this month.

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COMMODORE DAHLGREN'S MEMOIR OF HIS SON, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, has been kindly sent us by Colonel John P. Nicholson, of Philadelphia. We have for a long time been trying to procure a copy. We propose at an early day to discuss in full the question of the authenticity of the "*Dahlgren papers*" raised in the book; and we will only say now that the signatures given in the memoir with a view of showing that a forgery had been committed, afford *proof positive of the genuineness of the papers*, as we can convince any fair minded man who will compare them with a photograph copy of the originals in our possession. But we will furnish abundant proof on these points.



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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., April, 1879.

No. 4.

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**Battle of Chickamauga—Report of General J. C. Breckinridge.**

HEAD QUARTERS BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION,  
D. H. HILL'S CORPS, October, 1863.

Lieutenant-Colonel ARCHER ANDERSON, *A. A. General, Hill's Corps* :

Colonel—I have the honor to report the operations of my division in the battle of Chickamauga on the 19th and 20th of September last.

It was composed of the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Kentucky and Fourth Alabama regiments, with Cobb's battery, under the command of Brigadier-General B. H. Helm; the Thirteenth, Twentieth, Sixteenth, Twenty-fifth and Nineteenth Louisiana, Thirty-second Alabama and Austin's battalion sharpshooters, with Slocomb's battery (Fifth Washington artillery), under the command of Brigadier-General Daniel Adams; the First, Third and Fourth Florida, Forty-seventh Georgia and Sixtieth North Carolina regiments, with Mebane's battery, under the command of Brigadier-General M. A. Stovall.

My effective strength was of enlisted men three thousand three

hundred and ninety-five; total, three thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine.

At daylight of the 18th my command moved from Catlett's gap and that neighborhood in the Pigeon mountain, and the same afternoon took position on the east bank of the Chickamauga near Glass' mill, and composed the extreme left of the infantry of the army. I immediately threw the Second Kentucky across the ford to skirmish with the enemy and reveal his position—the Sixth Kentucky being placed in close supporting distance at the mill. Adams' brigade was sent by order of Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill to a ford a mile and a half above, where the enemy, as the cavalry reported, threatened to cross. It was so late when these dispositions were made that nothing satisfactory was developed that night.

On the morning of the 19th, Slocumb, with four guns, Cobb, with two, and the remainder of Helm's brigade were moved across Glass' ford to ascertain the position of the enemy, while the two rifled pieces of Slocumb's battery, under Lieutenant Vaught, took position on a bluff upon the east side of the stream. An artillery engagement ensued, much to our advantage, until the enemy, who occupied the better position, brought forward a number of heavy guns and showed the greater weight of metal. While the engagement was progressing I received an order from Lieutenant-General Hill to withdraw my command if it could be done without too great peril, and take position about three miles south of Lee and Gordon's mill, on the road leading from Chattanooga to Lafayette, and so as to cover the approach to that road from Glass' mill and the ford above, leaving a regiment and section of artillery to observe those crossings.

The movement was made in good order—Colonel Dilworth, with the First and Third (consolidated) Florida and a section of Cobb's battery being left in observation. Our casualties, which fell upon Slocumb, Cobb and Helm, were twenty-two killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy in killed alone, as shown by an examination of the ground after the 20th, was nearly equal to the sum of our casualties. Although the enemy was in considerable strength at the fords above referred to, the result showed that it was a covering force to columns passing down the valley to unite with the centre and left of his army.

Soon after taking up the new position I was ordered to relieve Brigadier-General Patton Anderson's division, which was facing the



enemy opposite Lee and Gordon's mill. The troops marched rapidly, yet it was late in the afternoon before this movement was completed. The division was hardly in position when I received an order from the General commanding the army to move to the right, cross the Chickamauga at a point farther down, and occupy a position to be indicated. The division crossed at Alexander's bridge, and arriving between 10 and 11 o'clock at night at a field about a mile and half in the rear of the right of our line of battle, bivouacked there by order of Lieutenant-General Polk. Remaining some time at Lieutenant-General Polk's camp-fire, I left there two hours before daylight (the 20th) to place my command in position. During the night General Polk informed me that I was to prolong the line of battle upon the right of Major-General Cleburne. Conducted by Major ———, of his staff, and Lieutenant Reid, Aid-de-Camp to General Hill, my division reached Cleburne's right a little after daybreak. Upon the readjustment of his line, I formed on his right, and became the extreme right of the general line of battle. Helm was on the left of my line, Stovall in the centre and Adams on the right—the last extending across a country road leading from Reid's bridge and striking the Chattanooga road at a place called Glenn's farm. The country was wooded, with small openings, and the ground unknown to me. Our skirmishers, a few hundred yards in advance, confronted those of the enemy. Our line was supposed to be parallel with the Chattanooga road.

Soon after sunrise I received a note from Lieutenant-General Polk directing me to advance, and about the same time Major-General Cleburne, who happened to be with me, received one of the same tenor. Lieutenant-General Hill having arrived, the notes were placed in his hands. By his order the movement was delayed for the troops to get their rations, and on other accounts.

Dilworth, who had been relieved by a cavalry force late the preceding evening and who had marched all night, now arrived and took his place in line. At 9½ A. M., by order of Lieutenant-General Hill, I moved my division forward in search of the enemy. At a distance of seven hundred yards we came upon him in force, and the battle was opened by Helm's brigade with great fury.

The Second and Ninth Kentucky, with three companies of the Forty-first Alabama regiment, encountered the left of a line of breastworks before reaching the the Chattanooga road, and though assailing them with great courage, were compelled to pause. From some cause, the line of my left had not advanced simultaneously

with my division, and in consequence from the form of the enemy's works these brave troops were at first, in addition to the fire in front, subjected to a severe enfilading fire from the left. The rest of Helm's brigade, in whose front there were no works, after a short but sharp engagement, routed a line of the enemy, pursued it across the Chattanooga road, and captured a section of artillery posted in the centre of the road. This portion of the brigade was now brought under a heavy front and enfilading fire, and being separated from its left and without support, I ordered Colonel Joseph H. Lewis, of the Sixth Kentucky, who succeeded to the command upon the fall of General Helm, to withdraw the troops some two hundred yards to the rear, reunite the brigade, and change his front slightly to meet the new order of things, by throwing forward his right and retiring his left. The movement was made without panic or confusion.

This was one of the bloodiest encounters of the day. Here General Helm, ever ready for action and endeared to his command by his many virtues, received a mortal wound while in the heroic discharge of his duty. Colonel Hewit, of the Second Kentucky, was killed, acting gallantly at the head of his regiment. Captains Madered, Rogers and Dedman, of the Second; Captain Daniel, of the Ninth Kentucky, and many other officers and men, met their deaths before the enemy's works, while Colonel Nuckols, of the Fourth Kentucky; Colonel Caldwell, of the Ninth, and many more officers and men, were wounded.

In the meantime, Adams and Stovall advanced steadily, driving back two lines of skirmishers. Stovall halted at the Chattanooga road. Adams, after dispersing a regiment and capturing a battery, crossed at Glenn's farm and halted a short distance beyond in an open field.

When Helm's brigade was checked, and I had given Colonel Lewis orders in reference to his new position, I rode to the commands of Adams and Stovall on the right. It was now evident, from the comparatively slight resistance they had encountered and the fact that they were not threatened in front, that our line extended beyond the enemy's left. I at once ordered these brigades to change front perpendicularly to the original line of battle, and with the left of Adams and the right of Stovall resting on the Chattanooga road, to advance upon the flank of the enemy. Slocomb's battery, which had previously done good service, was posted on favorable ground on the west of the road to support the movement.

The brigades advanced in fine order over a field and entered the woods beyond. Stovall soon encountered the extreme left of the enemy's works, which, retiring from the general north and south directions of his entrenchments, extended westwardly nearly to the Chattanooga road. After a severe and well contested conflict, he was checked and forced to retire. Adams, on the west of the road, met two lines of the enemy, who had improved the short time to bring reinforcements and reform nearly at a right angle to the troops in his main line of works.

The first line was routed, but it was found impossible to break the second, aided as it was by artillery, and after a sanguinary contest, which reflected high honor on the brigade, it was forced back in some confusion. Here General Adams, who is as remarkable for his judgment on the field as for his courage, was severely wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Turner, of the Nineteenth Louisiana, was wounded, and the gallant Major Butler, of the same regiment, was killed.

Stovall had gained a point beyond the angle of the enemy's main line of works. Adams had advanced still farther, being actually in rear of his entrenchments. A good supporting line of my division at this moment would probably have produced decisive results. As it was, the engagement on our right had inflicted heavy losses and compelled him to weaken other parts of the line to hold his vital point. Adams' brigade reformed behind Slocomb's battery, which repulsed the enemy by a rapid and well directed fire, rendering on this occasion important and distinguished service.

By order of Lieutenant-General Hill, my division was withdrawn a short distance to recruit, while the troops of Major-General Walker engaged the enemy. My new line was about six hundred yards in advance of the position on which I formed first in the morning, with a slight change of direction, which brought my right relatively nearer the Chattanooga road. Soon after taking this position an attack was reported on our right flank. It proved to be Granger's corps coming up from Rossville and threatening our right with a part of his force.

At the request of Brigadier-General Forrest, I sent him a section of Cobb's battery, under the command of Lieutenant Gracie, who assisted handsomely in repulsing the enemy.

At the request of the brigade commanders, the artillery of the division had been ordered to report to the brigades with which



they were accustomed to serve. Cobb's battery, from the nature of the ground, could not participate to its accustomed extent; yet, as opportunity offered, it displayed its accustomed gallantry. The excellent battery of Captain Mebane, for the same reason, was able to take little part in the action.

The afternoon was waning and the enemy still obstinately confronted us in his entrenchments.

I received permission from Lieutenant-General Hill to make another charge. A line of troops on my right and covering a part of my front advanced at the same time. A portion of these troops obliques to the right and my line passed through the rest, who seemed to be out of ammunition; so that after moving a few hundred yards the enemy alone was in my front. The division advanced with intrepidity under a severe fire and dashed over the left of the entrenchments. In passing them I saw on my left the right of Major-General Cleburne, whose brave division stormed the centre.

Several hundred of the enemy ran through our lines to the rear, the rest were pursued several hundred yards and beyond the Chattanooga road; of these some were killed, and a good many taken prisoners, but most of them escaped through the darkness. It was now night; pursuit was stopped by order of Lieutenant-General Hill, and throwing out pickets, I bivouacked in line near the road.

The prisoners taken by my command, of whom there was a considerable number, were allowed to go to the rear, since details could not be spared for them, and it was known they would be gathered up there.

The division captured nine pieces of artillery. I am aware that it is usually the whole army, not a part of it, that takes guns from the enemy, and that often the troops who obtain possession of them owe their good fortune quite as much to fire from the right and left as to their own efforts. Yet I think it due to my command that in regard to six at least of these guns such considerations do not apply, and that they were taken without assistance from any other troops.

My total casualties, as shown by official reports, twelve hundred and forty, of which number one hundred and sixty-six (166) were killed, nine hundred and nine (909) wounded, and one hundred and sixty-five (165) missing.

To Brigadier-General Stovall, to Colonel Lewis, who succeeded to the command of Helm's brigade, and to Colonel R. L. Gibson, who



succeeded to the command of Adams' brigade, the country is indebted for the courage and skill with which they discharged their arduous duties.

The officers and men of the division, with exceptions so rare as to place in striking contrast to them the general good conduct, sustained their former reputation, and were alike worthy of each other.

To the gentlemen of my staff I feel sincere gratitude for the prompt, fearless and cheerful manner in which they discharged their duties.

Major Wilson, Assistant Adjutant-General; Colonel Von Zinken, Assistant Inspector-General, who had two horses shot under him; Captain Mastin, Assistant Inspector-General, who received a contusion from a grape shot; Lieutenant Breckinridge, Aid-de-Camp, whose horse was shot; Captain Semple, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant Berties, Twentieth Louisiana, Assistant Inspector-General; Dr. Heustis, Chief Surgeon; Dr. Kratz, on duty in the field, and Messrs McGehee, Coleman, Mitchell and Clay, volunteers on my staff, performed their duties in a manner to command my confidence and regard.

One member of my staff I cannot thank. Major R. E. Graves, Chief of Artillery, received a mortal wound in the action of Sunday the 20th. Although a very young man he had won eminence in arms, and gave promise of the highest distinction. A truer friend, a purer patriot, a better soldier never lived.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, *Major-General, P. A. C. S.*

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#### *Endorsement of Report.*

In speaking of the final attack, on the afternoon of the 20th, General Breckinridge employs a phrase in a different sense from its ordinary meaning. He says: "I *received permission* from Lieutenant-General Hill to make another charge." The facts in the case are simply these: About 3½ P. M., or it may be a little later, I ordered another Major-General, not of my corps, but who had been sent to report to me, to make the attack, telling him that Breckinridge's men, after their repulse, were scarcely in a condition to make another charge. He replied: "My division was sent by General Polk as a support to General Breckinridge, and under my orders I can do nothing more than support him." I then returned to

General Breckinridge, told him of this conversation, and asked him if his troops were ready to renew the attack. He answered, "Yes, I think they are." I then added: "Well, then, move promptly and strike hard." The division responded to the order with a cheer, moved off in most beautiful style and made a most glorious charge.

D. H. HILL, *Lieutenant-General.*

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**Engagement at Sappony Church—Report of General Wade Hampton.**

HEADQUARTERS HAMPTON'S DIVISION,  
CAVALRY CORPS, A. N. V.,  
July 10th, 1864.

To Lieutenant-Colonel TAYLOR, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

Colonel—On the morning of 27th June the General-Commanding ordered me to move my command from Drewry's farm to Stony creek, in order to intercept Wilson, who was returning from Staunton river bridge to rejoin Grant's army. In obedience to these orders, I moved rapidly in the direction indicated with my division—Chambliss' brigade having been sent forward the evening previous. At 12 M. the next day I reached Stony Creek depot, where I found Chambliss. From this point scouts were sent out to find the position of the enemy and to ascertain what route he was pursuing. At 12.30 P. M. I wrote the General-Commanding, suggesting that a force of infantry and artillery be placed at Reams' station, as the enemy would have to cross the railroad there—Jarratt's or Hicksford. The scouts having reported what road the enemy were marching on, I notified General Lee of their position, and informed him that I should attack them at Sappony church, asking him at the same time to place the infantry at Reams' station and to order Major-General Fitz. Lee to take position near there. These dispositions were made by the General-Commanding, and in the meantime my command was put in motion. Chambliss, who was ahead, was ordered to push on to the church and to charge the enemy as soon as he met him. Soon after crossing Sappony creek the enemy was encountered, and he was gallantly charged by the Ninth Virginia and driven back beyond the church. Here he occupied a strong position with dis-

mounted men, and he succeeded in checking the charge. General Chambliss dismounted his men and took up a line near the church, when in a few moments he was heavily attacked. I brought up a part of the Seventh Virginia to reinforce him, and the attack was repulsed along the whole line. Young's brigade, under Colonel Wright, was then dismounted and put into position—the enemy in the meantime using his artillery and small arms rapidly. Soon after my line was established, Lieutenant-Colonel Crawley, commanding the Holcombe legion (infantry), brought 200 men of his command to join me, and he was placed in the centre of the line. With these troops the line, which was not a strong one, was held steadily all night, the enemy constantly making demonstrations and attacks upon it, but without the least impression. The fire of their artillery becoming very hot, I directed Major Chew to place two guns—all I had—under Captain Graham, where they could respond. These guns were well served and rendered me great assistance. The position of the enemy—who had two lines of works—was so strong that I could not attack it in front, so at daylight I threw portions of Butler's and Rosser's brigades on the left flank of the enemy. At the same moment Chambliss advanced the whole of the front line, and in a few moments we were in possession of both lines of works, and the enemy were in full retreat, leaving their dead and wounded on the ground. They were followed closely for two miles, when, finding they had taken the route to Reams' station, I moved by Stony Creek depot, in order to get on the Halifax road to intercept them, should they attempt to cross below Reams'. Butler's brigade was sent to Malone's crossing, two miles south of Reams' station, and the other brigades were ordered to occupy the roads leading into the Halifax road. I moved up with Chambliss' brigade, following Butler, and soon after crossing Rowanty creek we met an advance of the enemy who had struck the Halifax road between Butler and Chambliss. These were charged and scattered, when another party were reported coming into the same road at Perkins' house. I took a portion of the Thirteenth Virginia, and meeting them, drove them back, and Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips pushed on, getting possession of the bridge over the Rowanty. Finding that a portion of the force which had crossed the creek had taken a road leading east, I sent Colonel Beale with two or three squadrons in pursuit. He followed them for four miles, capturing a large number and scattering the rest. The force of the enemy was entirely broken and the frag-



ments were seeking safety in flight in all directions. They scattered through the woods, and night coming on the pursuit had to cease. Knowing that a portion of the enemy were retreating towards the Nottoway river on the Stage road, I brought my command to Stony Creek depot, which was the most central point, to let the men who had been fighting all the night previous obtain some rest, and that I might be where I could best intercept the party which was retreating west and south of me. My command was ordered to be ready to move at daylight, and I anxiously waited for some information which would indicate the point at which the enemy would attempt to cross the Nottoway river. I had not heard one word of the result of the fight at Reams' station, nor did I know the position of Major-General Lee or of the enemy. At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 30th of June I received a note directed to the "Commanding officer Stony Creek depot," from General Fitz. Lee, saying that he was "still pursuing the enemy, capturing prisoners," &c., and that he was five miles from Nottoway river on the Hicksford road. The note went on say that General Lee thought "the enemy after crossing the river will try to cross the railroad at Jarratt's depot," and he wished "all the available force sent to that point to intercept their march until he gets up." I immediately moved my command in the direction of Jarratt's depot, but when I got within five miles of that place some of my scouts, who had been sent on, reported that the enemy had passed there at daylight. I then advanced to intercept them on the road leading to Peter's bridge, but though I made a rapid march, I found on striking the road that the rear of their column had passed two hours previously. Had there been proper concert of action between the forces at Reams' and my own, there would have been no difficulty in cutting off the party which escaped by Jarratt's. In the fight at Sappony church and during the following days, the enemy lost quite heavily in killed and wounded. We captured 806 prisoners, together with 127 negroes—slaves. My own loss was two killed, eighteen wounded and two missing. The reports from General Chambliss and Colonel Crawley have not been sent to me. I regret to announce that the latter was severely wounded, and I beg to express my sense of the valuable services rendered to me by this officer and his command. General Chambliss, by his gallantry, his zeal and his knowledge of the country, contributed largely to the success we gained. The officers and men of my own division behaved to my entire satisfaction, and the



members of my staff gave me every assistance possible. Captain Graham, who had a section of his battery with me, did good service, and he was well supported by his command. The pursuit of the enemy, which ended near Peters' bridge, closed the active operations which commenced on the 8th June, when the movement against Sheridan began. During that time, a period of twenty three days, the command had no rest, was badly supplied with rations and forage, marched upwards of 400 miles, fought the greater portion of six days and one entire night, captured upwards of 2,000 prisoners, many guns, small arms, wagons, horses and other material of war, and was completely successful in defeating two of the most formidable and well organized expeditions of the enemy. This was accomplished at a cost in my division of 719 killed, wounded and missing, including twenty-one casualties in Chew's battalion not mentioned in my previous report. The men have borne their privations with perfect cheerfulness; they have fought admirably, and I wish to express, before closing my reports, not only my thanks to them for their good conduct, but my pride at having had the honor to command them.

I am, very respectfully, yours,

WADE HAMPTON, *Major-General.*

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**General Bragg's Proclamation on Entering Kentucky.**

The following should go on the record and be preserved with the "material for the future historian":

HEADQUARTERS OF DEPARTMENT NO. 2,  
GLASGOW, KY., September 18, 1862.

Kentuckians—I have entered your State with the Confederate Army of the West, and offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler. We come, not as conquerors or as despoilers, but to restore to you the liberties of which you have been deprived by a cruel and relentless foe. We come to guarantee to all the sanctity of their homes and altars; to punish with a rod of iron the despoilers of your peace, and to avenge the cowardly insults to your women. With all non-combatants the past shall be forgotten. I shall enforce a rigid discipline, and shall protect all in their persons and property. Needful supplies must be had for my army, but they shall be paid for at fair and remunerating prices.

Believing that the heart of Kentucky is with us in our great struggle for constitutional freedom, we have transferred from our own soil to yours, not a band of marauders, but a powerful and well disciplined army. Your gallant Buckner leads the van. Marshall is on the right, while Breckinridge, dear to us as to you, is advancing with Kentucky's valiant sons to receive the honor and applause due to their heroism. The strong hands which, in part, have sent Shiloh down to history, and the nerved arms which have kept at bay from our own homes the boastful army of the enemy, are here to assist, to sustain, to liberate you. Will you remain indifferent to our call, or will you not rather vindicate the fair fame of your once free and envied State? We believe that you will, and that the memory of your gallant dead who fell at Shiloh, their faces turned homeward, will rouse you to a manly effort for yourselves and posterity.

Kentuckians: We have come with joyous hopes. Let us not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer Federal rule show it by your frowns, and we shall return whence we came. If you choose rather to come within the folds of our brotherhood, then cheer us with the smiles of your women and lend your willing hands to secure you in your heritage of liberty.

Women of Kentucky: Your persecutions and heroic bearing have reached our ear. Banish henceforth, forever, from your minds the fear of loathsome prisons or insulting visitations. Let your enthusiasm have free rein. Buckle on the armor of your kindred, your husbands, sons and brothers, and scoff with shame him who would prove recreant in his duty to you, his country and his God.

BRAXTON BRAGG, *General-Commanding.*

**Battle of Monocacy—Report of General John B. Gordon.**

[It was eclipsed at the time by other stirring events, but there was scarcely a more gallant fight made during the war than that in which, after a march of fourteen miles that morning, General Early defeated General Lew Wallace at Monocacy. Our readers will be glad to see the report of the battle given by Major-General John B. Gordon, who bore the brunt of the battle with his accustomed skill and gallantry.]

HEADQUARTERS GORDON'S DIVISION,  
July 22d, 1864.

Major J. STODDARD JOHNSTON,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Breckinridge's Corps :*

Major—In accordance with orders from corps headquarters I have the honor to submit the following report.

About 2½ P. M., 9th of July, I was ordered by Major-General Breckinridge, commanding corps, to move my division to the right and cross the Monocacy about one mile below the bridge and ford (on the Georgetown pike), which were then held by the enemy. On reaching the river I directed my brigade commanders to cross as rapidly as possible and then to file to the left in the direction of the enemy's line, and I rode to the front in order to reconnoitre the enemy's position. I found that Brigadier-General McCausland's cavalry brigade (dismounted) had been driven back by superior numbers, and that the enemy was posted along the line of a fence, on the crest of the ridge running obliquely to the left from the river. In his front lay an open field, which was commanded by his artillery and small arms to the extent of their range, while in his rear ran a valley nearly parallel with the general direction of his line of battle. In this valley I discovered, from a wooded eminence in front of his left, another line of battle in support of the first. Both these lines were in advance of the Georgetown road. The enemy's line of skirmishers covered the front of his first line and stretched far beyond it to the left. Having been ordered to attack this force, I had the division skirmishers (under Captain Keller, of Evans' brigade) deployed, and directed one brigade (Evans'), under the protection of a dense woodland about seven hundred yards in front of the enemy's left, to move by the right flank and form so as to overlap the enemy's left. The two brigades (Hays' and Stafford's), united under the command of Brigadier-General York, were ordered to form on the left of Brigadier-General Evans, and Terry's brigade to move in support of the left of

my line. These dispositions having been made, I ordered the command to advance *en echelon* by brigades from the right. The troops emerged from the woods seven hundred yards in front of the enemy's left, under heavy fire from infantry and artillery, and had advanced but a short distance when, on account of the wounding of one brigade commander (Evans), to whom explicit instructions had been given as to the movement of his (the leading) brigade, and the killing of several regimental commanders, and the difficulty of advancing in line through a field covered with wheat-shocks and intersected by fences, the perfect alignment of this brigade was necessarily to some extent broken. However, this temporary confusion did not retard its advance, which, as I had anticipated, forced the enemy to change his front under fire. At this point the Louisiana brigades, under the command of Brigadier-General York, became engaged, and the two brigades (Evans' and York's) moved forward with much spirit, driving back the enemy's first line in confusion upon his second. After a brief halt at the fence from which this first line had been driven, I ordered a charge on the second line, which was equally successful. At this point I discovered a third line, which overlapped both my flanks and which was posted still more strongly in the deep cuts along the Georgetown road and behind the crest of the hill near the Monocacy bridge, and at once ordered Brigadier-General Terry, who as yet had not been engaged, to attack vigorously that portion of the enemy's line nearest the river, and from which my troops were receiving a severe flank fire. This brigade advanced with great spirit and in excellent order, driving the enemy from his position on a portion of the line. He still held most stubbornly his strong position in front of the other two brigades and upon my right. He also advanced at the same time two fresh lines of troops to retake the position from which he had been driven by Terry's brigade. These were repulsed with heavy loss and in great confusion. Having suffered severe loss in driving back two lines, either of which I believed equal in length to my command, and having discovered the third line longer than either of the others, and protected by the cuts in the road, and in order to avoid the great loss it would require to drive the enemy from his position by a direct front attack, I dispatched two staff officers in succession to ask for a brigade to use upon the enemy's flank. Ascertaining, however, that a considerable length of time must elapse before these could reach me, I at once ordered Brigadier-General Terry to change



front with his brigade to the right and attack the enemy's right. This movement, promptly executed, with a simultaneous attack from the front, resulted in the dislodging of this line and the complete rout of the enemy's forces.

This battle, though short, was severe. I desire, in this connection, to state a fact of which I was an eye witness, and which, for its rare occurrence and the evidence it affords of the sanguinary character of this struggle, I consider worthy of official mention. One portion of the enemy's second line extended along a branch, from which he was driven, leaving many dead and wounded in the water and upon its banks. This position was in turn occupied by a portion of Evans' brigade in the attack on the enemy's third line. So profuse was the flow of blood from the killed and wounded of both these forces that it reddened the stream for more than a hundred yards below.

It has not been my fortune to witness on any battlefield a more commendable spirit and courage than was exhibited on this by both officers and men. To my brigade commanders for their good example and prompt execution of orders, I am especially indebted. They rode in the midst of their troops under the severest fire, and exhibited that cool courage so essential in an officer on the field. There are many other officers of lower grade who well deserve particular mention; among them I desire to call attention to the admirable conduct of Colonel Peck, Ninth Louisiana, commanding Hays' brigade; Colonel Atkinson, commanding Evans' brigade; Colonels Funk and Dungan, commanding the remnants of the "Stonewall" and Jones' brigades, of Terry's command.

I regret to state that my loss was heavy in both officers and men, amounting in the aggregate, as shown by tabular report of brigade commanders, to 698. Among the killed are Colonel J. H. Lamar and Lieutenant-Colonel Van Valkenburg, both of the Sixty-first Georgia regiment, of Evans' brigade, and both meritorious officers. Colonel Lamar, a most promising young officer, was shot from his horse at the head of his regiment. Several other regimental commanders of this brigade were wounded—some, it is feared, mortally. Lieutenant Colonel Hodges, Ninth Louisiana regiment, Hays' brigade, an officer of rare merit, was severely wounded and left at hospital in Frederick City.

I cannot too highly commend the conduct on the field of the members of my staff—Major R. W. Hunter and Captains V. Dabney and L. Powell. The prompt, fearless and intelligent manner with which

they bore my orders to every portion of the field met my hearty approbation. Lieutenant S. Wilmer, my signal officer, had been previously wounded, during the skirmishing in front of Maryland Heights, bearing under severe fire an order from me. Major Moore, my inspector, rendered efficient service in his department. My senior surgeon, Dr. J. H. Stevens, labored assiduously during the afternoon and night in caring for the many wounded.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. GORDON, *Major-General.*

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### Detailed Minutia of Soldier Life.

By Private CARLTON MCCARTHY.

#### PAPER NO. 6—*"Brave Survivors" Homeward Bound.*

[This is the last of a series of papers which have been widely read and complimented for their vivid pictures of the life of the private soldier.]

Bitter grief for the past, which seemed to be forever lost, and present humiliation could not long suppress the anxious thought and question, "What now?" The discussion of the question brought relief from the horrid feeling of vacuity, which oppressed the soldier, and introduced him to the new sensations of liberty of choice, freedom of action—full responsibility. For capital he had a clear conscience, a brave heart, health, strength, and a good record. With these he sought his home.

Early in the morning of Wednesday the 12th of April, without the stirring drum or the bugle call of old, the camp awoke to the new life. Whether or not they had a country these soldiers did not know. Home to many, when they reached it, was graves and ashes. At any rate there must be, somewhere on earth, a better place than a muddy, smoky camp in a piece of scrubby pines—better company than gloomy, hungry comrades and inquisitive enemies, and something in the future more exciting, if not more hopeful, than nothing to eat, nowhere to sleep, nothing to do and nowhere to go. The disposition to start was apparent, and the preparations were promptly begun.

To roll up the old blanket and oilcloth, gather up the haversack, canteen, axe, perhaps, and a few trifles, in time of peace of no value,

eat the fragments that remained and light a pipe, was the work of a few moments. This slight employment, coupled with pleasant anticipations of the unknown, and therefore possibly enjoyable future, served to restore somewhat the usual light-hearted manner of soldiers and relieve the final farewells of much of their sadness. There was even a smack of hope and cheerfulness as the little groups sallied out into the world to combat they scarcely knew what. As we cannot follow all these groups, we will join ourselves to one and see them home.

Two "brothers-in-arms," whose objective point is Richmond, take the road on foot. They have nothing to eat and no money. They are bound for their home in a city, which, when they last heard from it, was in flames. What they will see when they arrive there they cannot imagine; but the instinctive love of home urges them. They walk on steadily and rapidly and are not diverted by surroundings. It does not even occur to them that their situation, surrounded on all sides by armed enemies and walking a road crowded with them, is at all novel. They are suddenly roused to a sense of their situation by a sharp—"Halt! show your parole!" They had struck the cordon of picket posts which surrounded the surrendered army. It was the first exercise of authority by the Federal army. A sergeant, accompanied by a couple of muskets, stepped into the road, with a modest air examined the paroles and said quietly, "Pass on."

The strictly military part of the operation being over, the social commenced. As the two "survivors" moved on they were followed by numerous remarks, such as "Hello! Johnny, I say! going home?" "Ain't you glad!" They made no reply, these wayfarers, but they *thought* some very *emphatic remarks*.

From this point "on to Richmond!" was the grand thought. Steady work it was. The road, strangely enough considering the proximity of two armies, was quite lonesome, and not an incident of interest occurred during the day. Darkness found the two comrades still pushing on.

Some time after dark a light was seen a short distance ahead and there was a "sound of revelry." On approaching, the light was found to proceed from a large fire, built on the floor of an old and dilapidated outhouse, and surrounded by a ragged, hungry, singing and jolly crowd of paroled prisoners of the Army of Northern Virginia, who had gotten possession of a quantity of corn meal and were waiting for the ashcakes then in the ashes. Being liberal,

they offered the new comers some of their bread. Being hungry, they accepted and eat their first meal that day. Here seemed a good place to spend the night, but the party in possession were so noisy and finally so quarrelsome and disagreeable generally, that the "survivors," after a short rest, pushed on in the darkness, determined, if possible, to find some shelter more quiet. The result was a night march, which was continued till the morning dawned.

Thursday morning they entered the village of Buckingham Courthouse, and traded a small pocket-mirror for a substantial breakfast. There was quite a crowd of soldiers gathered around a cellar door, trying to persuade an ex-Confederate A. A. A. Commissary of Subsistence that he might as well, in view of the fact that the army had surrendered, let them have some of his stores; and after considerable persuasion, and some threats, he forego the hope of keeping them for himself and told the men to help themselves. They—did so.

The people of the village did not exactly doubt the *fact* of the surrender, but evidently thought matters had been *somewhat exaggerated*, facts suppressed and everything allowed to fall into a very doubtful condition. Confederate money would not pass, however; *that* was settled *beyond doubt*.

As the two tramps were about to leave the village and were hurrying along the high road which led through it, they saw a solitary horseman approaching from their rear. It was easy to recognize at once General Lee. He rode slowly, calmly along. As he passed an old tavern on the roadside some ladies and children waved their handkerchiefs, smiled and wept. The General raised his eyes to the porch on which they stood, and slowly raising his hand to his hat, raised it slightly and as slowly again dropped his hand to his side. The "survivors" did not weep, but they had strange sensations. They passed on, steering, so to speak, for Cartersville and the ferry.

Before leaving the village it was the sad duty of the survivors to stop at the humble abode of Mrs. P., and tell her of the death of her husband, who fell mortally wounded, pierced by a musket ball near Sailor's creek. She was also told that a comrade who was by his side when he fell, but who was not able to stay with him, would come along soon and give her the particulars. That comrade came and repeated the story. In a few days the dead man reached home alive and scarcely hurt. He was originally an infantryman, recently transferred to artillery, and therefore wore a small knapsack as infantrymen did. The ball struck the knapsack with a "whack!" and knocked the man down. That was all.



Some time during the night the travelers reached the ferry at Cartersville. Darkness and silence prevailed there. Loud and continued shouts brought no ferryman, and eager searchings revealed no boat. The depth of the water being a thing unknown and not easily found out, it was obviously prudent to camp for the night.

On the river's edge there was an old building, which seemed a brick one—one wall near the water's edge. A flight of steep, rough steps led to an open door on the second floor. Up these steps climbed the weary men. Inside there was absolute darkness, but the floor was dry and there was shelter from the wind. Feeling about on the floor they satisfied themselves of its cleanliness and dryness. The faithful old blankets were once more spread, their owners laid down and at once fell into a deep sleep which was not broken till morning. The room was surprisingly small. When the soldiers entered they had no idea of the size of it, and went to sleep with the impression that it was very large. The morning revealed its dimensions—about ten by twelve feet. The ferryman was early at his post and put the travelers across cheerfully without charge.

Soon after crossing, a good silver-plated tablespoon, bearing the monogram of one of the travelers, purchased from an aged colored woman a large chunk of ashcake and about half a gallon of buttermilk. This old darkey had lived in Richmond in her younger days. She spoke of grown men and women there as "children whar I raised." "Lord! boss, does you know Miss Sadie? Well, I nussed her and I nussed all uv them chillun; that I did, sah! Yawl chillun does look hawngry, that you does. Well, you's welcome to them vittles, and I'm powful glad to git dis spoon! God bless you, honey!" A big log on the roadside furnished a seat for the comfortable consumption of the before-mentioned ashcake and milk. The feast was hardly begun when the tramp of a horse's hoofs were heard. Looking up, the survivors saw with surprise General Lee approaching. He was entirely alone, and rode slowly along. Unconscious that any one saw him, he was yet erect, dignified and apparently as calm and peaceful as the fields and woods around him. Having caught sight of the occupants of the log, he kept his eyes fixed on them, and as he passed, turned slightly, saluted and said, in the most gentle manner: "Good morning, gentlemen; taking your breakfast?" The soldiers had only time to rise, salute and say: "Yes, sir!" and he was gone.

Having finished as far as they were able the abundant meal furnished by the liberality of the good "old mammy," the travelers resume their journey greatly refreshed.

It seems that General Lee pursued the road which the "survivors" chose, and starting later than they, overtook them, he being mounted and they on foot. At any rate it was their good fortune to see him three times on the road from Appomattox to Richmond. The incidents introducing General Lee are peculiarly interesting, and while the writer is in doubt as to the *day* on which the next and last incident occurred, the reader may rest assured of the truthfulness of the narration as to what occurred and what was said and done.

After the feast of bread and milk, the no longer hungry men pressed on. About the time when men who have eaten a hearty breakfast become again hungry—as good fortune would have it happen—they reached a house pleasantly situated and a comfortable place withal. Approaching the house they were met by an exceedingly kind, energetic and hospitable woman. She promptly asked: "You are not deserters?" "No," said the soldiers, "we have our paroles; we are from Richmond; we are homeward bound, and called to ask if you could spare us a dinner?" "Spare you a dinner? Certainly I can. My husband is a miller; his mill is right across the road there, down the hill, and I have been cooking all day for the poor, starving men. Take a seat on the porch there and I will get you something to eat." By the time the travelers were seated, this admirable woman was in the kitchen at work. The "pat-a-pat, pat, pat, pat, pat-a-pat-a-pat" of the sifter, and the cracking and "fizzing" of the fat bacon as it fried, saluted their hungry ears, and the delicious smell tickled their olfactory nerves most delightfully. Sitting thus, entertained by delightful sounds, breathing the fragrant air and wrapped in meditation—or anticipation rather, the soldiers saw the dust rise in the air and heard the sound of an approaching party.

Several horsemen rode up to the road-gate, threw their bridles over the posts or tied to the overhanging boughs and dismounted. They were evidently officers, well dressed fine looking men, and about to enter the gate. Almost at once the men on the porch recognized General Lee and his son. They were accompanied by other officers. An ambulance had arrived at the gate also. Without delay they entered and approached the house, General Lee preceding the others. Satisfied that it was the General's in-

tention to enter the house, the two "brave survivors" instinctively and respectfully, venerating the approaching man, determined to give him and his companions the porch. As they were executing a rather rapid and undignified flank movement to gain the right and rear of the house, the voice of General Lee overhauled them thus: "Where are you men going?" "This lady has offered to give us a dinner, and we are waiting for it," replied the soldiers. "Well you had better move on now—this gentleman will have quite a large party on him to-day," said the General. The soldiers touched their caps, said "Yes, sir," and retired, somewhat hurt, to a strong position on a hen-coop in the rear of the house. The party then settled on the porch.

The General had of course no authority, and the surrender of the porch was purely respectful. Knowing this the soldiers were at first hurt, but a moment's reflection satisfied them that the General was right. He no doubt had suspicions of plunder, and these were increased by the movement of the men to the rear as he approached. He *misinterpreted their conduct*.

The lady of the house (*a reward for her name!*) hearing the dialogue in the yard, pushed her head through the crack of the kitchen door, and as she tossed a lump of dough from hand to hand and gazed eagerly out, addressed the soldiers: "Ain't that old General Lee?" "Yes, General Lee and his son and other officers come to dine with you," they replied. "Well," she said, "he ain't no better than the men that fought for him, and I don't reckon he is as hungry; so you just come in here. I am going to give you yours first and then I'll get something for him!"

What a meal it was. Seated at the kitchen-table, the large hearted woman bustling about and talking away, the ravenous tramps attacked a pile of Old Virginia hoecake and corn-dodger, a frying pan with an inch of gravy and slices of bacon, streak of lean and streak of fat, very numerous. To finish—as much rich buttermilk as the drinkers could contain. With many heartfelt thanks the survivors bid farewell to this immortal woman, and leaving the General and his party in quiet possession of the front porch, pursued their way.

Night found the "survivors" at the gate of a quite handsome, framed, country residence. The weather was threatening, and it was desirable to have shelter as well as rest. Entering and knocking at the door they were met by a servant girl. She was sent to her mistress with a request for permission to sleep on her premises.

The servant returned, saying: "Mistis say she's a widder, and there ain't no gentleman in the house, and she can't let you come in." She was sent with a second message, which informed the lady that the visitors were from Richmond, members of a certain company from there, and would be content with permission to sleep on the porch, in the stable or in the barn. They would protect her property, &c., &c., &c.

This message brought the lady of the house to the door. She said: "If you are members of the — —, you must know my nephew; he was in that company." Of course they knew him. "Old chum," "comrade," "particular friend," "splendid fellow," "hope he was well when you heard from him; glad to meet you, madam!" These and similar hearty expressions brought the longed for "come in, gentlemen, you are welcome. I will see that supper is prepared for you at once." (Invitation accepted.)

The old haversacks were deposited in a corner under the steps and their owners conducted down stairs to a spacious dining-room, quite prettily furnished. A large table occupied the centre of the room, and at one side there was a handsome display of silver in a glass-front case. A good, big fire lighted the room. The lady sat quietly working at some woman's work, and from time to time questioning, in a *rather suspicious* manner, her guests. Their correct answers satisfied her and their respectful manner reassured her, so that by the time supper was brought in she was chatting and laughing with her "defenders."

The supper came in steaming hot. It was abundant, well prepared and served elegantly. Splendid coffee, hot biscuit, luscious butter, fried ham, eggs—fresh milk! The writer could not expect to be believed if he should tell the quantity eaten at that meal. The good lady of the house enjoyed the sight. She relished every mouthful, and no doubt realized then and there the blessing which is conferred on hospitality and the truth of that saying of old: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

The wayfarers were finally shown to a neat little chamber. The bed was soft and glistening white. Too white and clean to be soiled by the occupancy of two Confederate soldiers who had not had a change of underclothing for many weeks. They looked at it, felt of it, spread their old blankets on the neat carpet and slept there till near the break of day.

While it was yet dark the travelers, unwilling to lose time waiting for breakfast, crept out of the house, leaving their thanks for



their kind hostess, and pressed rapidly on to Manikin Town, on the James River and Kanawha canal, half a day's march from Richmond, where they arrived while it was yet early morning. The green sward between the canal and river was inviting and the survivors laid there awhile to rest and determine whether or not they would push on to the city. They decided to do so as soon as they could find a breakfast to fit them for the day's march.

A short walk placed them at the yard gate of a house prominent by reason of its size and finish. Everything indicated comfort, plenty and freedom from the ravages of war. The proprietor, a well fed, hearty man of not more than forty-two or three, who, as a soldier could tell at a glance, had never seen a day's service, stood behind the tall gate, and without a motion towards opening it replied to the cheery "good morning, sir!" of the soldiers with a sullen "morn—what do you want here?" "We are from Richmond, sir, members of the — — —. We are on our way home from Appomattox, where the army was surrendered, and called to ask if you could spare us something to eat before we start on the day's march." "Oh! yes! I know about the surrender! I do. Some scoundrels were here last night and stole my best mare—d—— em! No, I don't want any more of such cattle here," replied the patriot. (A large reward for his name). The foragers, having worked for a meal before and being less sensitive than "penniless gentlemen" sometimes are, replied: "We are not horse thieves or beggars. If you do not feel that it would be a pleasure and a privilege to feed us, *don't do it!* We don't propose to press the matter."

At last he said: "Come in, then; I'll see what I can do." The seekers after food accepted the ungracious invitation, followed the dog through his yard and into his house and took seats at his table. At a signal from the master a servant went out. The host followed and, it is supposed, instructed her. The host returned and was soon followed by the servant bearing two plates, which were placed before the "survivors." Alas! that they should "survive" to see the plates contained the heads, tails, fins and vertibræ of the fish, fresh from the river, which the family of this hero and sufferer from the evils of war had devoured at their early and no doubt cosy breakfast.

"Survivor" No. 1 looked at "Survivor" No. 2, Survivor No. 2 looked at "Survivor" No. 1, and simultaneously they rose to their feet, glanced at the "host" and strode to and out of the door. The "host" followed amazed. "What's the matter, gentlemen? You did

not eat!" The "poor soldiers" replied: "No, we didn't eat; we are not dogs. Permit us to say we are satisfied it would be an injustice to the canine race to call *you* one; you deserve to lose another mare; you are meaner than the language at our command will express."

The man fairly trembled. His face was pale with rage, but he dared not reply as he would. Recovering himself, and seeing an odorous name in the future, he attempted apology and reparation for the insult and complete reconciliation. "Oh! come in, come in! I'll have something cooked for you. Sorry the mistake occurred! All right! all right, boys, come in!"—pulling and patting at the "boys." But the boys wouldn't "go in." On the contrary they staid out persistently, and, before they left that gate, heaped on its owner all the contempt, disdain and scorn which they could express; flung at him all the derisive epithets which four years in the army places at a man's disposal; pooh poohed! at his hypocritical regrets, and shaking off the dust of that place from their feet, pushed on to the city, the smoke of which rose to heaven.

At 11 A. M. of the same day two footsore, despondent and penniless men stood facing the ruins of the home of a comrade who had sent a message to his mother: "Tell mother I am coming." The ruins yet smoked. A relative of the lady whose home was in ashes and whose son said "I am coming" stood by the survivors. "Well, then," he said, "it must be true that General Lee has surrendered." The solemnity of the remark, coupled with the certainty in the minds of the survivors, was almost amusing. The "relative" pointed out the temporary residence of the "mother" and thither the survivors wended their way.

A knock at the door startled the mother, and with agony in her eyes she appeared at the opened door exclaiming, "My poor boys!"—"are safe and coming home," said the survivors. "Thank God!" said the mother, and the tears flowed down her cheeks.

A rapid walk through ruined and smoking streets, some narrow escapes from negro soldiers on police duty, the satisfaction of seeing two of the "boys in blue" hung up by their thumbs for pillaging, a few handshakings, and the survivors found their way to the house of a relative, where they did eat bread with thanks.

A friend informed the survivors that day that farm hands were needed all around the city. They made a note of that and the name of one farmer. Saturday night the old blankets were spread on the parlor floor. Sunday morning, the 16th of April, they bid farewell to the household and started for the farmer's house.

As they were about to start away, the head of the family took from his pocket a handfull of odd silver pieces, and extending it to his guests, told them it was all he had, but they were *welcome to half of it!* Remembering that he had a wife and three or four children to feed, the soldiers smiled through *their* tears at his, bade him keep it all and "weep for himself rather than for them." So saying, they departed, and at sundown were at the farmer's house, fourteen miles away. Monday morning, the 17th, they "beat their swords" (muskets in this case) into plow-shares and did the first day's work of the *sixty* which the simple farmer secured at a cost to himself of about *half rations* for two men. Behold the gratitude of a people! Where grow now the shrubs which of old bore leaves and twigs for garlands? The brave live! are the fair dead? Shall time or calamity, downfall or ruin annihilate sacrifice or hatch an ingrate brood?

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### Who Burned Columbia?—A Review of General Sherman's Version of the Affair.

By Colonel JAMES WOOD DAVIDSON.

The publication of his "Memoirs" by General Sherman makes for the third time an occasion for the country to ask, Who burned Columbia? The first occasion was the publication of his official report just after the event; and the second was in September, 1873, when he published a letter in the *Washington Chronicle*, apparently designed to influence the decision of the Mixed Claims Commission.

In his "Memoirs" just published General Sherman uses this language concerning the burning of the capital of South Carolina: "Many of the people think this fire was deliberately planned and executed. This is not true. It was accidental, and in my judgment began from the cotton which General Hampton's men had set fire to on leaving the city (whether by his order or not is not material), which fire was partially subdued early in the day; but when night came the high wind fanned it again into full blaze, carried it against the frame buildings, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond our control."

In his letter to the *Washington Chronicle* in 1873 General Sherman says: "I reiterate that, no matter what his (General Hampton's)



orders were, the men of his army, either his rear guard or his stragglers, did apply the fire, and that this was a sufficient cause for all else that followed." By "all else," of course, General Sherman means the destruction of the city.

In his official report of the event itself in 1865 General Sherman says: "And without hesitation I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a Roman stoicism, but from folly and want of sense in filling it with lint, cotton and tinder."

I have thus given in his own words General Sherman's three statements of his version of the story of Columbia's burning. They show a toning down as we come on from 1865 to 1873, and finally to 1875; but this discrepancy is not the matter before me just now. The general idea of the three statements is that the burning of Columbia was an accident, and that General Hampton is responsible for it. I propose to show that the burning of Columbia was a crime, and that General Sherman is responsible for it.

First. On page 287 of volume first of the "Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," published officially by the Government, are these words in a dispatch dated December 18, 1864, from Major-General H. W. Halleck, in Washington, to General Sherman, then in Savannah: "Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by *some* accident the place may be destroyed, and if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession." The italicising of the word *some* is done by General Halleck. Are not the animus and intention of these words perfectly clear? That they were understood and cordially concurred in by the officer to whom they were addressed is apparent from General Sherman's reply to them, which, dated December 24, 1864, contains these words: "I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think 'salt' will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth corps will be on the right of the right wing, and their position will bring them naturally into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. \* \* \* I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston." (Page 291.) It will be observed here that General Sherman distinctly approves General Halleck's suggestion that



Charleston should be utterly desolated; that he regards Columbia as equally deserving that fate; that he foresees that if the Fifteenth (Howard's) corps should get a chance they would destroy the city; that he promises that this Fifteenth corps shall have the first chance at destroying the city; that he knows that his whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon the city; and subsequent events bear out every one of these points.

He marched the Fifteenth corps into Columbia on the 17th of February, and the city was destroyed that night. General Hampton evacuated the city about 9 o'clock Friday, the 17th; General Sherman took possession before 10 o'clock; and the fires that destroyed the city began between 8 and 9 o'clock that evening—more than ten hours after the city was in General Sherman's hands.

Second. In his cross-examination before the Mixed Claims Commission (in November or December, 1872)—that portion conducted by George Rivers Walker—General Sherman stated that in Columbia soldiers not on duty and of the Fifteenth corps were allowed to disperse about the city; that his men were thoroughly under control, well disciplined, and that the long roll would at any time have summoned them to their ranks; that he feared they would burn the city, and that he would not restrain them to their ranks to save every city in South Carolina. I have not the text of this examination now before me; but am satisfied as to the correctness of this summary; and if it is incorrect it can easily be disproven, as it can be verified if correct.

Third. General O. O. Howard, while in Columbia in 1867, in a conversation with General Hampton, held in the office of Governor James L. Orr, several other witnesses being present, said that General Sherman knew perfectly well that General Hampton did not burn Columbia; that no one was authorized to say that "our troops did not set fire to it, for I saw them do it myself." Governor Orr testified concerning that conversation to this effect: "General Howard said in substance that the city was burned by United States troops; that he saw them fire many houses." There were several other witnesses to this conversation between Generals Howard and Hampton.

Fourth. In his official report of the event, quoted above, General Sherman goes something beyond the usual scope of a military paper in specifically charging the destruction of the city upon General Hampton. This specific charge was unfortunate for General Sherman, in that all the evidence goes to prove that the charge is

rash. Colonel Stone received the surrender of the city from Mayor Goodwyn as early in the day as 10 o'clock, and took immediate possession of it, the Confederate troops having been withdrawn before the surrender; and—note the importance of the connection—the conflagration that destroyed the city began after dark, say after 8 o'clock (Colonel Stone himself says about 9 o'clock). That is to say, the Federal troops had possession of Columbia fully ten hours previous to the fires that destroyed it; and during this time General Hampton's command was marching northward towards or beyond Winnsboro'. But further upon this point Colonel Kennedy, of the Seventeenth corps, one of the "skirmish" line that entered the city ahead of Colonel Stone's command, and one of General Sherman's pet witnesses before the Mixed Claims Commission, says in testimony: "I cannot for my life see how Wade Hampton and Beauregard are so positive that Sherman's soldiers first set fire to the cotton, for not one was near it when the fire first started, and certainly neither Hampton nor Beauregard were within gunshot of either the cotton or the State-House." This was before 9 o'clock that morning. This glib witness, in proving the distance of the Confederates at the time the cotton was fired, proves rather too much for his General, who is trying to prove that these same Confederates did fire that cotton. Of the fire itself, that which destroyed the city, Colonel Stone, after stating that the time was "about 9 o'clock," says: "All at once fifteen or twenty flames, from as many different places along the river, shot up, and in ten minutes the fate of Columbia was settled." Colonel Stone, it will be remembered, is the officer who, as the official representative of General Sherman, received from Mayor Goodwyn the surrender of Columbia.

Fifth. General Sherman did not submit before the Mixed Claims Commission the testimony of Colonel Stone, who was sent by himself into Columbia about two hours earlier than he (General Sherman) and his main witnesses arrived there. For not submitting this important testimony General Sherman offers the frivolous pretext of not knowing Colonel Stone's address.

Sixth. Adjutant S. H. M. Byers, in a pamphlet entitled "What I Saw in Dixie; or, Sixteen Months in Rebel Prison," says: "The boys, too, were spreading the conflagration by firing the city in a hundred places." The "boys" seem to have done that night exactly as General Sherman told General Halleck they generally did, that is, "do their work up pretty well;" for no one should complain of a hundred separate applications of the incendiary torch as not being "pretty well" in its way.

Seventh. Mr. Whitelaw Reid's "Ohio in the War" says of this destruction of Columbia: "It was the most monstrous barbarity of the barbarous march." This opinion bears upon the character of the act, not upon the question of who did it.

Eighth. Before the Mixed Claims Commission scores of witnesses testified to the fact that the soldiers of Sherman's army set fire to the city in hundreds of places; that they carried about torches, kerosene or petroleum balls, and buckets of the inflammable fluid, lighting fires wherever the wind would not carry the flames fast enough; that this was done often in the presence of their officers, who made no attempt to check or to punish them; and that—as above shown in Sherman's letter to Halleck—General Sherman selected his guards from a corps notorious for their violent and destroying habits, and that, with opportunities furnished by the commanding General himself, these men plundered, burned and robbed in the presence of their officers, and all this with the previous, present and perfect knowledge of General Sherman himself.

Ninth. Mr. William Beverly Nash, a negro, then resident in Columbia, now a State Senator of South Carolina, who was a delegate to the Philadelphia Republican Convention that nominated President Grant in 1872, has made affidavit to the effect that the Federal troops burned Columbia and that General Hampton had nothing to do with it. This is an eye witness of a race and of a party not likely to stretch a point in General Hampton's favor.

Tenth. Dr. T. J. Goodwyn, the Mayor of Columbia, who surrendered the city to Colonel Stone, in his affidavit testifies that with a number of leading citizens he called upon General Sherman two days after the fire; that in the course of conversation about the burning of the city, General Sherman said that he thought his troops burned the city, but excused them because, as he alleged, the citizens had given them liquor. Generals Howard and Blair and other Federal officers were present at this conversation. It is manifest that General Sherman afterwards forgot about this liquor matter when he talked before the Claims Commission, seven years later, about the discipline of his soldiers and the long-roll's power to bring every man to his ranks at any moment.

Eleventh. Colonel Stone, who received the city in surrender, two hours before General Sherman entered it, in a letter to the *Chicago Tribune*, says: "The streets in some instances contained bales of cotton which had been cut open, and these caught fire twice or three times during the day; but these fires had been promptly put



out by some of the firemen of the city, aided by a detail of soldiers under charge of an officer. \* \* \* I now (later in the day) had intimation that the Union officers released by us from the city prisons had formed a society, to which had been added many members from our soldiers and the negroes, the object of which society was to burn Columbia." This movement is mentioned, not to account for the burning, but to show the feeling in the army—a feeling of which General Sherman was fully aware before he furnished that opportunity for its wreaking.

Twelfth. The following towns and villages in South Carolina, in some of which at least there was no cotton in the streets, were burned either in whole or in part during the same campaign: Robertsville, Grahamville, McPhersonville, Barnwell, Blackville, Orangeburg, Lexington, Winnsboro', Camden, Lancaster, Chesterfield, Cheraw and Darlington.

Thirteenth. General Beauregard, and not General Hampton, was the highest military authority in Columbia at that time. General Hampton was assigned to duty at Columbia on the night of the 16th, Thursday; and the order issued about the cotton came from General Beauregard at the request of General Hampton (through the latter, of course); and that order signed by Captain Rawlins Lowndes, Assistant Adjutant-General, was that the cotton be not burned. Captain Lowndes in his affidavit, submitted in evidence before the Mixed Claims Commission, after explaining that General Hampton, after conference with General Beauregard, had directed him (Captain Lowndes) to issue an order that no cotton should be fired, adds: "This I did at once, and when I left Columbia, which I did after the entrance of the Federal troops, not one bale of cotton was burned, nor had any been fired by our troops. At the time I was acting as Assistant A. A. G. for General Hampton." This order not to burn the cotton is not important as showing the origin of the fire, because it hardly touches that question directly at all; but it is important in its bearing upon the veracity of General Sherman, who in his official report (1865) said that General Hampton "ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired." The existence of that order—not to burn the cotton—and the testimony of General Beauregard, General Hampton and Captain Lowndes may be accepted as settling that one point.

Fourteenth. General Sherman, in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 6 of Part 1 of the Sup-



plemental Report), says: "I hereto subjoin complete details;" but from these details, called complete, the General has omitted all his correspondence between the 16th and the 21st of February—the period covering the destruction of Columbia. Both before and after this event the correspondence submitted is frequent and altogether voluminous, but in these five days not a word is given there. Why are these letters withheld, and where are they?

Such is a brief outline of the case Columbia has against General Sherman. The points above given are not the whole evidence in the case, but merely illustrative items, the great body of proof lying beyond the limits of a paper like this. The Mixed Claims Commission has "settled" one point—shall the United States pay for the property destroyed in Columbia?—in the negative. Let that remain settled. Columbia has another case already in action before the great assize of history. The court are the historians who are to sum up the evidence, and the jury is the civilized world. Before that assize she is preparing the evidence. Her points are sharply defined ones, and she makes them without indirectness or chicanery. A local committee of citizens of Columbia, with Chancellor Carroll, a jurist of ability and purity of character, at its head, has been already several years collecting testimony upon the burning of that city in 1865, and the evidence thus put in legal form will probably have some influence in shaping the opinion of the civilized world.

Columbia expects to make, among probably others, the following points, and she will rely in the strongest of them upon General Sherman's testimony or that of his own witnesses: first, that General Sherman desired the destruction of Columbia; second, that General Sherman knew that his soldiers desired the same thing; third, that General Sherman believed that if the Fifteenth army corps were quartered in that city they would destroy it; fourth, that General Sherman, thus desiring, thus knowing and thus believing, did quarter the Fifteenth corps in Columbia; fifth, that the Federal forces, under Colonel Stone, of the Fifteenth corps, received the city in surrender from Mayor Goodwyn, and took military possession of it about 10 o'clock Friday morning, the 17th of February, 1865; sixth, that the body of the Fifteenth corps entered the city an hour or two later than the command of Colonel Stone; seventh, that the conflagration which destroyed the city began about 8 o'clock in the evening—ten hours subsequent to the occupation; eighth, that the conflagration began in several places by

concert, of which notice was given with signal rockets; ninth, that Federal soldiers in large numbers aided in spreading the conflagration by brand, match and torch; tenth, that as to the cotton, General Beauregard on the 14th ordered Major Greene, commandant of the post, to have the cotton moved out of the warehouses to a place or places where it could be burned, if it should become necessary to burn it, without endangering the city, and that Major Greene, having no available transportation, placed the cotton in the broadest of the streets, as the best he could do under the circumstances; eleventh, that on the 16th, when General Hampton was assigned to duty at Columbus, he urged General Beauregard, his superior officer, to order that the cotton be not burned, that General Beuregard so ordered and that the order was issued by Captain Lowndes, Assistant Adjutant-General, from General Hampton's headquarters; twelfth, that all the fires that arose from the burning cotton during the day (Friday), in whatever way caused, were extinguished by the local fire companies, assisted by the citizens and Federal soldiers; thirteenth, that several citizens of Columbia, during the day (Friday) were warned by officers and soldiers of Sherman's army of the impending conflagration of the city to take place that night; fourteenth, that the conflagration did take place that night, announced by signals and beginning at several places to the windward of the heart of the city; fifteenth, that numerous Federal officers witnessed the active agency of the soldiers in spreading the conflagration without taking timely steps to prevent the same; and, sixteenth, that in fine, General Sherman is morally responsible for the burning of Columbia.

JAMES WOOD DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK, June 15, 1875.

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**Notes on the Final Campaign of April, 1865.**

By General H. L. BENNING.

After I rejoined the brigade in November, 1864, nothing of importance was done by it until the 2d of April, 1865. On that day, at about 11 A. M., I reached Petersburg with two regiments, the Second and Twentieth, by the train from Richmond. The other two—Seventeenth and Fifteenth—and the rest of Field's division were detained by an accident to the train, and did not arrive till late in the day. Colonel Fairfax received me, and conducted me and the two regiments through Petersburg to General Longstreet, who was beyond the creek at General Lee's headquarters on Cox's road; this I think is the name of the road. When near the headquarters, General Longstreet met us, and ordered me to advance on the left of the road and take position on the high ground about a half mile in front, and hold it as long as I could safely, making as much display of force as possible; and that when I fell back, if I should have to do so, to fall back from position to position slowly. The desperate state of things was visible to every eye. Not an infantry soldier of ours was to be seen. Fort Gregg was the nearest point on our line still held by us, and the attack on it had commenced. There was a battery, but the horses were so weak that they could not pull the guns into position until the enemy were prepared to drive it away from the position. The enemy's line was in the edge of the woods, some mile beyond General Lee's headquarters, with batteries near; nothing between.

We went to the position indicated, which was about six or eight hundred yards from the enemy's line in the woods, with open, level ground between. They soon opened fire on us from a number of guns. The fire was at first rather wild, but it soon improved; and as the batteries were too far off for our arms, we dropped back a short distance and took up a less exposed position. The batteries made a corresponding change, and when their fire again became good, we fell back a second time and took a safer position. They again found a position from which they commanded us; we again moved back and got a position which afforded considerable protection to most of our line. Here we remained for a good while under the artillery fire. We had ourselves never fired a gun. The fire towards Fort Gregg ceased. I ran up a long hill and found that the fort had fallen, and at the same time that the enemy's

infantry were advancing. Returning, I ordered the two regiments to a new position. Here I soon received an order from General Longstreet to take the Twentieth back across the creek and occupy some incomplete works that had been thrown up recently, leaving the Second to skirmish with the enemy and retard his advance as long as possible. This order was executed. The Second deployed as skirmishers and kept the enemy's skirmishers in check for a long time, falling back slowly until they came to the hill next the creek. There they stopped and held the position all day. General Longstreet complimented them there on the field, as I was told.

The Twentieth crossed the creek and entered the works, where they received the fire of the enemy's artillery for some time. His advancing infantry began to show itself in long lines on the opposite side of the creek; but about this time, say 4 P. M., the other troops of Field's division were arriving and getting into position on my right and left and entrenching themselves. The enemy's infantry seeing this, halted; nor did it advance afterwards. A retreat for the army was secured.

The Second Georgia was commanded by Captain Thomas Chaffin; the Twentieth, by Captain Little. The number of officers and men in the former was about one hundred; in the latter, about one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty. What was the loss was never reported to me, but it was not large. Both officers and men evinced a perfect appreciation of the situation and of the object to be accomplished, and executed every movement with promptitude, order and decision. We were the last to leave the line on the retreat—leaving it about midnight. All was done under the immediate eye of General Longstreet, who rode "the colt" everywhere, frequently in front of the line, up and down, with grand unconcern. I never saw anything like it in the war; it was the talk of all.

Field's division in the retreat was some times in the front, some times in the rear. At Farmville it had a sharp affair with the enemy, in which Anderson's brigade made several hundred prisoners. Benning's brigade was not actively engaged. The affair was quite a success.

At Appomattox Courthouse the division was in the rear, with the enemy close up. Its organization was perfect, and it was not at all demoralized. I saw many men with tears streaming from their eyes when it was known that Lee had surrendered. They gathered in groups and debated the question whether we should



not cut our way out and escape. Most of them were in favor of the attempt. They only waited for a word from me; but I would not give it. On the contrary, I urged them to acquiesce.

I do not remember the number we surrendered. It was between six hundred and seven hundred, men and officers. I do, however, well remember one thing—that not more than four men had been lost as stragglers during the trying march from Petersburg; and I can say almost, if not quite as much for every brigade in the division.

I never made any official report of these events.

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**The North Carolina Battalion at Averasboro'—Letter from General Taliaferro.**

RICHMOND, February 27th, 1879.

Dr. J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society:*

My Dear Sir—It is but an act of justice that I should state that the communication of Captain Graham Daves in the March number of the *Society Papers*, meets my cordial approval, and that as far as I can I adopt it as a true and proper addendum to my report of the conflict at Averasboro'.

The efficiency and bravery of the North Carolina battalion in that action has been repeatedly mentioned by me since the war, and I have often regretted that I could not recall the name of its commander, whose gallantry was conspicuous and the subject of commendation by myself and others. I cannot remember now what reports were sent in to me by subordinate commanders—if in fact any were made—and thus, as I state in the report, the names of many deserving special notice were unhappily omitted. I do remember well, however, that I spoke to General Hardee of the gallant service of Captain (supposed to be Major) DeRosset, the officer in command of the North Carolina battalion, and that I designed to mention him particularly; and I think it not unlikely that I hastily wrote Georgia battalion for North Carolina battalion, and meant to fill the blank with the name of the North Carolina commander, supposed to be a Major, when I could have it reported to me. No troops are mentioned in the report by States or regiments, and therefore no special reference could be made to those from North Carolina.

I will add to this that the name of the Sergeant of artillery mentioned is Guibert, and the battery was that of Captain Le Gardeur, from New Orleans.

Respectfully and truly yours,

WILLIAM B. TALIAFERRO.

**Report of Major-General Heth of the Affair at Falling Waters.**

HEADQUARTERS HETH'S DIVISION,  
NEAR RAPIDAN STATION, October 3d, 1863.

Captain W. N. STARKE, *Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps :*

Captain—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command (Heth's and Pender's divisions) at Falling Waters, July 14th, 1863.

On the evening of the 13th July, I received orders to withdraw my command at dark from the entrenchments near Hagerstown and move in the direction of Falling Waters, at which point we were to cross the river on a pontoon bridge already constructed.

The artillery attached to my command received its orders through its immediate commander, and moved off a little before dark. I was directed to leave the skirmishers in my front, and was informed that they would be relieved during the night by the cavalry. The officers in charge of the skirmishers were directed, as soon as relieved, to take the road followed by the division.

The night was entirely dark, and the roads in a dreadful condition—the entire distance between our breastworks and Falling Waters being ankle deep in mud. The progress of the command was necessarily very slow and tedious, halting every few minutes to allow the wagons and artillery in our front to pass on. The division was twelve hours accomplishing seven miles; once halting for two hours.

On reaching an elevated and commanding ridge of hills one mile and a half—possibly a little less—from Falling Waters, I was ordered by Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill to put my division in line of battle on either side of the road and extending along the crest of this hill, facing towards Hagerstown. On the left of the road and on the crest of this hill our engineers had thrown up some half dozen epaulements for artillery, the spaces between the epaulements being open. In our front was an open space, with the view unobstructed for half to three-quarters of a mile; then came a heavy piece of timber, some three-fourths of a mile in width.

I was directed, at the same time that I received the order to place my division in line of battle, as described, to put Pender's division in rear of my own in column of brigades.

At this point we halted, to allow the wagons and artillery to get

over the river. We remained in this position awaiting their crossing for several hours. About 11 o'clock I received orders from General Hill to move Pender's division across the river, following General Anderson's division, and after leaving one brigade of my division in line, to follow up the movement of the corps as speedily as possible.

About fifteen or twenty minutes after receiving these orders and while they were in progress of execution, a small body of cavalry—numbering not more than forty or forty-five men—made their appearance in our front, where the road debouched from the woods, previously described.

I will here remark that when on the road, and some two or three miles from the position I now occupied, a large body of our cavalry passed by my command going to our rear.

When the cavalry alluded to made its appearance, it was at once observed by myself, General Pettigrew and several members of my staff, as well as many others. On emerging from the woods, the party faced about, apparently acting on the defensive. Suddenly facing my position, they galloped up the road and halted some one hundred and seventy-five yards from my line of battle. From their manœuvring, and the smallness of numbers, I concluded it was a party of our own cavalry, pursued by the enemy. In this opinion I was sustained by all present. It was not until I examined them critically with my glasses, at a distance of not more than one hundred and seventy-five yards, that I discovered they were Federal troops. The men had been restrained from firing up to this time by General Pettigrew and myself. The command was now given (orders) to fire. At the same time the Federal officer in command gave the order to charge. The squad passed the intervals separating the epaulements, and fired several shots. In less than three minutes all were killed or captured, save two or three, who are said to have escaped.

General Pettigrew received a wound in one of his hands at Gettysburg, in consequence of which he was unable to manage his horse, which reared and fell with him. It is probable, when in the act of rising from the ground, that he was struck by a pistol ball in the side (left), which, unfortunately for himself and his country, proved mortal.

A soldier of the Seventh Tennessee regiment was at the same time mortally wounded. This was the entire loss of my command from this charge. Thirty-three of the enemy's dead were counted, six prisoners fell into our hands, also a stand of colors.

Very soon after this a large body of dismounted cavalry, supported by artillery, of which I had none, made a vigorous attack on Brockenbrough's brigade, which was deployed in line of battle to the right of the road.

Brockenbrough repelled the attack, and drove the enemy back into the woods, following him up for some distance. The enemy was now heavily reinforced, and Brockenbrough was compelled to fall back. His brigade, having been badly cut up on the 1st and 3d at Gettysburg, was much reduced in numbers.

Seeing that the enemy evidently designed turning his right flank and thus cutting him off from the river, Brockenbrough deployed his brigade as skirmishers, extending well to the right. About this time the enemy appeared on my left flank in force, also in my front.

Seeing the attack was becoming serious, I ordered the several brigades of Pender's division (except Thomas', which had crossed the river) to return. I at the same time sent a message to the Lieutenant-General Commanding, requesting that artillery might be sent me, as I had none. On returning, my aid informed me that General Hill directed me to withdraw my command as speedily as possible and cross the river.

When this order was received, my line of skirmishers occupied a front of a mile and a half—the left resting on the canal, the right bending around well towards the Potomac.

The orders were that the several brigades in line should withdraw simultaneously, protecting their front by a strong line of skirmishers and converge toward the road leading to Falling Waters.

In order to cover this movement, Lane's brigade was formed in line of battle about five hundred yards in rear of the advanced line, protected by a heavy line of skirmishers. The first brigade that passed through Lane's line of battle was reformed in line of battle a quarter of a mile or more in rear of Lane's position; and so on till the command reached the south bank of the Potomac.

With the extended line of skirmishers in my front, and being compelled to fall back upon a single road, it was not surprising that in attempting to reach the road, over ravines impassible at many points, and through a thick undergrowth and wood, and over a country with which both men and officers were unacquainted, that many of them were lost and thus fell into the hands of the enemy, who pushed vigorously forward on seeing that I was retiring.

The enemy made two cavalry charges, and on each occasion I



witnessed the unhorsing of the entire party. I desire here to brand upon its perpetrator a falsehood, and correct an error.

The commander of the Federal forces—General Meade—reported to his Government, on the statement of General Kilpatrick, that he (General Kilpatrick) had captured a brigade of infantry at Falling Waters. To this General Lee replied in a note to General Cooper that no organized command had been captured.

General Meade recently wrote a note to his Government reaffirming his first statement, upon the authority of General Kilpatrick. General Kilpatrick, in order to glorify himself, has told a deliberate falsehood. He knows full well that no organized body of men were captured—not even a company was captured, nor the majority of a single company. He asserts, however, that he captured an entire brigade.

The error I wish to correct is attributing all the men captured by the enemy on the 14th as belonging to my command. I think I state correctly when I say that three out of four of the men captured by the enemy were captured between our works near Hagerstown and the point where I engaged the enemy, and were the representatives of every corps, division and brigade who passed over this road. My staff officers alone succeeded in driving from barns and houses, immediately on the roadside, several hundred stragglers, who probably never reached their commands, and these were but a small proportion of the men who straggled.

In conclusion, I will add that the brigade commanders did their duty, and the losses sustained were not attributable to any errors or short-comings of theirs, but resulted from causes beyond their control.

The rear guard of a large army, protecting its crossing over a wide river, can seldom fail to lose heavily if vigorously pursued by the enemy, especially when in the act of crossing. Under the circumstances, attacked as we were by a large and momentarily increasing force, we have every reason to be thankful that our losses were so small.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. HETH, *Major-General.*

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**Report of General Edward Johnson of Capture of Winchester.**

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION,  
August 18th, 1863.

Major A. S. PENDLETON, *Assistant Adjutant-General* :

Major—In obedience to orders, headquarters Second army corps, August 13, 1863, I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division "from the time of leaving Fredericksburg for Winchester until it crossed the Potomac."

The division left camp near Hamilton's crossing June 5th, 1863, and moved in the direction of Winchester, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap. Nothing occurred worthy of particular note during the march, which was steady and regular, the command being in good condition and excellent spirits.

At daylight of the morning of the 13th ultimo, the division left its camp at Cedarville, moving on the Winchester and Front Royal turnpike. The enemy's pickets were discovered four miles from the town about 12 M. The Second Virginia regiment, Colonel Nadenbousch commanding, was detached from the "Stonewall" brigade and deployed as skirmishers on the left of the road. This regiment advanced handsomely, driving the enemy to a stone fence near the junction of the Millwood and Front Royal roads, behind which they made a stand. After a sharp skirmish they were driven from this position.

At this juncture they advanced a battery to an eminence on the right of the road, and opened fire upon our skirmishers and the woods in the vicinity. Carpenter's battery, Lieutenant Lambie commanding, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, was put in position on the left of the road and behind a stone fence, from which it opened an accurate fire upon the enemy's battery and supporting infantry—the effect of which was to explode a limber, killing three men and a number of horses and put the enemy to precipitate flight upon the town.

The "Stonewall" and Stuart's brigades were formed in line of battle in a ravine to the right of the road, out of sight and range of the enemy's guns; J. M. Jones' and Nicholls' brigades to the left in a body of woods. Later in the day the brigades to the right of the road were advanced under cover of woods to a position nearer, the town, where they remained until the following morning.

When General Early advanced on the left, a body of the enemy's

infantry, retreating, became exposed to view, and were fired upon by two rifle guns of Carpenter's with good effect, greatly accelerating their speed. This attracted the fire from the fortifications north of the town upon the battery and such portions of the infantry as were necessarily exposed, which was maintained in a desultory manner until nightfall. The casualties in my command during the day's operations were, happily, few; two men killed and three horses disabled.

The following day—14th—was occupied in engaging the enemy's attention upon the right, while Early was putting his command in position on the left for the main attack upon the fortifications. For this purpose, the "Stonewall" brigade, Brigadier-General J. A. Walker commanding, was moved across the Millwood pike to a range of hills east of and fronting the town, and between the Millwood and Berryville pikes. Steuart's brigade was posted in the rear and within supporting distance of Walker. The Fifth Virginia regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel H. J. Williams commanding, was thrown forward as skirmishers, encountering the enemy on the crest of the hills above mentioned, and driving them to the edge of the town, from which position, sheltered by houses and fences, they kept up a brisk and continual fire upon our line, which occupied the stone fence at the western base of the hills and within easy musket range.

About 4 P. M. the enemy advanced a considerable force against the right of our line of skirmishers, compelling it to fall back and capturing ten men. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, Fifth Virginia, who had commanded the skirmish line during the day with conspicuous gallantry, was severely wounded in this engagement. The reserve of the skirmishers was immediately ordered forward, and succeeded in driving the enemy back and recovering their former line. The only casualties during the day occurred in the Fifth Virginia, the only regiment engaged—three killed, sixteen wounded and ten missing.

About nightfall I received an order from the Lieutenant-General Commanding to move by the right flank with three of my brigades and a portion of my artillery, to a point on the Martinsburg turnpike, two and a half miles north of Winchester, with the double purpose, I suppose, of intercepting the enemy's retreat and attacking him in his fortifications from that direction. Steuart's and Nicholls' brigades, with Dement's and portions of Raines' and Carpenter's batteries, under Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, were immediately

put in motion, and Brigadier-General Walker, whose line was nearest the enemy, was ordered to follow, after having advanced his skirmishers to the town to conceal his movement and ascertain the position of the enemy. J. M. Jones' brigade and the remainder of Andrews' battalion, under Major Latimer, were left in reserve and for the purpose of preventing the enemy's escape by the road on which we had advanced.

After moving some distance on the Berryville road, I was informed by my guide that I would be obliged to cross fields, over a rough country, in order to carry out literally the directions of the Lieutenant-General; and, moreover, that near Stephenson's, five miles north of Winchester, there was a railroad cut, masked by a body of woods and not more than two hundred yards from the turnpike (along which the enemy would certainly retreat), which would afford excellent shelter for troops in case of an engagement. The night was very dark, and being satisfied that the enemy would discover the movement and probably escape if I moved to the point indicated by the Lieutenant-General, I determined to march to Stephenson's by the road which led by Jordan's Springs. Halting the head of the column at a small bridge which crosses the Winchester and Potomac railway a few hundred yards from the Martinsburg pike, I rode forward with my staff and sharpshooters to reconnoitre the position and assure myself of the whereabouts of the enemy. I had gone but a short distance when I distinctly heard the neighing of horses and sound of men moving, and in a few moments ascertained that I had opportunely struck the head of the enemy's retreating column.

Their videttes fired upon us, and I returned to my command to make the necessary dispositions for an instant attack. Along the edge of the railway cut, next to the pike, ran a stone fence, behind which I deployed the three regiments of Steuart's brigade—Tenth Virginia, First and Third North Carolina regiments—on the right, and three regiments of Nicholls' brigade, under Colonel J. M. Williams, on the left.

One piece of Dement's battery was placed upon the bridge, one piece a little to the left and rear; the remaining pieces, with sections of Raines' and Carpenter's batteries (the whole under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews) on the rising ground in rear of the position occupied by infantry. Two regiments of Nicholls' brigade were held in reserve as support to the artillery.

My dispositions were scarcely completed when the enemy, cheer-



ing, charged with his whole force—the front of my position driving in the skirmishers and delivering heavy volleys. My infantry and artillery fired with such rapidity and effect as to repulse them with considerable loss. At longer range the enemy maintained a heavy fire upon us, until convinced that nothing could be accomplished by a front attack. He detached heavy flanking parties of cavalry and infantry to the right and left, whether for the purpose of breaking our lines and effecting his escape, or driving us out of the railroad cut, is not known; still, however, keeping a vigorous attack in front. My infantry had expended all but one round of ammunition; the ordnance wagons were seven miles in rear. The situation was extremely critical, and nothing could have been more timely than the arrival of the “Stonewall” brigade. Owing to a misconception of orders, for which Brigadier-General Walker was not in the slightest degree responsible, his brigade did not leave its former position until twelve o’clock of the previous night. He was a mile from Stephenson’s when the engagement began. Hurrying up his brigade, just in time to meet the flanking party to the right, he pursued them hotly through the woods, beyond the turnpike and into the woods a half mile to the right of the Carter house, where they surrendered as prisoners of war, the cavalry alone escaping. The flanking party (about 300 cavalry and 600 infantry), which moved to the left, under the immediate command of Major-General Milroy (as was ascertained afterwards from prisoners and citizens on the route of his escape), was met by two regiments of Nicholls’ brigade—the Second and Tenth Louisiana. Raines’ battery was faced to the left and played upon them with fine effect, whilst sections from Dement’s and Carpenter’s batteries were hurried down the road to intercept their retreat.

The two Louisiana regiments, above named, moved parallel with the enemy’s line, a ridge intervening, until they reached a level space, when they opened a destructive fire upon them, killing a considerable number, and with the aid of the artillery scattering them in every direction. Most of them were captured by these two regiments. The person supposed to be Millroy (riding a fine white horse), with most of his cavalry, after a vigorous pursuit, unfortunately escaped. The substantial results of the engagement were from twenty-three to twenty-five hundred prisoners and about one hundred and seventy-five horses, with arms and equipment in proportion.

Steuart’s brigade captured about 900 and Nicholls’ brigade the

remainder, except 900 captured by the "Stonewall" brigade. Eleven stands of colors were captured, of which the "Stonewall" brigade captured six, Steuart's brigade four and the Louisiana brigade one.

For particulars as to the numbers captured, and the individual instances of gallantry, I have the honor to refer you to the accompanying reports of the brigade and regimental commanders. It will be observed that my force, until the timely arrival of the "Stonewall" brigade, did not amount to over 1,200 muskets, with a portion of Andrews' battalion, J. M. Jones' brigade, and two regiments (Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia) of Steuart's brigade and a portion of the artillery having been left in the rear on the Front Royal road. The number of prisoners considerably exceeded the whole number engaged on our side, including the "Stonewall" brigade.

Before the closing of this report, I beg leave to state that I have never seen superior artillery practice to that of Andrews' battalion in this engagement, and especially the section under Lieutenant Contee, Dement's battery—one gun of which was placed on the bridge, above referred to, and the other a little to the left and rear. Both pieces were very much exposed during the whole action. Four successive attempts were made to carry the bridge. Two sets of cannoneers (13 of 16) were killed and disabled. Lieutenant Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Contee, whose gallantry calls for special mention at this point, fell wounded here. Lieutenant John A. Morgan, First North Carolina regiment, and Lieutenant Randolph H. McKim, took the place of the disabled cannoneers, rendering valuable assistance and deserving special mention.

I feel much indebted to Majors B. W. Leigh, H. K. Douglas and E. L. Moore, of my staff, for their gallantry and efficiency on the field and in pursuit of the enemy; to Surgeon R. T. Coleman for correcting a misapprehension of orders on the part of my engineer officers, thereby expediting the march of General Walker who found me most opportunely.

The total list of casualties in the engaged division during the operations embraced in this report, amounted to fourteen killed and seventy-four wounded.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

EDWARD JOHNSON, *Major-General.*

## Editorial Paragraphs.

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OUR THANKS are due and are hereby tendered to friends who have interested themselves in forwarding us new subscriptions or renewals on old ones. But we very much need *more work of the same sort*. There are hundreds (we believe thousands) who would subscribe to our *Papers* if their attention were only called to them; and it is surprising how many of our best subscribers allow their names to go off of our list simply because they *forget* to renew, and have no one to remind them personally of it. Now we beg our friends to help us in this matter both by getting us new subscribers and inducing old ones to renew.

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THE FOURTH ANNUAL REUNION LOUISIANA DIVISION A. N. V. ASSOCIATION came off in New Orleans on the evening of February 22d, and seems to have been a very brilliant affair. We regret that we were not able to accept the kind invitation to be present. The following are the officers of the Association for the current year:

John B. Richardson, President; A. Brady, First Vice-President; W. R. Lyman, Second Vice-President; A. S. Herron, Third Vice-President; J. Moore Wilson, Fourth Vice-President; L. Prados, Fifth Vice-President; John H. Murray, Treasurer; John J. Fitzpatrick, Recording Secretary; Fred. A. Ober, Corresponding Secretary; F. L. Taney, Surgeon; Rev. D. Hubert, Chaplain; E. D. Willett, Honorary President. Executive Committee: Albert M. Levy, D. M. Kilpatrick, J. J. Cumpsten, John A. Russell, and John Charles.

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THE VIRGINIA DIVISION A. N. V. ASSOCIATION have happily selected as their orator at their annual reunion in October next, General Fitz. Lee. He has chosen as his subject "*Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville*," and we can promise in advance something which shall be at the same time *entertaining* to those who may hear it, and of *great value to the historian*. This Association have been very fortunate in the orators who have represented them at previous reunions, and the series of addresses embraced in the "*A. N. V. Memorial Volume*" (see advertisement) will compare favorably with any historical addresses ever delivered. But the value of the series will be greatly enhanced when the gallant Fitz. Lee shall have added the true story of Fredericksburg and of Chancellorsville.

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### Book Notices.

*Semi-Centennial Catalogue, with Brief Biographical Sketches of the Students of the University of Virginia.*

We are indebted to the publisher, *Captain Joseph Van Holt Nash*, late of Petersburg, Virginia, now of Atlanta, Georgia, for a copy of this valuable

work. It was compiled by Professor Schele De Vere, with whom it was "a labor of love" to give to the work his untiring energy, fine literary taste and enthusiastic devotion to everything pertaining to our grand old University. He gracefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Captain Nash for valuable services in completing the catalogue.

Professor Schele gives a vivid and deeply interesting sketch of the origin and early history of the University, and especially of Mr. Jefferson's connection with it. Then follows a list of the Rectors, members of the Board of Visitors, officers of the Board and of the Faculty, and names of the Professors and Assistant Professors from the foundation of the University down to 1878. Next we have the catalogue of students during that period, with a brief biography of each one—giving date of birth, sessions spent at the University, degrees won and chief events in the after life of each. The volume contains "ten thousand names and over a hundred thousand statements of facts." Its compilation was a work of immense labor; and if errors have crept in the wonder is that they are not far more numerous and important. The *get up* of the volume, in type, paper and binding, is all that could be desired. In a word it is a volume which no alumnus of our noble old *Alma Mater* should be willing to be without, and which should at the same time find a place in every well selected library. It has a high historic value, not only in showing the character of the men whom the University has sent out to bless the world, but also in illustrating the statement that much the larger part of the intelligence, education and moral worth of the South entered the Confederate army. The book can be had of Captain Joseph Van Holt Nash, of Atlanta, Georgia.

*The Southern Review* for January, 1879, has been laid on our table by the new editor and proprietor, C. J. Griffith, Esq., Richmond, Virginia, by whom this quarterly will be hereafter published. Under the able management of Dr. A. T. Bledsoe and his accomplished daughter, Mrs. S. Bledsoe Herrick, the *Review* won a wide reputation, which has not suffered during the period since Dr. Bledsoe's death, when it has been under the management of Mrs. Herrick, who, during her father's life, was accustomed to contribute to the *Review* articles so original in conception, so able in argument, so full of learning and so fresh and vigorous in style that they were attributed to Dr. Bledsoe himself.

If the present number is a fair specimen of what we may expect of the *Review* under its new management, then we predict for it an even wider reputation—not for ability, for *that* were scarcely possible, but for variety, popular interest and real value as an exponent of Southern thought and Southern literature. We regret that our limited space will allow us little more than a bare mention of the table of contents of this number:

In "*Southern Poetry—A Sketch*," Rev. H. Melville Jackson gives a very pleasing and, in the main, judicious statement of the claims of Southern poets, together with some well selected illustrations of their style.

Rev. Dr. W. P. Harrison gives an interesting sketch of the rise, progress and extension of the "*Southern Methodist Church*."



Professor George Frederick Holmes treats "*The Eastern Question and the Berlin Treaty*" with the fulness and ability which characterize the productions of the distinguished author.

"*Frances Hodgson Burnett and her Novels*" is an article from the graceful pen of Mrs. Herrick, and in her happiest vein, and will make the readers of the *Review* rejoice to know that she is still to be a regular contributor.

Hon. William M. Burwell, of New Orleans, contributes an interesting and valuable paper "*On Yellow Fever*."

General B. T. Johnston's article on "*The Civil Rights Bill and the Enforcement Act*" is a very able and timely discussion of the questions involved, and a very strong putting of certain fundamental principles of our Government which seem to have grown obsolete in these days of "Reconstruction" (so-called).

The other articles—"Commercial Future of the United States," by W. P. H.; "*Birds in Song and the Songs of Birds*," by Miss K. M. Rowland; "*Dr. William E. Munsey*," by Rev. E. E. Hoss; "*Charlotte Cushman*," by Mrs. James Gittings, and "*Gold Interests of Virginia and the South*," by John Tyler—seem all to be cleverly done, while "Table Talk" and "Book Notices," by the editor, clearly indicate that these departments of the *Review* will be fresh, sprightly and readable. On the whole, we cordially commend the *Review* as worthy of a wide circulation.

*The Annals of the War.* By Principal Participants North and South.

We are indebted to the publishers (*Philadelphia Weekly Times*) for a copy of this volume of 800 pages, which is made up of papers which were originally published in the *Weekly Times*, which we had read with interest, and which we are glad to be able to have in so convenient a form. In paper, type and binding, it is a beautiful specimen of the book-makers' art; and if the engravings strike an old soldier as pictures of the artist's fancy rather than of anything which ever really occurred, it is fair to say that they will probably please the average reader. The papers themselves, written by actors on both sides of the great struggle, are many of them of deep interest, and some of them of great historic value. The Confederate sketches in the volume are the following:

A Campaign with Sharpshooters, by Captain John D. Young; A Ruse of War, by Captain John Scott; Confederate Negro Enlistments, by Edward Spencer; Fire, Sword and the Halter, by General J. D. Imboden; Flight and Capture of Jefferson Davis, by J. H. Reagan; General Stuart in Camp and Field, by Colonel J. E. Cooke; Lee and Grant in the Wilderness, by General C. M. Wilcox; Lee in Pennsylvania, by General James Longstreet; Lee's West Virginia Campaign, by General A. L. Long; Morgan's Indiana and Ohio Raid, by General Basil W. Duke; Mr. Lincoln and the Force Bill, by Hon. A. R. Boteler; Stonewall Jackson and his Men, by Major H. Kyd Douglas; Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, by Colonel William Allan; The Battle of Fleetwood, by Major H. B. McClellan; The Black Horse Cavalry, by Colonel John Scott; The Burning of Chambersburg, by General John McCausland; The Campaign in Pennsylvania, by Colonel W. H. Taylor; The Career of General A. P. Hill, by Hon. William E. Cameron; The Dalton-Atlanta Operations, by General Joseph E. Johnston; The Exchange of Prisoners, by Judge Robert Ould; The Last Confederate Surrender, by

Lieutenant-General R. Taylor; The Mistakes of Gettysburg, by General James Longstreet; The Morale of General Lee's Army, by Rev. J. William Jones, D. D.; Torpedo Service in Charleston Harbor, by General Beauregard; Van Dorn, the Hero of Mississippi, by Major-General D. H. Maury; Vicksburg During the Siege, by Edward S. Gregory.

The list of Federal contributions is as follows:

Characteristics of the Army, by H. V. Redfield; Death of General John H. Morgan, by H. V. Redfield; General Meade at Gettysburg, by Colonel James C. Biddle; General Reynolds' Last Battle, by Major Joseph G. Rosengarten; Gregg's Cavalry at Gettysburg, by Major J. E. Carpenter; How Jefferson Davis was Overtaken, by Major-General Wilson; Morgan's Indiana and Ohio Raid, by Colonel J. E. McGowan; On the Field of Fredericksburg, by Hon. D. Watson Rowe; Recollections of General Reynolds, by General T. E. McCoy; Some Recollections of Grant, by S. H. M. Byers; The Baltimore Riots, by Frederic Emory; The Battle of Beverly Ford, by Colonel F. C. Newhall; The Battle of Shiloh, by Colonel Wills De Hass; The Campaign of Gettysburg, by Major-General Alfred Pleasonton; The Capture of Mason and Slidell, by R. M. Hunter; The Draft Riots in New York, by Major T. P. McElrath; The Famous Fight at Cedar Creek, by General A. B. Nettleton; The First Attack on Fort Fisher, by Benson J. Lossing, LL. D.; The First Cavalry, by Captain James A. Stevenson; The First Great Crime of the War, by Major-General W. B. Franklin; The First Iron-Clad Monitor, by Hon. Gideon Welles; The First Shot Against the Flag, by Major-General S. W. Crawford; The "Old Capitol" Prison, by Colonel N. T. Colby; The Right Flank at Gettysburg, by Colonel William Brooke-Rawle; The Siege of Morris Island, by General W. W. H. Davis; The Union Cavalry at Gettysburg, by Major-General D. McM. Gregg; The Union Men of Maryland, by Hon. W. H. Purnell, LL. D.; The War's Carnival of Fraud, by Colonel Henry S. Olcott; Union View of Exchange of Prisoners, by General R. S. Northcott; War as a Popular Educator, by John A. Wright.

On the whole, it is a book worthy of a place in our libraries, and we hope that our friend Dr. George W. Bagby, the agent for Virginia, will meet with great success in selling it.

There are criticisms on some of the articles which we reserve for future review; but we must now express our regret that the compilers of the volume have put in General Wilson's miserable slander of President Davis, which, when first published, displayed gross ignorance, which has grown into something worse when persisted in after its complete refutation, both in the *Times* and in our *Papers*.

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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., May, 1879.

No. 5.

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**The Missouri Campaign of 1864—Report of General Stirling Price.**

[We have been very anxious to publish reports of the campaign in the Trans-Mississippi department, and are glad to be able to give the following report of General Price's operations in 1864, which was not published by the Confederate Government. It will be read with great interest not only by those who served with that gallant army but by all who desire to know the truth concerning this important campaign ]

SHREVEPORT, LA.

Brigadier-General W. R. BOGGS, *Chief of Staff*:

General—I have the honor to make the following report of my operations in the late expedition to Missouri. I regret to state that the report is meagre and incomplete, for the reason that Major-General Marmaduke and Brigadier-General Cabell, who bore so honorable and conspicuous a share in the greater part of the expedition, were captured before its close and are prisoners in the hands of the enemy; whilst Major-General Fagan, who commanded the Arkansas troops, composing a large part of the forces engaged, has as yet been unable to make any report, nor have any been received from the subordinate commanders. In conformity with the letter



of instructions from General E. Kirby Smith, dated 11th August, 1864, I made immediate arrangements for a movement into Missouri, as concluded upon in my interview and conference with him upon that subject, with the cavalry force in the District of Arkansas, then under my command—being promised, in addition, the brigade of Louisiana cavalry, commanded by Colonel Harrison, estimated at 1,500 strong. At the same time information in full detail of the proposed movement, of the route to be pursued and of the probable time when it would be made, was, without delay, sent by me to Brigadier-General Shelby, who then commanded in Northeast Arkansas, with instructions to make an attack, when in his judgment he should deem advisable, upon Du Vall's bluff and the railroad between Little Rock and White river, in the possession of the enemy, and by diverting their attention, enable me to cross the lower Arkansas and unite our forces without danger of failure. These instructions were carried out in full by General Shelby, and resulted in an attack upon the railroad, terminating in the most complete success—over four hundred Federals captured, three hundred killed and wounded, six forts taken and destroyed, ten miles of railroad destroyed, as well as vast quantities of forage, &c.; full particulars of which are contained in General Shelby's report accompanying. This exploit was one of the most brilliant of the war, and cast additional lustre upon the well earned fame of that gallant General and the officers and men under his command. It was part of the plan concluded upon that I should cross the Arkansas river about the 20th of August, with the troops under my immediate command; but from delay in receiving the necessary ordnance stores I was unable to do so. Finally, the required complement was received on the 27th, and on the 28th of August I was relieved from the command of the District of Arkansas and crossed the Ouachita river. On the 29th arrived at Princeton, where the divisions of Fagan and Marmaduke were, and assumed command of all the cavalry in the District of Arkansas, according to the instructions of General Smith above referred to. In the meantime, owing to the delay in starting, I was of the opinion that the enemy had become informed of my intended line of march, and concluded to cross the Arkansas river at the most feasible point north of Little Rock and south of Fort Smith, taking into consideration the probable means of obtaining forage and subsistence.

On the 30th I took up my line of march in the direction of Little



Rock, and arrived that afternoon at Tulip, a distance of nine miles. Colonel Harrison's brigade had not yet arrived, but as I could wait no longer, I left instructions at Princeton, directing him, if he should arrive there within three days, to follow on and form a junction with me, giving him information of the route I should take; but in case he did not reach Princeton in that time, he should then report to the commanding officer of the District of Arkansas. Colonel Harrison did not take part in the expedition.

On the morning of the 31st I resumed my march in the same direction as on the previous day, and continued on the same until within seven miles of Benton, when I diverged to the left, taking a northwest direction, sending Major-General Fagan across the Saline river to make a demonstration towards Little Rock and to protect my right flank. On the 5th September he joined me, bringing up the rear. I reached Dardanelle, on the Arkansas river, a distance of 167 miles from Camden, on 6th September. The country through which I had passed was hilly and in some parts mountainous, sparsely settled, but plenty of forage and subsistence was obtained. The Arkansas being fordable at this point, on the 7th I crossed and marched to Dover, a distance of fourteen miles. Major-General Marmaduke, with his division, and part of his train, had already crossed before my arrival, thus covering the crossing of the remainder of the army.

At Princeton verbal and written communications had been sent to Brigadier-General Shelby, apprising him of the changes of route, and directing him to join me at Batesville. But up to this time I had received no information from him of his movements or position. I resumed the march in the direction of the last mentioned point—Major-General Fagan, with his command, marching along the Springfield road, and Major-General Marmaduke and headquarters train the Clinton road; taking separate roads on account of the scarcity of forage, and to rid that section of country of deserters and Federal jayhawkers, as they are termed (*i. e.*, robbers and murderers), with which that country is infested. These bands, however, dispersed and took refuge in the mountains at the approach of the army; several were killed and a few taken prisoners. Arriving at Little Red river on the 10th, and still without information of the position or movements of General Shelby, I dispatched an officer of known skill and daring to communicate with him, directing that he should unite himself with the rest of the command at once. On the 18th I arrived at a point on White river,

eighteen miles above Batesville, and received information that Brigadier-General Shelby was at Powhatan, about sixty-four miles northeast of Batesville, and on the selected route to Missouri. I adopted the town of Pocahontas as the point of rendezvous, and directed Major-General Marmaduke, with his own command and train and that of headquarters, to march to that point direct, while I proceeded to Batesville and thence to Powhatan. Major-General Fagan, with his division, who had arrived at Batesville, marched to Powhatan on the left. I arrived on the 13th September and found General Shelby with part of his command. Reached Pocahontas the next day, and then the remainder of Shelby's command reported, including the brigades of Jackman, McCroy and Dobbins. In fine, the whole army was concentrated. The country over which I had passed was rugged and mountainous in the extreme, and had damaged the transportation to some extent, but it had been or was on the point of being repaired; and on the other hand, by adopting the routes marched over, sufficient forage and subsistence had been obtained.

The towns and villages through which I had passed had been robbed, pillaged, burned and otherwise destroyed by the enemy, and were nearly deserted by the former inhabitants; in fact, the whole country presented but a scene of desolation.

Upon arriving at Pocahontas I proceeded to organize the army, which was completed on the 18th, as follows:

Fagan's division, commanded by Major-General J. F. Fagan, composed of Brigadier-General W. L. Cabell's brigade, Colonel Slemmons', Colonel McCroy's and Colonel Dobbins' brigades, Colonels Lyle's and Rogan's commands, and Captain Andrews' battalion.

Marmaduke's division, commanded by Major-General J. S. Marmaduke, composed of Brigadier-General John B. Clark's and Colonel Freeman's brigades, Colonel Kitchen's regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Wood's battalion.

Shelby's division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. O. Shelby, consisted of Colonels Shanks' and Jackson's brigades, and Colonel Coleman's command.

Having determined to invade Missouri in three columns, General Fagan with his division was ordered to march to Fredericktown, Missouri, by the way of Martinsburg, Reeve's station and Greenville. Major-General Marmaduke with his division was ordered to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, Missouri, to the right of the route to be followed by Fagan's division, as above designated;

varying from it ten to thirty miles, or as near within those limits as might be practicable on account of the roads and forage. Shelby with his command was to march to the vicinity of Fredericktown, by a route to the left of General Fagan's, varying from ten to twenty miles, as nearly as practicable, on account of roads and forage. Headquarters to march with the centre column. At Fredericktown the three divisions were ordered to form a junction. A map of the route to be followed was furnished each of the division commanders. The most stringent orders were issued against straggling and pillaging under the severest penalties, and the division commanders were earnestly enjoined to use their utmost endeavors to have the orders carried into effect in every particular and without delay.

On the 19th of September the army marched in the order above designated, and on that day I entered Missouri with 12,000 men—only 8,000, however, armed—and fourteen pieces of artillery, and on the 24th of September reached Fredericktown, Missouri, with the centre column. Brigadier-General Shelby was in the advance, passing, in his route, through Doniphan and Patterson; whilst Major-General Marmaduke, whose route was by Poplar bluff, Castorville and Dallas, had not yet come up. On the 19th, before Brigadier-General Shelby reached Doniphan, news of the arrival of the army having been received, a force of the enemy, composed of a part of the Federal Missouri Twelfth cavalry, then occupying the place, withdrew, first setting fire to the town, which was consumed, and retreated to Pender's mills (burning the houses of citizens as they passed), where they were overtaken the next day and routed, with a loss of a lieutenant and three men killed, four wounded and six prisoners, besides several horses and small arms; our loss two killed and five wounded.

On the 22d Brigadier-General Shelby attacked the town of Patterson, but the garrison having received information of his approach hastily evacuated the place, with a loss of twenty-eight killed and several wounded, also a telegraph battery and operator captured; no loss on our part.

On the 25th I remained at Fredericktown awaiting the arrival of Marmaduke's division, which came up that evening within eight miles of the place. General Marmaduke on his route had a few skirmishes with the Federal militia, killing and wounding four and capturing eleven. Colonel Jeffries, of Marmaduke's division, had, before the arrival of the army at Pocahontas, been sent with his regiment to Bloomfield, Missouri, which the enemy evacuated on



his approach, killing a number and capturing arms and six wagon loads of army stores. He rejoined his brigade (Clark's) on the 24th; detached again on the 25th, he attacked and, by a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of the town of old Jackson. For particulars see Brigadier-General Clark's report. I received at Fredericktown satisfactory evidence that the strength of the enemy at Ironton was about 1,500, and that the Federal General A. J. Smith was camped about ten miles from Saint Louis with his corps, composed of about eight thousand infantry, on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain railroad. I immediately ordered Brigadier-General Shelby to proceed at once with his division, by way of Farmington, to a point on the Saint Louis and Iron Mountain railroad, where there were then five bridges in close proximity to each other, to destroy the railroad there and the bridges, and after effecting that object to fall back in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, which would effectually prevent General A. J. Smith from reinforcing the garrison at those places, which I would attack and take with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. General Shelby proceeded to the point indicated and performed the duty assigned him in the most complete and effectual manner, destroying the splendid bridge at Irondale as well as the three mentioned, tearing up miles and miles of the track, burning the ties, rails, &c. For full particulars, reference is made to his report accompanying. On the morning of the 26th, being rejoined by Major-General Marmaduke with his division, I proceeded at an early hour, with his and Fagan's divisions, in the direction of Ironton and Pilot Knob, at the same time sending forward a portion of Fagan's division to take and hold a difficult pass in that direction, between two mountains, within three and four miles of Ironton. This was effected rapidly and with success. That evening I sent forward the remainder of his division, leaving his train at Saint Francois creek, where forage could be obtained for the animals, and where I encamped for the night with the rest of the command. That evening General Fagan drove in the Federal pickets at Arcadia and took position before the town for the night. Next morning he drove the enemy from Arcadia, where they abandoned a very strong position, through Ironton, where he also took a strong fort, in a most gallant and brilliant manner. The enemy took refuge behind their fortifications at Pilot Knob. Having received such information as appeared to be perfectly reliable concerning the character and strength of the fortifications as induced me to believe that the



place could be taken without great loss, I accordingly directed Major-General Marmaduke to take possession of Shepherd's mountain, which was west of the fortifications and completely commanded them. This was most satisfactorily accomplished, and his artillery placed in position on the mountain. Major-General Fagan formed on the south and east. Skirmishing took place all the day, and firing of artillery from the enemy until 2 P. M., when a charge was ordered and made in the most gallant and determined manner, officers and men vying with each other, in both divisions, in deeds of unsurpassed bravery, charging up to the muzzles of the enemy's cannon. Where all acted as heroes, it would seem almost invidious to make any exception; but I must be allowed to call attention to the courage and gallantry of General Cabell in leading his men to the assault, having his horse killed under him within forty yards of the fort. But the information I had received in regard to the strength of the fortifications, proved totally incorrect. Our troops were repulsed; and it being too late to renew the assault, they were withdrawn beyond reach of the enemy's guns, and preparations were made for a renewal of the assault on next day. I had dispatched a courier, on the morning of the 27th, to Brigadier-General Shelby, informing him of the proposed operations, and directing him to rejoin the main army to assist in the attack, and on the evening of the 27th another courier was dispatched, informing him of the capture of Arcadia and Ironton, and of the repulse at Pilot Knob, and of my design to renew there the attack on the following morning, and hoping that the courier would meet him on the way, instructed him to join me, as also the route to pursue. Neither of these communications, as it appears, was received by Brigadier-General Shelby, who, having heard that there was a force of the enemy at Potosi, had left the railroad and marched to attack them at that place, which was captured by him, with its garrison of one hundred and fifty Federals, arms, &c. The depot of the railroad at that place, with seven fine cars, were also destroyed. For full particulars, reference is made to the accompany report of Brigadier-General Shelby.

The enemy at Pilot Knob, on the night following the first attack, evacuated the fort, blowing up the magazine, leaving in my possession sixteen pieces of artillery, a large number of small arms, a large amount of army stores, consisting of bales of blankets, hundreds of barrels of flour and bacon, quantities of coffee, &c. After destroying the artillery, which I could not take with me, and dis-

tributing among the troops such of the stores as were needed, I moved my command twelve miles on the road the enemy had retreated, sending Marmaduke forward in pursuit, in command of his own and Shelby's divisions, which had rejoined the command. Untiring pursuit was made night and day, but it was not until the evening of the following day that he was overtaken, owing to the natural difficulties presented by the country over which the enemy retreated. Major-General Marmaduke, who was in advance, fought him until an hour before sunset, when Shelby was thrown in front and the fight continued until dark. The enemy having thrown up fortifications during the night, it was deemed not advisable to renew the attack, and the forces were withdrawn. The particulars in full are contained in accompanying reports of Brigadier-Generals Shelby and Clark.

My loss in this effort I cannot give, as I have no report from Fagan's division, but the loss in Marmaduke's division was fourteen officers and eighty men killed and wounded. The loss in Fagan's division was doubtless greater. Whilst at Iron-ton, receiving information that the Federal forces exceeded my own two to one, and knowing the city to be strongly fortified, I determined to move as fast as possible on Jefferson City, destroying the railroad as I went, with a hope to capture that city with its troops and munitions of war. I arrived at Richwoods on the 30th, having passed through Potosi. Lieutenant Christian, whom I had sent to the Mississippi river before I left Camden for the purpose of obtaining gun-caps, joined me at this place, bringing 150,000. Lieutenant Christian is a most energetic and efficient officer, and deserves especial notice. Major-General Fagan sent 300 men to De Soto to destroy the depot, which was effected, and the militia, who had gathered there in some numbers, at the same time was scattered. At the same time, General Cabell was sent with his brigade to cut the Pacific railroad, east of Franklin, which he did effectually, also burning the depot in that town. On the 29th, Colonel Burbridge and Lieutenant-Colonel Wood were detached by Major-General Marmaduke and sent to Cuba to destroy the depots on the Southwest branch of the Pacific railroad at that place, which they succeeded in doing. The divisions of Marmaduke and Shelby tore up several miles of the Southwest branch of the Pacific railroad. For full details, see reports of Brigadier-Generals Clark and Shelby. Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, of Marmaduke's division, destroyed the important bridge over the Moselle. These two divisions were sent

forward in the direction of Union, which was captured by Brigadier-General Clark, killing thirty-two and wounding seventy of the Federal garrison. On the 2d of October Clark's brigade took possession of Washington without opposition and destroyed the Pacific railroad bridge about two miles from that place. On the 3d a train was captured at Miller's station, with a large amount of clothing and four hundred Sharp's rifles. On the same evening the town of Hermann was taken possession of, after a slight opposition (the enemy abandoning a six-pound iron gun), by Clark's brigade; for particulars, see report of Brigadier-General Clark, with the accompanying report of Colonel Green. On the 4th of October Major-General Marmaduke sent four hundred men with one gun, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, to destroy the Pacific railroad bridge over the Gasconade river, which he effected. Linn was captured with one hundred prisoners and as many arms by a portion of Shelby's division. On the 6th Brigadier-General Shelby sent a force under Colonel Shanks to destroy the bridge over the Osage, on the Pacific railroad, which was successfully accomplished. A passage was there forced by him across the Osage, six miles below Castle Rock. The enemy disputed the passage warmly, but in vain. In this action the gallant Colonel Shanks received a severe if not mortal wound, and was left in the hands of friends to be cared for; he afterwards fell into the possession of the enemy, and is reported to have since died—a loss greatly to be deplored. He was ever foremost in battle and last in retreat; his death would be regretted by all who mourn the loss of the good and the brave. At the same time Colonel Shanks forced the passage of the Osage as stated, Colonel Gordon, of the same division, forced its passage at Castle Rock, and the division bivouacked that night seven miles from Jefferson City. On the next morning Major-General Fagan was thrown in front with his division, and on the march came upon the enemy five miles from Jefferson City, in large force. A hotly contested battle immediately ensued, but the enemy was gradually driven back to Moscow creek, when being reinforced they again made an obstinate resistance, but were finally routed and forced to seek shelter in their entrenchments—Fagan occupying the heights in full view of the city. On this occasion Major-General Fagan handled his troops with marked skill and ability, under my own immediate observation. Night approaching, I determined to move my forces two miles south of the city, where water and forage were abundant. Did so, and encamped for the night. I had received



positive information that the enemy were 12,000 strong in the city, and that 3,000 more had arrived on the opposite bank of the river, by the North Missouri railroad, before I withdrew to the encampment selected; whereupon I gave immediate instructions to Brigadier-General Shelby to send a sufficient force to burn the bridges and destroy the railroad west of Jefferson City, in the direction of California, the county seat of Moniteau county; and after a consultation with my general officers, I determined not to attack the enemy in his entrenchments, as they outnumbered me two to one and were strongly fortified, but to move my command in the direction of Kansas, as instructed in my original orders, hoping to be able to capture a sufficient number of arms to arm my unarmed men at Booneville, Sedalia, Lexington and Independence—places which I intended to occupy en route. The next day I accordingly marched towards Kansas and was followed by General McNeill, who made an attack on my rear guard, Fagan's division, but was easily repulsed. General Shelby's division, constituting my advance, reached California on the 7th, having sent a portion of his command to destroy the Pacific railroad, which it did, track, bridges, &c.; passing rapidly on to Booneville he, by a rapid charge, drove in their pickets and the garrison took refuge in their entrenchments. Brigadier-General Shelby, disposing his forces in such a manner as to prevent the arrival of reinforcements, awaited until his artillery could come up. In the meantime propositions for the surrender of the town were made to him and accepted. Accordingly, the place, its garrison, stores, &c., were delivered into his hands. For particulars, reference is made to his accompanying report.

I followed on with the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke, and camped on the night of the 8th fourteen miles from Jefferson City. On the 9th marched through and beyond California, making twenty-six miles. On the 10th arrived at Booneville with the rest of the command. My reception was enthusiastic in the extreme—old and young, men, women and children vied in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and war-worn soldiers. About 300 prisoners were captured at Booneville, with arms, ammunition and many stores, which were distributed among the soldiers. On the 11th, hearing of the approach of General McNeill, with a cavalry force estimated at 2,500 men, for the purpose of attacking Booneville by the Tipton road, I selected my position about half a mile from the river, and placed the divisions of Major-Generals Fagan and Marmaduke in



line of battle to receive him. The enemy attacked them, but was easily driven back with loss, and was pursued by a portion of Fagan's division and Jackman's brigade a distance of twenty-one miles from Booneville, with heavy loss, in spite of an obstinate resistance and the ruggedness of the country over which the pursuit was made.

For full particulars of the action, so far as his own troops were concerned, see report of Colonel Jackman accompanying.

Captain Anderson, who that day reported to me with about 100 men, was sent to destroy the North Missouri railroad; at the same time Quantrell, with the men under his command, was sent to destroy the Hannibal and Saint Joseph railroad, to prevent, if possible, the enemy from throwing their forces from Saint Louis in my front. These officers, I was afterwards informed, did some damage to the roads, but none of advantage, and totally failed in the main object proposed, which was to destroy the large railroad bridge in the edge of Saint Charles county. I moved that evening from Booneville to Chatteau Springs, on my proposed route, a distance of eleven miles, having recruited at Booneville 1,200 or 1,500 men, mostly unarmed. That night, receiving information that there was 5,000 stand of arms stored in the city hall at Glasgow, I sent Brigadier-General Clark, of Marmaduke's division, with his own brigade and 500 of Jackman's, with orders to cross the river at Arrow Rock and attack the place the next morning at daybreak and capture it; at the same time sending Brigadier-General Shelby, with a small portion of his division and a section of artillery, to attack the town at the same hour from the west side of the river, to divert the attention of the enemy and protect their advance under cover of the fire from his artillery. Owing to unforeseen difficulties in crossing the river, Brigadier-General Clark was unable to commence the attack for an hour after Brigadier-General Shelby had engaged them. The place was surrendered, but not until the City Hall was destroyed and the arms consumed by fire. However, we obtained eight hundred or nine hundred prisoners, 1,200 small arms, about the same number of overcoats, one hundred and fifty horses, one steamboat, and a large amount of under-clothing. This enterprise was a great success, effected with but small loss on our side and reflects great honor on all parties concerned. The prisoners were paroled, such of the ordnance and other stores as could be carried were distributed and the remainder with the steamboat burned. For particulars, reference is made to the accompanying reports of

Generals Clark and Shelby. In the awards of praise contained, the Commanding-General cordially concurs.

On the night of the 13th encamped at Mr. Marshall's, marching fourteen miles, and on the next day to Jonesboro', eight miles, where I was joined by General Fagan, who had been left behind at the Lamine. I then ordered Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, then commanding Shelby's old brigade, to take with him a force of not less than eight hundred or one thousand men and one section of artillery by Longwood and thence to Sedalia and to attack the Federals at that place, if he should deem it prudent and advisable. This order was promptly and completely carried out by General Thompson; the place, though strongly fortified and well garrisoned, was carried by a bold and daring assault, and fell into our hands with over two hundred prisoners, who were paroled, several hundred stand of arms, many pistols and wagon loads of goods suitable to soldiers. Reference is made to the accompanying reports of Generals Shelby and Thompson. The latter withdrew on the approach of a large force of the enemy.

On the 15th I reached Keisus, having passed through Marshall, marching seventeen miles, where I remained two days awaiting General Clark, for whose safety I began to entertain fears, inasmuch as information had been received that the enemy were on my left flank and in my rear in large force. Previous to the attack on Sedalia, the large and magnificent bridge over the Lamine, on the Pacific railroad, had been destroyed by Lieutenant James Wood, of Elliott's battalion, who had been sent there for that purpose by General Shelby. On the 17th I received information that the enemy (Kansas troops) had entered Lexington on the 16th. On the 17th I also received news of the capture of Sedalia by General Thompson. On the 18th, having been joined by Shelby's division and Clark's brigade of Marmaduke's division, I marched to Waverly, twenty-two miles.

On leaving Pocahontas I had sent an agent of great intelligence and tact into Saint Louis to ascertain the strength of the enemy at that city, with instructions to report to me if possible at Potosi. He was, however, so closely watched that he could not join me until I had passed that city. Upon overtaking me he informed me that I would be pursued by 24,000 men from Saint Louis and 15,000 from Jefferson City, which, with the force in my front from Kansas, he believed to be the entire force with which I would have to contend.

I then abandoned my former determination to issue an address to the people, calling upon them to rally to me, as they were already pouring in so rapidly that I knew I would not be able to protect and feed them, and as it would require that my army should be kept together to protect them on a rapid and dangerous retreat from the State. At daybreak on the morning of the 19th I moved from Waverly towards Lexington—General Shelby's division in the advance. Having received information that Generals Blunt, Lane and Jemmison, with between 3,000 and 4,000 Federals (Colorado, Kansas and Missouri Federal troops) were at Lexington, and fearing they might make a junction with McNeill and A. J. Smith, who were at Sedalia and Salt Fork, I made a flank movement to the left, after crossing Tabo, so as to intercept their line of march. The advance under Shelby met them at 2 P. M., and a battle immediately ensued. For a time the Federals fought well and resisted strenuously, but finally giving way, they were pressed by our troops, driven well past Lexington, and pursued on the road to Independence until night. That night the enemy evacuated Lexington in great haste and confusion. Shelby's old brigade, under Brigadier-General M. Jeff. Thompson, bivouacked that night in the suburbs of town. I encamped at General Shield's, three miles south of Lexington, marching that day twenty-six miles. On the morning of the 20th I moved west, in the same direction as before, to Five Creek prairie, twenty-two miles, where I encamped. Information was received that the enemy had fallen back to the Little Blue. On the 21st I resumed my line of march to the Little Blue on the Independence road—Marmaduke's division in the front, whose advance soon came upon the enemy's pickets, who, being driven across the Blue, burned the bridge as they crossed. A ford half a mile below the bridge was seized by our troops, and Marmaduke's division crossed it. His advance, Colonel Lawther's regiment, soon came upon the enemy, who were strongly posted behind a stone fence, in superior numbers. Lawther's regiment was driven back and hotly pursued by the foe, when they were reinforced by Colonel Green with one hundred and fifty men. A fierce engagement ensued, with varying success—Colonel Green contesting every inch of ground, when Wood's battery arrived and the enemy gave way; but being reinforced, again renewed the attack. Just as the ammunition of our troops engaged—who still manfully resisted with success the far superior numbers of the enemy—was about to become exhausted, Colonel Kitchen's regi-



ment arrived. Again the enemy was repulsed, and fell back to their former strong position. Hearing of the critical condition of General Marmaduke's division, I had sent orders for Shelby to move rapidly to his relief. He accordingly hastened with his division to the scene of action, and arrived there at the time the enemy had taken refuge in their first position; an attack was made upon them; a furious battle followed; the enemy was forced from his position and retreated. General Shelby now, taking the lead, drove them in a stubborn running fight on foot (his men having been dismounted) for two miles, and beyond Independence. For full particulars of this fight, reference is made to the reports of Generals Shelby and Clark, and to that of Colonel Green, accompanying the latter. In this action, General Marmaduke acted with distinguished gallantry, having not less than two horses shot under him. General Clark, of his division, also exhibited great skill and bravery, whilst Colonel Green, by the manner in which he handled his regiment against vastly superior forces, flushed with success, beating them back with his handful of men, contesting every inch of ground until assistance came, as well as by the personal courage exhibited by him, justly excited the admiration of his superior officers. Fagan's division, under my orders, supported General Shelby, but was not immediately engaged. Encamped that night in Independence—marching twenty-six miles, the troops being engaged most of the time.

On the evening of the 21st, Captain Williams, of Shelby's division, who had been sent on recruiting service, rejoined his command with six hundred men, capturing on his route the town of Carrollton with three hundred prisoners, and arming his entire command. On the morning of the 22d I left Independence. The enemy had fallen back to Big Blue on the Kansas City road, to a position strong by nature and strengthened by fortifications, upon which all their art had been expended; where they had been joined by General Curtis and his forces, thus increasing Blunt's army to between 6,000 and 8,000 men. Receiving this information, I determined to advance on the Santa Fe road, with Shelby's division in front, detaching Jackman and sending him on the Kansas City road to engage the enemy, then skirmishing with the pickets. General Shelby crossed the Big Blue with the remainder of his division, meeting some opposition from the enemy, which was soon overcome. After crossing, he engaged the enemy to cover the crossing and passage of the train. General Thompson with his brigade,



except Gordon's regiment, pressed the enemy to near the town of Westport, when he was ordered to fall back to the Blue. Colonel Gordon, with his regiment, who had been detained to guard the left, soon became engaged and was sorely pressed by overpowering numbers, when he was rejoined by Jackman, and gallantly charging they repulsed the enemy, pursued them some distance and inflicted heavy loss upon them; also captured a twenty-four pound howitzer. A large force of the enemy came out from Westport and a fight ensued, the enemy endeavoring to regain the lost gun. They were sternly resisted, and finally the arrival of General Thompson and night stopped the combat. Reference is made to the report of General Shelby for particulars. Two flags were also captured and presented to me on the battlefield by Captains McCoy and Wood, of Gordon's regiment, who had taken them with their own hands from the enemy. In the meantime other forces had engaged me in the rear. Having received information that other bodies of the enemy were pursuing me, I had directed pickets to be placed at the Little Blue to give notice of their approach. This had been done by General Fagan, and being advised on the morning of the 22d that the enemy had attacked and driven in his pickets, he dispatched General Cabell to drive back the enemy, which he did; but on his return, coming through Independence, the enemy struck Cabell in flank, cutting off three hundred or four hundred men and capturing two pieces of artillery. General Marmaduke's division, which formed the rear, became engaged with the same enemy half an hour before sundown. The division was then about two miles from Independence; the advance of the enemy was checked by our troops, who then fell back one half mile to a new position, which the enemy attacked with increasing fierceness, driving our troops steadily back until a late hour at night, and in almost impenetrable darkness.

For particulars, reference is made to the accompanying report of General Clark. I encamped that night on the battlefield near Westport, in line of battle, having marched twelve miles, the troops constantly engaging the enemy the whole distance. On the morning of the 23d I took up my line of march and soon discovered the enemy in position on the prairie. The train had been sent forward on the Fort Scott road. I had instructed General Marmaduke to resist the advance of the enemy, who was in his rear, if possible, as he was on the same road as the train. General Shelby immediately attacked the enemy, assisted by General Fagan, with two

brigades of Arkansas troops, and though they stubbornly resisted and contested every point of approach, drove them six or seven miles into Westport. In the meantime, General Marmaduke, who was to my right and rear, being attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, had to fall back, after a most strenuous resistance—his ammunition being exhausted.

For full particulars, reference is made to the report of General Clark.

Being at that time near Westport, and in full view of Generals Fagan's and Shelby's commands, I received information that my train, which was in front and on the right of the Fort Scott road, was threatened by some two thousand or two thousand five hundred of the enemy, moving in a line parallel with the Fort Scott road. I immediately directed General Fagan and General Shelby to fall back to the train as soon as they could do so with safety, which I would attempt to defend until they arrived. I immediately pushed forward to the front of the train with my escort, and there formed in line of battle the unarmed men who were present to the number of several thousand; throwing my escort and all the armed men of Tyler's brigade forward as skirmishers—the whole not amounting to more than two hundred—to the front of the enemy, and directing General Cabell, who arrived soon after, to hold the crossing of the creek on my left, sending forward at the same time for a portion of Colonel McCroy's brigade, which was in advance of the train, and on his arrival found him in line of battle on the left flank of the enemy, which caused the enemy to fall back a considerable distance on the prairie. In the meantime, the rear and flank of the commands of Generals Fagan and Shelby, by the falling back of General Marmaduke, were uncovered, and the former, in attempting to rejoin me, was attacked by a large force of the enemy, but with the aid of Colonel Jackman and his brigade, who acted so heroically and skillfully as to receive the thanks of General Fagan on the field, the enemy was repulsed. General Shelby, in attempting to obey my instructions, was attacked in the flank, and his command thrown into some confusion, but he rallied, repulsed the enemy and joined me that evening, as did also General Fagan. Full details of this are contained in the accompanying reports of General Shelby and Colonel Jackman.

I encamped that night on the middle fork of Grand river, marching twenty-four miles—the troops having been engaged with the enemy nearly all day. The number of the enemy's troops engaged

that day exceeded 20,000 well-armed men, whilst I did not have 8,000 armed men.

On the evening of the 24th I moved with the command on the Fort Scott road to the Marais du Cygnus, where I encamped, having marched thirty-three miles—no enemy appearing. During the night I received information from General Marmaduke, who was placed in charge of the approaches in front, that the enemy was threatening his pickets; and upon consultation with General Marmaduke, we were both of the opinion that the enemy was marching upon our right by Mound City, on a road parallel to the one on which we were. We were strengthened in that belief by a dispatch which had been captured from the commanding officer (Federal) at that place to his scouts stationed near our then encampments, stating "that he would be largely reinforced that night, and he wanted a sharp lookout for my army, and he wanted the earliest information of the route on which I traveled and the direction." I also learned at a late hour that night, from some recruits who joined me and had traveled fifteen miles on the route I had come, that no enemy was in my rear.

On the morning of the 25th I resumed my march in the same direction as before, and thinking from the information received the night before that if I should encounter the enemy, it would be in my front or on my right flank.

General Shelby's division composed the advance; Generals Fagan and Marmaduke brought up the rear; Colonel Tyler's brigade to the right of the centre of the train, four hundred yards; Shelby's old brigade to the right of the front of the train, four hundred yards; and Colonel Jackman's brigade to the immediate front. On reaching Little Osage river I sent forward a direction to General Shelby to fall back to my position in rear of Jackman's brigade, for the purpose of attacking Fort Scott, where I learned there were one thousand negroes under arms. At the moment of his reaching me, I received a dispatch from General Marmaduke in the rear, informing me that the enemy, 3,000 strong, were in sight with lines extending, and on the note General Fagan had endorsed he would sustain General Marmaduke. I immediately ordered General Shelby to take his old brigade, then on my immediate right, and return to the rear as rapidly as possible to support Generals Fagan and Marmaduke. I mounted my horse and rode back at a gallop, and after passing the rear of the train I met the divisions of Generals Fagan and Marmaduke retreating in utter and indescribable



confusion, many of them having thrown away their arms. They were deaf to all entreaties or commands, and in vain were all efforts to rally them. From them I learned that Major-General Marmaduke, General Cabell and Colonel Slemmons, commanding brigade, had been captured, with three hundred or four hundred men, and all their artillery—five pieces. General Fagan and several of his officers, who then joined me, assisted me in trying to rally the armed men, without success. I then ordered General Shelby to hold the enemy (who were pressing their success hotly and fiercely) in check, if possible, at the crossing of the Osage until the train could be placed in safety—which he succeeded in doing for several hours. I again formed the unarmed men, numbering several thousand, in lines of battle on the prairie beyond the river. General Fagan in the meantime had succeeded in rallying a portion of his forces and assisted General Shelby in again holding the enemy in check upon the prairie and in front of the immense lines of unarmed men until night, when I withdrew. The train having reached the Marmiton, ten miles, I then overtook it, having marched twenty-eight miles. On the next morning, after destroying many wagons, with broken-down teams that could not be replaced, I moved at two o'clock, there being but little forage in the neighborhood of my camp. We marched over beautiful prairie roads fifty-six miles and encamped at Carthage, on Spring river, the nearest point where forage could be procured, as I was informed by Generals Fagan and Shelby, who earnestly desired me to reach Spring river, as no forage could be obtained short of it. The Federal prisoners I had with me became so much exhausted by fatigue that, out of humanity, I paroled them. For full report of this action, see the several reports of Generals Shelby and Clark, and other accompanying reports.

On the next morning at 9 o'clock, after giving the men and animals time to rest and feed, I resumed the march and camped on Shoal creek, twenty-two miles. During the march a number of desertions took place among the Arkansas troops and recruits. No enemy having appeared, the morale of the troops had much improved.

On the 28th I marched towards Newtonia—Generals Fagan and Marmaduke's divisions, the latter now commanded by General Clark, in the rear, and General Shelby's in the advance. On approaching Newtonia our advance was discovered by the Federal garrison, who commenced to retreat. On seeing this Shelby's ad-



vance attempted to intercept them—the distance they had gained was too great for this to be effected. They succeeded, however, in killing the Federal Captain Christian, a notorious “bushwhacker,” noted for his deeds of violence and blood.

After passing over the prairie four miles beyond Newtonia, General Shelby encamped in a skirt of timber; the other divisions passed beyond and encamped in the positions they were to take in the march of the following day. Ere long our scouts brought information that the enemy was crossing the prairie in pursuit of us. Preparations were at once made to receive him, and at 3 P. M., General Blunt, with 3,000 cavalry, made a furious onslaught on our lines. He was met by Shelby, supported by a portion of Fagan’s command. A short but obstinate fight ensued, when General Blunt was repulsed and driven three miles, with heavy loss. This was the last we saw of the enemy. For full particulars, see General Shelby’s report.

The army marched that day twenty-six miles. On the 29th we marched twenty-six miles and encamped on Sugar creek, five miles south of Pineville, passing through that town. On the 30th and 31st we reached Maysville, near the Arkansas line, marching forty-three miles. November 1st we reached Boonsboro’, or Cane Hill, as it is commonly termed, marching seventeen miles. Then information was received by General Fagan from Colonel Brooks that he had the town of Fayetteville, Arkansas, closely invested, having forced the garrison within their inner fortifications, and asking for men to enable him to take it. As this was a place of importance to the Federals, and its capture would be of great advantage to the cause, upon General Fagan’s earnest solicitation, I ordered a detail of five hundred men and two guns to be made to him for that purpose, which was furnished by General Shelby, under command of Colonel Elliott—the guns from Collins’ battery. The expedition started to Fayetteville, formed a junction with Colonel Brooks, but before the place could be taken, the approach of General Blunt, with a large cavalry force, caused the seige to be raised, and Colonel Elliott rejoined his command. Our march from Illinois river to Cane Hill was over a bad road, rough and hilly, rendered worse than usual by constant rain; in consequence, much of the stock became worn out and was abandoned on the route. On the 3d I remained in camp; the weather very bad, both snowing and raining during the day. I there received information that the Federals at Little Rock had been greatly reinforced by a portion of

General Canby's command; and as it was necessary that I should here adopt the line of march I should pursue on my return to Arkansas, to district headquarters, or elsewhere, as I should be directed, I determined not to risk the crossing of the Arkansas river between Fort Smith and Little Rock, on which route I could not procure subsistence, forage or grass in anything like sufficient quantity; but decided to cross through the Indian country, where beef at least could be obtained, which would subsist my men for the few days it would require them to march until they would meet supplies, even if no salt or breadstuffs could be procured, whilst some grass could be obtained for the animals. In addition, the route across the Arkansas river below Fort Smith would be over a hilly and mountainous country—that the stock, in its present condition, would be unable to travel over—whilst through the Indian country it would be over level plains, traversed by good roads. Again, by taking the route below Fort Smith I would expose my army to be destroyed by a joint attack from forces detached from the heavy garrison there, acting with large forces from Little Rock, which could be easily spared, and which would, in all probability, take place, as information of my adopting that route would certainly reach them, and the slowness with which I was compelled to move would give them ample time to make all preparations. I furthermore came to this conclusion from the fact that it coincided with my instructions—in the propriety of which my own judgment fully concurred. Colonels Freeman, Dobbins and McCroy were ordered to return, with such of their men as still remained with their colors, to the places where they had raised their commands, to collect the absentees, and bring them within our lines during December, if possible; and on the 4th of November I<sup>st</sup> marched with the balance of my command through the Indian territory in the direction of Boggy depot. On the 13th I reached Perryville—a distance of one hundred and nineteen miles—when I met three wagons with supplies and encamped, remaining one day to rest and recruit my men. I had marched carefully and slowly, stopping to graze my stock whenever an opportunity offered. On the 14th, General Shelby, at his request, was left behind on the Canadian to recruit. On the 20th, Cabell's and Slemmons' brigades were furloughed. On the 21st of November I arrived at Clarks-ville, where I received an order from General Magruder to march to Lanesport and there establish my headquarters. I arrived there on the 2d of December, having marched 1,434 miles. The march

through the Indian country was necessarily a severe one, especially upon the stock, many of which died or became worn out and were left. The men, in some instances, hungered for food, but never approached starvation, nor did they suffer to the extent that other of our soldiers have cheerfully endured without complaint for a much longer time during the war. At all events, I arrived in the country where food and forage could be obtained in abundance, bringing with me all the sick and wounded and all my command with which I entered the Indian country, except those who voluntarily straggled and deserted their colors. To enumerate specially the names of the officers who distinguished themselves for skill and courage would swell this report beyond all reasonable limits. Therefore, as to all but general officers and those who acted in that capacity, I must simply refer to the accompanying reports, heartily concurring in the meed of praise awarded to such officers as are thus enumerated by their immediate commanding officers.

General Fagan, commanding the division of Arkansas troops, bore himself throughout the whole expedition with unabated gallantry and ardor, and commanded his division with great ability.

General J. S. Marmaduke, commanding the division of Mississippi troops, proved himself worthy of his past reputation as a valiant and skillful officer, and rendered with his division great service. His capture was a great loss to the service.

General J. O. Shelby, commanding the division of Missouri troops, added new lustre to his past fame as a brilliant and heroic soldier, and, without disparagement to the other officers, I must be permitted to say that I consider him the best cavalry officer I ever saw. The services rendered by him and his division in this expedition are beyond all praise.

General Cabell bore himself as a bold, undaunted, skillful officer. Impetuous, yet wary, he commanded his brigade in such a manner as to win praise from all. I regret that from want of reports from their several commanding officers, I cannot do justice to this as well as the other brigades of Arkansas troops. General Cabell's capture was a great misfortune, and his place will be difficult to fill.

General Clark, true to his past fame, bore himself with undaunted courage and bravery, as well as skill and prudence. His brigade was most skillfully handled.

Colonels Slemmons, Dobbins and McCroy (the first of whom was

captured) acted throughout as brave, daring, yet prudent commanders and are each entitled to great praise.

Colonel Jackman, through the whole expedition, won for himself great honor for the services he rendered, as have been herein enumerated, and for which the whole army awarded him the highest praise.

Colonel Freeman proved himself to be a brave and energetic officer, but as his men were mostly unarmed they were unable to render the same brilliant services as other brigades that were armed.

Colonel Tyler, who was placed in command of a brigade of new recruits, for the most part unarmed, deserves great praise for the success with which he kept them together and brought them within our lines. He deserves especial mention for the cool gallantry he displayed in charging the enemy with them at an important juncture, thereby greatly aiding in saving the train from destruction.

My thanks are due to my staff officers for their untiring energy and unremitting attention to their duties during the entire campaign; their zeal and devotion cannot be too highly commended by me.

In conclusion, permit me to say that in my opinion the results flowing from my operations in Missouri are of the most gratifying character. I marched 1,434 miles, fought forty-three battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over three thousand officers and men, captured eighteen pieces of artillery, three thousand stand of small arms, sixteen stand of colors (brought out by me, besides others destroyed by our troops who took them), at least three thousand overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes and clothing, many wagons and teams, numbers of horses and great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of railroad, burning depots and bridges. Taking this into the calculation I do not think I go beyond the truth in saying that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri \$10,000,000 worth of property. On the other hand, I lost ten pieces of artillery, two stand of colors, one thousand stand of small arms, whilst I don't think I lost over one thousand prisoners, including the wounded left in their hands, other than recruits on their way to join me, some of whom may have been captured. I brought out with me over five thousand recruits, and they are still arriving daily. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri, my march was an ovation; the people thronged around and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our flag in such numbers as to



threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, being mostly unarmed. In some counties the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in Missouri this winter the army would have increased fifty thousand men.

My thanks are due Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, my Provost Marshal-General, for the able, energetic and efficient discharge of his duties.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

STIRLING PRICE, *Major-General Commanding.*

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**Instructions to Hon. James M. Mason—Letter from Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, Secretary of State, C. S. A.**

[The following letter has never been published, so far as we are aware, and will be read with pleasure as an important link in the history of the Confederacy.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
RICHMOND, September 23, 1861.

To the Honorable JAMES M. MASON, *Etc., Etc.*:

Sir—The President desires that you should proceed to London with as little delay as possible, and place yourself, as soon as you may be able to do so, in communication with the Government. The events which have occurred since our commissioners had their first interview with Lord John Russell have placed our claims to recognition in a much stronger point of view; but in presenting the case once more to the British Government, you ought again to explain the true position in which we appear before the world. We are not to be viewed as revolted provinces or rebellious subjects, seeking to overthrow the lawful authority of a common sovereign. Neither are we warring for rights of a doubtful character, or such as are to be ascertained only by implication. On the contrary, the Union from which we have withdrawn was founded upon the express stipulations of a written instrument which established a government whose powers were to be exercised for certain declared purposes and restricted within well defined limits. When a sectional and dominant majority persistently violated the covenants and condi-

tions of that compact, those States whose safety and well-being depended upon the performance of these covenants were justly absolved from all moral obligation to remain in such a Union. And when the government of that Union, instead of affording protection to their social system, itself threatened not merely to disturb the peace and the security of its people, but also to destroy their social system, the States thus menaced owed it to themselves and their posterity to withdraw immediately from a Union whose very bonds prevented them from defending themselves against such dangers. Such were the causes which led the Confederate States to form a new Union, to be composed of more homogeneous materials and interests. Experience had demonstrated to them that a union of two different and hostile social systems under a Government in which one of them wielded nearly all the power, was not only ill-assorted, but dangerous in the extreme to the weaker section whose scheme of society was thus unprotected.

Prompted by these teachings, eleven sovereign States, bound together by the tie of a common social system and by the sympathies of identical interests, have instituted a new Confederacy and a new Government, which they justly hope will be more harmonizing in its operation and more permanent in its existence. In forming this Government they seek to preserve their old institutions and to pursue through their new organic law the very ends and purposes for which, as they believe, the first was formed. It was because a revolution was sought to be made in the spirit and ends of the organic law of their first union by a dominant and sectional majority, operating through the machinery of a government which was in their hands and placed there for different purposes, that the Confederate States withdrew themselves from the jurisdiction of such a government and established another for themselves. Their example, therefore, furnishes no precedent for the overthrow of the lawful authority of a regular government by revolutionary violence, nor does it encourage a resort to factious tumult and civil war by irresponsible bodies of men. On the contrary, their union has been formed through the regular action of the sovereign States composing the Confederacy, and it has established a government competent to the discharge of all its civil functions and entirely responsible, both in war and peace, for all its actions. Nor has that Government shown itself unmindful of the obligation which its people incurred whilst their States were members of the former union. On the contrary, one of their first

acts was to send commissioners to the Government at Washington to adjust amicably all subjects of difference and to provide for a peaceable separation and a fair satisfaction of the mutual claims of the two Confederacies. These commissioners were not received, and all offers for a peaceful accommodation were contemptuously rejected. The authority of our Government itself was denied, its people denounced as rebels, and a war was waged against them, which, if carried on in the spirit it was proclaimed, must be the most sanguinary and barbarous which has been known for centuries among civilized people. The Confederate States have thus been forced to take up arms in defence of their right to self-government, and in the name of that sacred right they have appealed to the nations of the earth, not for material aid or alliances, offensive and defensive, but for the moral weight which they would derive from holding a recognized place as a free and independent people. In asking for this they feel that they will not receive more than they will give in return, and they offer, as they think, a full equivalent for any favor that may thus be granted them. Diplomatic relations are established mainly to protect human intercourse and to adjust peaceably the differences which spring from such intercourse or arise out of the conflicting interests of society. The advantages of such an intercourse are mutual, and in general, as between nations, any one of them receives as much as it gives, to say nothing of the well being of human society which is promoted by placing its relations under the protection and restraints of public law. It would seem, then, that a new Confederacy asking to establish diplomatic relations with the world ought not to be required to do more than to present itself through a government competent to discharge its civil functions and strong enough to be responsible for its actions to the other nations of the earth. After this is shown, the great interests of peace and the general good of society would seem to require that a speedy recognition should follow. It cannot be difficult to show in our case a strict compliance with these, the just conditions of our recognition as an independent people. If we were pleading for favors we might ask and find more than one precedent in British history for granting the request that we be recognized for the sake of that sacred right of self-government for which we are this day in arms, and which we have been taught to prize by the teachings, the traditions and the example of the race from which we have sprung. But we do not place ourselves before the bar of nations to ask for favors; we seek for what we believe to

be justice not only to ourselves, but justice to the great interests of peace and humanity. If the recognition of our independence must finally come and if it be only a work of time, it seems to be the duty of each of the nations of the earth to throw the moral weight of its recognition into the scale of peace as soon as possible. For, to delay, will only be to prolong unnecessarily the sufferings of war. If then our Government can be shown to be such as has been here described, we shall place ourselves in the position of a people who are entitled to a recognition of their independence. The physical and moral elements of our Confederacy, its great, but undeveloped capacities, and its developed strength as proved by the history of the conflict in which we are now engaged, ought to satisfy the world of the responsible character of the Government of the Confederate States. The eleven States now confederated together cover seven hundred and thirty-three thousand one hundred and forty-four square miles of territory and embrace nine millions two hundred and forty-four thousand people. This territory, large enough to become the seat of an immense power, embraces not only all the best varieties of climate and production known to the temperate zone, but also the great staples of cotton, tobacco, sugar and rice. It teems with the resources, both moral and physical, of a great empire, and nothing is wanted but time and peace for their development. To these States there will probably be added hereafter Maryland, Missouri and Kentucky, whose interests and sympathies must bind them to the South. If these are added, the Confederate States will embrace eight hundred and fifty thousand square miles of territory and twelve and a half millions of people, to say nothing of the once common Territories west of these States, which will probably fall into the new Confederacy. Is it to be supposed that such a people and with such resources can be subdued in war when subjugation is to be followed by such consequences as would result from their conquest? If such a supposition prevails anywhere, it can find no countenance in the history of the contest in which we are now engaged. In the commencement of this struggle, our enemies had in their possession the machinery of the old Government. The naval, and, for the most part, the military establishments, were in their hands. They had, too, most of the accumulated capital and nearly all the manufactories of arms, ordnance and of the necessities of life. They had all the means of striking us hard blows before we could be ready to return them. And yet in the face of all this we have insti-



tuted a government and placed more than 200,000 men in the field with an adequate staff and commissariat. A still larger number of men are ready to take the field if it should become necessary, and experience has shown that the only limit to the disposition of the people to give what may be required for the war is to be found in their ability. The enemy, with greatly superior numbers, have been routed in pitched battles at Bethel and Manassas in Virginia, and their recent defeat at Springfield, Missouri, was almost as signal as that of Manassas. The comparatively little foothold which they have had in the Confederate States is gradually being lost, and after six months of war, in which they employed their best resources, it may truly be said they are much further from the conquest of the Southern States than they seemed to be when the struggle commenced. The Union feeling which was supposed to exist largely in the South, and which was known to us to be imaginary, is now shown in the true light to all mankind. Never were any people more united than are those of the Confederate States in their purpose to maintain their independence at any cost of life and treasure, nor is there a party to be found anywhere in these States which professes a desire for a reunion with the United States. Nothing could prove this unanimity of feeling more strongly than the fact that this immense army may be said to have taken the field spontaneously and faster almost than the Government could provide for its organization and equipment. But the voluntary contributions of the people supplied all deficiencies until the Government could come to their assistance, as it has done, with the necessary military establishments. And what is perhaps equally remarkable, it may be said with truth, that there has been no judicial execution for a political offence during the whole of the war, and so far as military offences are concerned our prisons would be empty if it were not for a few captured spies. Under these circumstances it would seem that the time has arrived when it would be proper in the Government of Great Britain to recognize our independence. If it be obvious that the Confederate States cannot be conquered in this struggle, then the sooner the strife be ended the better for the cause of peace and the interests of mankind. Under such circumstances, to fail to throw the great moral influence of such a recognition into the scale of peace, when this may be done without risk or danger, may be to share in the responsibility for the longer continuance of an unnecessary war. This is a consideration which ought, perhaps, to have some weight.

with a nation which leads so largely, as does that of Great Britain, in the progress of Christian civilization. That the British people have a deep political and commercial interest in the establishment of the independence of the Confederate States must be obvious to all. Their real interest in that event is only a little less than our own. The great question of cotton supply, which has occupied their attention so justly and so anxiously for some years past, will then be satisfactorily settled. Whilst the main source of cotton production was in the hands of such a power as that of the late United States and controlled by those who were disposed to use that control to acquire the supremacy in navigation, commerce and manufactures over all rivals, there was just cause for anxiety on the part of nations who were largely dependent upon this source of supply for the raw material of important manufactures. But the case will be far different when peace is conquered and the independence of the Confederate States is acknowledged. Within these States must be found for years to come the great source of cotton supply. So favorable a combination of soil, climate and labor is nowhere else to be found. Their capacity for increased production has so far kept pace with the increased demand, and in time of peace it promises to do so for a long while to come. In the question of the supply of this great staple there is a world-wide interest, and if the nations of the earth could choose for themselves a single depository for such an interest, perhaps none could be found to act so impartially in that capacity as the Confederacy of Southern States. Their great interest is and will be, for a long time to come, in the production and exportation of the important staples so much sought by the rest of the world. It would be long before they would become the rivals of those who are largely concerned in navigation, manufactures and commerce. On the contrary, these interests would make them valuable customers and bind them to the policy of free trade. Their early legislation, which has thrown open their navigation, foreign and coasting, to the free competition of all nations, and which has imposed the lowest duties on imports consistent with their necessary revenue wants, proves the natural tendency of their commercial policy. Under such circumstances, the supply of cotton to Great Britain would be as abundant, as cheap and as certain as if these States were themselves her colonies. The establishment of such an empire, committed, as it would be, to the policy of free trade by its interests and traditions, would seem to be a matter of primary importance to the progress of

human industry and the great cause of human civilization. It would be of the deepest interest to such a government to preserve peace, and to improve its opportunities for the pursuit of the useful arts. The residue of the world would find here, too, sources of supply of more than one of the great staples in which manufactures and commerce are most deeply interested, and these sources would probably prove to be not only constant, as being little likely to be troubled by the chances of war, but also of easy access to all who might desire to resort to them. In presenting the great importance of this question to the Government of Great Britain in its connection with their material interests, you will not omit its bearing upon the future political relations between the old and the new world. With a balance of power established between the great Confederacies on the North American continent, the fears of a disturbance of the peace of the world from the desire for the annexation of contiguous territory on the part of a vast and overshadowing political and military organization will be dissipated. Under the former Union the slaveholding States had an interest in the acquisition of territory suitable to their institutions in order to establish a balance of power within the Government for their own protection. This reason no longer exists, as the Confederate States have sought that protection by a separation from the Union in which their rights were endangered. It is manifest from the nature of its interests that the Southern Confederacy in entering as a new member in the family of nations would exercise not a disturbing but a harmonizing influence on human society, for it would not only desire peace itself, but to some extent become a bond of peace amongst others. In offering these views to the Government of Great Britain, you will be able to say with truth that you present a case precisely and entirely within the principles upon which it has acted since 1821,—principles so well stated by Lord John Russell in his dispatches upon the Italian question that they can not be better defined than in his own words. In his letter to Lord Cowley, of the 15th November, 1859, after adverting to the action of Great Britain in 1821 in regard to the declarations of the Congresses of Troppan and Laybach; in 1823 in regard to the Congress of Verona, and in 1825, 1827 and 1830 in the cases of the South American Republics, of Greece and of Belgium, he says: "Thus in these five instances the policy of Great Britain appears to have been directed by a consistent principle. She uniformly withheld her consent to acts of intervention by force to alter the internal



government of other nations; she uniformly gave her countenance, and if necessary her aid, to consolidate the *de facto* governments which arose in Europe or America." To recognize the Confederate States as an independent power would be to give her countenance to consolidate a *de facto* government in America which is already supported by a force strong enough to defend it against all probable assaults. To withhold that recognition would certainly encourage the armed intervention of a government, now foreign to us, for the purpose of altering the internal government of the Confederate States of America. In his letter of December 3d, 1859, to Lord A. Loftus, in regard to the controversy between Austria and her provinces, he says: "We, at least, are convinced that an authority restored by force of arms constantly opposed by the national wishes would afford no solid and durable basis for the pacification and welfare of Italy." Is not this sentiment still more applicable to the contest now being waged between the United States and the Confederate States? Again, in his dispatch of November 26th, 1859, to Earl Cowley, he declared that "It would be an invidious task to discuss the reasons which, in the view of the people of Central Italy, justified their acts. It will be sufficient to say that since the peace of 1815 Her Majesty's predecessors have recognized the separation of the Spanish Colonies in South America from Spain; of Greece, from the dominion of the Sultan; and of Belgium from Holland. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the reasons adduced in favor of these separations were not stronger than those which have been alleged at Florence, Parma, Modena and Bologna in justification of the course the people of those States have pursued." Were the reasons "alleged" in the States of Florence, Parma, Modena and Bologna, whose people are thus assumed to be the judges in a matter so nearly touching their happiness as their internal government, at all stronger than those "alleged" by the people of the eleven sovereign States now confederated together for withdrawing from a Union formed by a voluntary compact upon conditions which were persistently violated and with covenants essential to their domestic repose openly threatened to be broken? But appended to this letter of instructions you will find more extended extracts from the letters here referred to, for your especial reference. There is yet another question of great practical importance to us and to the world, which you will present on the first proper occasion to Her Britannic Majesty's Government. It was declared by the five great powers at the Con-



ference of Paris that "blockades to be binding must be effectual." A principle long since sanctioned by leading publicists and now acknowledged by nearly all civilized nations. You will be furnished with abundant evidence of the fact that the blockade of the coasts of the Confederate States has not been effectual or of such a character as to be binding according to the declaration of the Conference at Paris. Such being the case, it may, perhaps, be fairly urged that the five great powers owe it to their own consistency and to the world to make good a declaration thus solemnly made. Propositions of such gravity and emanating from sources so high may fairly be considered as affecting the general business relations of human society and as controlling, in a great degree, the calculations and arrangements of nations, so far as they are concerned, in the rules thus laid down. Men have a right to presume that a law thus proclaimed will be universally maintained by those who have the power to do so and who have taken it upon themselves to watch over its execution, nor will any suppose that particular States or cases would be exempted from its operation under the influence of partiality or favor. If, therefore, we can prove the blockade to have been ineffectual, we, perhaps, have a right to expect that the nations assenting to this declaration of the Conference at Paris will not consider it to be binding. We are fortified in this expectation, not only by their own declarations, but by the nature of the interests affected by the blockade. So far, at least, it has been proved that the only certain and sufficient source of cotton supply has been found in the Confederate States. It is probable that there are more people without than within the Confederate States who derive their means of living from the various uses which are made of this important staple. A war, therefore, which shuts up this great source of supply from the general uses of mankind is directed as much against those who transport and manufacture cotton as against those who produce the raw material. Innocent parties, who are thus affected, insist that a right, whose exercise operates so unfavorably on them, shall only be used within the strictest limits of public law. Would it not be a movement more in consonance with the spirit of the age to insist that amongst the many efficient means of waging war, this one should be excepted in deference to the general interests of mankind, so many of whom depend for their means of living upon a ready and easy access to the greatest and cheapest cotton market in the world? If, for the general benefit of commerce, some of its great routes have been neutralized so

as to be unaffected by the chances of war, might not another interest of a greater and more world-wide importance claim at least so much consideration as to demand the benefit of every presumption in favor of its protection against all the chances of war, save those which arise under the strictest rules of public law? This is a question of almost as much interest to the world at large as it is to the Confederate States. No belligerent can claim the right thus to injure innocent parties by such a blockade, except to the extent that it can be shown to furnish the legitimate, or perhaps we might go still further and say the necessary, means to prosecute the war successfully. If it has become obvious, as would now seem to be the case, that no blockade which they can maintain will enable the United States to subdue the Confederate States of America, upon what plea can its further continuance be justified to third parties, who are so deeply interested in a ready and easy access to the cheapest and most abundant sources of cotton supply. Perhaps we had the right to expect, inasmuch as by the proclamation of Her Britannic Majesty neutrality had been declared as between the belligerents, that one of the parties would not have been allowed to close the ports of the other by a mere proclamation of blockade without an adequate force to sustain it. In presenting the various views contained in this letter of instructions, you will say that they are offered as much in the general interests of mankind as in our own. We do not ask for assistance to enable us to maintain our independence against any power which has yet assailed us. The President of the Confederate States believes that he cannot be mistaken in supposing it to be the duty of the nations of the earth by a prompt recognition to throw the weight of their moral influence against the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Whether the case now presented be one for such action, he is perhaps not the most impartial judge. He has discharged his duty to other nations when he has presented to their knowledge the facts to which their only sure access is through himself, in such a manner as will enable them to acquit themselves of their responsibilities to the world according to their own sense of right. But whilst he neither feels nor affects an indifference to the decision of the world upon these questions which deeply concern the interests of the Confederate States, he does not present their claim to a recognized place amongst the nations of the earth from the belief that any such recognition is necessary to enable them to achieve and secure their independence. Such an act might diminish the

sufferings and shorten the duration of an unnecessary war, but with or without it he believes that the Confederate States, under the guidance of a kind and overruling Providence, will make good their title to freedom and independence and to a recognized place amongst the nations of the earth. When you are officially recognized by the British Government, and diplomatic relations between the two countries are thus fully established, you will request an audience of Her Majesty, for the purpose of presenting your letters accrediting you as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Confederate States near Her Majesty, and in that capacity you are empowered to negotiate such treaties as the mutual interests of both countries may require, subject of course to the approval of the President and the co-ordinate branch of the treaty-making power.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

R. M. T. HUNTER.

### The Gettysburg Campaign.

We propose, from time to time, to add to our "Gettysburg series" such reports as have never been published and are important in completing the Confederate account of that great battle.

We are quite sure our readers generally will thank us for giving this week the reports of the chivalric Georgian and the gallant Carolinian who both won military fame which has been only eclipsed by their splendid "victories of peace," and who now sit together in the Senate chamber at Washington.

#### Report of Brigadier-General John B. Gordon.

HEADQUARTERS GORDON'S BRIGADE, August 10th, 1863.

To Major JOHN W. DANIEL, *A. A. G., Early's Division*:

Major—I have the honor to report that my brigade began the march with Early's division from Hamilton's crossing on the 4th of June last. Halting at Culpeper Courthouse two days, on the night of the 12th, after a most exhausting march of seventeen miles in about six hours, we reached Front Royal. I was ordered to move on the pike leading to Winchester at three o'clock A. M.,

13th of June. Forging both branches of the Shenandoah, we marched to a point on the Staunton pike, about five and one half miles from Winchester, when, as ordered by Major-General Early, I moved to the left of this road and formed line of battle three miles southwest of the town. About four o'clock in the afternoon I deployed a line of skirmishers and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments (the Thirteenth and Thirty-first Georgia) in reserve. After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to bring into line these two regiments—the Thirty-first on the right and the Thirteenth on the left. The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle line, a portion of which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from which he was immediately driven. A battery, which I had hoped to capture, was rapidly withdrawn.

In this charge, which was executed with spirit and unchecked at any point, my brigade lost seventy-five men, including some efficient officers.

On the 14th, detachments from this brigade were engaged in skirmishing with the enemy in front of the town and fort. In accordance with orders from Major-General Early, received in the night of the 14th, I began to move my brigade upon the fort at daylight the following morning. I soon discovered that the fort was evacuated, and sending a detachment to occupy it and take possession of the garrison flag, I sent an officer to communicate with the Major-General and moved as rapidly as possible in the direction of the firing distinctly heard on the Martinsburg pike.

My brigade reached the point where a portion of Johnson's division engaged the retreating enemy only in time to assist in collecting horses and prisoners.

Crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 22d of June, we marched through Boonsboro', Maryland, to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Before reaching this place my brigade was detached by Major-General Early from the division and ordered on a different road, with a battalion of cavalry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel White.

In front of Gettysburg a regiment of Pennsylvania militia was charged and routed by this cavalry battalion. I was here ordered to move on the direct pike to the city of York. Before entering this place, the Mayor and a deputation of citizens were sent out by the city authorities to make a formal surrender. In accordance with prior instructions from Major-General Early, I moved directly through, having sent in front of the brigade a provost-guard to occupy the city and take down the Federal flag, left flying over the principal street. We moved by the direct pike to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna. At this point I found a body of Pennsylvania militia, nearly equal in number to my brigade, reported by the commanding officer, whom we captured, at twelve hundred men, strongly entrenched, but without artillery. A line of skirmishers was sent to make a demonstration in front of these works, while I moved to the right by a circuitous route with three regiments, in



order to turn these works, and, if possible, gain the enemy's rear, cut off his retreat and seize the bridge. This I found impracticable, and placing in position the battery under my command, opened on the works, and by a few well aimed shots and the advance of my lines, caused this force to retreat precipitately, with the loss of about twenty prisoners, including one lieutenant-colonel. I had no means of ascertaining the enemy's number of killed and wounded. One dead man was left on the field. Our loss, *one* wounded. It may not be improper in this connection, as evidence of the base ingratitude of our enemies, to state that the Yankee press has attributed to my brigade the burning of the town of Wrightsville. In his retreat across the bridge, the enemy fired it about midway with the most inflammable materials. Every effort was made to extinguish this fire and save the bridge, but it was impossible. From this the town was fired, and notwithstanding the excessive fatigue of the men, from the march of twenty-nine miles and the skirmish with the enemy, I formed my brigade in line around the burning buildings and resisted the progress of the flames until they were checked.

Leaving Wrightsville on the morning of the 29th, I sent the cavalry under my command to burn all the bridges (fourteen in number) on the railroad leading to York, to which place I marched my brigade and rejoined the division, from which we had been separated since June 26th. Marching thence to Gettysburg, we participated in the battle of July 1st. In accordance with orders from Major-General Early, I formed my brigade in line of battle on the right of the division—one regiment, the Twenty-sixth Georgia, having been detached to support the artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones.

About 3 o'clock P. M. I was ordered to move my brigade forward to the support of Major-General Rodes' left. The men were much fatigued from long marches, and I therefore caused them to move forward slowly, until within about three hundred yards of the enemy's line, when the advance was as rapid as the nature of the ground and a proper regard for the preservation of my alignment would permit.

The enemy had succeeded in gaining a position upon the left flank of Doles' brigade, and in causing these troops to retreat. This movement of the enemy would necessarily have exposed his right flank but for the precaution he had taken to cover it by another line. It was upon this line, drawn up in a strong position on the crest of a hill, a portion of which was woodland, that my brigade charged. Moving forward under heavy fire over rail and plank fences, and crossing a creek whose banks were so abrupt as to prevent a passage except at certain points, this brigade rushed upon the enemy with a resolution and spirit, in my opinion, rarely equaled.

The enemy made a most obstinate resistance, until the colors on portions of the two lines were separated by a space of less than fifty paces, when his line was broken and driven back, leaving the

flank which this line had protected exposed to the fire from my brigade. An effort was here made by the enemy to change his front and check our advance, but the effort failed, and this line too was driven back in the greatest confusion and with immense loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. Among the latter was a division commander (General Barlow), who was severely wounded. I was here ordered by Major-General Early to halt.

I had no means of ascertaining the number of the enemy's wounded by the fire of this brigade, but if these were in the usual proportion to his killed, nearly three hundred of whom were buried on the ground where my brigade fought, his loss in killed and wounded must have exceeded the number of men I carried into action.

Neither was it possible for me to take any account of the prisoners sent to the rear. But the division inspector credits this brigade with about eighteen hundred. I carried into action about twelve hundred men, one regiment having been detached as above stated. The loss of the brigade in killed and wounded was three hundred and fifty—forty of whom were killed.

The movements during the succeeding days of the battle (July 2d and 3d) I do not consider of sufficient importance to mention. In the afternoon of July 5th, on the retreat from Gettysburg, my brigade, acting as rear guard, was pressed by the enemy near Fairfield, Virginia. I was ordered by Major-General Early to hold him in check until the wagon and division trains could be moved forward. Detaching one regiment (the Twenty-sixth Georgia) I deployed it, and after a spirited skirmish succeeded in driving back the enemy's advance guard and in withdrawing this regiment through the woods, with the loss of eight or ten killed and wounded.

On the 14th of July this brigade, with the division, recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport.

It would be gratifying, and in accordance with my sense of justice, to mention the acts of individual courage which came under my own observation and which have been reported to me, but as the exhibition of this virtue was the general rule, I should do injustice to many if I attempted it.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. GORDON, *Brigadier-General.*

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## Report of Brigadier-General Wade Hampton.

COLUMBIA, August 13, 1863.

Major McCLELLAN, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Major—I avail myself of the first opportunity at which I am able to do so to send in a report of the part taken by my brigade during the battle of Gettysburg. The previous operations of the brigade shall be embodied in a subsequent report as soon as I am well enough to make it out. I send the present report, as I deem it important that it should go in at the earliest moment.

The brigade was stationed, on the 2d of July, at Hunterstown, five miles to the east of Gettysburg, where orders came from General Stuart that it should move up and take position on the left of our infantry. Before this could be accomplished, I was notified that a heavy force of cavalry was advancing on Hunterstown, with a view to get in the rear of our army. Communicating this information to General Stuart, I was ordered by him to return and hold the enemy in check. Pursuant to these orders, I moved back and met the enemy between Hunterstown and Gettysburg. After skirmishing a short time he attempted a charge, which was met in front by the Cobb legion, whilst I threw the Phillips legion and the Second South Carolina as supporting forces on each flank of the enemy. The charge was most gallantly made, and the enemy were driven back in confusion to the support of his sharpshooters and artillery, both of which opened on me heavily. I had no artillery at this time, but soon after two pieces were sent to me and they did good service. Night coming on, I held the ground until morning, when I found that the enemy had retreated from Hunterstown, leaving some of his wounded officers and men in the village.

The Cobb legion, which led in this gallant charge, suffered quite severely. Lieutenant-Colonel Delaney and several other officers being wounded, whilst the regiment lost in killed quite a number of brave officers and men, whose names I regret not being able to give. On the morning of the 3d July I was ordered to move through Hunterstown and endeavor to get on the right flank of the enemy. In accordance with these orders the brigade passed through the village just named, across the railroad and thence south till we discovered the enemy.

I took position on the left of Colonel Chambliss, and threw out sharpshooters to check an advance the enemy were attempting. Soon after, General Fitz. Lee came up and took position on my left. The sharpshooters soon became actively engaged, and succeeded perfectly in keeping the enemy back, whilst the three brigades were held ready to meet any charge made by the enemy. We had, for the three brigades, but *two* pieces of artillery, whilst the enemy had apparently two batteries in position. In the afternoon, about four and a half o'clock I should think, an order came from General



Stuart for General Fitz. Lee and myself to report to him, leaving our brigades where they were. Thinking that it would not be proper for both of us to leave the ground at the same time, I told General Lee that I would go to General Stuart first and on my return he could go. Leaving General Lee, I rode off to see General Stuart, but could not find him. On my return to the field, I saw my brigade in motion, having been ordered to charge by General Lee. This order I countermanded, as I did not think it a judicious one, and the brigade assumed its former position—not, however, without loss, as the movement had disclosed its position to the enemy. A short time after this, an officer from Chambliss reported to me that he had been sent to ask support from General Lee, but he had replied my brigade was nearest and should support Chambliss' brigade. Seeing that support was essential, I sent to Colonel Baker, ordering him to send *two* regiments to protect Colonel Chambliss, who had made a charge—I know not by whose orders—and who was falling back before a large force of the enemy. The First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis legion were sent by Colonel Baker, and these two regiments drove back the enemy, but in their eagerness they followed him too far and encountered his reserve in heavy force. Seeing the state of affairs at this juncture, I rode rapidly to the front to take charge of these two regiments, and whilst doing this, to my surprise, I saw the rest of my brigade (except the Cobb legion) and Fitz. Lee's brigade charging. In the hand-to-hand fight which ensued, as I was endeavoring to extricate the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis legion, I was wounded, and had to leave the field, after turning over the command to Colonel Baker.

The charge of my brigade has been recently explained to me as having been ordered by Captain Barker, Assistant Adjutant-General, who supposed that it was intended to take the whole brigade to the support of Colonel Chambliss—a mistake which was very naturally brought about by the appearance of affairs on the field.

Of what occurred after I gave up the command, I am of course ignorant, nor can I state the casualties of my command. I am only able now to give a brief and bare statement of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of the 3d July, showing how it became engaged. The disposition I had made of my command contemplated an entirely different plan for the fight, and beyond this disposition of my own brigade, with the subsequent charge of the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis legion, I had nothing whatever to do with the fight.

I am, Major, very respectfully, yours,

WADE HAMPTON, *Brigadier-General.*

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**Operations of a Section of the Third Maryland Battery on the Mississippi in the Spring of 1863.**

By Captain W. L. RITTER.

BALTIMORE, MD., February 27, 1879.

Rev. JOHN WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:*

Dear Sir—I give a few items which may serve as a branch link in the great historical chain that is being forged for the future historian.

April 2, 1863, Lieutenant Ritter was ordered to Deer creek, up the Mississippi river, to take command of a section of the Third battery of Maryland artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Bates, of Waddell's Alabama artillery. This section, with one of Bledsoe's Missouri battery and one of a Louisiana battery, were under the command of Lieutenant Wood, of the Missouri artillery. These sections were all attached to General Ferguson's brigade, that had been operating along the Mississippi, firing into transports and harassing the enemy in every conceivable manner.

In March, 1863, when Porter's fleet, consisting of five gunboats and several transports, entered Black bayou for the purpose of flanking the Confederate batteries at Haynes' bluff, on the Yazoo river, Ferguson's command met the fleet below Rolling fork, and after an engagement which lasted three days, drove it into the Mississippi river, with considerable loss.

Early in April, 1863, General Steel's Federal division, consisting of eight regiments and one battery of artillery, landed at Greenville, Mississippi, and marched down Deer creek about forty miles to the Two-mile canebrake above Rolling fork, through which he made no effort to pass, in consequence of the narrow passage and the impossibility of flanking it on either side. He then returned to Greenville, destroying the gin houses, barns and dwellings for about thirty miles up the creek on his way back. Ferguson's command followed as far as Fish lake and then returned to Rolling fork, except Major Bridges' battalion.

April 29, Lieutenant Ritter, with his section, was ordered to join Major Bridges' battalion at Fish lake, near Greenville, Mississippi.

May 1st he came up with the command, and the next day proceeded to the river to fire upon the boats that were continually

passing. At this time, Grant's army at Vicksburg was being rapidly reinforced, and it was the aim of the Confederate commander to harass the passing troops as much as possible.

The morning of the 4th, having learned from one of Major Bridges' scouts that a transport, heavily laden with stores, was coming down the river, Lieutenant Ritter took his guns and masked them at a point where the current ran near the shore, upon which he had posted his pieces. Soon the black smoke of a steamer was seen rising above the tree tops, above Carter's bend, a few miles off, and shortly afterwards it came in sight. The vessel was sailing rapidly yet quietly, and, as was afterwards learned, the crew anticipated no danger, for they had not asked any of the vessels they passed if the river was clear of Confederate batteries. The cannoniers were ordered to their posts, the guns loaded, and, as the boat came within range, the order "fire" was given. The stillness of the morning was broken by the shrill report of the rifle piece and the loud roar of the twelve pounder howitzer, which in quick succession flamed out upon the unsuspecting crew. The first or second shot cut the tiller rope, and another broke a piston rod of one of the engines. The crew, finding escape impossible, hoisted a white flag and surrendered and brought the boat ashore. Major Bridges and Lieutenant Ritter were the first to board the boat. The prisoners, seventeen in number, were ordered ashore and put under guard.

They had been drinking the night previous, and therefore failed to inquire of the gunboats they passed whether there were any Confederates on the river. A dinner had been prepared for the passengers, but not served. Lieutenant Ritter's command, therefore, though neither invited nor expected guests, were just in season for the savory dishes of the pantry; nor need we add that they greatly enjoyed the excellent turkey, pies, etc., provided for the occasion.

All the wagons, gun carriages and caissons were filled with such articles as the men thought most useful for the soldier, and the balance, much the greater part, with the beautiful boat (Minnesota), a side-wheel steamer, was consigned to the flames.

This was one of the richest prizes captured on the Mississippi river. The boat contained about a quarter of a million dollars worth of stores, and was the property of a Northern speculator.

About 5 o'clock in the evening, two of the enemy's gunboats came in sight and immediately commenced a furious and indiscriminate cannonading of the surrounding plantations, without

the least notification to the inhabitants, save that of the shell, to remove the women and children to a place of safety.

Lieutenant Ritter's section and the sharpshooters lay within three hundred yards of the river, waiting for the enemy to land, but they sailed down the river two miles, where they put a few men ashore.

No further demonstration being made, the battalion returned to camp at Fish lake.

Yours, truly,                      WILLIAM L. RITTER.

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**Beauregard's and Hampton's Orders on Evacuating Columbia—Letter from Colonel A. R. Chisolm.**

[The following letter from a gallant officer of General Beauregard's staff seems to settle beyond question the character of the orders given when the Confederates evacuated Columbia.]

NEW YORK, March 23, 1879.

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:*

My Dear Sir—I have read in the April number of the *Society Papers* Colonel James Wood Davidson's communication relative to the burning of Columbia by General Sherman, and it may be a matter of interest in future that I inform you of what took place between Generals Beauregard and Hampton on the evening previous to the evacuation of that city. As Aid-de-Camp to General Beauregard I was the only officer present with the two Generals. Beauregard had arrived late in the day from Charleston. Late in the evening Hampton called on him at the hotel, and after stating the condition of affairs in his front and arranging for the evacuation of the place early the following day, the matter of disposing of the large quantity of cotton piled in the streets was discussed. General Beauregard immediately said that it should on no account be burnt, for by doing so it would only endanger the city; that all railroad communication with the coast was cut off and the enemy could not remain long enough to remove it; whereas, if saved, it would be of much value to the citizens. It was then determined that orders should be issued by General Hampton that none of the cotton should be burnt; this was carried out, as appears by the affidavit of Captain Rawlins Lowndes, who was his Adjutant.

The explosion which took place at the railway depot on the outskirts of the town, about daylight on the morning of the evacuation, was caused by men sleeping among ammunition stored there. The depot alone was destroyed and no fire spread from it. I visited the spot before leaving the city, which I did about nine A. M., as the enemy were entering the town.

An officer of General Sherman's staff (Major Murray), now attached to the New York *Herald's* editorial corps, informed me several years ago that he went to General Sherman and begged him to stop his soldiers from burning the city, and that he turned a deaf ear to him. I furnished General Hampton with the name of this officer at the time, as he authorized me to do so.

Yours, truly,

A. R. CHISOLM.

#### **The Bristoe Campaign—Preliminary Report of General R. E. Lee.**

[The following report has never been in print. The reports of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, Major-General R. H. Anderson, Major-General H. Heth, Brigadier-General H. H. Walker, Colonel E. D. Hall and Major D. G. McIntosh were all published by the Confederate Government, but from some cause General Lee's report and other subordinate reports were not. Nor do we know whether General Lee ever wrote his final report, as was his custom, after receiving the reports of his subordinates. If he did, it is not in the War Records' office at Washington, and we fear it was destroyed with other invaluable papers on the retreat from Petersburg. We are indebted to the kindness of the War Records' office for a copy of this report.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

October 23d, 1863.

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector-General, C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:*

General—In advance of a detailed report I have the honor to submit for the information of the Department the following outline of the recent operations of this army. With the design of bringing on an engagement with the Federal army, which was encamped around Culpeper Courthouse, extending thence to the Rapidan, this army crossed that river on the 9th instant, and advanced by way of Madison Courthouse. Our progress was necessarily slow, as the march was by circuitous and concealed roads, in order to avoid the observation of the enemy. General Fitz. Lee, with his cavalry division and a detachment of infantry, remained to hold



our lines south of the Rapidan. General Stuart, with Hampton's division, moved on the right of the column. With a portion of his command he attacked the advance of the enemy near James City on the 10th, and drove them back towards Culpeper. Our main body arrived near that place on the 11th instant and discovered that the enemy had retreated towards the Rappahannock, removing or destroying his stores. We were compelled to halt during the rest of the day to provision the troops, but the cavalry, under General Stuart, continued to press the enemy's rear guard towards the Rappahannock. A large force of Federal cavalry in the meantime had crossed the Rapidan after our movement began, but was repulsed by General Fitz. Lee and pursued towards Brandy station. Near that place the commands of Stuart and Lee united on the afternoon of the 11th, and after a severe engagement drove the enemy's cavalry across the Rappahannock with heavy loss. On the morning of the 12th the army marched in two columns, with the design of reaching the Orange and Alexandria railroad north of the river and intercepting the retreat of the enemy. After a skirmish with some of the Federal cavalry at Jeffersonton we reached the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs in the afternoon, where the passage of the river was disputed by cavalry and artillery. The enemy was quickly driven off by a detachment of our cavalry, aided by a small force of infantry and a battery. Early next morning (13th) the march was resumed, and the two columns reunited at Warrenton in the afternoon, where another halt was made to supply the troops with provisions. The enemy fell back rapidly along the line of the railroad, and early on the 14th the pursuit was continued, a portion of the army moving by way of New Baltimore towards Bristoe station and the rest, accompanied by the main body of the cavalry, proceeding to the same point by Auburn mills and Greenwich. Near the former place a skirmish took place between General Ewell's advance and the rear guard of the enemy, which was forced back and rapidly pursued. The retreat of the enemy was conducted by several direct parallel roads, while our troops were compelled to march by difficult and circuitous routes. We were consequently unable to intercept him. General Hill arrived first at Bristoe, where his advance, consisting of two brigades, became engaged with a force largely superior in numbers posted behind the railroad embankment. The particulars of the action have not been officially reported, but the brigades were repulsed with some loss and five pieces of artillery, with a number of prisoners captured. Before the rest of the troops could be brought up.

and the position of the enemy ascertained, he retreated across Broad run. The next morning he was reported to be fortifying beyond Bull run, extending his line towards the Little River turnpike. The vicinity of the entrenchments around Washington and Alexandria rendered it useless to turn his new position, as it was apparent that he could readily retire to them and would decline an engagement unless attacked in his fortifications. A further advance was, therefore, deemed unnecessary, and after destroying the railroad from Cub run southwardly to the Rappahannock, the army returned on the 18th to the line of that river, leaving the cavalry in the enemy's front. The cavalry of the latter advanced on the following day, and some skirmishing occurred at Buckland. General Stuart, with Hampton's division, retired slowly towards Warrenton in order to draw the enemy in that direction, thus exposing his flank and rear to General Lee, who moved from Auburn and attacked him near Buckland. As soon as General Stuart heard the sound of Lee's guns, he turned upon the enemy, who, after a stubborn resistance, broke and fled in confusion, pursued by General Stuart nearly to Haymarket and by General Lee to Gainesville. Here the Federal infantry was encountered, and after capturing a number of them during the night, the cavalry slowly retired before their advance on the following day. When the movement of the army from the Rapidan commenced, General Imboden was instructed to advance down the Valley and guard the gaps of the mountains on our left. This duty was well performed by that officer, and on the 18th instant he marched upon Charlestown and succeeded, by a well concerted plan, in surrounding the place and capturing nearly the whole force stationed there, with all their stores and transportation; only a few escaped to Harper's Ferry. The enemy advanced from that place in superior numbers to attack General Imboden, who retired, bringing off his prisoners and captured property—his command suffering very little loss, and inflicting some damage upon the pursuing columns. In the course of these operations two thousand four hundred and thirty-six prisoners were captured, including forty-one commissioned officers. Of the above number four hundred and thirty-four were taken by General Imboden. A more complete account, with a statement of our loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, will be forwarded as soon as the necessary official reports shall have been received.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

## Editorial Paragraphs.

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A LOUISIANA BRANCH OF THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY was organized at New Orleans on the 29th of March by a meeting called by about one hundred prominent Confederates of the city, and of which General F. N. Ogden was President, and Colonel F. R. Southmayd was Secretary. After a statement of the plans, objects, &c., of the Society by General George D. Johnston, our efficient General Agent, the following plan of organization was adopted :

This society shall be known as the Louisiana Branch of the Southern Historical Society, and its object is to collect for the archives of the parent society such historical material relating to the Confederate war as can be secured in the State of Louisiana.

It shall be located at New Orleans, and shall hold meetings at least once each year.

Membership in the parent society shall entitle the person to membership in this society.

The officers shall consist of a president, eight vice-presidents, a corresponding secretary, a recording secretary, a treasurer and an executive committee, who shall hold their offices for one year, or until their successors are elected.

The executive committee shall consist of sixteen members, with power to increase its number, and five of its members shall constitute a quorum.

The officers of this society shall be ex-officio members of the executive committee.

The executive committee is charged with the general direction and management of the interest and work of this society ; has authority to adopt rules for its own government (not inconsistent with this plan), and shall at the annual meeting submit a report of its proceedings to the society.

The president shall have authority to call meetings of this society whenever it is thought best.

The following officers were elected.

President, Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D.; Vice-Presidents, General Fred. N. Ogden, General G. T. Beauregard, General J. B. Hood, Governor Francis T. Nicholls, Colonel A. Reichart, Major J. B. Richardson, General Brent, Major J. Moncre; Corresponding Secretary, J. Jones, M. D.; Recording Secretary, F. R. Southmayd; Treasurer, J. B. Lafitte.

Executive Committee--Dr. J. D. Burns, chairman, J. D. Hill, B. J. Sage, W. T. Vaudry, C. E. Fenner, E. A. Palfrey, B. M. Harrod, W. Fearn, J. G. Devereux, L. Bush, J. B. Walton, L. A. Wiltz, Douglas West, N. T. N. Robinson, J. B. Eustis, Archie Mitchell.

The following resolution was adopted :

*Resolved*, That we heartily welcome General George D. Johnston, the General Agent of the parent society, to New Orleans, and will cheerfully co-operate in assisting him to extend the membership of the society in our midst, and otherwise, as may contribute to the success of his important mission.

We cordially thank our friends for the heartiness with which they have taken hold of this matter, and we anticipate the happiest results from their action. As the Southern Historical Society originated in New Orleans, and

many of the gentlemen prominent in the recent meeting were its original founders (as we showed in our last annual report), it is especially appropriate that we should still have their active co-operation in pushing forward our good work.

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FOURTEEN YEARS AGO TO-DAY (April the 9th) seven thousand five hundred ragged, starved, foot sore, weary, but heroic men, with arms in their hands, gathered around our grand old Chief and wept bitter tears as he told them that he was "compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources." They stacked their arms, furled forever their tattered battle flags, and returned home, not to sit in idleness around desolated hearthstones to mourn over blighted hopes, but to go to work with an energy worthy of their glorious record. That these men and those whom they represented have been law abiding citizens—that they have observed to the letter the terms of their parole—that they have deserved confidence and honor from all sections of the country—is a historic fact too patent to need discussion.

The South has honored the Confederate soldier to an extent that has excited the ire of Radical politicians. Our Governors, our Judges, our Legislators, our State and county officers, our Senators and Congressmen, the professors in our colleges, our leading business men, our prominent professional men, our preachers under forty-five years of age—in a word, nearly all of the men occupying positions of honor, emolument or trust which have been filled by the voice of the true people of the South, have been men who "wore the gray," proved true to the land they loved, and have not abandoned their principles since the war. This has resulted not simply from the fact that there is a general feeling that we owe a debt of gratitude to these men which we can never pay, but also for the very obvious reason that *when we select our best men we must choose Confederate soldiers.*

Nor should the people of the North complain of this. If they choose to neglect *their* soldiers, and fill their places of honor with men who were "invisible in war," and are proving themselves "invincible in peace," *that* is their affair, but they must not expect us to follow their example. We trust the day will never come when our Southern people shall forget to honor the Confederate soldier—when our women shall cease to deck their graves with flowers and teach their children to cherish the memory of those who "died for us," or when the voters of the South shall neglect to put the survivors into the high places within their gift.

But while we are doing this, we should not forget that it is of the very highest moment, that we gather the material for a true history of the principles, the deeds and the character of the Confederate soldier. *The Southern Historical Society* is engaged in just this work, and we think we have a claim on the sympathies and the active help of every Confederate soldier, and all who desire to see vindicated at the bar of history his name and his fame.

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THE LEE MAUSOLEUM AT LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA, is being rapidly pushed to completion. The executive committee announced in their report the 29th



of November last that they had received in all \$21,140.95—that they had paid in full for the recumbent figure of Lee \$15,000, and on the mausoleum to receive it \$2,844.67, leaving a balance in the treasury of \$3,296.28, and a deficiency of \$6,183.05 to raise in order to *complete* the mausoleum.

A recent Lexington paper states that only \$2,000 are now needed. Surely the needed amount ought to be *at once* raised in order that at least one fitting monument to our grand old chieftain may be *completed*. Valentine's monument is one of the most splendid creations of genius in this country, and when the beautiful mausoleum designed by Neilson of Baltimore is completed, the tomb of Lee will be fitly decorated and appropriately cared for.

Let the old soldiers of Lee, and his friends and admirers everywhere, rally *at once*, raise the small amount necessary to complete this beautiful monument, and then combine on the grand monument in Richmond, which we are pledged to build.

We are authorized to receive subscriptions, and would be glad to be the medium of sending to Lexington a good part of what remains to be collected.

*Send on at once, then, a contribution (large or small) for this noble object.*

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THE SECOND REUNION OF THE LOUISIANA DIVISION ARMY OF TENNESSEE was held in New Orleans on the 5th of April, and seems to have been quite a brilliant affair. We are glad to hear of all such reunions, and hope that they will keep alive the memories of the brave old days of 61-65. But we again urge that at these "gatherings of the clans" arrangements ought to be made to put on record the heroic deeds of the men who "wore the gray."

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### Book Notices.

*Life of Alexander H. Stevens.* By Richard Malcom Johnston and William Hard Browne. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this beautifully gotten up book, which, in paper, printing and binding, is in the usual style of the work of this famous house.

The literary execution of the book is admirable. Mr. Johnston has been for years an intimate friend of Mr. Stephens, and has had some peculiar advantages in gathering material for a true picture of the *inner* life of the "great commoner." Mr. Browne has added his fine literary taste and skill, and the book is one of deep interest—indeed, a charming specimen of biography. The extracts from Mr. Stephens' private letters, diaries and conversations, as well as from his public speeches, enhance the value of the book.

\*Mr. Stephens' long public career, his unquestioned ability, and his high character give a certain degree of importance to his utterances. But each one must, of course, judge for himself as to the correctness of many of his opinions and acts. We do not here pass upon them at all.

*Destruction and Reconstruction—Personal Experiences of the late War.* By Richard Taylor, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this really charming book, which we have read with deep interest.

If the style is sometimes pedantic, flippant, and occasionally even coarse, it is always sprightly, often sparkling, and throughout decidedly entertaining. There is not a page in the book over which one could nod. Indeed, we found ourselves riveted to its pages in the "wee'sma' hours" of the morning. A competent military critic, who served under General Taylor the last year of the war, has promised us a full review of the book for our next number. We will, therefore, content ourselves with saying now that General Taylor's descriptions of the campaigns in which he served are very vivid and will be valuable material for the future historian, marred only by the fact that, in the haste of writing, he has not always verified his facts, and is sometimes inaccurate in his statements—e. g., his account of the battle of First Manassas strangely adopts the Federal version that the battle was decided by Johnston's coming to Beauregard's help at a critical juncture of the battle, on the 21st of July, when, if he had consulted the official reports, he would have seen that General Johnston arrived with the bulk of his force the day before, and that the only troops from Johnston's army who arrived during the battle were three regiments under Kirby Smith and Elzey.

General Taylor's criticisms of men and measures are trenchant, sharp and decided, and there will be, of course, difference of opinion as to whether they are always just. For example, we very decidedly protest against his opinion of General Lee as a military man, and so far from admitting that he was merely a master of *defensive* warfare, and that "the tendency of engineer service to unfit men for command" had spoiled him as the leader of great armies and the manager of great campaigns, we believe that when the facts are all brought out, the difficulties against which he contended considered, and the overwhelming numbers and resources opposed to him calmly weighed, the future historian will write Lee down as not only the greatest general which this country has ever produced, but one of the ablest commanders in all history.

Some of General Taylor's pen portraits are very vivid, life-like and accurate. We have space for only his portrait of Stanton, of whom he says: "A spy under Buchanan, a tyrant under Lincoln and a traitor to Johnson, this man was as cruel and crafty as Domitian. I never saw him. In the end, conscience, long dormant, came as Alecko, and he was not; and the temple of justice, on whose threshold he stood, escaped profanation."

The Appletons have brought out the book in a style worthy of their reputation, and it will doubtless have a wide sale.

Since the above notice was penned a telegram announces that General Taylor died in New York on the 12th of April.

In his death a gallant soldier, an able commander, a brilliant writer and a genial, accomplished gentleman has passed from a wide circle of admiring, loving friends.



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**Sketches of Operations of General John C. Breckinridge.**

By Colonel J. STODDARD JOHNSTON, of his Staff.

**No. 1—*From Dalton, Georgia, to Hanover Junction, Virginia.***

[Our readers will receive with great interest the following sketches from the facile pen of the gallant soldier whose position on the staff gave him special opportunities for knowing whereof he affirms.]

While the Army of Tennessee was in winter quarters at Dalton, Georgia, General Breckinridge was, early in February, 1864, ordered to the command of the Department of Southwestern Virginia. He repaired to Richmond about the middle of that month, and there remained nearly a fortnight in consultation with the President and War Department, gathering information and receiving instructions concerning his new command. On the 5th of March he relieved General Samuel Jones, and formally assumed command of the Department of Southwestern Virginia, with headquarters at Dublin station, a depot on the Virginia and East Tennessee railroad a few miles west of New river. His new command included all of East Tennessee occupied by the Confederate forces and all of Virginia west of the Blue Ridge. Its great extent of exposed front, with



the small force for its protection, had always rendered it a precarious command, and it had proved disastrous to several of his predecessors. With the prospect of a trying ordeal before him as soon as the spring and summer campaign should open, General Breckinridge addressed himself at once to the work of placing his troops in an effective condition. To this end he made a tour of inspection to all the posts in Virginia on horseback, going in an inclement season as far as the Warm Springs, in Bath county, and traversing the line as far to the southwest as Abingdon, a trip of nearly four hundred miles. Wherever he went, the officers and men were animated by his presence, and new life was infused into all branches of the service.

About this time, the command of General Longstreet, which had wintered in East Tennessee, was transferred by rail to General Lee's army, thus uncovering his left and leaving it guarded only by cavalry. The scope of this sketch will not admit of a statement of the forces of the Department, further than to say that Vaughan's cavalry was on the East Tennessee front, Morgan's at Abingdon, Jenkins' at or near the Narrows of New River, and W. L. Jackson's on the extreme right at Warm Springs—the largest command not exceeding a good brigade; while the only infantry in the Department was Echols' brigade at Union Draught, in Monroe county, and Wharton's brigade at the Narrows of New River—twenty-six miles north of Dublin. Such was the disposition when information was received that General Crook was advancing in the direction of Dublin, with a strong force, from the Kanawha. General Breckinridge was engaged in preparations to receive him, when, on the evening of the 4th of May, he received a telegram from President Davis, saying that Siegel was advancing up the Shenandoah Valley on Staunton, and that the indications were that he (Breckinridge) would have to go at once to meet him, closing with directions to communicate with General Lee. A dispatch was sent General Lee the same night, informing him of the attitude in the Department and asking instructions. Early on the morning of the 5th of May—the day on which the battle of the Wilderness was fought—an answer was received from General Lee, directing General Breckinridge to march at once with all of his available force to the defence of Staunton. Orders having been previously sent to Generals Echols and Wharton to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning, General Breckinridge proceeded on the same day with his staff to the Narrows, and on the 6th the brigades of Wharton and Echols



took up their march for Staunton, at which place General Breckinridge arrived on the 9th—the last of the troops reaching there on the 11th. Immediately on his arrival he proceeded to organize to meet Siegel. The reserves of Augusta were called out, under Colonel John H. Harmon, numbering several hundred men, and the cadets of the military institute at Lexington, two hundred strong. These reported promptly; and General Breckinridge, learning that Siegel was proceeding up the Valley, determined to march to attack him, instead of standing on the defensive. Accordingly on the morning of the 13th he left Staunton with the forces named, camping that night twenty miles from Staunton. Next day he advanced to Lacy's spring, about thirty-five miles from Staunton, and went into camp, heavy rains falling almost continually both days. General Imboden, who was in front with a cavalry force of several hundred, reported the enemy in the neighborhood of New Market, ten miles off. After dark he visited General Breckinridge in person, and informed him that Siegel had occupied New Market. General Breckinridge then determined to attack him early in the morning before information of his advance could be received. Accordingly he put his troops in motion at one o'clock that night, and by daylight was in line of battle two miles south of New Market, his front being covered by Imboden's cavalry; Harmon's command being left as rear guard to the trains, a mile further in the rear. Siegel was apparently unconscious of the presence of infantry in his front, and was advancing confident of the capture of Staunton, with no obstruction except a small cavalry force. The situation will be taken in at a glance. Lee was being pressed at Spotsylvania; Crook was moving on the extreme left of the line from the Kanawha, apparently occupying Breckinridge with the defence of the important country of Southwest Virginia, where lay the salt works, the lead mines and the chief source of commissary supplies for Richmond; while Siegel was moving upon Staunton, the center of the line, the key to the Valley—which was apparently hopelessly indefensible. Besides its strategic importance, as the immediate left flank of General Lee's line, it was at that time the location of large hospitals for the Army of Northern Virginia and depots of commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores. The importance, therefore, of success by Breckinridge will be appreciated.

To accomplish the defeat of Siegel's advance he had but a meagre force—the aggregate of infantry muskets being but thirty-one hundred. With this command, as the morning opened, he advanced

in line of battle; the cavalry of Imboden giving way to our infantry skirmishers and going to the right, with instructions to operate during the day as a cover to our right flank, and to endeavor, as the battle progressed, to gain the rear of Siegel and to burn the bridge across the Shenandoah near Mount Jackson, four miles from New Market. The topography of the country was as follows: The main turnpike passes down the Valley due north through the town of New Market, which lies rather in a depression, from which, both to the north and south, the road and country rise with a gradual ascent. The Massanutten mountain runs parallel with the road, at the distance of a mile or more, with an intervening wooded valley, interspersed with wet weather marshes, rendered by the rain then falling difficult for field operations, which gave Breckinridge's right good protection. On the left of the turnpike, and also parallel with it, and half a mile or more distant, runs the south branch of the Shenandoah, then swollen with the rains, a high ridge intervening and ascending by a gradual slope from the turnpike. General Breckinridge formed his line of battle with the right resting on the turnpike and his left on the summit of the ridge, placing the cadets in the center between the two brigades. He had but one line of battle in two ranks, with no reserves. It was not long before the skirmish line of the opposing forces became engaged, and after sharp firing the enemy fell back beyond New Market. Then ensued heavy artillery firing, which occupied the greater part of the morning. A reconnoissance showed that Siegel, finding he was opposed by infantry instead of cavalry, had abandoned the offensive and assumed the defensive. To this end he had retired with his main force to the crest of the hill about a mile north of New Market, where, with open ground in his front and his flanks well covered by the topography already described, he occupied an exceedingly strong defensive position. The rain was almost continuous during the day, and Breckinridge's forces had operated in wheat fields, which made it very laborious, particularly in handling artillery, beyond the reach of which Siegel had now placed himself. Notwithstanding the odds at which General Breckinridge now found himself, he determined to press to the attack. Putting his troops in motion, he passed beyond the village of New Market and began to ascend the open space intervening between himself and the enemy, composed of blue grass pastures intersected occasionally with stone fences. Seeing that his troops would be exposed to a heavy artillery fire unless there was some provision to prevent it, he boldly

threw ten pieces of artillery, which he moved in a gallop through New Market, upon the right of the pike and beyond the town where a series of slight knolls offered good positions for firing without its endangering his own command. These pieces he directed in person, so arranging that as his line of battle advanced the artillery would limber up, gallop to the front and open fire—making, as it were, a skirmish line of artillery.

The boldness of the whole movement seemed to disconcert the enemy and to give a moral advantage to our side. The first firing of Siegel's artillery passed harmlessly over the heads of our troops, and when our artillery opened with a quartering fire upon his line it seemed to strike them with consternation; so much so, that it was afterwards ascertained that our bursting shells had stampeded his reserves before the first line gave way. Our infantry advanced with wonderful steadiness, firing, and halting at intervals to load, with the steadiness of troops on dress parade; the precision of the cadets' drill serving well as a color guide for the brigades on either side to dress by. The whole scene was one such as is rarely witnessed, the eye taking in at one glance all the forces engaged, save that a good part of the Federal line had the advantage of a stone wall which served as a breastwork. Every man in Breckinridge's command was under his eye, while he, with his conspicuous form, was plain to the view of all his troops, who, though they had never fought with him, were proud of the fame he brought them as a commander and animated to heroism by his immediate presence. When his line had reached within two hundred yards of that of the enemy, the position was very critical, and for a time it seemed doubtful as to which would be the first to give way. At this juncture, Siegel's cavalry, on his left, were seen deploying for a charge down the pike. Breckinridge, with his keen eye, detected the manœuvre and ordered the guns to be double shotted with canister. It had scarcely been done before they were seen advancing in squadron front, when, coming in range, the artillery opened and the charge was repulsed disastrously—not more than a score reaching our lines, and they as prisoners, lying on the necks of their horses. This seemed to turn the tide of battle, for in a few moments Siegel's line gave way and our troops pressed to the crest only to see the enemy in full retreat. Pursuit was given as soon as our line could be reformed. Siegel made a brief stand at Rood's hill to cover his retreat, which he effected beyond the Shenandoah, burning the bridge as his rear guard passed over. Had Imboden succeeded in carrying out his

instructions, the whole of Siegel's command would have been captured. As it was, Breckinridge captured five pieces of artillery, which were abandoned on the field, besides five or six hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded left on the field. His own loss, though not nearly so large as Siegel's, was several hundred killed and wounded. That night his soldiers slept on the battlefield, going into camp with cheers of victory such as had not been heard in the Valley since Stonewall Jackson had led them. In fact, everybody hailed Breckinridge as the new Jackson, who had been sent to guard the Valley and redeem it from the occupation of the enemy.

General Breckinridge modestly telegraphed General Lee the result of the battle and the same night received from him his own thanks and the thanks of the Army of Northern Virginia. Next day General Breckinridge issued an order thanking his brave soldiers, particularly the cadets, who, though mere youths, had fought with the steadiness of veterans.

Immediately following General Lee's congratulatory dispatch came another, directing General Breckinridge to transfer his command as speedily as possible to Hanover Junction. The battle had been fought on the 15th. One day being given the troops for rest, General Breckinridge gave orders for them to march to Staunton on the 17th, he going in advance to make better disposition for their transfer by rail from Staunton to Hanover Junction, a distance of near one hundred miles. The energy and promptness of his movement were such that, notwithstanding the inferior facilities for transportation at that time in the South, his whole command, including artillery, was at Hanover Junction on the 20th. The Augusta reserves being disbanded, the cadets returned to Lexington and Imboden left to watch the Valley.

J. STODDARD JOHNSTON.

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## **The Career of the Confederate Cruiser "Stonewall."**

By Captain THOMAS J. PAGE, C. S. N.

[The history of the Confederate vessels which, despite great obstacles, made themselves the terror and the scourge of the merchant marine of the United States, and forced her powerful navy to treat them with respect, would form a most interesting chapter in the true story of our great struggle. The career of the "Stonewall" was a glorious one, and our readers will thank us for the interesting narrative of the gallant Captain Page.]

In presenting this blurred picture of the "Stonewall," its imperfections should be attributed more to the shortcomings of the artist than to the absence of intrinsic worth in the subject represented.

The "Stonewall," a small twin-screw ironclad man-of-war, was built in France by the then most eminent constructor in the Empire. Her tonnage, twelve hundred; armament, one three-hundred pounder and two seventy-pounder guns, and crew about forty men.

Thus equipped, this little craft was seen one fair morning, after much negotiation, bearing the beautiful Confederate flag in place of the Danish, under which she had arrived from the region of the North sea. She was built with the knowledge and sanction of the late Emperor of France, and on the eve of her completion and readiness for delivery it was rumored that she was designed for the Confederate Government. Every ship then being built in Europe acquired this reputation. This rumor reached the ears of the Emperor, and he was officially informed, from high authority, that if this or any other such vessel should be permitted to leave France and fall into the possession of the Confederate Government, Mexico would be made untenable ground for French troops. However impotent such a threat may have been at that time, it had the desired effect. The Emperor was truly sensitive on this Mexican question. His policy there was unpopular in France, and he was not the man to long debate which of the two to choose when compliance with his word pointed to the right and self-interest to the left.

He ran no risk in laying an injunction on his friend and ship builder, that no vessels, under his construction, should pass into the hands of the Confederate Government. Whatever may have been *his* sentiments individually, policy constrained him to consult those of the French people, who may not have comprehended his aim and object in measures of such remote bearing. He had been

challenged to a game of "brag," in which he was no proficient. Astute, sagacious, far-seeing as he was, he could not see into his adversary's hand—he was bluffed—he revoked the permission he had given the constructor.

A similar diplomatic game had already been successfully played in England, in the case of the "Berkenhead rams"—as two vessels built on the Mercey were called; for a like issue had been made on the charge that they were designed for the Confederate Government. Had all the vessels charged to the Confederate account so actually belonged, that Government would have been the most formidable of all naval powers.

This case could not be so summarily disposed of in England, where all questions involving the rights of the people had been up to this time invariably adjudicated and decided according to law—the English people being pre-eminently conservative and law-abiding. This case *was* adjudicated, and all the powers of Government brought to the investigation in order to establish the charge that these vessels *were* built for the Confederate Government. The prosecution exerted a degree of energy unparalleled in the accumulation of evidence from every hole and corner; for there were consequences involved in the decision so momentous as not to be weighed in the balance with tens of millions of pounds sterling, or any other sum of money—the life of a nation was at stake.

Notwithstanding the disposition on the part of the Government, the earnest hope that the investigations of the Attorney-General would discover evidence to sustain the charge, that learned jurist, after a laborious search, was obliged to report that there was *no* evidence to show that the "Berkenhead rams" were built for the Confederate Government. This was too important a measure to be given up because the law was impotent, or even after the failure of the desperate efforts that had been resorted to. It was a case of life or death. If the law were not strong enough, some other course must be adopted. A *threat* was made—it would be a "*casus belli*" if the vessels in question should come into the possession of the Confederate Government. Impotent as was this threat, it prevailed. The Government succumbed, did what had never before been done—violate their own laws and take peaceable possession of the vessels; that the law could not condemn—the surest course by which to satisfy the complainants. This occurred previously to the action of the French Emperor—in the case before mentioned—an example he conceived worthy of his following.

The "Stonewall" had not, at this time, been baptized with the ever memorable name she subsequently bore, for she was not then a Confederate vessel; and, after much circumlocution, fell into the hands of the Danish Government, at the time, be it remembered, while Prussia and Austria were at war with Denmark. How this occurred is not pertinent to this narrative. We can only conjecture that Prussian spies were not so "wide-a-wake" as had been some other detectives. She was taken to Copenhagen under the direction of Danish naval officers, in order to witness and test her capacity as a "sea-going" vessel. Her performance in the North sea somewhat dampened the ardor of these hardy seamen of the North, for they looked upon her as being more of the amphibia kind than of that class of vessels in which they had been accustomed to navigate the ocean.

It is true she had no very great respect for the heavy waves of the sea—she defied them—and if they did not permit her to gracefully ride *over*, she would go through them—protruding her long elephantine proboscis as the seas receded; and, rising from her almost submerged condition, would shake the torrent from her deck and again walk the water like a thing of life. She was not so dangerous. She was dangerous only when coming in conflict with one of her own kind; and even in this respect her reputation subsequently grew to vast proportions—far exceeding her capacity to do damage.

Arrived in Copenhagen, the report as to her sea-worthiness was not favorable. Her good qualities were ignored, and her disposition to act the part of the leviathan exaggerated. Moreover, the war in which Denmark was engaged was speedily brought to a close and the services of such a vessel were no longer required. In a word, that Government wished to get rid of her; and after much discussion, deliberation, investigation, &c., as to compliance with contract, it was finally determined to return the little craft to the builders. Their agent received her, and under charge of a Danish merchant captain and crew, she was dispatched to France.

Before leaving port a Confederate navy officer, who was curiously interested in all such naval architecture, had been often on board and inspected the vessel throughout—her armament, gun-gear, projectiles, naval stores, &c.—for in her construction, equipment, &c., she was quite unique. Pleased with the appearance of the vessel and all on board, he accepted the invitation of the builder's agent and took passage in her for France. She had scarcely got fairly

into the North sea when the weather, always boisterous in those latitudes in the winter season, became so bad that the captain conceived it prudent to put into Christiansand in Norway. Time was precious—for there were pressing obligations pending. Moreover, the captain and crew were to be discharged after the lapse of a limited time. Under these circumstances, the passenger, Mr. Brown, whose status on board was known only to the captain, urged him to “put to sea” on the least abatement of the gale. They had been out in blue water only a few hours when the vessel began to exhibit her powers of diving and coming up, after the fashion of the porpois, as if for the amusement of all on board. But the engineers and crew, not amused by these fantastic tricks, as they were neither ducks nor fish, petitioned the captain to “put back” into port. He, quite of their opinion, proposed the same to Mr. Brown; but the latter, though in a minority of one, declined to accede to the proposition of the majority—the rule of the sea being the reverse of that on land under republican government—and expressing his entire confidence in the “sea-worthiness” of the vessel, advised the captain to assure the engineers that turning back was always attended with danger; that there was bad luck in it; that the only danger lay in stopping the engines; that, in a word, the safety of the vessel and all on board depended entirely on the continuous movement of the engine, and the watchful care of it by the engineers.

She weathered that gale and arrived off the coast of France in clear weather and a smooth sea, where—a very singular coincidence—a steamer had taken up *her* anchorage, as though there had been some preconcerted arrangement for their meeting, for this was neither a port nor harbor. The agent of the builders, who had been up to this time the ostensible owner of the vessel, concluding it would be as well for him to land on the nearest point of the coast, took his departure, accompanied by the captain and crew, and went on shore, indulging the pleasing remembrance of an adventurous passage from the North sea, and the still more pleasing anticipation of the fruitful results he was about to realize.

This procedure would seem inhospitable and unkind towards the little craft that had borne them safely through the tempestuous weather of the North sea, thus to be left with one solitary man on board. But she had not long to remain in this unpeopled state. Boats came, crowded with men, from the steamer that lay close by, not only curious to see, but, perhaps, to minister to the wants of



the little craft in her deserted condition and to offer their services, which sailor men are prompt to render when duty calls; for "old salts" are proverbially kind, and will often risk their lives in an adventure. It turned out, however, that these visitors were not actuated solely by curiosity, for they consisted of officers and sailors prepared to cast their lot, to do their duty, under the Confederate flag, come weal or woe.

The "spar-deck" of the vessel presented, on that bright, sunny morn, a busy scene. The Confederate flag was "run up" at the peak, and the pennant at the main-mast head, when the commander, surrounded by the little band of officers and men, with caps in hand, pointed to the pure emblem at her peak, the token of the nationality of the vessel, and announced her "The Stonewall"—ever to be remembered name, given at the baptismal font of the Bay of Biscay.

Certain preliminaries, the "shipping" of men, assignment to specific duties, &c., having been gone through with, the deck was soon cleared of the various articles, so generously presented and as gratefully received from the steamer in company, which, having been stowed in their appropriate places, all was made snug for the cruise. The anchor was "hove up" under the inspiration of that joyous music, familiar to every sailor man, when the "boatswain" "calls all hands up—anchor for home"; for *that* is music, though it comes from nature's roughest cut, whose melody touches the soul and causes a responsive vibration of the tenderest chords of the heart.

The Bay of Biscay, whose normal condition is that of a boisterous sea, lay like a mirror, reflecting the bright rays of the sun; while balmy air, fanned into the gentlest of breezes by the "head-way" of the vessel, promised a happy entrance into the broad Atlantic. "Man proposes but God disposes." The night was not half spent ere the wind blew and the storm arose, and at the dawn of day the Stonewall was contending against a gale and heavy sea, well calculated to test the sea-worthiness of the little craft, and try the faith of the stoutest heart in her capacity to weather the storm. "Battened down," she was "water-tight," and, although she was no "Mother Cary's chicken" to gracefully dance on the crest of waves, would, in her lazy way, receive them over her bows, in cataract form, and give them free exit through the quarter ports to their mother ocean. Romantic as this may seem, though not comparable to the grandeur of the Falls of Niagara, it was neither exhilarating nor agreeable; for, apart from these too frequent and overwhelming

visitations, the officers and men began to look upon them as a imposition, in compelling them to appear on deck booted up to the knee. This round of *amusement* continued for three days to the monotonous *music* of the howling of the storm, and the contention of the sea with the skies; when the Stonewall's friend—the steamer that had befriended her at the anchorage, and now anxiously watched her performance in this terrific gale, in order to render other assistance if needed—telegraphed or signaled to know “how she was getting on”; for at times when the Stonewall would be in the “trough of the sea,” partly submerged, there could be nothing seen of her. Knowing that her friend had some other important duty to discharge, with a heavy heart she replied, “all right, go ahead.” The steamer went on her way; in her construction she was better constituted to resist the gale.

Only a few hours had elapsed when it was discovered that all was *not* right, that water was flowing into the captain's cabin from “abaft” in a very unusual manner; and, although men were set to bailing with buckets, the water gained on them. The storeroom for the men's clothing and other purser's effects was “abaft” the cabin, whence came the water. On opening this apartment a very discomfoting spectacle met the eye. The caps over the two “rudder heads” were, by the force of the sea, as the Stonewall would occasionally dive beneath, being gradually lifted, the bolts yielding to the pressure, and the water gushing in every direction with great force. Had these blocks been suddenly lifted from their places there would have been opened two holes of ten inches diameter each below the “water line,” apertures well calculated to endanger the safety of the vessel. A temporary repair was soon made by malling the blocks into their places, and the rush of water partially arrested.

This disaster rendered it necessary to “put into” the nearest port for repairs; although the great consumption of coals would alone have caused this course to be taken, as but little headway had been or could be made “in the face” of such a gale. No observations for determining the geographical position of the vessel had been made for more than two days. The sun, moon and stars—those beacons by which the mariner shapes his course mid the trackless ocean—were obscured by the lurid clouds that spanned the firmament. With exhausted bunkers and paralyzed engine the Stonewall would have been a prey to the raging storm; she was not capable of contending under sail alone against a severe gale. To run the risk of being wrecked on the iron-bound coast of Spain,

should the hoped for port not be reached, was preferable to being swamped in the Bay of Biscay. From the best data available, under the circumstances, an imaginary position was assigned the vessel and a course determined upon, which it was hoped would lead into some safe anchorage; for any port in a storm is a sailor's snug harbor.

Trusting to "that little cherub that sits up aloft and keeps watch on poor Jack," the helm was "put hard up," the close-reefed fore topsail "sheeted home," and the little craft went off before the wind like a thing of life and proudly said to the foaming seas, "*follow me.*" They *did* follow, as though frantic to get on board, but however given to taking them in over the bows, the Stonewall refused them admittance over the stern. To "scud" so small an ironclad so little above the water's edge was a dangerous evolution, but necessity makes its own laws, and this was one of those cases in which success proved the propriety of adopting the exceptional rule.

The coast of Spain lay ahead, but what part of it was the doubtful question soon to be solved. The pulsations of every heart beat quickly, and every eye was anxiously strained to descry, midst the obscurity of the atmosphere, the crescent shaped contour of the coast, in which lay the port hoped for. Not more joyously did the cry of "land O!" find an echo in the hearts of Columbus' crew, than it did in the hearts of the Stonewall's on this occasion, when the anxiously looked for haven was seen directly ahead. None but the wearied mariner, after days of doubtful contest with the angry elements, can appreciate such deliverance from the dangers of the sea. This was the happy lot of the Stonewall, as she steamed into the snug harbor, leaving the raging of the gale behind, and dropped anchor in the placid, hospitable waters of Ferrol.

The usual visits of ceremony were made, and on calling on the Captain-General, who was an "old salt" holding the rank of Admiral, the character of the Stonewall was stated, and the object of her visit to have certain repairs made and to procure a supply of coals. Permission was politely granted, and authority to employ such hands from the dock-yard as might be required.

Ferrol is one of Spain's principal naval stations. I should not pass over the admission of the Stonewall into this port without expressing the obligation under which she lay for this very courteous, hospitable reception at the hands of the Captain-General and others, of which there remains a pleasing remembrance not soon to be forgotten.

Ship carpenters were immediately at work repairing damages, and at the same time a supply of coals was being taken on board. These operations had scarcely gotten fairly under way when it became known that there were other difficulties and dangers than those she had just escaped that beset the Stonewall. The intelligence of her arrival was not to be confined to Ferrol. There were here, as in every other part of Europe, *curious gentlemen*, whose avocation was to find out other people's business. The wires soon flashed the news of this arrival, under a novel flag, to the American Minister at Madrid, who forthwith protested to that Government that the admission of such a vessel—a pirate, an enemy to all mankind, a reckless rover of the sea—was an infringement of international law, a violation of the rights of nations, and that the Government should eject her from that port and prohibit her entering another, though she might go to the bottom—the only port the hospitalities of which she was entitled to. Now, it had been supposed that this unpretending little craft had come into the world all right; had been baptized in accordance with the strictest tenets of received public creed, and that she did not come under that class designated by such harsh epithets. She was aware that she was not exempt, in the eyes of some, from the imputation of having been conceived in sin, but, as she had been baptized in the purest of salt water, she intended to take upon herself the responsibilities of her sponsors, to strive hard to do her duty, and to this end she had sought while in distress the hospitable haven of Ferrol.

When a grave complaint is laid before a Government by a foreign minister, it is supposed to be actuated by important considerations and sustained by truthful arguments, in accordance with the dignity of the high position from which such complaint issues. It necessarily commands that respectful consideration demanded by international courtesy. The Government at Madrid was unwilling to believe that their trusted official, the Captain-General, had been delinquent in the discharge of the important duties assigned him, but it became necessary that they should be officially advised as to the status of this stranger in the port of Ferrol, thus denounced by such authority as a pirate and all the rest of it, for the pride of the nation would be compromised in extending hospitality to such an enemy to mankind.

The Captain-General was therefore required to furnish the Government with positive evidence as to the nationality of the Stonewall. There was no difficulty in doing this. The commanding



officer's presence was requested at the office of the Captain-General; the information required by the Government stated, with the pleasing assurance that *he* was satisfied as to the status of the *Stonewall*; but inasmuch as the American Minister had officially made grave charges against the vessel, it became the duty of the Government to place themselves in a position to rebut such charges, if erroneously made; or, if true, to withhold their national hospitality. The required evidence was at hand. The commanding officer presented his commission, showing the authority under which he acted, and the evidence that *he* was no pirate, nor was the vessel under his command a lawless rover of the sea. He went farther, in order to satisfy the inquiry of the Government—he exhibited a document, bearing the signature of authority—"his instructions"—stating what the Captain-General, an Admiral in the Spanish navy, very readily appreciated, "that his *instructions* were for *his* guidance *solely*, and that he would be recreant to his trust were he to submit them to the perusal of another." The Admiral considered the evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of his Government, and transmitted the same to Madrid. Orders came to permit the continuance of the repairs that had been suspended.

It is eminently proper here to state the ground on which rested the nationality, not only of the *Stonewall*, but of every other Confederate man-of-war, because it was not an uncommon assertion in high places, and eagerly embraced in some quarters, that inasmuch as these vessels under the Confederate flag had been neither built, nor fitted out, nor commissioned in some Confederate port, they were not, in view of international requirements, men-of-war; and consequently not entitled to the hospitality usually accorded to belligerents in neutral ports. It is sufficient to set at rest all quibbling as to the legal status of the *Stonewall*, to quote a few extracts from the very many authorities on this point, as laid down in the "British Counter Case" before the "Geneva Convention," and sustained by learned writers on international law: "Where either belligerent is a community or body of persons not recognized by the neutral power as constituting a sovereign state, commissions issued by such belligerent are recognized as acts emanating, not indeed from a sovereign government, but from a person or persons exercising *de facto* in relation to the war, the powers of a sovereign government.

"Public ships of war, in the service of a belligerent, entering the

ports or waters of a neutral, are, by the practice of nations, exempt from the jurisdiction of a neutral power. To withdraw or refuse to recognize this exemption without previous notice, or without such notice to exert or attempt to exert jurisdiction over any such vessel, would be a violation of a common understanding which all nations are bound by good faith to respect.

"A vessel becomes a public ship of war by being armed and commissioned—that is to say, formally invested by order or under the authority of a government with the character of a ship employed in its naval service, and forming part of its marine, for purposes of war. There are no general rules which prescribe *how, when* or in *what* form the commissioning must be effected, so as to impress on the vessel the character of a public ship of war. What is essential is that the appointment of a designated officer to the charge and command of a ship likewise designated, be made by the Government or the proper department of it, or under authority delegated by the government or department, and that the charge and command of the ship be taken by the officer so appointed. Customarily, a ship is held to be commissioned when a commissioned officer appointed to her has gone on board of her and hoisted the colors appropriated to the military marines."

The doctrine set forth in the above extracts clearly and incontrovertibly establish the claim of the Stonewall to the right and title of a Confederate man-of-war. This claim was immediately recognized by the Government at Madrid, so soon as counter representation was presented, and that international comity usually extended to belligerents was not denied the Stonewall. Neither was it withheld from the powerful man-of-war "Niagara," for she too had put into Ferrol, not "crippled" nor in want of repairs, but simply to pay a visit, to enjoy the hospitalities of the port, or, as was said, to look after the Stonewall. On the same errand arrived the man-of-war steamer "Sacramento" in the port of Corunna, situated in the same crescent of the coast and distant from the entrances to Ferrol only a few miles; so near that the departure of a vessel from the latter would be seen from the former.

The telegraph wires had been brought into requisition, and these two powerful men-of-war summoned to seek out and arrest the mad career of this "rebel rover." They *found* her, but what then? If actuated simply by curiosity to see and learn something of this novel specimen of naval architecture, their subsequent course would indicate that they had become perfectly satisfied. The Niagara,

after remaining a day or two in Ferrol, got under way and proceeded to Corunna, where both she and the Sacramento remained until after the departure of the Stonewall. This was assumed as *prima facie* evidence that they designed to attack the Stonewall immediately on her leaving Ferrol and having got beyond Spanish jurisdiction. Had the Niagara remained in Ferrol, she could not, under the international rule, have sailed until the lapse of twenty-four hours after the sailing of the Stonewall; but from Corunna she could have sailed on the same day and hour, for every movement of this little vessel was promptly telegraphed to the Niagara.

That this procedure is inadmissible in public law is clearly laid down by publicists, and that the international hospitality of the port of Corunna was in this instance violated is clearly deducible from the recognized doctrine as to the treatment of belligerents in neutral ports. It cannot be doubted that the Niagara and Sacramento, while lying in the port of Corunna, were making that neutral port a "base of naval operations"—a point of departure—where they lay in wait for and whence they designed to issue and attack the Stonewall on her going to sea. This is clearly prohibited to belligerents, and a violation of the hospitalities usually extended by the neutral power to the vessel in distress. These two men-of-war had not "put into port" wanting either repairs or provisions. A striking instance of the argument of "*meum and tuum*" is here illustrated. It was urged upon the Government at Madrid to eject the Stonewall from the port of Ferrol without repairs, without coal or provisions; while the Niagara and Sacramento, wanting neither, were not only to enjoy the hospitalities of the very near port, but be permitted to make that port a "base of naval operations." It seemed, however, that the "bases" was not suited to the "operations" for which these vessels had been summoned.

The repairs had been finally completed, the Stonewall "stripped" to lower-masts and "standing rigging," in order that neither spars nor running rigging, if shot away, should entangle her propellers—when the commanding officer called to make his acknowledgments to the Captain-General and others, for the hospitalities extended in the work of making her again seaworthy. It was kindly suggested, in view of the great odds against her, that the Stonewall should avail herself of the obscurity of the night to make her escape from the superior force supposed to be lying in wait in Corunna. The suggestion was the prompting of gallant, generous spirits, who inva-



riably sympathize with the weaker party in all conflicts. It was gratefully acknowledged, but the Stonewall had been built to fight, not to run—especially in this case, where the pursuer would have the speed of two to one of the pursued. Her boats, save one at the stern, had been sent on shore, lest they should obstruct the free use of the after-guns in time of action, for if sunk or captured the boats of her *kind friends* would be amply sufficient to rescue from a watery grave those who might be on the surface. The gallant spirits on board of the Stonewall were not dismayed in the face of this superior force; but trusting in the Omnipotent Ruler, and in the justice of the cause represented by that emblem at the “peak,” they were of one mind to do their duty. The small sum of Government money on hand was sent on shore, and the officers sent, each one, his watch—a memento of his last gallant deeds—to some dear relative.

One bright spring morning, after the men had broken their fast, the Stonewall “put to sea,” to face the momentous ordeal awaiting her, as it was supposed. She was followed by a very imposing Spanish frigate, whose object—doubtless coupled with a little curiosity to witness a fight—was to see that in the impending conflict between the belligerents there should be no violation of Spanish territory. A few minutes only served to put them both in blue water. Doubtless the anticipations of the frigate’s officers were wrought to the highest pitch of interesting excitement; but they were destined to disappointment. When the Stonewall had passed beyond the “marine league” from the Spanish coast, the frigate fired a gun, from which the inference was that she had got beyond Spanish jurisdiction. Assuming an imaginary line between the headlands of the crescent-formed coast, the Stonewall “stood” on that line, to and fro, taking care not to approach either headland within three marine miles. The Niagara and Sacramento, lying in Corunna, were plainly in sight, with “steam up” and issuing from the steam pipe.

The sloping sides of the mountains, both north and south, presented a beautiful panoramic spectacle. Curiosity had led thousands of persons from both Corunna and Ferrol, as on some gala occasion, to assemble on these mountain slopes to witness the anticipated conflict; but they, too, were destined to disappointment, and as the day waned, convinced that no performance would come off, they retired to their homes, as it was reported, giving vent to their feelings in no measured terms, against those actors who were



to come from Corunna and without whom there could be no performance.

The dinner hour of the crew had come, while the Stonewall "stood" on the line she had taken back and forth, her screws slowly revolving, seeming to think there was a screw loose in Corunna. The men had been at "quarters"—that is, at their several stations in time of action—for some hours since an early breakfast, sitting, standing, walking by the side of their respective guns, chatting in low tones among themselves as cheerfully as though they were going into some home port. They ate their dinner at "quarters," for the distance between the Stonewall and her anxiously *looked for friends* from Corunna was too short to admit of the usual formalities of a set dinner. They imagined that after the settlement of the "slight unpleasantness," should any of them happen to "turn up" alive, they would be invited to a more formal dinner on board of the Niagara or Sacramento.

Thus passed the day, in hopeless anticipation. The spectators on the mountain side had disappeared, and the Spanish frigate, seeing there would be no violation to Her Majesty's territory, had returned to Ferrol, while the Stonewall, at the close of the day, abandoning all hopes of meeting her fellow-travelers of the sea, for they evidently desired none of her company, stood on her course for Lisbon. It became necessary to "put into" this port, though so near, because the Stonewall had taken on board in Ferrol only a limited quantity of coals. This was done in order to enable her to carry the "bow gun" as high as possible above the sea, and thereby be more efficient. She conceived the chances of victory greatly against her, and that she would not require coals if captured or sent to the bottom.

Arrived in Lisbon, and while in the act of taking on board a supply of coals, the Stonewall was honored with an official visit, the object of which was to ascertain when she was going to sea. The tone and nervous manner accompanying this inquiry were strongly indicative of an earnest desire that she should leave the port without delay. This Portuguese reception, in contrast with that of the Spanish, was very striking. The official was given to understand that the Stonewall had availed herself of the hospitalities of Lisbon *only* with the view of procuring coals, and that if he would kindly expedite the delivery of them on board she would hasten her departure. The truth was the authorities on shore had received information of the sailing of the Niagara and Sacramento from

Corunna, and, doubtless, the phantom of a naval engagement in the Tagus floated before their eyes. Before the setting of the sun on that mild, calm day, these two men-of-war appeared off the entrance to the port. This, in no small degree, added to the nervousness on shore. It had certainly the appearance, if not confirmation strong, of a pursuit, and seemed as though these vessels had not seen enough of the Stonewall. But this idea was dispelled by their coming into the port and anchoring. By so doing they subjected themselves to the international rule—prohibiting them from leaving the port until the lapse of twenty-four hours after the departure of the Stonewall. The weather was good, the sea was smooth, and it was argued that if they desired to meet the Stonewall in action they would have remained outside. Perhaps the weather was *too* good, the sea too smooth—conditions most favorable to the Stonewall, for in a heavy sea she could not have fought her guns at all, while the Niagara could have not only fought hers, but, towering above, could have run over her, *provided* she had not run “afoul” of her most salient point, the spur at the bow. It is not, however, my purpose to express an opinion as to how the Stonewall might have been destroyed.

The coaling of the vessel was not finished until after the night had set in, when the pilot of the port refused to take her out to sea, as he did not consider it safe to attempt doing so. Although the quiet of the night, for all was calm and still, had not brought peaceful rest to the slumbers of the Lisbon officials while these belligerents lay in their port, relief came at early dawn when they saw this troublesome little craft turn her bow towards the ocean and proceed down the river. On passing the Niagara and Sacramento (they had anchored about a mile below), the commander of the Stonewall was pleased to see on the “quarter-deck” of the Niagara his quondam shipmate and friend, bearing the rank of commodore. They had cruised in the West Indies on board of the same ship, the “old Erie,” when one was “sailing master,” the other a “green midshipman.” This midshipman, ere the end of the cruise, had seen some service, had passed some dangers during the three years spent in those boisterous latitudes. When the “Erie” was visited by that dire disease, the yellow fever, it pervaded the ship from cabin to forecastle, striking down the captain, most of the officers and forty of her crew in the course of a few days. The captain, ere he became too ill, gave this midshipman orders, with the appointment of an “acting lieutenant,” to take the ship into

Norfolk. This was safely done after a stormy passage, and anchoring off the navy hospital the sick were sent on shore. It may be asked, what this little episode has to do with the *Stonewall*? Nothing, save that this midshipman, after the lapse of years, became the commander of the craft whose short life and shortcomings are here treated of.

Taking an unceremonious leave of her *friends* lying quietly in the Tagus, for they seemed to think her unworthy their steel, the *Stonewall* stood out to sea, touched at Tanariffe, the most eligible point from which to cross the Atlantic, and filling up with coals, shaped her course so as to reach the latitude of the "trade winds" in the shortest possible time, where her sails would come into requisition. It was advisable to avail of those winds in order to economize coals, as she could not carry enough to steam the whole way across. It was also important to have enough on board for the emergency of "falling in" with any of those cruisers that it was supposed were keeping a sharp lookout for her. But the *look-out* could not have been very much on the alert, inasmuch as no man-of-war was seen throughout the entire passage to Havana, although the conclusion was inevitable that she must call either at Bermuda or Nassau to replenish her bunkers. That her departure from Lisbon was speedily made known in the United States cannot admit of a doubt. Her arrival at Ferrol had been made the subject of diplomatic correspondence with the Government at Madrid, and before her departure from Lisbon she was honored with a visit from a gentleman attached to the American Legation at Madrid, who availed himself of the privilege granted all persons wishing to visit the vessel, but omitted the observance of the usual courtesies on such occasions and presented his card at the "gang-way" from his boat, *only* when in the act of going on shore in company with many other visitors. He doubtless satisfied his curiosity, saw all that he cared to see, perhaps a little more, for there was nothing to conceal on board of the *Stonewall*, and boasted on shore of the gallantry of his conduct; though it was closely akin to that of a spy—a character recognized by the laws of war as entitled, if caught, to hanging; but the dignity of his position should have deterred him from the commission of an act of vulgarity. There was a low bravado in boasting of the accomplishment of a design in which there could be no detection, unbecoming the office he held and the gentleman he assumed to be. His acquaintance would, doubtless, have been politely acknowledged by the commanding officer, and quarters suited to his rank assigned him.



On the slow, monotonous passage across the Atlantic, nothing worthy of note occurred, save the appearance of a clipper-built bark, bound from Baltimore to Rio de Janeiro, laden with flour. She was under all sail, going rapidly through the water, with a free wind. There is but one object, either in nature or art, given to the eyes of man to behold more beautiful than the ship under "full sail." The French flag was hoisted at the "peak" of the Stonewall, and immediately the American flag was shown by the bark. When she had come within a suitable distance, the French flag was hauled down, the Confederate hoisted in its place, and a "nine-inch" shell thrown across her bow. The music of such a projectile, flying through the air with ignited fuse, is not that of the Æolian harp. With "flowing sheets," the bark "came up into wind" as gracefully as are the movements of the swan when gliding through the waters of a placid lake. Here was presented an unpleasant conflict of duty and inclination. To destroy such a craft was repulsive; and yet duty might demand it. The commander of the Stonewall would gladly avail himself of a justifiable excuse to avoid such an alternative. The captain of the bark was brought on board. His troubled appearance may be more easily imagined than described. In great anguish he declared that he had been in that trade many years, and this was the first time he had brought his wife and little daughter with him. Here was an appeal that added to the embarrassment of the situation, not easily disregarded. The Stonewall had no accommodations for such passengers, and moreover this was not the kind of game she was in pursuit of. The captain of the bark was given to understand that a bond would be required of him for the release of his vessel, and that he should assure his owners they were indebted solely to his wife and daughter for the rescue of their vessel and cargo from the flames. A heavier oppression was never lifted from the human breast, and his countenance beamed with all the kindly feelings the human heart is susceptible of. He begged that he might be allowed to present to the Stonewall some of the luxuries with which his pantry was supplied. His offer was gratefully acknowledged, but declined. The bark went on her way rejoicing, and the Stonewall pursued her course to Nassau, a convenient port at which to procure coals.

She did not enter the harbor, but received the coals outside—an unpleasant indication, for there were rumors on shore, though not authentic, which made the Stonewall an unwelcome visitor. She



was permitted to take on board coals sufficient for the passage to Havana.

Arrived at Havana, the usual visits of ceremony made, the vessel was admitted to the customary hospitalities of the port, with no limitation as to the time she would be permitted to remain. Mark the difference of the Stonewall's reception here and that at Nassau! The sad intelligence here received, which I need not describe, was not to be questioned, and the feelings of both officers and men may be imagined, but not expressed.

The little craft that had so bravely breasted the storms of tempestuous seas, to do her duty in a holy cause, found herself a useless hulk, an incumbrance.

The political state of affairs in the Confederacy had not been as yet officially announced to the authorities of Cuba. When that shall have been done, the Stonewall would no longer be entitled to the flag she so proudly bore off Ferrol.

Negotiations were entered into with the authorities of Havana, which resulted in the acceptance of the Stonewall as a present, subject to the decision of the Queen of Spain. By the terms of the agreement, there was advanced to the Stonewall the sum of \$16,000 in order to pay the officers and crew what was due them, as set forth in the books of the paymaster. A much larger sum would have been advanced, and was suggested, but her commander was in honor bound to the crew for the payment of what was due them—the vessel being fully responsible—and he would receive nothing more.

An Admiral, with his attendant staff of officers, came on board to formally receive the Stonewall. The delicacy and courtesy of this distinguished officer on this occasion will ever be remembered. He appreciated the painful position of the commanding officer, and before proceeding to the details involved, remarked to him, "My barge is at your service, and Captain —— will attend you to the arsenal, and thence to your quarters on shore." Officials of some governments would have avoided a Confederate officer at that time as they would have done a contagious pestilence. Captain —— performed the duty assigned him with all that courtesy for which the Spanish race has ever been pre-eminently distinguished.

Thus terminated the career of the Stonewall under the Confederate flag.

What was her ultimate fate? It is said she came into the possession of the United States Government, was sold to the Japanese Government, and was wrecked during a severe typhoon while lying at anchor.

It may be proper to mention, as a pertinent episode in the last days of the Stonewall, that among the arrivals which soon followed her into Havana was an imposing looking American man-of-war steamer. She anchored only a very short distance off. One morning a letter was handed to the commander of the Stonewall, which bore the signature of an old acquaintance—the captain of the man-of-war close by. The purport of this communication was suggesting the propriety of a surrender of the Stonewall to him. Its receipt was promptly acknowledged, and although its kind suggestions were fully appreciated, they were politely declined.

The Stonewall was in a position to present herself to the Captain-General, or, through him, to the Queen of Spain; but she was not the craft to surrender on demand or solicitation.

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#### **Report of Brigadier-General Wilcox of the Battle of Gettysburg.**

HEADQUARTERS WILCOX'S BRIGADE,  
BUNKER HILL, VA., July 17, 1863.

Major THOMAS S. MILLS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Sir—I respectfully submit the operations of my brigade in the recent engagements with the enemy near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in the following report:

The division having encamped for three days at Fayetteville, on the morning of July 1st moved forward on the Chambersburg and Gettysburg turnpike; at two and a half P. M. came within sight and hearing of a distant artillery fire between our own and the enemy's forces near the latter place.

The division filed off to the right of the road and halted in the woods for an hour; then, resuming the march towards Gettysburg, one and a half miles, my brigade filed off to the right of the road in a perpendicular direction, and marched in this direction near one mile; and being joined by a battery of artillery, the command halted and remained here during the night on picket, beyond and to the rear and at right angles to the right flank of the remainder of the division in line in front.

At 7 A. M. the following morning the brigade rejoined the division, then in front, and advanced, bearing to the right for the purpose of taking position in line of battle—the Major-General Commanding indicated to me the position to be occupied by my brigade.

The right of my line, as thus directed, was thrown forward, resting against a heavy and thick woods, and ran thence back obliquely to the rear across an open field, terminating at a stone fence, one hundred yards from the right of Perry's brigade—the ground occupied by the left of my line being lower than the right, and ascending slightly in the latter direction.

In front of my line in the open fields were several farm houses, with barns, orchards, and the usual enclosures. The enemy's pickets were seen about these, and some six or seven hundred yards distant.

Not knowing whether the woods, against which the right of my line was to rest, was occupied by the enemy, the Tenth Alabama regiment (Colonel Forney) was ordered to occupy the woods, and the Eleventh Alabama regiment (Colonel Sanders) formed in line in the open field to the left of the Tenth.

The regiments, being preceded by skirmishers, were ordered to advance—the Eleventh to its position in line in rear of a fence, and the Tenth to keep on a line with the Eleventh, to protect it from the enemy's fire, should he be found in the woods—the remaining regiments being held in rear till it should be ascertained if the enemy were in the woods.

The Eleventh advanced more easily than the Tenth, being in the open field. Having moved forward about three hundred yards, this regiment received a heavy volley of musketry on its right flank and rear from the enemy, concealed behind ledges of rock and trees in the woods on its right. The Tenth Alabama moved forward promptly, and soon encountered a strong line of skirmishers. These were driven back upon their supports—two regiments of infantry—the Third Maine and the First New York sharpshooters.

A spirited musketry fight ensued between the Tenth Alabama and these two Federal regiments; and having continued for some ten or fifteen minutes, Colonel Forney gave the command to charge, and led his regiment in person. This broke the enemy's line, and they fled precipitately from the woods, leaving twenty or twenty-five *dead* men, and *twice* that number *wounded* and *prisoners*. In this affair, so creditable to the Tenth Alabama and its gallant colonel, this regiment lost *ten* killed and twenty-eight wounded; in the Eleventh Alabama one officer, Major Fletcher, severely wounded, and *seventeen men wounded*—six or eight *severely*.

The brigade now (nine A. M.) took its position in line of battle

on the right of the division, and the extreme right of the army at this time. The Tenth Alabama occupied the woods to the right, and at right angles to the remainder of my line for the safety of my right flank.

From this till two P. M. nothing occurred, save desultory firing between skirmishers. About this time troops were seen filing past my right flank, and soon McLaws' division was formed in line at right angles to my line, Barksdale's brigade being near mine. McLaws' troops formed in line across a road running parallel to my front, and into the Emmetsburg road five hundred yards in his front; from this intersection the road continued on to Gettysburg in a direction parallel to the front of Anderson's division. McLaws' troops had not been in position long when the enemy opened fire upon them from two batteries in the open field in front.

A battery was placed in position in the edge of the woods occupied by the Tenth Alabama regiment and responded to this fire; other batteries were soon placed in position further to our right on McLaws' front. Other and more distant batteries of the enemy to my left and front engaged in this artillery fight. This cannonading continued until 6.20 P. M., when McLaws' troops advanced to the attack.

My instructions were to advance when the troops on my right should advance, and to report this to the division commander in order that the other brigades should advance in proper time. In order that I should advance with those on my right, it became necessary for me to move off by the left flank, so as to uncover the ground over which they had to advance. This was done as rapidly as the nature of the ground, with its opposing obstacles, stone and plank fences, would admit. Having gained four hundred or five hundred yards to the left by this flank movement, my command faced by the right flank and advanced. This forward movement was made in an open field, the ground rising slightly to the Emmetsburg turnpike, two hundred and fifty yards distant.

Before reaching this road, a line of the enemy's skirmishers along a fence parallel to the road were encountered and dispersed. The fence being crossed, my men advanced to the road in which infantry in line of battle were formed. A brisk musketry fight for a few minutes followed, when the enemy gave way; not, however, till all save two pieces of a battery that was in the road had been removed. These fell into our hands, the horses having been killed.

On the far side of the pike the ground was descending for some



six hundred or seven hundred yards; at the bottom of this descent was a narrow valley, through which ran a rocky ravine or stream fringed with small trees and undergrowth of bushes. Beyond this the ground rose rapidly for some two hundred yards, and upon this ridge were numerous batteries of the enemy. This ridge to my right rose into a succession of higher ridges or spurs of mountains, increasing in height to the right, but to the left gradually descending.

When my command crossed the pike and began to descend the slope, they were exposed to an artillery fire from numerous pieces, both from the front and from either flank. Before reaching the ravine at the foot of the slope, two lines of infantry were met and broken and driven pell-mell across the ravine. A second battery of six pieces here fell into our hands. From the batteries on the ridge above referred to, grape and cannister were poured into our ranks. This stronghold of the enemy, together with his batteries, was almost won, when still another line of infantry descended the slope in our front at a double quick to the support of their fleeing comrades and for the defence of the batteries. Seeing this contest so unequal, I dispatched my Adjutant-General to the division commander to ask that support be sent to my men, but no support came.

Three several times did this last of the enemy's lines attempt to drive my men back, and were as often repulsed. The struggle at the foot of the hill, on which were the enemy's batteries, though so unequal, was continued for some thirty minutes. With a second supporting line the heights could have been carried. Without support on either my right or left, my men were withdrawn to prevent their entire destruction or capture. The enemy did not pursue, but my men retired under a heavy artillery fire and returned to their original position in line and bivouacked for the night, pickets being left on the pike.

Thus ended the engagement of the 2d instant. Two guns, with their caissons, were taken on the turnpike; six guns were taken three hundred or four hundred yards beyond the road; one line of infantry was broken and dispersed at the road; two other lines were also broken and thrown back before reaching the foot of the hill; a line which descended the hill on which their rear-most line of batteries were posted, was repulsed several times in their efforts to drive my men back; many of the enemy were killed and wounded, and about *one hundred* prisoners taken.

In the engagement of this day I regret to report a loss of *five hundred and seventy-seven killed, wounded and missing*. Among the seriously wounded and known to be in the hands of the enemy, I may mention Colonel Forney, Tenth Alabama regiment. This officer, not yet well of a wound received at Williamsburg, received a flesh wound in the arm and chest while charging a line of the enemy on the turnpike, but he still pressed onward and soon his right arm was shattered. He yet refused to quit the field and fell with a wound in the foot, in the ravine near the rear-most lines of the enemy. Colonel Pinckard, Fourteenth Alabama, had rejoined his regiment but two days before this battle, having been absent by reason of a severe wound received at Salem church, had his left arm badly broken; Captain Smith, Ninth Alabama, severe wound through the body (entitled to the promotion of lieutenant-colonel); Captain Brandigan, Eighth Alabama, leg broken. These four were left, not being able to bear transportation.

Colonel Sanders, Eleventh Alabama, and Major Fletcher, of same regiment, each received severe wounds. Captain King, Ninth Alabama (entitled to promotion of colonel), had a finger shot off.

It will be seen that of *five* of my regimental commanders *four* were wounded in this first day's battle. Of my two couriers, one—Private Ridgeway, Eleventh Alabama regiment—was killed, and the other—Private Brundridge, Ninth Alabama—severely wounded.

The conduct of my men and officers was in all respects creditable.

After the wounding of four regimental commanders, the other officers who succeeded to command acted with great gallantry and energy. Among these I may mention Lieutenant-Colonel Tayloe, of the Eleventh Alabama regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Shelley, of the Tenth Alabama, and Lieutenant-Colonel Broome, Fourteenth Alabama.

With reference to the action of the 3d instant, I beg to report that early in the morning, before sunrise, the brigade was ordered out to support artillery under the command of Colonel Alexander—this artillery being placed along the Emmetsburg turnpike and on ground won from the enemy the day before. My men had had nothing to eat since the morning of the 2d, and had confronted and endured the dangers and fatigues of that day; they nevertheless moved to the front to the support of the artillery, as ordered.

The brigade was formed in line parallel to the Emmetsburg turnpike and about two hundred yards from it—artillery being in

front, much of it on the road, and extending far beyond either flank of the brigade.

My men occupied this position till about 3.20 P. M. Our artillery opened fire upon the enemy's artillery and upon ground supposed to be occupied by his infantry. This fire was responded to promptly by the enemy's artillery, and continued with the greatest vivacity on either side for *one hour*. In no previous battle of the war had we so much artillery engaged, and the enemy seemed not to be inferior in quantity.

During all this fire my men were exposed to the solid shot and shell of the enemy, but suffered comparatively little, probably less than a dozen men being killed and wounded. The brigade (Kemper's) lying on my right suffered severely. Our artillery ceased to fire after about one hour; the enemy continued to fire for awhile after ours had ceased. I do not believe a single battery of the enemy had been disabled so as to stop its fire.

Pickett's division now advanced and other brigades on his left. As soon as these troops rose to advance, the hostile artillery opened upon them. These brave men (Pickett's) nevertheless moved on, and, as far as I saw, without wavering.

The enemy's artillery opposed them on both flanks and directly in front, and every variety of artillery missile was thrown into their ranks. The advance had not been made more than twenty or thirty minutes before three staff officers, in quick succession (one from the Major-General Commanding division), gave me orders to move to the support of Pickett's division.

My brigade, about twelve hundred in number, then moved forward in the following order from right to left: Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Eighth and Fourteenth Alabama regiments. As they advanced, they changed direction slightly to the left so as to cover in part the ground over which Pickett's division had moved. As they came in view on the turnpike, all of the enemy's terrible artillery (that could bear on them) was concentrated upon them from both flanks and directly in front, and more than on the evening previous.

Not a man of the division that I was ordered to support could I see, but as my orders were to go to the support, on my men went down the slope until they came near the hill upon which were the enemy's batteries and entrenchments. Here they were exposed to a close and terrible fire of artillery. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were seen moving by the flank towards the rear of my left.

I ordered my men to hold their ground until I could get artillery to fire upon them. I then rode back rapidly to our artillery, but could find none near that had any ammunition. After some little delay, not getting any artillery to fire upon the enemy's infantry that were on my left flank, and seeing none of the troops that I was ordered to support, and knowing that my small force could do nothing save to make a useless sacrifice of themselves, I ordered them back. The enemy did not pursue. My men, as on the day before, had to retire under a heavy artillery fire. My line was reformed on the ground they occupied before they advanced.

The casualties of the brigade on this day amounted to *two hundred and four killed, wounded and missing*. In the engagement of the 2d instant, my command inflicted severe loss upon the enemy; three of his infantry lines were broken and driven from the field; a fourth line was repulsed several times in their efforts to drive my men back. In the second day's (3d instant) engagement, none of the enemy's infantry were encountered in the open field. It was not until my brigade had reached the ravine, beyond which was the ridge on which were the enemy's rifle pits and batteries, that they met infantry, and here they were engaged but for a few minutes, without probably inflicting much, if any loss, upon their infantry. This day my men acted with their usual gallantry, though they accomplished but little. The regimental commanders were active and zealous in commanding and directing their men.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, of the Eighth; Lieutenant-Colonel Shelley, of the Tenth; Lieutenant-Colonel Tayloe, of the Eleventh, and Captain King, are all deserving of especial praise—the latter had lost a finger the day before. Captain May, Ninth Alabama, had also been wounded on the 2d, but remained with his company during the battle of the 3d. There were many acts of personal gallantry among both men and officers during the two days' battle.

The entire loss of the two days' battle was *seven hundred and seventy-seven killed, wounded and missing*. Of this number *two hundred and fifty* are missing, of whom *fourteen* are officers. Of this number nearly all are supposed to be killed or wounded. Most of the field upon which the brigade fought remained both nights in the possession of the enemy. It is believed that few, if any, not wounded, were taken prisoners.

To my staff, Captain W. E. Winn, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Lindsay, Aid-de-Camp, I am indebted for valuable services rendered on the field during both days, their duties fre-



quently requiring them to be under the severest musketry firing. The former was bruised by the explosion of a shell near him on the second day and thrown from his horse by it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. M. WILCOX,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding, &c.*

Two men, one of the Eighth and the other of the Tenth Alabama regiment, were wounded on the 12th instant near Saint James College, Maryland, thus making my loss *seven hundred and seventy-nine* while beyond the Potomac.

C. M. WILCOX, *Brigadier-General.*

**Confederate Losses During the War—Correspondence between Dr. Joseph Jones and General Samuel Cooper.**

The following correspondence explains itself. Dr. Joseph Jones, the first Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, is distinguished for his pains-taking research as well as for his high scientific attainments.

General Cooper, the able and efficient Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Confederacy, was, of course, very high authority on the questions discussed in this correspondence. It is a sad reflection that the General was not spared until the more liberal policy, which now prevails at the War Department, would have allowed him to inspect the records of his old office. Those records *will be* thoroughly sifted, and the story they tell given to the world; but in the meantime the carefully collated figures of this correspondence will be of interest and value.

NEW ORLEANS, August 2d, 1869.

General S. COOPER, *Alexandria, Virginia:*

Dear Sir—You will please excuse the liberty which I take in trespassing upon your valuable time.

I have recently been preparing for the Southern Historical Society a paper upon the losses of the Confederate army from battle, wounds and disease during the civil war of 1861–5.

The following general results of my investigation are most respectfully submitted to you for examination and criticism:

*Killed, Wounded and Prisoners of the Confederate Army during the War of 1861-5.*

YEAR.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	PRISONERS.
1861.....	1,315	4 054	2,772
1862.....	18,582	68,659	48,300
1863.....	11,876	51,313	71,211
1864... } 1865... }	22,000	70,000	80,000
Total.....	53,773	194,026	202,283

If the deaths from disease be added the sum total will represent the entire loss. The returns of the field and general hospitals are known for 1861 and 1862.

Confederates killed in battle, 1861-2,	-	-	19,897
Deaths caused by wounds in field hospital,	-	-	1,623
Deaths caused by wounds in general hospital,	-	-	2,618
Deaths caused by disease in field hospital,	-	-	14,597
Deaths caused by disease in general hospital,	-	-	16,741
Total deaths in the Confederate States army, 1861-2,	-	-	55,476
Total wounded in Confederate States army, 1861-2,	-	-	72,713
Total prisoners in Confederate States army, 1861-2,	-	-	51,072
Total discharged in Confederate States army, 1861-2,	-	-	16,940
Total wounded, prisoners and discharged, 1861-2,	-	-	140,725

If it be fair to assume that the total mortality of 1863-1864, was fully equal to that of 1862, then the total deaths in the Confederate army, 1861-5, was at least 160,000, exclusive of the deaths in the Northern prisons, which would swell the number to near 185,000; and if the deaths amongst the discharged for wounds and disease and amongst the sick and wounded on furlough be added, the grand total of deaths in the Confederate army during the entire war did not fall far short of 200,000. According to this calculation, the deaths from disease were about three times as numerous as those resulting from the casualties of battle.

The available Confederate force capable of active service in the field did not during the entire war exceed six hundred thousand (600,000) men. Of this number, not more than four hundred thousand (400,000) were enrolled at any one time; and the Confederate States never had in the field more than two hundred thousand (200,000) men capable of bearing arms at any one time, exclusive of sick, wounded and disabled. If the preceding calculation be correct, we have the following figures illustrating the losses of the Confederate armies during the war:

Confederate forces actively engaged, 1861-5, 600,000. Total deaths in Confederate States army, 200,000. Losses of Confederate States army in prisoners, 1861-5, which may be considered as total losses, on account of the policy of exchange by United States, 200,000. Losses of Confederate States army by discharges, disability and desertion, 100,000.

If this calculation, which is given only as an approximation, be correct, one-third of all the men actively engaged on the Confederate side were either killed outright upon the field, or died of disease and wounds; another third of the entire number were captured and held for an indefinite period in Northern prisons, and of the remaining two hundred thousand at least one-half were lost to the service by discharges and desertions.

At the close of the war the available force of the Confederate States numbered scarcely *one hundred thousand effective men*. The resolution, unsurpassed bravery and skill with which the Confederate leaders conducted this contest is shown by the fact that, out of 600,000 men in the field, about 500,000 were lost to the service.

At the close of the war the 100,000 Confederates were opposed to one million (1,000,000) Federal troops. Your approval or disapproval of this calculation is most respectfully solicited.

The distinguished ability with which you discharged the responsible and arduous duties of Adjutant-General of the Confederate army, qualifies you above every other officer of the late Confederate States to decide how far such calculations may approach to accuracy.

With great respect and the highest esteem,

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH JONES, M. D.,

*Secretary and Treasurer Southern Historical Society, Professor of Chemistry,  
Medical Department, University of Louisiana.*

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NEAR ALEXANDRIA, VA., August 29th, 1869.

Dr. JOSEPH JONES, *Secretary and Treasurer "Southern Historical Society,"  
New Orleans, Louisiana:*

Dear Sir—I have had the honor to receive your kind and interesting letter of the 2d instant and beg you will accept my best thanks for same.

I have closely examined your several statements in respect to the Confederate military forces during the late war, as well as the casualties incident thereto, and I have come to the conclusion, from my general recollection, which those statements have served to enlighten, that they must be regarded as nearly critically correct.

Most of the returns from which you most probably have derived your information, must have passed through the files of my office in the Confederacy, and if reference could be made to all the records of that office, they would, I have no doubt, enable you to give nearly a complete history of the strength and operations of our armies in detail.

The files of that office which could best afford this information were carefully boxed up and taken on our retreat from Richmond to Charlotte, North Carolina, where they were unfortunately captured, and, as I learn, are now in Washington, where they are arranged in a separate building, with other records appertaining to the Confederacy. I presume that by proper management reference might be had to them. Indeed, I had at one time contemplated to make an effort to renew my acquaintance with those records by a personal application to the authorities in Washington; but I finally abandoned the idea. . . \* . . It would afford me much pleasure to furnish you with the information in the tabular form you have suggested, but it would be quite impossible for me to do this without reference to those records. I can only state from general recollection that during the two last years of the war the monthly returns of our armies received at my office exhibited the present active force in the field nearly one-half less than the returns themselves actually called for, on account of absentees by sickness, extra duty, furlough, desertions, and other casualties incident to a campaign life.

These returns were kept with great secrecy, in order to prevent the enemy from becoming acquainted with our weakness. Another disadvantage was also felt in the limited number of our suitable weapons of war, and I believe it will be found on examination that the most approved and tried arms in the hands of our troops were captured from the enemy in battle. These, and many other incidents of a like nature, if brought to light, would exhibit the greatest disparity between the two opposing forces, if not in the numbers of troops, as you have exhibited in your tables, at least of sufficient importance to satisfy every unprejudiced mind that we were constantly laboring, throughout the contest, under every possible disadvantage.

I perceive by the printed prospectus of the "Southern Historical Society," which you were so kind as to send me, that time must be given in collecting the necessary facts which are to be the basis of this important work before it shall be prepared and given to the public. To this end it will be my endeavor to contribute from time to time such facts as I may be enabled to collect and as may be deemed of consequence by the Society.

With great respect, I have the honor to be,  
Your obedient servant,

S. COOPER.



## Correspondence Concerning the Campaign of 1864.

So many of the official reports, letters, telegrams, &c., concerning Lee's masterly campaign of 1864 were destroyed, that the records of that year are very imperfect, and even fragments are of great value. We shall, therefore, continue from time to time to give such letters, reports, telegrams, &c., as we have or may be able to procure. The following have never been published, and are worthy of going into the record:

*Letter from General Wade Hampton.*

SETH CAMPBELL'S, May 21st, 1864—9.30 P. M.

To Major-General BRECKINRIDGE:

General—I met the enemy near Wright's tavern, two and one half miles from Milford, where they showed themselves in some force. I think about five regiments were seen. At the Poorhouse I drove them back, but they are still on this side of the river. I shall occupy the road from Milford to the Junction to-night, and will advise you of any movement. General ——— is near Panola, his left resting on this road. Scouts just in say that only *six* of Sheridan's men crossed the Pamunkey, and that they went to Fredericksburg. The raiding party who burned Hanover Courthouse went down towards Charles City. This party between here and Milford could be cut off, unless they are much larger than I suppose. I am sure that I could burn the bridge behind them, and an attack in front would destroy them. Could you send any more troops up to effect this? I know this county thoroughly, and I think that a good blow might be struck. I shall be here to-night. If any of the cavalry come to the Junction, let them know that I am here.

Yours, very respectfully,

WADE HAMPTON, *Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS LONGSTREET'S CORPS,  
8 P. M.—May 30, 1864.

Major-General J. A. EARLY, *Commanding Second Corps:*

General—General *Field* reports having come upon an entrenched line of the enemy, and owing to that circumstance, and the approach of darkness, I have suspended his movement and have drawn my whole line back to the left again, so as to connect with General *Breckinridge*, between whom and the left of my line a very wide gap had been made.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. ANDERSON, *Major-General.*

*Letter from General R. E. Lee.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
2d June, 1864—8 P. M.

Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR, *Richmond, Va. :*

Sir—Yesterday afternoon the enemy's cavalry were reported to be advancing by the left of our line toward Hanover Courthouse and Ashland. General Hampton, with Rosser's brigade, proceeded to meet them. Rosser fell upon their rear, charged down the road towards Ashland, bearing every thing before him. His progress was arrested at Ashland by the entrenchments of the enemy, when he changed his direction, and advanced up the Fredericksburg railroad.

General W. H. F. Lee came up at this time with a part of his division, and a joint attack was made. The enemy was quickly driven from the place and pursued toward Hanover Courthouse till dark.

During the afternoon, General Fitz. Lee was forced to retire from Old Cold Harbor, on our extreme right, and as it was evident that the enemy was moving in that direction, our own line was extended accordingly—General Hoke occupying the extreme right.

The enemy attacked in heavy force and succeeded in penetrating between Hoke and Anderson, where there was an interval in our line, causing the right of Anderson and the left of Hoke to fall back a short distance. General Hoke subsequently recovered his position, and General Anderson's right assumed one a short distance in rear of that it first occupied.

This morning the enemy's movement to our right continuing, corresponding changes were made in our line, Breckinridge's command and two divisions of General Hill being placed on the right. General Early, with Ewell's corps and Heth's division, occupied our left, and was directed to endeavor to get upon the enemy's right flank and drive down in front of our line. General Early made the movement in the afternoon, and drove the enemy from his entrenchments, following him until dark. While this attack was progressing, General Hill reinforced Breckinridge with two brigades of Wilcox's division, and dislodged the enemy from Turkey Hill, in front of our extreme right.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Official : C. MARSHALL,

*Lieutenant-Colonel and Aid-de-Camp.*

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## Official Correspondence of Confederate State Department.

[CONTINUED].

*Letters from Honorable J. P. Holcombe.*

MONTREAL, June 16, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A.*:

Sir—I have very little to communicate since my last dispatch. Some ten or twelve more men have been sent on to take the boat which leaves for Bermuda next week. It is apparent, from all the information I receive, that very few remain who are willing to return at once to the discharge of their duty. There will, however, always during the existence of the war be small parties to be forwarded who have escaped into Canada and who are anxious to rejoin the army. As these will generally consist of brave and enterprising men, I am trying to make some permanent arrangement to furnish them in the most economical way with the necessary means. For this purpose I propose to leave as much as five thousand dollars in the hands of B. Weir & Co., to carry interest until used, to defray these expenses; and to employ discreet and responsible persons in Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Saint Catherine, Windsor, and other points likely to be reached by our men, whose interest in the cause will induce them to take the requisite precautions to prevent imposition and to advance the price of transportation until reimbursed by Mr. Weir. Experience has shown us that our escaped prisoners are too improvident in general to be entrusted with money, and I am organizing a system by which tickets for transportation and necessary board to Halifax can be furnished them by our agents. The isolation, both commercial and political, of these Provinces, and the number of distinct lines over which the men must be passed, render this a tedious and somewhat troublesome task. As soon as it has been accomplished I shall return via Bermuda to the Confederacy.

I have the honor, &amp;c.,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

CLIFTON HOUSE, NIAGARA FALLS, C. W., August 11, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, C. S. A.*:

Sir—Since my last dispatch I have visited all the points in Canada at which it was probable any escaped prisoners could be

found. I have circulated as widely as possible the information that all who desired to return to the discharge of their duty could obtain transportation to their respective commands within the Confederacy. For this purpose I have made arrangements with reliable gentlemen at Windsor, Niagara, Toronto and Montreal to forward such, as from time to time may require this assistance, as far as Halifax, from which point they will be sent by Messrs. Weir & Co. to Bermuda. The system thus organized will provide for the return of any ordinary average of escaped prisoners. If, however, any contingency should lead to the accumulation of a large number in Canada, some special arrangement, like that contemplated when I left Richmond, would be required. As events (to which it is scarcely prudent to refer) may soon transpire which would render this contingency by no means remote or improbable, I have deemed it my duty to defer my departure for a time. I feel the more confidence in my judgment from the fact that it has the concurrence of Messrs. Clay and Thompson. I have availed myself of the interim of every opportunity to co-operate with those gentlemen and think that I have been able to render useful service. My present expectation is to return in September.

A distinct communication from Mr. Clay and myself is sent by this mail.

With the highest respect, &c.,

JAMES P. HOLCOMBE.

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**Some Corrections of Sherman's Memoirs.**

By Colonel A. R. CHISOLM, of General Beauregard's staff.

NEW YORK, May 6th, 1879.

*To the Editor of the Southern Historical Society Papers :*

Dear Sir—Having recently had occasion to read General Sherman's Memoirs, together with his evidence before the Committee upon the Conduct of the War, I feel called upon to make a record in your valuable pages of my personal knowledge of certain important historical transactions of which General Sherman has spoken and written at length—giving a version, as I am sure, contrary to the truth of history.

As a point in military history, it is deserving of particular attention that at Savannah—the end of his “march to the sea”—General Sherman lost an easy and brilliant opportunity of capturing Hardee's entire command of about 10,000 men, with that city. He writes (“Memoirs,” page 284) that General Slocum “wanted to transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank” of the Savannah river, the object being to cut off Hardee's retreat! At this time Hardee's only line of retreat was by Screven's Ferry to a causeway on the South Carolina bank; he was without pontoon bridge or other means of getting away, relying only on three very small steamboats; and the only troops he had on the Carolina bank were a small force of light artillery and Ferguson's brigade of Wheeler's cavalry, numbering not more than 1,000 men. At this time General Beauregard's “Military Division of the West” embraced the department of Lieutenant-Generals Hood and Taylor, but not that of Lieutenant-General Hardee, although he had authority to bring the latter within his command, either at Hardee's request or at his own discretion in an emergency. He had arrived in Charleston, therefore, on December 7th, with a view of saving and concentrating the scattered Confederate forces in that region for some effective action against Sherman.

He telegraphed Hardee (December 8th), advising him to hold Savannah as long as practicable, but under no circumstance to risk the garrison, and to be ready for withdrawal to a junction with Major-General Samuel Jones at Pocotaligo, South Carolina. At Hardee's urgent request, Beauregard went to Savannah on the morning of the 9th. Finding no means prepared for the contingency of evacuation, he directed the immediate construction of a

pontoon bridge, with the plantation rice flats for pontoons, moored by old guns and car-wheels for anchors, and covered with flooring supplied by pulling down the wharves and wooden buildings. After giving a letter of instruction as to the plan of operations, indicating the contingency under which the movement should begin, he returned to Charleston. Instructions were also given for the most feasible defence of the causeway and road from Screven's Ferry. On the 14th Hardee telegraphed the General, stating the enemy's movements, his own doubts, and his desire in the emergency to have orders; and on the 15th he again telegraphed, urging the General to return and determine on the ground the actual time for the movement of evacuation and junction with Jones. Beauregard (whom I accompanied) arrived again in Savannah on the night of the 16th, after running the gauntlet of Foster's batteries near Pocotaligo, in a wagon, so as to save the railroad from obstruction by an unlucky shot at his train, and making, by like conveyances, the distance along which the railroad had been broken by Sherman near Savannah. He found the pontoon bridge only about one-third constructed, some of Wheeler's cavalry having destroyed a number of rice flats collected, supposing they had been gathered by Sherman for the crossing of the river. But the work was prosecuted with such vigor by Chief Engineer (Colonel) John G. Clarke, in person, that by daylight of the 19th the General found it all but completed—stretching from the city to Hutchinson's Island, over which a causeway was built; thence to Pennyworth Island, where another causeway was laid; thence across the Back river to a causeway which led over the swamps to the main land of the Carolina bank. Beauregard ordered the movement to be made that night, though accident delayed it until the night of the 20th, when by this route—the only exit from Savannah—Hardee was safely withdrawn, with field artillery, baggage and stores, and the bridge then destroyed. This was one of the neatest achievements of the war, rivaling in decision, resource and skill the celebrated evacuations of Corinth and of Morris' Island by the same commander. But, meanwhile, General Sherman, cautiously leaving his sixty thousand men concentrated on the Georgia bank of the river, had gone in person around by the sea to Hilton Head, in order to procure the assistance of Foster's army for the investment of Savannah from the Carolina bank. It is clear that had Slocum's suggestion been adopted, or had even the single brigade of his corps, which had crossed the river above Savannah, been

vigorously pushed against the thin line of Confederate pickets covering this causeway, all escape from Savannah must have been cut off. General Sherman saw his mistake too late, and, in his letter of December 24th, 1864, he excused himself to Halleck: "I feel somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame. I moved as quickly as possible to close up the Union causeway, but intervening obstacles were such that before I could get troops on the road, Hardee had slipped out." The real point is, that disposing of an overwhelming force, his movement should have been a prompt and vigorous one to the rear of Savannah, and not a voyage to Hilton Head to borrow such a movement from General Foster. As to intervening obstacles, they consisted of some light artillery and a very thin line of that cavalry of which, in his letters, he sees fit to write in the most disparaging terms. In this case they seem to have sufficed to cover the retreat of about ten thousand men whom he should have captured!

To estimate General Sherman's error here, we must consider that the Confederate troops in Savannah formed the only substantial force then interposed, and the bulk of the only force afterward interposed between him and Grant. From a military point of view, therefore, this failure was of chief importance and might have led to grievous consequences, as in the event of a bold and rapid junction of a portion of Lee's army with the forces then assembling under Beauregard in order to strike a supreme, decisive blow against Sherman, and, if successful, then to concentrate all forces upon Grant—an operation which, with the advantage of interior lines, Beauregard had suggested to the Government as the only chance left to save the Confederacy.

General Sherman's report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War consists of his letters, orders, &c.—these being, as he says, the best report he could submit. His letters are, indeed, an industrious daily correspondence, full of interest to the military student, including those who fought against him; and from the date of Vicksburg, March 4th, 1864, to Saint Louis, November 21st, 1865, have all been carefully published by him, excepting his letters and orders during the four days between the date of "In the field opposite Columbia, South Carolina, February 16, 1865," and "In the field, Winsboro', South Carolina, February 21st, 1865," (pages 327, 328 of report). Why are these suppressed? In his "Memoirs" (page 287) he states that "the burning of Columbia [during this four days period] was accidental." Yet in the "cotton cases" it transpired

that General-in-Chief Halleck wrote him: "Should you capture Charleston, I hope by some accident the place may be destroyed; and if a little salt should be thrown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession"; and General Sherman replied from Savannah, December 24th: "I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think 'salt' will be necessary. When I move, *the Fifteenth corps will be on the right of the right wing, and their position will bring them naturally into Charleston first, and if you have watched the history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally do their work pretty well.* The truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston."\* His army at this date numbered ("Memoirs," page 172) 62,204 men, exclusive of General Foster's army; the Confederate forces in that region embraced only Hardee's 10,000 troops in Savannah (one-half militia and reserves above the military age), and some 4,000 or 5,000 in South Carolina, all of them part of a desired main force which Beauregard in this strait was seeking to concentrate. Under such circumstances, Sherman's promise to Halleck was not difficult to carry out. General Sherman should not keep from the light his letters and orders of these four days, for surely their publication can show nothing worse than their suppression would infer. It is to be hoped, therefore, that in the discussion evoked by his book, he or his friends may yet fill this *hiatus* in a valuable series of daily letters and orders, which constitutes one of the completest detailed records in military history.

Respectfully, yours,

ALEX. ROBERT CHISOLM.

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\* It is noteworthy that it was the Fifteenth corps which first entered Columbia.



**The Battle of Williamsburg.**

Narrative of Colonel BRATTON, Sixth South Carolina Regiment.

[The following paper was originally prepared for General E. P. Alexander, who kindly turned it over to us along with other valuable MSS.]

FARMINGTON, April 20, 1868.

Dear Sir—At your request, I submit the following account of the operations of my regiment at Williamsburg, May 5th, 1862.

The disposition of the brigade on the morning of that day was as follows: Jenkins' regiment (Palmetto sharpshooters) occupied Fort Magruder, and the Fourth and Fifth regiments the smaller works on either flank of the fort. My own regiment was posted on the edge of the pine grove in rear and to the left of the fort. A detachment of it (two companies) were sent to occupy the last redoubt but one on the line of redoubts to the left of Fort Magruder.

Feeling some responsibility resting on myself as to this flank, I reported the extreme left redoubt as unoccupied and suggested that I post at least a picket there, but was told that it was in charge of somebody else (cavalry perhaps). I gave myself no more concern about it until it was occupied by Hancock's troops, which occupation was announced to me by a cannon ball from the enemy's gun, which passed through my line and buried itself in the embankment of Fort Magruder. My regiment had been withdrawn by General Anderson from its first position and was lying behind the fort. I reported this dispatch from the enemy (cannon ball), and was ordered by Colonel Jenkins to my "original position to repel the attack of the enemy." On arriving at my original position, I saw the line of the enemy (four flags and a battery of six guns) advancing on a redoubt immediately in rear of the one occupied by my two companies. The fort on the extreme left, also, was full of troops huzzaing and waving United States colors.

No time was to be lost, for if they occupied the redoubt in rear my two companies were inevitably lost; so without orders I left my position at once and advanced on the redoubt towards which the enemy were moving. They were nearer to it than we were, but were advancing cautiously; were receiving a minnie occasionally from my companies in the neighboring work, and were evidently a little suspicious and afraid to believe that things were really as they appeared.

All this was to be seen at a glance, and I moved promptly and directly on the redoubt across the open field. My movement had the effect that I expected it to have—they halted, unlimbered their guns and serenaded us with shot and shell throughout our advance, and on our reaching the work their infantry opened on us as we entered it. They then retired their line to the crest of the hill and formed on both flanks of the work that they had taken. I extended a line of skirmishers from the redoubt occupied by my troops to some distance into the woods, and remained in this position watching and expecting them for some three hours, for I thought that they would surely discover my real strength in a short time and move down on me. I advised Colonel Jenkins of my movement and position, and expressed my confidence in being able to hold the two redoubts, but suggested that more troops be sent into the woods on my left. He sent a detachment of the Fourth regiment to reinforce me, and with it I extended my line of skirmishers still further into the woods on my left. The enemy, however, did not advance on me; but late in the evening our friends did—Early's brigade charged my works from the left and rear. Nobody, either officer or scout, had come to the front to reconnoitre, and they did not even know where the enemy were. They charged me (two regiments of them) across the line of the enemy, one regiment against each of the works that my troops occupied. I did not know that they were near until they emerged from the wood on the charge, and seeing their mistake I rushed out to stop them and change their direction before they were exposed to the fire of the enemy; but they would not heed, and on they went until they reached my redoubts, when they for the first time learned where the enemy were. Two of Early's regiments were stopped in the wood and proper direction given to them (the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Hoke's North Carolina regiment). The two that charged my works were the Fifth North Carolina and a Virginia regiment commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel Early—a brother, I was told, of the General. The Fifth North Carolina charged across the entire front of the enemy to the redoubt occupied by my two companies, and on finding it already ours, with scarce a halt, changed direction and advanced most handsomely against the enemy (my two companies joining them in the charge) to within, I think, at least fifty yards of the enemy's line, when they encountered a small fence, partly torn down by the enemy, and unfortunately

halted and commenced firing. The Twenty-fourth Virginia had meanwhile emerged from the wood on the left, nearer to the enemy than my redoubt on which Early's regiment charged, and was moving in fine style upon them. Early's regiment never recovered from the confusion into which they were thrown by the taking of my works. They were formed, however, and started forward, but went obliquely to the left to the wood, and I saw no more of them. I met General Early near this redoubt, himself and horse both wounded, and told him that I had checked the enemy, and been there watching him for three or four hours, and asked him to give me a place in the charge. He said, "Certainly, go." I told him that some of my men were in that fort. He said, "Take them and go toward the enemy." I took my men out of the fort and moved them all forward into the gap left by the oblique movement of Early's regiment into the woods. We advanced to within a hundred yards of the enemy, when we were ordered by General D. H. Hill to move by the left flank into the wood. The Fifth North Carolina, on our right, as I said above, unfortunately stopped and commenced firing; I say unfortunately, because from the confused tangling of their muskets I shall ever believe that the enemy were actually broken (their fire, too, almost ceased), and it only required the continued advance of the Fifth North Carolina to complete their route. As it was, the crest of the hill protected the enemy from their fire, and they had time to recover from their panic, and return to the crest, and open fire, which they did, concentrating their overwhelming volleys on the Fifth North Carolina, and almost demolishing it. The Twenty-fourth Virginia on my left was not in time to engage them simultaneously with the Fifth North Carolina, and also met the concentrated fire of nearly the whole of the enemy's line, but being nearer to cover, did not suffer so terribly in retiring, but were completely used up, thus leaving my regiment advancing alone to share the same fate.

At this juncture, D. H. Hill, who was on the field, and not far from me, ordered me to move by the flank in the woods. I moved into the woods, and found a regiment that had not been in action drawn up, and was told that it was Hoke's regiment, North Carolina. I formed on it, and in a short time it was moved in retreat. I found D. H. Hill, and asked him if the orders were to retreat—that the regiment on which I had formed had moved back. He said that he had given no such orders, but that I had better move

with that regiment. We, following this regiment, withdrew from the field, and rejoining my brigade, took the position I had originally occupied in the morning. I have never, on any field during the war, seen more splendid gallantry exhibited than on that field of Williamsburg, but that splendid gallantry was thrown away and wasted by bad management, when it would have been entirely effective if properly directed. This was, I will add, the first and last time that I ever asked for a place in a charge—a pardonable folly, I hope, at that stage of the war.

The balance of Anderson's brigade was in Fort Magruder and the works about. They were more or less warmly engaged all day. About 9 or 10 o'clock A. M., General Anderson himself was put in command of troops on the right of Fort Magruder in the woods, where I am told that the severest fighting was done.

Very respectfully yours,

JOHN BRATTON.

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

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THIS VOLUME OF OUR PAPERS will conclude with the *December* number, as we have determined to adopt the suggestion of many of our readers that we hereafter put twelve numbers into each volume, instead of six, as heretofore. This will lessen to our subscribers the cost of binding the numbers for the year, and will at the same time give a book of more convenient size.

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OUR RELATIONS WITH THE "WAR RECORDS OFFICE" at Washington continue to be in the highest degree satisfactory.

General Marcus J. Wright and Mr. A. P. Tasker have again visited our office—this time spending two weeks in a careful examination of our records; and two accomplished copyists have been at work for a month making for the War Department copies of important official documents which it needs to complete its files. These gentlemen were hard at work during the whole time they were with us, and were more than ever impressed with the extent and value of our collection. On the other hand, we have received from General Townsend, Colonel Scott, General Wright, Mr. Tasker, and, in fact, every one connected with the War Records office, every courtesy and facility which we could desire.

We repeat again that our friends who have valuable documents ought to send them on *at once*. If you are not willing to give them, then by all means *lend* them to us, that copies may be made both for the Society and for the War Records office. We are hearing continually of the destruction (by fire and other causes) of valuable material which the owners *intended* to send us, and we beg that our friends will not run the risk of delay in forwarding what they have.

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GENERAL GEORGE D. JOHNSTON, our efficient General Agent, has been doing some very effective work for the Society in New Orleans, and expects to go thence to canvass the chief cities and towns of Texas. Our gallant friend needs no commendation from this office, for his genial manners, manly bearing, and high character win for him hosts of friends wherever he goes. He is the most efficient agent we have ever known, and we are expecting large results from his canvass among his old comrades and new friends in the "lone Star State."

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GENERAL J. R. CHALMERS, OF MISSISSIPPI, has kindly accepted our invitation to deliver the address before the Southern Historical Society at our annual meeting in Richmond the last of October next. Besides his splendid war record, General Chalmers is an accomplished orator, and we are anticipating an address of both historic value and popular power.

THE TIME OF A NUMBER OF OUR SUBSCRIBERS expires with this issue, and we beg that they will RENEW AT ONCE, and allow us to continue to make them our monthly visits. Either send us your subscription, authorize us to draw on you, or notify us that you *will do so very soon*.

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### Book Notices.

*History of the First and Second Missouri Confederate Brigades, 1861—1865; and from Wakarusa to Appomattox: A Military Anagraph.* By R. S. Brevier. Saint Louis: Bryan, Brand & Co. 1879.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this book, which is of a class which we would like to see largely multiplied, as histories of particular commands and sketches of personal adventure will be valuable "material for the future historian." The first part of the book is a deeply interesting history of the organization, campaigns and gallant deeds of the First and Second Confederate Missouri brigades. The facts are well grouped together and the story told in a narrative of deep interest, which gives one an exalted idea of the patient endurance and heroic courage of the splendid troops which composed these noble brigades.

The second part of the book—"From Wakarusa to Appomattox"—is a personal narrative of what the gallant soldier saw and heard while "wearing the gray," and discharging his duty as one of that glorious band who made the great struggle for Southern independence. Having preserved his diary, which was kept at the time, and having seen service, both in the Western army and in Virginia, Colonel Brevier has made a narrative of varied interest and value, which ought to find a wide circle of readers. The publishers have done their part well, and the book is gotten up in very attractive style.

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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., July, 1879.

No. 7.

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**Battle of Hampton Roads—Confederate Official Reports.**

*Message of the President.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, April 10, 1862.

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States :*

I herewith transmit to Congress a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, covering a "detailed report of Flag-Officer Buchanan of the brilliant triumph of his squadron over the vastly superior forces of the enemy, in Hampton Roads, on the 8th and 9th of March last."

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

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*Letter of Secretary of the Navy.*

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
RICHMOND, April 7th, 1862.

*To the President :*

Sir—I have the honor to submit herewith copy of the detailed report of Flag-Officer Buchanan of the brilliant triumph of

his squadron over the vastly superior forces of the enemy, in Hampton Roads, on the 8th and 9th of March last—a brief report by Lieutenant Jones of the battle of the 8th having been previously made.

The conduct of the officers and men of the squadron in this contest reflects unfading honor upon themselves and upon the navy. The report will be read with deep interest, and its details will not fail to rouse the ardor and nerve the arms of our gallant seamen.

It will be remembered that the Virginia was a novelty in naval architecture, wholly unlike any ship that ever floated; that her heaviest guns were equal novelties in ordnance; that her motive power and her obedience to her helm were untried, and her officers and crew strangers, comparatively, to the ship and to each other; and yet, under all these disadvantages, the dashing courage and consummate professional ability of Flag-Officer Buchanan and his associates achieved the most remarkable victory which naval annals record.

When the Flag-Officer was disabled, the command of the Virginia devolved upon her Executive and Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Catesby Ap. R. Jones, and the cool and masterly manner in which he fought the ship in her encounter with the ironclad Monitor, justified the high estimate which the country places upon his professional merit.

To his experience, skill and untiring industry as her Ordnance and Executive Officer, the terrible effect of her fire was greatly due. Her battery was determined in accordance with his suggestions, and in all investigations and tests which resulted in its thorough efficiency, he was zealously engaged.

The terms of commendation used by the Flag-Officer in characterizing the conduct of his officers and men, meet the cordial endorsement of the Department; and the concurrent testimony of thousands who witnessed the engagement places his own conduct above all praise.

With much respect, your obedient servant,

S. R. MALLORY, *Secretary of the Navy.*

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*Report of Flag-Officer Buchanan.*

NAVAL HOSPITAL, NORFOLK, March 27th, 1862.

Hon. S. R. MALLORY, *Secretary of the Navy:*

Sir—Having been confined to my bed in this building since the 9th instant, in consequence of a wound received in the action



of the previous day, I have not had it in my power at an earlier date to prepare the official report, which I now have the honor to submit, of the proceedings on the 8th and 9th instants of the James River Squadron, under my command, composed of the following named vessels: steamer Virginia, flag-ship, ten guns; steamer Patrick Henry, twelve guns, Commander John R. Tucker; steamer Jamestown, Lieutenant-Commanding J. N. Barney, two guns, and gunboats Teazer, Lieutenant-Commanding W. A. Webb; Beaufort, Lieutenant-Commanding W. H. Parker, and Raleigh, Lieutenant-Commanding J. W. Alexander, each one gun. Total, twenty-seven guns.

On the 8th instant, at 11 A. M., the Virginia left the Navy Yard, Norfolk, accompanied by the Raleigh and Beaufort, and proceeded to Newport News to engage the enemy's frigates Cumberland and Congress, gunboats and shore batteries. When within less than a mile of the Cumberland, the Virginia commenced the engagement with that ship with her bow gun, and the action soon became general—the Cumberland, Congress, gunboats and shore batteries concentrating upon us their heavy fire, which was returned with great spirit and determination. The Virginia stood rapidly on towards the Cumberland, which ship I had determined to sink with our prow, if possible. In about fifteen minutes after the action commenced we ran into her on her starboard bow; the crash below the water was distinctly heard, and she commenced sinking, gallantly fighting her guns as long as they were above water. She went down with her colors flying. During this time the shore batteries, Congress and gunboats kept up their heavy concentrated fire upon us, doing us some injury. Our guns, however, were not idle; their fire was very destructive to the shore batteries and vessels, and we were gallantly sustained by the rest of the squadron.

Just after the Cumberland sunk, that gallant officer Commander John R. Tucker was seen standing down James river under full steam, accompanied by the Jamestown and Teazer. They all came nobly into action, and were soon exposed to the heavy fire of shore batteries. Their escape was miraculous, as they were under a galling fire of solid shot, shell, grape and canister, a number of which passed through the vessels without doing any serious injury, except to the Patrick Henry, through whose boiler a shot passed, scalding to death four persons and wounding others. Lieutenant-Commanding Barney promptly obeyed a signal to tow her out of the action. As soon as damages were repaired, the Patrick Henry re-

turned to her station and continued to perform good service during the remainder of that day and the following. Having sunk the *Cumberland*, I turned our attention to the Congress. We were some time in getting our proper position, in consequence of the shoalness of the water, and the great difficulty of managing the ship when in or near the mud. To succeed in my object I was obliged to run the ship a short distance above the batteries on James river in order to wind her. During all this time her keel was in the mud; of course she moved but slowly. Thus we were subjected twice to the heavy guns of all the batteries in passing up and down the river, but it could not be avoided. We silenced several of the batteries, and did much injury on shore. A large transport steamer alongside the wharf was blown up, one schooner sunk and another captured and sent to Norfolk. The loss of life on shore we have no means of ascertaining.

While the *Virginia* was thus engaged in getting her position for attacking the Congress, the prisoners state it was believed on board that ship that we had hauled off; the men left their guns and gave three cheers. They were soon sadly undeceived, for a few minutes after we opened upon her again, she having run on shore in shoal water. The carnage, havoc and dismay caused by our fire compelled them to haul down their colors and to hoist a white flag at their gaff, and half-mast another at the main. The crew instantly took to their boats and landed. Our fire immediately ceased, and a signal was made for the *Beaufort* to come within hail. I then ordered Lieutenant-Commanding Parker to take possession of the Congress, secure the officers as prisoners, allow the crew to land and burn the ship. He ran alongside, received her flag and surrender from Commander William Smith and Lieutenant Pendergrast, with the side-arms of those officers. They delivered themselves as prisoners of war on board the *Beaufort*, and afterwards were permitted, at their own request, to return to the Congress, to assist in removing the wounded to the *Beaufort*. They never returned, and I submit to the decision of the Department whether they are not our prisoners. While the *Beaufort* and *Raleigh* were alongside the Congress, and the surrender of that vessel had been received from the commander, she having two white flags flying, hoisted by her own people, a heavy fire was opened upon them from the shore and from the Congress, killing some valuable officers and men. Under this fire the steamers left the Congress; but as I was not informed that any injury had been sustained by those ves-

sels at that time, Lieutenant-Commanding Parker having failed to report to me, I took it for granted that my order to him to burn her had been executed, and waited some minutes to see the smoke ascending from her hatches. During this delay we were still subjected to the heavy fire from the batteries, which was always promptly returned.

The steam frigates *Minnesota* and *Roanoke*, and the sailing frigate *Saint Lawrence*, had previously been reported as coming from Old Point; but as I was determined that the Congress should not again fall into the hands of the enemy, I remarked to that gallant young officer, Flag-Lieutenant Minor, "that ship must be burned." He promptly volunteered to take a boat and burn her, and the *Teazer*, Lieutenant-Commanding Webb, was ordered to cover the boat. Lieutenant Minor had scarcely reached within fifty yards of the Congress, when a deadly fire was opened upon him, wounding him severely and several of his men. On witnessing this vile treachery, I instantly recalled the boat and ordered the Congress destroyed by hot shot and incendiary shell. About this period I was disabled, and transferred the command of the ship to that gallant, intelligent officer, Lieutenant Catesby Jones, with orders to fight her as long as the men could stand to their guns.

The ships from Old Point opened their fire upon us. The *Minnesota* grounded in the north channel, where unfortunately the shoalness of the channel prevented our near approach. We continued, however, to fire upon her until the pilots declared that it was no longer safe to remain in that position, and we accordingly returned by the south channel (the middle ground being necessarily between the *Virginia* and *Minnesota*, and *Saint Lawrence* and the *Roanoke* having retreated under the guns of Old Point), and again had an opportunity of opening upon the *Minnesota*, receiving her heavy fire in return; and shortly afterwards upon the *Saint Lawrence*, from which vessel we also received several broadsides. It had by this time become dark and we soon after anchored off Sewell's Point. The rest of the squadron followed our movements with the exception of the *Beaufort*, Lieutenant-Commanding Parker, who proceeded to Norfolk with the wounded and prisoners, as soon as he had left the Congress, without reporting to me. The Congress, having been set on fire by our hot shot and incendiary shell, continued to burn—her loaded guns being successively discharged as the flames reached them—until a few minutes past midnight, when her magazine exploded with a tremendous report.



The facts above stated as having occurred after I had placed the ship in charge of Lieutenant Jones were reported to me by that officer.

At an early hour next morning (the 9th), upon the urgent solicitations of the surgeons, Lieutenant Minor and myself were very reluctantly taken on shore. The accommodations for the proper treatment of wounded persons on board the *Virginia* are exceedingly limited—Lieutenant Minor and myself occupying the only space that could be used for that purpose, which was in my cabin. I therefore consented to our being landed on Sewell's Point, thinking that the room on board vacated by us could be used for those who might be wounded in the renewal of the action. In the course of the day Lieutenant Minor and myself were sent in a steamer to the hospital at Norfolk.

The following is an extract from the report of Lieutenant Jones of the proceedings of the *Virginia* on the 9th:

"At daylight on the 9th we saw that the *Minnesota* was still ashore, and that there was an iron battery near her. At eight we ran down to engage them (having previously sent the killed and wounded out of the ship), firing at the *Minnesota*, and occasionally at the iron battery. The pilots did not place us as near as they expected. The great length and draft of the ship rendered it exceedingly difficult to work her; we ran ashore about a mile from the frigate and were backing fifteen minutes before we got off. We continued to fire at the *Minnesota*, and blew up a steamer alongside of her; and we also engaged the *Monitor*, sometimes at very close quarters; we once succeeded in running into her, and twice silenced her fire. The pilots declaring that we could get no nearer the *Minnesota* and believing her to be entirely disabled, and the *Monitor* having run into shoal water, which prevented our doing her any further injury, we ceased firing at 12, and proceeded to Norfolk.

"Our loss is two killed and nineteen wounded. The stem is twisted and the ship leaks; we have lost the prow, starboard anchor and all the boats; the armor is somewhat damaged; the steam pipe and smoke stack both riddled; the muzzles of two of the guns shot way. It was not easy to keep a flag flying; the flag staffs were repeatedly shot away; the colors were hoisted to the smoke-stack and several times cut down from it."

The bearing of the men was all that could be desired; their enthusiasm could scarcely be restrained. During the action they cheered again and again. Their coolness and skill were the more remarkable from the fact that the great majority of them were under fire for the first time; they were strangers to each other and to the officers, and had but a few days' instruction in the manage-



ment of the great guns. To the skill and example of the officers is this result in no small degree attributable.

Having thus given a full report of the actions on the 8th and 9th, I feel it due to the gallant officers who so nobly sustained the honor of the flag and country on those days, to express my appreciation of their conduct.

To that brave and intelligent officer, Lieutenant Catesby Jones, the Executive and Ordnance Officer of the Virginia, I am greatly indebted for the success achieved. His constant attention to his duties in the equipment of the ship; his intelligence in the instruction of ordnance to the crew, as proved by the accuracy and effect of their fire—some of the guns having been personally directed by him; his tact and management in the government of raw recruits; his general knowledge of the executive duties of a man-of-war, together with his high toned bearing, were all eminently conspicuous, and had their fruits in the admirable efficiency of the Virginia. If conduct such as his—and I do not know that I have used adequate language in describing it—entitles an officer to promotion, I see in the case of Lieutenant Jones one in all respects worthy of it. As Flag-Officer I am entitled to some one to perform the duties of flag captain, and I should be proud to have Lieutenant Jones ordered to the Virginia as Lieutenant-Commandant, if it be not the intention of the Department to bestow upon him a higher rank.

Lieutenant Simms fully sustained his well-earned reputation. He fired the first gun, and when the command devolved upon Lieutenant Jones, in consequence of my disability, he was ordered to perform the duties of Executive Officer. Lieutenant Jones has expressed to me his satisfaction in having had the services of so experienced, energetic and zealous an officer.

Lieutenant Davidson fought his guns with great precision. The muzzle of one of them was soon shot away; he continued, however, to fire it, though the wood work around the port became ignited at each discharge. His buoyant and cheerful bearing and voice were contagious and inspiring.

Lieutenant Wood handled his pivot gun admirably, and the Executive Officer testifies to his valuable suggestions during the action. His zeal and industry in drilling the crew contributed materially to our success.

Lieutenant Eggleston served his hot shot and shell with judgment and effect; and his bearing was deliberate, and exerted a happy influence on his division.

Lieutenant Butt fought his gun with activity, and during the action was gay and smiling.

The Marine Corps was well represented by Captain Thom, whose tranquil mien gave evidence that the hottest fire was no novelty to him. One of his guns was served effectively and creditably by a detachment of the United artillery of Norfolk, under the command of Captain Kevill. The muzzle of their gun was struck by a shell from the enemy, which broke off a piece of the gun, but they continued to fire as if it was uninjured.

Midshipmen Foute, Marmaduke, Littlepage, Craig and Long rendered valuable services. Their conduct would have been creditable to older heads, and gave great promise of future usefulness. Midshipman Marmaduke, though receiving several painful wounds early in the action, manfully fought his gun until the close. He is now at the hospital.

Paymaster Semple volunteered for any service, and was assigned to the command of the powder division—an important and complicated duty, which could not have been better performed.

Surgeon Phillips and Assistant Surgeon Garnett were prompt and attentive in the discharge of their duties; their kind and considerate care of the wounded, and the skill and ability displayed in the treatment, won for them the esteem and gratitude of all who came under their charge, and justly entitled them to the confidence of officers and crew. I beg leave to call the attention of the Department to the case of Dr. Garnett. He stands deservedly high in his profession, is at the head of the list of assistant surgeons, and there being a vacancy, in consequence of the recent death of Surgeon Blacknall, I should be much gratified if Dr. Garnett could be promoted to it.

The engines and machinery, upon which so much depended, performed much better than was expected. This is due to the intelligence, experience and coolness of Acting Chief Engineer Ramsey. His efforts were ably seconded by his assistants, Tynan, Campbell, Herring, Jack and White. As Mr. Ramsey is only acting Chief Engineer, I respectfully recommend his promotion to the rank of Chief; and would also ask that Second Assistant Engineer Campbell may be promoted to First Assistant—he having performed the duties of that grade during the engagement.

The forward officers, Boatswain Hasker, Gunner Oliver, and Carpenter Lindsey, discharged well all the duties required of them. The Boatswain had charge of a gun and fought it well. The Gun-

ner was indefatigable in his effort; his experience and exertions as a gunner have contributed very materially to the efficiency of the battery.

Acting Master Parrish was assisted in piloting the ship by Pilots Wright, Williams, Clark and Cunningham. They were necessarily much exposed.

It is now due that I should mention my personal staff. To that gallant young officer, Flag Lieutenant Minor, I am much indebted for his promptness in the execution of signals, for renewing the flag-staffs when shot away—being thereby greatly exposed; for his watchfulness in keeping the Confederate flag up; his alacrity in conveying my orders to the different divisions, and for his general, cool and gallant bearing.

My aid, Acting Midshipman Rootes, of the navy, Lieutenant Forrest, of the army, who served as a volunteer aid, and my clerk, Mr. Arthur Saint Clair, Jr., are entitled to my thanks for the activity with which my orders were conveyed to the different parts of the ship. During the hottest of the fight they were always at their posts, giving evidence of their coolness. Having referred to the good conduct of the officers in the flag-ship, immediately under my notice, I come now to no less pleasing task when I attempt to mark my approbation of the bearing of those serving in the other vessels of the squadron.

Commander John R. Tucker, of the *Patrick Henry*, and Lieutenants-Commanding J. N. Barney, of the *Jamestown*, and W. A. Webb, of the *Teazer*, deserve great praise for their gallant conduct throughout the engagement. Their judgment in selecting their positions for attacking the enemy was good; their constant fire was destructive, and contributed much to the success of the day. The "general order," under which the squadron went into action, required that in the absence of all signals, each commanding officer was to exercise his own judgment and discretion in doing all the damage he could to the enemy, and to sink before surrendering. From the bearing of those officers on the 8th, I am fully satisfied that that order would have been carried out.

Commander Tucker speaks highly of all under him, and desires particularly to notice that Lieutenant-Colonel Cadwallader Saint George Noland, commanding the post at Mulberry island, on hearing of the deficiency in the complement of the *Patrick Henry*, promptly offered the services of ten of his men as volunteers for the occasion—one of whom, George E. Webb, of the "Greenville guards," Commander Tucker regrets to say, was killed.

Lieutenant-Commanding Barney reports "every officer and man on board of the ship performed his whole duty, evincing a courage and fearlessness worthy of the cause for which we are fighting."

Lieutenant-Commanding Webb specially notices the coolness displayed by Acting Master Face and Third Assistant Engineer Quinn, when facing the heavy fire of artillery and musketry from the shore, whilst the Teazer was standing in to cover the boat in which, as previously stated, Lieutenant Minor had gone to burn the Congress. Several of his men were badly wounded.

The Raleigh, early in the action, had her gun-carriage disabled, which compelled her to withdraw. As soon as he had repaired damages as well as he could, Lieutenant-Commanding Alexander resumed his position in the line. He sustained himself gallantly during the remainder of the day, and speaks highly of all under his command. That evening he was ordered to Norfolk for repairs.

The Beaufort, Lieutenant-Commanding Parker, was in close contact with the enemy frequently during the day, and all on board behaved gallantly.

Lieutenant-Commanding Parker expresses his warmest thanks to his officers and men for their coolness. Acting Midshipman Foreman, who accompanied him as volunteer aid, Midshipmen Mallory and Newton, Captain's Clerk Bain, and Mr. Gray, pilot, are all specially mentioned by him.

On the 21st instant, I forwarded to the Department correct lists of the casualties on board all the vessels of the squadron, on the 8th; none, it appears, occurred on the 9th.

While in the act of closing this report, I received the communication of the Department, dated 22d instant, relieving me temporarily of the command of the squadron for the naval defences of James river. I feel honored in being relieved by the gallant Flag-Officer Tatnall.

I much regret that I am not now in a condition to resume my command, but trust that I shall soon be restored to health, when I shall be ready for any duty that may be assigned to me.

Very respectfully,

FRANKLIN BUCHANAN, *Flag-Officer.*

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## Colonel Winston's Correction Corrected.

By Rev. Dr. R. H. McKIM.

The February number of these *Papers* (page 94) contains a communication from Colonel J. R. Winston, calling in question the accuracy of certain statements made by me in my narrative of Steuart's brigade at Gettysburg.

Allow me first to assure my critic that I have been unfortunate in conveying my meaning if anything I have written seems to imply a slur either on General Daniel or his brave men. My meaning was that for *such* a charge to be made by a single brigade, unsupported, was proof that "somebody blundered"—not General Daniel, because "it is to be presumed that he acted in obedience to orders." I simply stated the fact that a charge which, to some of Steuarts' regiments, was as fatal as Balaklava was to the Light brigade, was made by that brigade without support, though help was at hand in General Daniel's gallant brigade, which moved up and took our position when we left the Federal works to make the charge.

So much for my *animus*. Now, as to the facts. Colonel Winston questions the statement that Daniel's command "remained in the breastworks during and after the charge," and gave no support to Steuart, and says: "I know that Daniel's brigade went into the fight on General Steuart's line. As we went in I passed General Steuart, and as I came out (badly wounded) I again passed him." This in no way disproves my assertion that "*during the charge*" Daniel held the Federal line of works which Steuart vacated in order to make the charge. The incident referred to by Colonel Winston must have occurred at some other time. I was not wounded (though struck four times), assisted in forming the line for the assault, was in the charge, and know whereof I affirm. It was the last charge made, and it is certain Colonel Winston did not pass General Steuart *during that charge*. I can assure him there was no time for exchanging salutations then and there, within twenty-five yards of two flame-breathing breastworks. In support of my assertion I respectfully refer to the surviving officers and men of the First and Third North Carolina regiments, which constituted part of Steuart's brigade. They will substantiate the only point at issue, viz: that Steuart's men made *that charge* without aid from any quarter.

The accuracy of my estimate of the loss in Steuart's brigade is also called in question. I stated the loss at 680, killed, wounded and missing; my critic, relying on the consolidated reports, says it was 301. Now, through the kindness of a friend, I have obtained from the Confederate archives at Washington a copy of the tabulated report of Major R. W. Hunter, Assistant Adjutant-General to Major-General Edward Johnson. This document gives the following table of casualties:

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	AGGREGATE
Johnson's staff.....	...	1	1	2
Stonewall brigade.....	35	208	87	330
Jones' brigade.....	58	302	61	421
Steuart's brigade.....	83	409	190	682
Nichol's brigade.....	43	309	36	388
Total.....	219	1,229	375	1,823

It appears, then, that my estimate of loss (680) was less than the loss as stated officially by General Johnson's Assistant Adjutant-General, viz: 682. The losses in Daniel's brigade were heavier, but were incurred chiefly in the first day's battle, as may be seen from General Rodes' report (September number, 1876, *Historical Society Papers*, page 149, compared with ditto, page 172). Rodes' division lost 2,869 in the entire three days' battle, of which number 2,500 were lost on the first day.

RANDOLPH H. McKIM.

NEW YORK, May 13th, 1879.

**Sketches of Operations of General John C. Breckinridge.**

By Colonel J. STODDARD JOHNSTON, of his Staff.

No. 2.

General Breckinridge's arrival at Hanover Junction was opportune. General Lee was still at Spotsylvania Courthouse, thirty-five miles north. The railroad from Hanover Junction was that to which he looked for supplies of all kinds and communication with Richmond. Knowing this, General Grant had sent Sheridan, with a large cavalry force, to make a raid in Lee's rear and to destroy his communications—particularly to burn the large bridge over the South Anna river, near Hanover Junction. It was in this raid that General Jeb Stuart was killed. Breckinridge's arrival secured the bridge, and Sheridan returned without having effected other material damage.

On the 22d of May, General Lee, having fallen back from Spotsylvania, arrived at Hanover Junction, and in person thanked and complimented General Breckinridge for his victory. In fact the whole Army of Northern Virginia was full of his praise. The veterans of Lee and Jackson greeted him with cheers whenever he came within sight, and wherever he moved among them, in camp or in line of battle, it was a perfect ovation. At Hanover Junction began that series of splendid strategic movements by General Lee to check General Grant in his advance on Richmond, which culminated in the defeat of the latter in the bloody battle of second Cold Harbor on the 2d of June. General Breckinridge continued with General Lee during this time, preserving his separate command. He was in various engagements of more or less moment in the interval, and in the battle of the 2d occupied a portion of the line which received probably the heaviest assault. A salient occupied by his troops was carried by the bayonet, but retaken with great gallantry. During an engagement on the evening of the same day, General Breckinridge's horse was killed under him, by a cannon ball which passed through him, just missing the General's left leg. The horse was killed instantly, and in falling caught his rider under him, producing the impression for the moment in the minds of his staff that he was himself killed. It required the strength of several to disengage him, when it was found that, though not wounded, his thigh and leg were so bruised that he was unable to ride for several weeks.

But General Breckinridge's stay with the Army of Northern Virginia was brief. Within a few days the intelligence came that General Hunter, reinforcing and superseding Siegel, had advanced up the Valley and taken Staunton. General Breckinridge was accordingly ordered to return with his force to the Valley and regain it, or protect Charlottesville and the country east of the Blue Ridge. His command moved by way of Richmond, Lynchburg and Charlottesville, to Rockfish gap, where the railroad from Staunton to Charlottesville crosses the Blue Ridge. While preparing to move on Hunter, General Breckinridge received information that the latter was moving to Lexington. Divining his purpose to be to attack Lynchburg, General Breckinridge, instead of pursuing, wisely concluded to get ahead of him; and to this end, marched to Lynchburg by the arc of the circle, through the counties of Nelson and Amherst. His interpretation of Hunter's design was correct, since he had scarcely reached Lynchburg before it was announced that Hunter was within a day's march. Fortunately, General Early, who had started for a diversion towards Maryland, also arrived with a portion of his corps the next day, and when Hunter appeared before the place, instead of finding it unprotected, he found a well organized force to defend it. On the 19th of June he made an attack, but was repulsed, and immediately began to retreat the same night. General Early, being the senior officer, directed the pursuit—his own and General Breckinridge's command following next morning. Having no adequate cavalry force, Hunter was enabled to escape, going by way of Buford's gap and thence to Salem, from which he left the Valley and moved towards the Kanawha by a rough and tedious route. From Salem, Early moved down the Valley, and on the 3d of July, having made a remarkable march, General Breckinridge, after a slight engagement, captured Martinsburg, General Siegel being again taken by surprise and barely escaping being a prisoner.

General Breckinridge's command was now temporarily changed. Before Early's arrival he had been in command of all the forces in the Valley. For purposes of better organization, he turned over to General Early all the cavalry, of which two brigades had arrived from Southwest Virginia—Vaughan's and McCausland's (late Jenkins'). In lieu of this, Major-General J. B. Gordon's division of infantry was assigned to him, and with Echols' division (Echols' and Wharton's brigades) formed into a corps—so that Early's command at this time consisted as follows: Breckinridge's corps of



Echols' and Gordon's divisions, Early's corps of Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, with a corps of cavalry commanded by General Ransom, the constitution or numbers of which I cannot give accurately. There were W. L. Jackson's brigade, McCausland's brigade, Vaughan's brigade, Imboden's brigade, and a number of smaller organization, the whole being about three thousand cavalry, most of it known as wild cavalry—of the inefficiency of which there was constant complaint and almost daily exhibition. The infantry numbered about eight thousand, and were in the main as good as any in the service—all being inured to fighting, except the troops which had come from Southwest Virginia with General Breckinridge, which had not seen so much field service as the others.

From Martinsburg, General Early moved to Sharpsburg, and, threatening Harper's Ferry with his cavalry, crossed on the 5th into Maryland. On the morning of the 9th he reached Frederick City, near and beyond which General Lew. Wallace, with a force of six or eight thousand men, had taken position beyond Monocacy creek. It was at this place shortly after noon that General Breckinridge, with Gordon's division alone, won a decisive victory over Wallace. Crossing the Monocacy two miles below the Monocacy Junction, he struck Wallace with a flanking movement, but not until he had time hastily to change front. The repulse was decisive, the engagement being one of the bloodiest of the war—the heaviest struggle being on the bluff bank of the Monocacy, whose waters were made crimson with the blood of those slain or wounded by its side, many of whom fell or found refuge in the creek. A large number of prisoners, near a thousand, were captured, and Wallace fled with his forces in confusion to Baltimore. The road to Washington being open (forty-five miles), Early marched on the Middletown road next day (10th), and on the 11th, about noon, his advance was in front of the fortifications at Silver Spring—Breckinridge being in the advance. It was plainly impracticable to make an attack, for besides an impassible *abatis* in front of the works, which consisted of star forts connected by heavy entrenchments, there was every evidence that the forts were manned and supplied with guns sufficient to repel any assault; an almost continuous fire was kept up at us with artillery. Early's object being to make a diversion merely to draw troops from General Lee's front, he remained until the night of the 12th, and then, a council of officers having approved the move, fell back in the night towards Edwards' ferry, reaching Seneca creek, twenty-seven miles from Washington,

at sunrise. The same day he continued to the Potomac, which he crossed next morning (14th), and went into camp near Leesburg. Here he remained till the 16th, when he crossed the Blue Ridge in direction of Winchester at Snicker's gap, and camped beyond the Shenandoah. The enemy pursued, and on the 18th he fought a battle at Chapman's ford near by, repulsing the enemy. But he was being sorely pressed, as a heavy column was moving against Winchester, where he had sent Ramseur's division, which here suffered a repulse. He accordingly fell back and concentrated his forces at a place called Fisher's Hill, near the junction of the North and South forks of the Shenandoah, and on the main road from Staunton to Winchester, twenty-four miles south of the latter place. This retreat necessitated the giving up the richest part of the Valley, and surrendered all of our flouring mills which had been put in operation for the supply of the army. The portion of the Valley given up had been found rich in supplies of grain, none having been burned up to that time, and it not being uncommon to find two crops of wheat in the stack. But to utilize this for the army, on account of the scarcity of labor, details of soldiers had to be made to thresh out the grain, place the mills in order—most of them having fallen into disuse—and to grind the flour. Arriving at Fisher's Hill, the army found itself on less than half rations, foot-sore from almost constant marching, weakened from its losses in battle, and encumbered with many wounded. The aspect was very gloomy, and for a time it seemed that nothing was left but to continue the retreat, abandon the Valley, and return to General Lee. The position being good for defence, a few days were given for rest. In the meantime General Breckinridge proposed to General Early the resumption of offensive operations, and on the 25th of July the following plan was adopted at his suggestion: It having been ascertained that the enemy was at Kernstown, five or six miles south of Winchester, it was proposed to march with the infantry at daylight to the attack, the cavalry to be sent on the back road, a dirt road running parallel with the pike two miles off—so as to get in the rear of the enemy, to harrass them in the event of a repulse and cut off retreat. At early dawn the troops were on the road ready to move when a striking incident occurred. Breckinridge's command was in the lead. The rations in feeble supply had not been given out till late the night before, and, small as was the issue, the troops had not had time to prepare them. They were therefore without breakfast, except such as had had some

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slight crust from the previous scanty meal. As Breckinridge rode along the line, which was at rest, a cry arose of "Bread!" "Bread!" which was taken up and passed along until it seemed threatening to break out into some demonstration of riot. Breckinridge bore it with equanimity, until reaching a colonel of one of the regiments which was peculiarly demonstrative, he halted and good humoredly addressed him: "Your men seem to be in a bad humor this morning, Colonel." "Yes," was the reply, "they did not have time last night to cook their rations and they are hungry." "Never mind, boys," said the General, addressing himself to the soldiers, "we will have plenty to eat to-night. Those fellows in front of us have got our mills, and they have the biggest droves of fat cattle you ever saw; we are going now to capture them." This acted like a charm; the men who heard him cheered him lustily, and soon along the line all complaint was hushed, and the surrounding hills echoed with the cheers of the tattered veterans eager to be led to battle. The result of the day verified Breckinridge's predictions. The enemy were found to be at Kernstown as expected. The army was drawn up in line of battle at right angles to the Valley, confronting a parallel line of the enemy. Breckinridge, after a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, which was always his custom before entering into action, took Echols' division, leaving its skirmish line in position, and marching it by the flank, placed it under cover of a ridge on the left flank of the enemy. From the crest of the ridge could be seen the hostile lines not more than forty yards, moving to the attack of the position we had just left. The skirmish lines being engaged, at a signal of command, the division swept over the hill, struck the enemy full in the flank, doubled his line in instant confusion, and in half an hour the whole force was routed and driven in confused flight towards the Potomac—the other divisions moving forward on the first sound of an engagement and completing the rout. A rapid pursuit followed, and had the cavalry carried out its instructions all the enemy's trains, if not the entire army, would have been captured. The army halted for the night three miles beyond Winchester, and for the first time in many days had full rations. Within the very limits of the camp was a mill in which a large supply of flour, which had been abandoned by us a week before, was found undisturbed. The enemy did not halt until the Potomac lay between us, leaving their dead and wounded, several hundred prisoners, and



the road along which they traveled, strewn with the wrecks of abandoned wagons and other evidences of a hasty flight.

Thus was the Valley a second time recovered and abundant supplies secured to the army. For a fortnight or thereabouts it remained at rest near Martinsburg, picketing with cavalry well up to Harper's Ferry; the only active operations being McCausland's raid into Pennsylvania, in which he burned Chambersburg in retaliation for the barbarities of Hunter at Lexington and along his whole line of march in the Valley.

In the meantime the Federal forces were preparing for an advance. General Sheridan had been detached from the army operating against Richmond, and had arrived at Harper's Ferry, with heavy reinforcements, both of infantry and cavalry. Early's force had previously been outnumbered nearly two to one, and now that Wright's (Sixth) corps was added to the enemy in front, it seemed impossible longer to remain in the Valley. With the advance of Sheridan, General Early fell back and again took position on Fisher's Hill. He was followed immediately by Sheridan, who then began to carry out his instructions towards leaving the Valley in a condition so barren that a crow flying over it would have to carry his rations. It was on this retreat that General Breckinridge and General Early were riding along together very moodily at the prospect, both of the Valley campaign and the general cause of Southern independence, when General Early spoke up quizzically and said: "Well, Breckinridge, what do you think of our rights in the territories now?" The inquiry was so humorous and in a vein so much in contrast with the gloomy feelings of the company, that General Breckinridge and all present were thrown into good spirits at once. Early was an old Whig, and up to the breaking out of the war a violent Union man, always the antipodes of Breckinridge in politics.

The army had not been but a day or two at Fisher's Hill before it was confronted by Sheridan's whole force, and the indications were that there would be an early engagement. But, unexpectedly, General Anderson, who had succeeded to the command of Longstreet's corps after the wounding of the latter in the Wilderness, had been sent by General Lee with one division of infantry to reinforce General Early, and arrived in the Luray Valley, six or eight miles east of us, before we were aware of his coming. His approach was known to Sheridan before it was to us, and an enterprising officer would have profited by the knowledge in falling at



once upon either Early or Anderson, separated, as they were, by an impassible mountain. But instead of this, to our surprise, the early morning disclosed to us the fact that Sheridan had retreated. Instantly Early was in pursuit, but it was useless. Sheridan fell back to Harper's Ferry, leaving traces of his retreat in the smoking mills, hay stacks and barns, which were fired as he fell back by details made for the purpose. General Early remained confronting Sheridan on the line of the Opequon and Bunker Hill, fourteen miles north of Winchester until the 19th of September, when Sheridan advanced with his cavalry on the main turnpike from Martinsburg, and from Smithfield via Brucetown, and his infantry from Berryville. On that day was fought the battle of Winchester. The main engagement was on the Berryville pike, a mile and a half or two miles from Winchester, in which Sheridan was repulsed heavily; but his cavalry, which largely outnumbered Early's, succeeded in driving back the latter, and came down upon our left flank, threatening our rear and the town. This rendered a change of front necessary for a part of Early's infantry which successfully resisted the cavalry; but the firing in the rear of his main force, of which they could not understand its meaning, caused confusion, and finally a stampede. Sheridan at this juncture advanced, and Early only succeeded in getting off the bulk of his force with great disorder, and not until twelve or fifteen hundred had been killed and captured. His retreat, under hot pursuit, followed, and on the next day he halted at Fisher's Hill to make a stand. Of his subsequent disasters, it is not my purpose to speak, nor of his brilliant victory at Cedar creek, a month later, turned also into a defeat, since General Breckinridge's connection with his army closed at Fisher's Hill. On his arrival here on the 21st of September, he was met with an order from Richmond, directing him to return in person to the command of the Department of South-western Virginia, which required his attention. He accordingly turned his command over to the next senior officer, General Gordon, and parted sadly from the brave men who had followed him so gallantly through the eventful campaign. Never were men more devoted to a commander, and in leaving the Valley he did so with none of the feeling with which he had first inspired both his command and the noble people abated in the least.

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### **Prison Experience.**

By JAMES T. WELLS, Sergeant Company A, Second South Carolina Infantry.

#### **No. 1.**

[The following narrative is written by a gentleman of unimpeachable character, and will be read with interest. We propose to add from time to time a few chapters to our discussion of "the prison question."]

At the battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July 2, 1863, I was severely wounded, and, with many others, was unfortunate enough to be captured by the enemy. We remained at the field hospital until about the middle of September, when myself and several others were transferred to the Newton University Hospital, Baltimore, and afterwards to Fort McHenry. While at the hospital we fared very well, as we were all supplied with everything we needed by the kind and noble ladies of Baltimore. God will surely bless them for their kindness to the Confederate prisoners with whom they came in contact. Our treatment was not so good after we left the hospital; however, at the Fort we did not have much to complain of, as we were thrown into a heterogenous mass of Federal and Confederate prisoners—prisoners of war, oath-takers, pick-pockets and cut-throats.

We certainly had some scruples about being placed among criminals, but we were all treated alike and fared ditto. Our principal pastime at this delightful retreat consisted in scrambling for our soup and beans—said pastime being diversified by blows on the head and shins from a hickory stick in the hands of a huge Yankee sergeant. The blows were only received by those who were unruly in the "lines," and tried to push others out of the way. Our quarters were in an old brick house, situated on the bank of the river, inside of the Fort inclosure. It was divided as follows: Front room, first floor—Provost-Marshal's office; second room, first floor—dark hole; third room, first floor—Yankee prisoners of all descriptions. Second floor, front room—prisoners of State; second and rear room—Confederate prisoners. We had the liberty of the yard and to go where we pleased, provided the Yankee prisoners would permit us (and they were masters of the situation, owing to their superior numbers). In the dark hole, on the first floor, were confined some of the most villianous cut-throats it has ever been my misfortune to meet. They were convicted of different crimes and had different

terms to serve. All of them wore balls and chains, and they made night hideous with their curses, screams, and the rattling of the chains. An instance will suffice to show what manner of men they were. One day, a terrible fight was in progress amongst them. The sentry approached the door, which was an aperture about 4x4, and commanded them to desist. A blow on the head with a brick was the answer he received. An officer came in with a guard of three or four men, and as he came in front of the opening he also was felled by a blow on the head. He ordered his men to fire. They did so, when the most horrid groans and screams, interspersed with frightful oaths, issued from the opening. The firing checked the fight, and the result was observable. A few moments afterwards one dead and several wounded were brought out. It may be well to remark that the Confederates who were thrown together here formed attachments for each other which lasted until the end of their imprisonment. It was nothing more than natural—situated, as we were, in a strange land, amongst strangers and enemies. It was while we were here (Fort McHenry) that the South Carolina prisoners were notified that they could either take the oath or submit to the drawing of lots. Some weak minded ones yielded, but the majority remained firm. We were told after the drawing was over that it was for hostages to be retained by the United States Government for the safe return of three negroes, who, they affirmed, had been captured by the Confederate authorities in Charleston harbor. The unfortunate men selected by this drawing were Williams, McDowell and Cline, of the Second South Carolina cavalry, who were then confined in the old Carroll Prison, at Washington, District of Columbia. The writer did not know what disposition was made of them, but learned afterwards that they were retained in close confinement during the war, which impaired their health to such a degree that two of them died soon after they came home. From our quarters at Fort McHenry we had a delightful view of the city of Baltimore and suburbs; also of Fort Marshall, situated across the bay. The gallows, upon which the gallant but unfortunate Layfole was hung, was also in full view of our window—left standing long after the event apparently to remind us of his fate. The famous New York Seventh regiment was stationed here awhile, and was often taken by new comers for Confederate soldiers. The dress parade of the garrison, with their fine music, was eagerly anticipated every evening. But I am consuming too much time with Fort McHenry, and must bid it good

bye, with the hope that I may, at some future time, renew the acquaintance under more auspicious surroundings.

On the 15th of September we embarked on the steamer John J. Tracy for Point Lookout—an extreme point of land, distant about seventy-five miles, and situated between the Chesapeake bay and the Potomac river, just opposite the Eastern shore of Maryland. Our number was about one hundred and sixty; consequently we were not much crowded, and the steamer was quite comfortable and clean, being one of the bay boats, and not a Government transport. One of our number, a Tennessean, died on the passage, and was buried in the bay. Weights were attached to his body, which was placed upon a plank, one end of which was raised, and the Confederate passed away. The solemn spectacle was witnessed by our men with much emotion. He had some friends, no doubt, who informed his command of his death. That night we lay upon the upper deck of the steamer, many of us thinking of the death of the stranger. Accustomed as we had become to death on the battlefield and in hospital, it had lost much of its dread; but this mode of burial was something new, and made a lasting impression upon us. I was somewhat surprised, next morning, to find myself addressed by one of the guard (Twenty-fifth New York artillery). He proved to be an old schoolmate of mine and a near neighbor, who had been induced to take the oath on account of the drawing previously referred to. He remained North during the war, but not as a soldier, having been detected in some smuggling correspondence and thrown into prison. He visited his home at the close of the war, but soon enlisted in the United States army, and is now stationed in the far West. Upon arriving at Point Lookout, he gave me what money he had, and promised to aid me whenever he could; but he did not have an opportunity afterwards.

This camp had been but recently established, and there was not many prisoners here. They yelled to us to “grab your pocket-books,” as we came in sight. This referred to the strict search to which all new comers were subjected, in which everything, even to a few Confederate dollars, was taken from you. It was labelled and put away, to be returned to you when you were leaving; but the valuables were never returned, as they could not be found. We were now regularly initiated as prisoners of war, and began to feel all the rigors and severities of such. We were divided into companies of one hundred men each, and were allowed for some time to draw and cook our own rations, each company sergeant being supplied with the necessary utensils. Soon, however, large numbers



of prisoners began to arrive, most of them from Fort Delaware. They were in a most destitute and deplorable condition—many of them not having sufficient clothing to clothe them, and all were without blankets. The severity of a winter on this barren place can only be imagined by those who have been there, and our prospects were now gloomy indeed. Our camp had formerly been a corn-field, and consisted of about fifty acres. The Federal authorities conceived the plan of fencing in the camp, and erecting cook-houses, a commissary, &c., and for this purpose secured the services of several good carpenters. They employed about two hundred prisoners to assist, paying them in extra rations and tobacco. When these were erected the camp was thoroughly reorganized. The men were divided into divisions of one thousand men each—each under a Yankee sergeant—and the division into companies of one hundred men each, under a Confederate sergeant. We were compelled to keep the camp clean, well drained, &c., and for this purpose carts and barrows were furnished. Each company street was well drained, and made as hard and firm as pebble and sand could make it. Each drain ran into the main drain, which ran through the centre of the camp, and from which all the refuse water was thrown into the bay. Our tents were miserable affairs, being full of holes, and very rotten. They were of the “Sibley pattern,” and into each one of these sixteen men were crowded. In order to lay down at night, the men were compelled to lay so close together as to exclude sleep. The winter of 1863 was now approaching, and gloom, privation and starvation were staring us in the face. On the 9th of November, snow fell and there was not a stick of wood in camp. The day was bitter cold, most of us were but poorly clad, and very few of us had shoes of any description. We were compelled to stand in our damp tents, and “mark time” to keep from freezing. This scarcely seems possible, yet it can be attested by hundreds who were there. Previous to this time—November, 1863—we had no reason to complain of our rations, but now we began to feel the pangs of hunger. Shortly after the cook houses were finished, a detail of ten or twelve men, under a sergeant, was assigned to each house, whose duty it was to cook the rations and issue them. Each house was furnished with three huge boilers—holding, perhaps, forty gallons apiece—thus enabling them to feed about five hundred men at once. Our rations were now reduced as follows: for breakfast, half-pint coffee, or, rather, slop water; for dinner, half-pint greasy water (called soup for etiquette), also a small piece of meat, perhaps three or four ounces. For bread

we were allowed eight ounces per day; this you could press together in your hand and take at a mouthful. Our water was of such a character that we could scarcely use it, being so highly tinctured with sulphur and iron as to render it almost unbearable. Clothes which were washed in it were turned black and yellow. To our suffering from the cold and the want of pure water was now added that of hunger. To those who have never suffered in this respect, it is almost impossible to describe the sensations. The writer has known large, stout men to lay in their tents at night and cry like little babies from hunger and cold. We were not allowed to walk about, but were compelled to retire to our tents at "taps," which were sounded quite early. Even the poor privilege of keeping ourselves warm by walking up and down in front of our tents was denied us, and we were compelled to lay in the cold. The supply of blankets was very scant, and "bunks" were unknown. The cold ground was our bed, and pillows we had none. To add to our discomforts, the tide from the bay occasionally backed into the camp, and compelled those whose tents had been flooded to stand all night. Midwinter was now upon us, and the intense cold we suffered may be judged when it is stated that the Chesapeake bay was frozen hard full twenty feet from the bank.

Point Lookout is situated in Saint Mary's county, Maryland. The Department was commanded by General Barnes, United States army. Major Patterson was provost-marshal and had charge of the prisoners. The Second, Fifth and Twelfth New Hampshire constituted the guard, with two batteries of artillery and a squadron of cavalry. These troops were housed in comfortable tents, and as we saw the smoke rising from the innumerable stove-pipes projecting from their tents, we could not but indulge in bitter thoughts of their cruelty. If this man Patterson still lives his conscience must burn him. He was the impersonation of cruel malignity hatred and revenge, and he never let an opportunity pass in which he could show his disposition in this respect. Of the guards we could not complain, as they acted under orders and were not responsible for any of the cruelties to which we were subjected. As might be inferred, our Christmas was a dull one, and we passed the day in thinking of "Dixie" and the loved ones at home. About the 10th of January, our suffering had grown so intense that a party formed a plan to escape. It was a bold one in conception, and required men of determination and courage to undertake it. Sergeant Shears, a man of about sixty years of age and a member of a Virginia cavalry regiment, was placed in command. A tun-

nel was to be dug from the rear of Company A, first division, to the fence, a distance of about twenty feet, and was commenced in a small tent. This work was extremely dangerous, and had to be carried on with great caution. It was large enough for a man to crawl through. It was worked by detail, and as the dirt was dug out of it, it was drawn to the mouth of the tunnel in an old haversack, and distributed over the bottom of the tent. At last it was completed, and the party was divided into squads of ten each. The squads were to make their exit on separate nights. After getting beyond the inclosure, each party was to choose its own mode of proceeding. The first party made the attempt. They were betrayed by a sentinal, whom some of them had most foolishly bribed, as there was no necessity for it. The alarm was given, and the prisoners who had succeeded in getting out had taken refuge behind the protecting banks of sand on the beach. As soon as the officers reached the spot, they called upon the prisoners to surrender, saying they would not be harmed. Major Patterson (the Provost-Marshal) stood at the gate, and as each prisoner came up, he deliberately shot at him. One was shot in the head, from which he never recovered, and the last account we had of him he was in a lunatic asylum. Another was shot in the shoulder, and another in the abdomen, from the effects of which he died. The remaining seven managed to get into the camp again, without being hurt, for which they could thank the darkness of the night. The tunnel was fired into several times, but no one was in it. The next day it was filled up, and the men in whose tent the opening had been made were confined in the guard house, on bread and water, for ten days. The shooting of these men was without any excuse whatever, as they had expressed a willingness to surrender, and were proceeding to do so; besides, it is a recognized principle that a prisoner of war has a right to escape if he can, and the capturing party has no right to punish, but simply to remand to proper custody. This event stopped all idea of escape for awhile, and we became resigned to our fate.

The intense cold weather at this season induced the authorities to give us some wood, and for this purpose a detail of four men from each one hundred was allowed to go, under a guard, to a point about a quarter of a mile above the camp for it. An idea can thus be obtained of the quantity of wood each company obtained—as much as four men could carry a quarter of a mile. This, too, was for three rations.



**The Battle of Farmington, Tennessee—Report of General Daniel Ruggles.**

HEADQUARTERS RUGGLES' DIVISION,  
ARMY OF MISSISSIPPI,  
CORINTH, MISSISSIPPI, May 16th, 1862.

Major G. G. GARNER, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Sir—I have the honor to report, for the information of the Commanding-General of the forces, that in obedience to instructions my division marched on the morning of the 9th of May along the lower road leading to Farmington, some four miles and a half distant, and reached there about 10 o'clock A. M., having encountered some small scouts of the enemy.\* Colonel McCulloch, with about two hundred Arkansas cavalry, joined me some two miles distant from the trenches, and one-half of his force was thrown out as flankers to the right and left and the remainder in the advance.

In the vicinity of the town we discovered a body of the enemy's cavalry and dispersed it by a section of Captain Ducatel's guns of the Orleans Guards battery.† Possession was immediately taken of the village of Farmington, where the enemy had established a telegraph station, and, as we subsequently learned, the Assistant Secretary of War of the Federal Government had just been engaged with it in urging the advance of the Federal troops. The brigades of my division advanced in separate columns in readiness to deploy into line of battle. Finding masses of the enemy apparently in line of battle some distance in front, I directed sections of Hodgson's, Ducatel's and Hoxton's batteries to open fire upon them, awaiting in the meantime the advance of General Van Dorn's division on my right. Having communicated with General Trapier's division, which had already arrived on my left, I then deployed the columns into line of battle—holding the Fourth brigade in

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\* General Bragg, the commander of the corps to which my division belonged, joined me soon after commencing the march, and informed me that my division was to be supported on the right by General Van Dorn with his forces, among others, comprising General Price's division, and that he had been instructed to march forward with expedition and to communicate with me as soon as his forces could be aligned on my division, and recommended that I should march slowly until notified that this object had been attained.

General Bragg notified me at the same time that General Trapier, with General Wither's division, was marching forward to support my division on my left, and that he had been directed to communicate with me and to conform to my directions.

† These guns were brought into the action about half a mile from the town and before General Van Dorn notified his arrival, and with design of bringing on an engagement with the enemy's advance, to hold it upon the field, and to gain time for General Van Dorn to advance to my support on my right.



reserve—and advanced against the enemy, encountering his first fire near the road leading to the left of Farmington. The enemy was sheltered by the high bank along the roadside and in a narrow skirt of timber bordering the road on the left in which his position was partially taken.

Just previous to the opening of his fire, I had directed the three batteries into action at a point in advance, calculated to sweep the forest and more elevated ground beyond. The march of my division was mainly through an open field, in which exposed position our troops received the enemy's opening fire when about passing the batteries, mainly directed against the left of Walker's, the entire front of Anderson's and Gober's brigades.

At this time Robertson's battery of General Trapier's division, which had just opened fire on the enemy on our left, ceased firing at my request, as our lines came under the range of his guns, and advanced to a position I indicated, where he swept the open ground beyond the skirt of timber already mentioned.\* The contest of our infantry with the enemy was for the space of half an hour sharp and spirited, until we drove them before us to another skirt of timber and underbrush, distant some quarter of a mile beyond an open field. After having cleared the enemy from the forest, and driven him from the open field in front, the division pursued him until his entire force had fled and retreated across the large creek, where the pursuit was called off and the bridge burned, and was then ordered to fall back on Farmington, and thence to return to its encampment within the lines at Corinth.†

Brigadier-General J. P. Anderson speaks in terms of special commendation of the conduct of the First brigade, specifying the Confederate Guards of Louisiana and the Florida battalion, com-

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\* Captain Robertson, from his new position, with his splendid battery of twelve-pounder Napoleon guns, repulsed a strong cavalry charge, and swept the open field beyond the skirt of timbers most effectively, and thus made a timely and telling diversion in favor of my troops, then engaged in a fierce and deadly contest.

† The large creek here referred to was margined by an impassible quagmire. General Van Dorn's unexpected delay in advancing prevented the complete realization of our plan of battle. This was attributable to obstructions along his line of march. It was expected that his force would have advanced rapidly and swept around toward the centre, cutting off the enemy's retreat across the bridge over the creek. Subsequently I was informed that General Pope commanded the Federal forces—comprising his corps—engaged in this battle, and that he had sent a telegram from the field to Mr. Lincoln, the Federal Executive, that he had in this engagement taken 20,000 Rebel prisoners.

Our forces captured a considerable amount of camp equipage, arms and equipments while driving the enemy from the field. At the close of the action General Bragg said, as we met on the field, addressing me, "*General, the honors of the field are yours.*"

DANIEL RUGGLES.

manded by Lieutenant-Colonel Clack; the Twenty-eighth regiment Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Fisk, and also of the Thirty-seventh Mississippi volunteers, during a brief period when under his observation.

The Second brigade, Major D. Gober commanding, participated to a small extent in the action and behaved in a spirited manner, advancing with the line, without however encountering any great force of the enemy.

Brigadier-General S. M. Walker, commanding the First brigade, speaks in high terms of the conduct of the Twentieth regiment Louisiana volunteers, Colonel Richard, and Thirty-seventh regiment Mississippi volunteers, Colonel Benton; also of Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard, commanding Thirteenth regiment Louisiana volunteers, for making a gallant dash at the enemy with his regiment; also of Lieutenant Morgan, Thirty-seventh Mississippi volunteers, who continued to lead his company although wounded.

Colonel Fagan, commanding the Fourth brigade, speaks in high terms of the bearing of the First Arkansas and Second Tennessee, composing his command, and a section of Captain Ketchum's battery attached to his brigade.

Captain Hoxton, with two of James' rifled guns, temporarily attached to the First brigade; Captain Hodgson, with a section of two guns of the Washington artillery, also serving with the First brigade; Captain Ducatel, with his Orleans Guards battery of six guns, and Captain Robertson, with his battery of twelve-pounder field guns, of Brigadier-General Trapier's division, serving temporarily under my orders, were all distinguished for their gallantry, as well as their men for good conduct on the field.

I respectfully refer to the reports of commanders of brigades, and to those of subordinate commanders, for full details of the services promptly and gallantly rendered by the division I have the honor to command.

The accompanying return of casualties will show that our loss in killed and wounded was by no means inconsiderable—amounting to *one hundred and nineteen*.

I am greatly indebted to Captain R. M. Hooe, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major F. C. Tackarie, Twenty-fifth regiment Louisiana volunteers, Assistant Inspector-General; Lieutenants H. H. Price and A. B. de Samuels, on special service, and Dr. Hereford, Chief Surgeon of division, who was indefatigable in the performance of his appropriate duties—for their services on the field.

I am also under obligations for services voluntarily rendered by Captain McMahan, and also Captain Laster, late of Tennessee cavalry, during the engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL RUGGLES, *Brigadier-General.*

Official copy : R. M. HOOE, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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**Official Correspondence of Confederate State Department.**

[CONTINUED.]

*Letters from Honorable C. C. Clay, Jr.*

SAINT CATHERINE'S, C. W., August 11, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, Richmond, Va., C. S. A. :*

Sir—I deem it due to Mr. Holcombe and myself to address you in explanation of the circumstances leading to and attending our correspondence with Hon. Horace Greeley, which has been the subject of so much misrepresentation in the United States, and, if they are correctly copied, of at least two papers in the Confederate States.

We addressed a joint and informal note to the President on this subject, but, as it was sent by a messenger under peculiar embarrassments, it was couched in very guarded terms, and was not so full or explicit as we originally intended or desired to make it. I hope he has already delivered it, and has explained its purpose and supplied what was wanting to do us full justice.

Soon after the arrival of Mr. Holcombe, Mr. Thompson and myself in Canada West, it was known in the United States, and was the subject of much speculation there as to the object of our visit. Some politicians of more or less fame, and representing all parties in the United States, came to see Mr. Holcombe and myself—Mr. Thompson being at Toronto and less accessible than we were at the Falls—either through curiosity or some better or worse motive.

They found that our conversation was mainly directed to the mutual injury we were inflicting on each other by war, the necessity for peace in order to preserve whatever was valuable to both sections,

and probability of foreign intervention when we were thoroughly exhausted and unable to injure others, and the dictation of a peace less advantageous to both belligerents than they might now make, if there was an armistice of sufficient duration to allow passion to subside and reason to resume its sway.

In the meantime, Mr. George N. Sanders, who had proceeded us to the Falls, was addressing, directly or indirectly, his ancient and intimate party friends, and others in the United States supposed to be favorably inclined, assuring them that a peace mutually advantageous to the North and the South might be made, and inviting them to visit us, that we might consider and discuss the subject. He informed us that Mr. Greeley would visit us if we would be pleased to see him. Believing from his antecedents that he was a sincere friend of peace, even with separation if necessary, we authorized Mr. Sanders to say that we would be glad to receive him. Mr. Greeley replied, as we were told, through Mr. Jewett—who had been an active and useful agent for communicating with citizens of the United States—that he would prefer to accompany us to Washington city to talk of peace, and would do so, if we would go. We did not then believe that Mr. Greeley had authorized this proposal in his name, for neither we nor Mr. Sanders had seen it in any telegram or letter from Mr. Greeley, but had it only from the lips of Mr. Jewett, who is reported to be a man of fervid and faithful imagination and very credulous of what he wishes to be true. Notwithstanding, after calm deliberation and consultation, we thought that we could not in duty to the Confederate States decline the invitation, and directed Mr. Sanders to say that we would go to Washington, if complete and *unqualified* protection was given us.

We did not feel authorized to speak for Mr. Thompson, who was absent, and we, moreover, deemed it necessary that he or I should remain here to promote the objects that the Secretary of War had given us and another in charge.

Mr. Sanders responded in his own peculiar style, as you have seen, or will see by the inclosed copy of the correspondence, which was published under my supervision. We did not expect to hear from Mr. Greeley again upon the subject, and were greatly surprised by his note from the United States side of the Falls, addressed to us as "duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace."

How, or by whom, that character was imputed to us, we do not know. We suspect, however, that we are indebted for the attribu-



tion of the high and responsible office to Mr. Jewett, or to that yet more credulous and inventive personage, Dame Rumor. Certainly, we are not justly chargeable with having assumed or affected that character, or with having given any one sufficient grounds to infer that we came clothed with any such powers. We never sought or desired a safe conduct to Washington, or an interview with Mr. Lincoln. We never proposed, suggested or intimated any terms of peace, to any person, that did not embrace the independence of the Confederate States. We have been as jealous of the rights, interest and power of our Government as any of its citizens can be, and have never wittingly compromised them by act, word or sign. We have not felt it our duty to declare to all who have approached us upon the subject that reunion was impossible under any change of the constitution or abridgement of the powers of the Federal Government. We have not dispelled the fond delusion of most of those with whom we have conversed, that some kind of common government might at some time hereafter be re-established. But we have not induced or encouraged this idea. On the contrary, when obliged to answer the question—"Will the Southern States consent to reunion?"—I have answered, "Not *now*. You have shed so much of their best blood, have desolated so many homes, inflicted so much injury, caused so much physical and mental agony, and have threatened and attempted such irreparable wrongs, without justification or excuse, as they believe, that they would now prefer extermination to your embraces as friends and fellow citizens of the same government. You must wait till the blood of our slaughtered people has exhaled from the soil, till the homes which you have destroyed have been rebuilt, till our badges of mourning have been laid aside, and the memorials of our wrongs are no longer visible on every hand, before you propose to rebuild a joint and common government. But I think the South will agree to an armistice of six or more months and to a treaty of amity and commerce, securing peculiar and exclusive privileges to both sections, and possibly to an alliance defensive, or even for some purposes both defensive and offensive."

If we can credit the asseverations of both peace and war Democrats, uttered to us in person or through the presses of the United States, our correspondence with Mr. Greeley has been promotive of our wishes. It has impressed all but fanatical Abolitionists with the opinion that there can be no peace while Mr. Lincoln presides at the head of the Government of the United States. All concede

that we will not accept his terms, and scarcely any Democrat and not all the Republicans will insist on them. They are not willing to pay the price his terms exact of the North. They see that he can reach peace only through subjugation of the South, which but few think practicable; through universal bankruptcy of the North; through seas of their own blood as well as ours; through the utter demoralization of their people, and destruction of their Republican government; through anarchy and moral chaos—all of which is more repulsive and intolerable than even the separation and independence of the South.

All the Democrat presses denounce Mr. Lincoln's manifesto in strong terms, and many Republican presses (and among them the New York *Tribune*) admit it was a blunder. Mr. Greeley was chagrined and incensed by it, as his articles clearly show. I am told by those who profess to have heard his private expressions of opinion and feeling, that he curses all fools in high places and regards himself as deceived and maltreated by the Administration. From all that I can see or hear, I am satisfied that the correspondence has tended strongly towards consolidating the Democracy and dividing the Republicans and encouraging the desire for peace. Many prominent politicians of the United States assure us that it is the most opportune and efficient moral instrumentality for stopping the war that could have been conceived or exerted, and beg us to refrain from any vindication of our course or explanation of our purposes.

At all events, we have developed what we desired to in the eyes of our people,—that war, with all its horrors, is less terrible and hateful than the alternative offered by Mr. Lincoln. We hope that none will hereafter be found in North Carolina, or in any other part of the Confederate States, so base as to insist that we shall make any more advances to him in behalf of peace; but that all of our citizens will gird themselves with renewed and redoubled energy and resolution to battle against our foes until our utter extermination, rather than halt to ponder the terms which he haughtily proclaims as his ultimatum. If such be the effect of our correspondence, we shall be amply indemnified for all the misrepresentation which we have incurred or ever can incur.

Mr. Greeley's purpose may have been merely to find out our conditions of peace, but we give him credit for seeking higher objects. While we contemplated and desired something more, yet it was part of our purpose to ascertain Mr. Lincoln's condition of

peace. We have achieved our purpose in part; Mr. Greeley has failed altogether. He correctly reports us as having proposed no terms. We never intended to propose any until instructed by our Government. We have suffered ourselves to be falsely reported as proposing certain terms—among them reunion—for reasons that our judgment approved, hoping that we would in due time be fully vindicated at home.

If there is no more wisdom in our country than is displayed in the malignant articles of the *Richmond Examiner* and *Petersburg Register*, approving of the ukase of Mr. Lincoln, the war must continue until neutral nations interfere and command the peace. Such articles are copied into all the Republican presses of the United States, and help them more in encouraging the prosecution of the war than anything they can themselves utter.

If I am not deceived, the elements of convulsion and revolution existing in the North have been greatly agitated by the *pronunciamento* of the autocrat of the White House. Not only Democrats, but Republicans are protesting against a draft to swell an army to fight to free negroes, and are declaring more boldly for State-rights and the Union as it was. Many say the draft cannot and shall not be enforced. The Democracy are beginning to learn that they must endure persecution, outrage and tyranny at the hands of the Republicans, just as soon as they can bring back their armed legions from the South. They read their own fate in that of the people of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland. They are beginning to lean more on the side of our people as their natural allies and as the champions of State-rights and of popular liberty. Many of them would gladly lock arms with our soldiers in crushing their common enemy, the Abolitionists. Many of them would fall into our lines if our armies occupied any States north of the Ohio for a month, or even a week. Many of them are looking to the time when they must flee their country, or fight for their inalienable rights. *They are preparing for the latter alternative.*

The instructions of the Secretary of War to us and the officer detailed for special service have not been neglected. We have been arranging for the indispensable co-operation. It is promised, and we hope will soon be furnished. Then we will act. We have been disappointed and delayed by causes which I cannot now explain.

I fondly trust that our efforts will not be defeated or hindered by unwise and intemperate declarations of public opinion, by newspaper editors or others who are regarded as its exponents



We have a difficult *role* to play, and must be judged with charity until heard on our own defence.

I am much indebted to Mr. Holcombe, Mr. Sanders and Mr. Tucker for the earnest and active aid they have given me in promoting the objects of Mr. Thompson's and my mission.

Mr. Thompson is at Toronto, and Mr. Holcombe is at the Falls. If here, or if I could delay the transmission of this communication, I should submit it to them for some expression of their opinions.

As I expect this to reach the Confederate States by a safe hand I do not take the time and labor necessary to put it in cipher—if, indeed, there is anything worth concealing from our enemies.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

C. C. CLAY, JR.

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SAINT CATHERINE'S, C. W., September 12, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of State, Richmond, Va., C. S. A. :*

Sir—I addressed you on the 11th August last in explanation of the circumstances inducing, attending and following the correspondence of Mr. Holcombe and myself with the Hon. Horace Greeley. Subsequent events have confirmed my opinion that we lost nothing and gained much by that correspondence. It has, at least, formed an issue between Lincoln and the South, in which all her people should join with all their might and means. Even his Northern opponents believed, up to the meeting of the Chicago Convention, that the same issue would be decided against him by the people of the United States in November next. All of the many intelligent men from the United States with whom I conversed, agreed in declaring that it had given a stronger impetus to the peace party of the North than all other causes combined, and had greatly reduced the strength of the war party. They thought that not even a majority of the Republicans would sustain Lincoln's ultimatum, laid down as his rescript "To whom it may concern." Indeed, Judge Black stated to us that Stanton admitted to him that it was a grave blunder, and would defeat Lincoln unless he could countervail it by some demonstration of his willingness to accept other terms—in other words, to restore the Union as it was. Judge Black wished to know if Mr. Thompson would go to Washington to discuss the terms of peace, and proceed thence to Richmond; saying that Mr. Stanton desired him to do so, and would send him a safe conduct for that purpose. I doubt not that Judge Black came at the instance of Mr. Stanton.



Mr. William C. Templeton—professedly an acquaintance of the President, a planter in the Mississippi bottoms and a temporary resident of New Jersey, and reputedly a man of wealth before the war—has been here, representing that C. G. Baylor is in New York and was at the Chicago Convention, claiming to be a peace commissioner from the State of Georgia, duly accredited by Governor Brown, and urging an armistice and convention of States. Templeton wishes to see Mr. Thompson and to urge him to accept a safe conduct to Washington, which Baylor was authorized to say would be furnished, with a view of arranging such preliminaries for peace. Templeton has gone to Toronto to see Mr. Thompson on the subject. I had no acquaintance with Mr. Templeton before meeting him here. I have known Mr. Baylor well enough not to place implicit reliance upon his statements. Still, as he is walking abroad in New York and traveling *ad libitum* in the United States, I believe he has been to Washington, and has the authority he claims from there. I do not credit his being sent out by Governor Brown.

Templeton said Baylor objected to his communicating the above facts to me, because I was identified with the *Davis dynasty*, and not likely to agree to any terms of peace that would be unacceptable to the President.

You may have remarked that the New York *Times* maintains, as by authority, that the rescript declares one mode of making peace, but *not the only one*. The abler organs of the Administration seize this suggestion and hold it up in vindication of Lincoln from the charge that he is waging war to abolish slavery, and will not agree to peace until that end is achieved. Mr. Seward, too, in his late speech at Auburn, New York, intimates that slavery is no longer an issue of the war, and that it will not be interfered with after peace is declared. These and other facts indicate that Lincoln is dissatisfied with the issue he has made with the South and fears its decision.

I am told that his purpose is to try to show that the Confederate Government will not entertain a proposition for peace that does not embrace a distinct recognition of the Confederate States, thereby expecting to change the issue from war for abolition to war for the Union. He thinks a majority of the Northern people will oppose him on the issue he has made, but may support him on that he desires to make. It is thought that he will send commissioners to Richmond in order to develop the ultimatum of our Government.

If he does, it seems to me our true policy is not to make such development, or receive commissioners unless they come duly accredited to make peace, and in that event to demand their conditions and respond to them without suggesting ours. It is well enough to let the North and European nations believe that reconstruction is not impossible. It will enflame the spirit of peace in the North and will encourage the disposition of England and France to recognize and treat with us.

Most of our true friends from the Chicago Convention whom I saw, thought it would be very unwise in the South to do anything tending to the defeat of McClellan. They argued thus: "Peace may be made with him on terms you will accept. At all events, he is committed by the platform to cease hostilities and to try negotiations. That is a great concession from him and the war Democracy. An armistice will inevitably result in peace—the war cannot be renewed if once stopped, even for a short time. The North is satisfied that war cannot restore the Union, and will destroy their own liberties and independence if prosecuted much longer.

"If McClellan be elected, the real indebtedness of the Government will be exposed, for his own sake and to damn the Republicans. The war must stop when that is known." (Judge Black says it is not now less than five thousand millions, and such is the common opinion expressed to me).

"Again, your showing a preference for McClellan will aid him, increase the desire and disposition for peace in the North, and will foster the revolutionary spirit in the Northwest in case of Lincoln's election—which may be effected by force or fraud."

The platform means peace, unconditionally; Vallandigham and Weller framed it. It is recognized as satisfactory by nearly all the delegates at the Convention and by the *New York News* and other peace papers. McClellan will be under the control of the true peace men. Horatio or T. H. Seymour is to be Secretary of State; Vallandigham Secretary of War. McClellan is privately pledged to make peace even at the expense of separation, if the South can not be induced to reconstruct any common government.

They also assure me that the speeches and the prevailing sentiment of the people at Chicago were for peace, unconditionally, and this was the impression of the escaped prisoners there—of whom there were near seventy—with whom I have conversed. They say McClellan was nominated for his availability.

On the other hand, some of our friends expressed a hope that Lincoln will be elected on these grounds: "That McClellan has at West Point and Ticonderoga declared for war till the Union is restored, and can accept peace only with reunion; that he can raise an army and money to carry on the war, but Lincoln cannot; that the Republicans will sustain him in making war, and, in addition to them, many Democrats; that he will infuse new life, hopes and vigor into the war party; that foreign nations will wait longer on him than on Lincoln before intervening or recognizing the South; that the platform is in accordance with McClellan's speeches and does not commit him to peace, except on the basis of Union; that Vallandigham betrayed them for the promise of a seat in McClellan's Cabinet; that Lincoln's election will produce revolution in the Northwest—McClellan's will not." Such are the arguments briefly stated of the peace men who support or who oppose McClellan's election.

Perhaps our true policy is to keep our own counsels, withhold any further declaration of purpose, and let the so-called peace party of the North have no excuse for laying its defeat at our door, if Lincoln should be re-elected. By declaring for Lincoln rather than McClellan, we may divide the friends of the latter into a position of hostility to us as implacable and bitter as that of the Republicans. Yet, since reading McClellan's letter of acceptance, I see reason for preferring him to Lincoln.

I am induced to think, from the intimations of the peace papers and of individuals, that there will be a considerable minority of the Democracy of the North who will not vote for McClellan, and that they may put up some other candidate. His nomination has not been greeted as cordially as was anticipated, and the Republicans are evidently in better spirits than they were before the Convention at Chicago. Perhaps the fall of Forts Gaines and Morgan and of Atlanta may have caused the apparent change of feeling in the North. It is thought those events caused McClellan to ignore the platform, or the construction given it by the unconditional peace men, in his letter of acceptance. I remember that Dr. Mackay said, during his visit here, about three weeks since, that the Northern people were as unstable and capricious as spoiled children, and that although a large majority seemed resolved on peace, the capture of Richmond or Atlanta would cause most of them to renew their shouts for war. Certainly they are greatly encouraged by those captures and seem persuaded that the end of the "rebellion" is near at hand.

The Republican papers now urge Lincoln to employ all of his navy, if necessary, to seal up the port of Wilmington, which they say will cut us off from all foreign supplies and soon exhaust our means for carrying on the war.

You may look with confidence to an attack on Fort Fisher ere long. I have been frequently asked by men of Southern birth, residing in the North, whose desire for our independence I do not doubt, whether we could support an army for six months after the port of Wilmington was sealed.

Upon the whole, I am confirmed in the opinion I entertained and often expressed before coming here—that the peace feeling of the North fluctuates with the vicissitudes of the war, increasing with their reverses and diminishing with ours. They will not consent to peace without reunion while they believe they can subjugate us. As to revolution in the Northwest, or anywhere in the United States, I am growing skeptical. The men who gave us strongest assurances of the purpose of the “sons of liberty” to rush to arms if any other illegal arrest was made, or any other abuse of private rights committed, are now in prison or fugitives in Canada. Their houses have been broken open, their arms and private papers seized, and other wrongs done them, without exciting anything more than a feeble protest from their friends. The people who would resist such outrages need a leader, and I fear they will not find one. Many of them would join our army if they could get to it; but they may be forced into that of our enemy. They would resist the draft if they were not deterred by the large police force that is sent to enforce it.

I am assured by those who have been on the Ohio river and the roads leading across it, that recruits for the army of Sherman are being sent forward daily. Lincoln will exert his utmost power to sustain Sherman and Grant in the present positions, in order to insure his re-election. He knows that a great disaster to either of them would defeat him.

Mr. Thompson will, I presume, explain how the plans for the release of the prisoners failed. He took that matter under his peculiar and almost exclusive control, and I knew scarcely anything of it until everything was determined save the time of execution.

Mr. Holcombe will, probably, carry this communication to you and can explain more fully than I can do on paper our operations here. He has remained here at the instance and request of Mr. Thompson and myself, to await the result of the enterprise alluded to above.



He has co-operated with us earnestly and actively in all our efforts, and has sometimes expended the public money in his hands to promote the objects of our mission. Indeed, I am indebted to him for most of the money which I have used; but Mr. Thompson has, since Mr. Sanders was started to Richmond, put in my hands all the funds I asked for and more than I shall probably employ.

When Mr. Holcombe left the result of the measures for the release of our prisoners was not known, and, on that account, he transferred to me the balance of money on deposit to his credit in the bank at this place, that I might use it in affording those who had escaped, or might escape, the necessary transportation to Wilmington. He left here at the instance of Mr. Thompson and myself for reasons which he will explain.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

C. C. CLAY, JR.

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### **Sketch of General Richard Taylor.**

By General D. H. MAURY.

General Richard Taylor was only son of President Zachary Taylor. His father and mother were natives of Virginia, and his grand father, also a Virginian, commanded a brigade of Virginia troops in the battle of Brandywine. The hereditary residence of the family was in Orange county, Virginia.

President Taylor's eldest daughter married Lieutenant Jefferson Davis, the late President of the Southern Confederacy; another daughter married Surgeon Wood, of the United States army, and the other was Mrs. Bliss, now Mrs. Dandridge, of Winchester. When her father was President of the United States, it was Mrs. Bliss who gracefully extended the hospitalities of the President's house. Quite early in life General Dick Taylor took charge of his father's plantation in Mississippi, and soon afterwards moved to a fine estate in Louisiana, to the development of which he addressed himself until the war of 1861 called him to the field. He married Miss Bringer, of Louisiana, thereby connecting himself with several able and prominent men of the State and with one of the most respectable of the Creole families.

His active, vigorous mind could not find scope in the avocations

of a wealthy planter, and he asserted himself in every important State or national movement which interested his people from the time he assumed the responsibilities of a citizen to the day of his death. The prominent part he took in the Charleston Convention and other important events preceding the election of Mr. Lincoln, are fully set down in his book, which is almost a posthumous record of his own remarkable career, and made it inevitable that he would assume a prominence in the struggle he had endeavored to avert.

His military career was exceptionally successful. He was never involved in disaster or identified with any defeat during the four years of his varied and active service. As commander of a brigade under Jackson in the Valley, he was conspicuous by his frequent and critical success, and from the day he arrived in the Trans-Mississippi Department till the day of his promotion to command of the Department of Mississippi and Alabama, his history was a brilliant record of incessant activity and unfailing success, culminating in the remarkable victories of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, which are distinguished above all others by the fact that they afford the most conspicuous instance in which a Confederate commander having won a victory followed it up. Taylor having beaten Banks one day at Mansfield, pursued him twenty-three miles next day, encountered his reinforced army at Pleasant Hill, and beat it again. His operations alone in that Department gave the gleams of hope which redeemed the four years of defeats, inactivity and despondency of the Confederate armies of the Trans-Mississippi Department. When he recrossed to this side of the river, nothing was left to him to do but to provide for the decent obsequies of the corpse of the Confederacy, and in executing this sad duty he evinced the highest capacities of his character.

His promptness and boldness in recognizing the responsibilities of his position, and his tact in the conduct of his negotiations with General Canby, secured to his command the best possible terms of surrender and lent to the closing scenes of his capitulation a dignity and good order which won him the lasting respect of all who were concerned in it. On the close of the war he returned to his ruined estate, which was soon after confiscated and sold. The Legislature of Louisiana granted him a lease of the new canal, which was so administered as to afford him a becoming livelihood, and it is hoped that he had provided sufficient means for the support of his three orphaned daughters.

His book, which has attracted such wide-spread admiration, is but the transcript of the brilliant wit and vivid pictures presented by his ordinary conversation, which, had it been directed to the topics of the work, might have been stenographed just as is there written.

It seems probable that had he lived he would have been placed where his wonderful acquirements and endowments might have greatly served his people.

His absolute self-reliance amounted to a total irreverence for any man's opinion, and he was so intractable as never to be regarded as a safe subject to the behests of a political party; but he has, by the very last act of his life, made an enduring record which holds him among the most remarkable men of the times in which he lived.

He was marked in the expression of his friendships and of his antipathies—these regard the conduct of men rather than the men themselves; and an intimate personal acquaintance, which has been enjoyed ever since he reached manhood, enables me to bear testimony to many kindly acts of this gifted man.

His scholastic experience was confined to America. He was never at school in Edinburg, as has been stated. But no college course could measure or restrain or develop his genius—mankind was his study and the world his curriculum.

He was only fifty-three years old when he died—young enough for a great career. He died in the enjoyment of the first flush of the great success of his first and only book.

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#### Telegrams Concerning Operations around Richmond and Petersburg in 1864.

NEAR PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA,  
August 16th, 1864—8 A. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff*:

All quiet yesterday and last night. Scouts report Second corps marched with five days' rations; expedition must then be only a division to prevent Early being reinforced.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

NEAR PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA,  
August 17th, '64—10 A. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff* :

All quiet here yesterday and last night. No material change reported in enemy's movements or position. Thirty-six wagons and ten ambulances passed this morning on Military road, rear Battery Five, going in direction of City Point.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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NEAR PETERSBURG, August 17th, '64—5 P. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff* :

Have ordered over batteries to open daily for thirty minutes at 2 and 3 A. M., to prevent enemy's concentration of troops for an attack.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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NEAR PETERSBURG, August 18th, '64—10.15 A. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff* :

Following dispatch just received from General Dearing: "Enemy has driven in my pickets and reserve in front of Yellow House. I am just going up with another regiment. Colonel Taliaferro reports them in force with infantry and cavalry." Can any cavalry reinforcements be sent him? I have none here.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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PETERSBURG, 18th August, '64.

Colonel GARNETT, *Commanding Hicksford* :

Enemy reported on railroad at Yellow House, both infantry and cavalry. Be on the alert.

GEORGE WILLIAM BRENT,  
*Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Same also to Colonel Armistead, Weldon.

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NEAR PETERSBURG, 18th August, '64—12 M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff* :

Artillery firing of this morning has developed nothing. General Dearing reported just now "enemy is advancing in force,



both upon railroad and Vaughan road." I have ordered two brigades of infantry to support General Dearing. They must return to-night to their positions.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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NEAR PETERSBURG, August 18th, '64—7 P. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff*:

General Dearing reports having checked enemy's advance at the "Davis House," where they have formed strong line of battle in his front; he does not think, however, the force more than a few regiments of infantry and one or two of cavalry. I have sent some infantry to his assistance.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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NEAR PETERSBURG, August 18th, '64—3.40 P. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff*:

General Hill reports that prisoners taken state that two divisions of Fifth corps are on railroad. Has Fifth corps left your front?

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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NEAR PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA,  
August 19th, '64—8 A. M.

General R. E. LEE, *Chaffin's Bluff*:

Three divisions of enemy reported still in position, fortifying where repulsed last evening near Davis House, on Weldon railroad. I will endeavor to-day to dislodge him with four brigades of our infantry and the division of cavalry you have promised. Result would be more certain with a stronger force of infantry.

Signal station reports just now one brigade of infantry, one hundred wagons and forty-nine ambulances, passing towards our front on Military road, road in rear of Battery Five.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

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AUGUST 21ST, '64—10 A. M.

Major-General C. W. FIELD, *via Chaffin's Bluff*:

If all the enemy have left, send as many of your brigades as you can spare. If Gregg has left, request Hampton to report to me.

R. E. LEE, *General*.

Official: W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

AUGUST 21ST, '64—4.30 P. M.

Major-General C. W. FIELD, *Chaffin's Bluff*:

A brigade of cavalry and one of infantry, followed by wagon train, are reported passing in front of our works around Petersburg to our right. Advise General Hampton. These troops are supposed to come from north of James river.

R. E. LEE, *General*.Official: W. H. TAYLOR, *A. A. G.*

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PETERSBURG, VA., August 21st, '64—4.45 P. M.Major-General WADE HAMPTON, *via Chaffin's Farm*:

Your telegram received. If enemy's cavalry has left north side, I desire you to move with "Hampton's" division to this point as soon as practicable.

R. E. LEE, *General*.Official: W. H. TAYLOR, *A. A. G.*

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AUGUST 21ST, '64—11 P. M.

CHARLES G. TALCOTT,

*Danville Railroad, Richmond, Va., and*

SUPERINTENDENT SOUTHSIDE RAILROAD,

*Petersburg, Va.:*

It is reported that enemy's cavalry crossed Weldon railroad at Reams' this evening, and took direction of Dinwiddie Courthouse. Raid on Southside and Danville railroads may be contemplated. Be on the lookout for them.

W. H. TAYLOR,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General*.

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AUGUST 21ST, 1864—4.45 P. M.Major-General C. W. FIELD, *via Chaffin's Farm*:

Telegram received. If enemy has reduced his force, send two (2) of your brigades to Petersburg. Telegraph Major Wood, Quartermaster, Richmond, to have cars at Rice's turnout.

R. E. LEE, *General*.Official: W. H. TAYLOR, *A. A. G.*

## Editorial Paragraphs.

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MEMORIAL DAY has been duly observed all through the South, and we are under obligations to our friends for invitations from every quarter to attend the exercises.

There seems to have been more interest than usual taken in the proper observance of the day, and we regret that our space does not allow us to give in detail accounts which come to us from all parts of the Confederacy of how loving hands strewed with flowers the graves of sleeping heroes, or of how, in several instances, fitting monuments to our Confederate dead were unveiled.

But we must speak briefly of two memorial services which it was our privilege to attend.

At "*Loudoun Park Cemetery*," near Baltimore, on Thursday evening, June the 5th, we had the privilege of uniting with our comrades of the "*Confederate Army and Navy Society of Maryland*," and the large crowd of ladies and citizens who were present, in paying respect to the memory of the Confederate braves who sleep in this beautiful city of the dead.

The statue of finely chiselled marble, which stands guard over "the bivouac of the dead"—the marble head-stones, which mark each grave—the perfect order in which the cemetery is kept, and the tasteful decorations of evergreens, immortelles and various floral designs—the procession of over four hundred old soldiers of the "*Maryland line*"—the immense crowd of the very best people of Baltimore, and the enthusiasm with which the oration was received—all told that Baltimore still cherishes in her heart of hearts the memory of "the boys who wore the gray."

The orator of the occasion had been happily selected in the person of Hon. A. M. Keiley, of Richmond, who made an address of rare appropriateness, eloquence and power.

The Secretary was the recipient of many courtesies at the hands of Maryland comrades, which he highly appreciated.

The ceremonies at Winchester, Virginia, on Friday, June the 6th, were of deepest interest, and we esteemed it a high privilege to be permitted to mingle in them.

*Winchester*—battle-scarred, heroic, glorious old Winchester—has been first to carry out the eloquent suggestion of Bishop Elliott, of Georgia, and to rear a monument to "THE UNKNOWN AND UNRECORDED DEAD." And surely there is no spot more appropriate on which to erect such a monument. Standing in the beautiful "*Stonewall Cemetery*," one can see the line of march by which the first troops who moved in Virginia in '61 hurried to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the defence of our border. Yonder is the camp from which "old Joe" Johnston moved out to meet Patterson, and from which, after ably eluding his foe, he started on that "forced march to

save the country," which terminated in the brilliant victory of first Manassas. Looking southward, we see the field of Kernstown, where Stonewall Jackson first taught Shields the caution which he afterwards used with such discretion. There are the hills from which we drove Banks on the morning of May 25th, 1862, and in full view the streets of the town, through which we rushed pell-mell after the enemy, amid the waving of handkerchiefs by the noble women and the cheers of the whole people. Yonder is Milroy's Fort, which, in June, 1863, General Early says, was "surprised and captured by Colonel Hilary P. Jones' battalion of artillery." And the very location of the cemetery is on a part of the field where, on the 19th of September, 1862, Early's little army had won a splendid victory over Sheridan's overwhelming numbers, when it was wrested from its grasp by a flank and rear movement of the enemy's cavalry, which alone considerably outnumbered Early's whole army. Indeed, as one looks out on this beautiful landscape, every hill, and valley, and stream, and hamlet, seems redolent with memories of those stirring movements by which Winchester changed hands no less than eighty-three times during the war, and we can almost see Johnston, Jackson, Stuart, Ewell, Ashby, A. P. Hill, Early, Breckinridge, Gordon, Rodes, Ramseur, Pegram, and other chieftains leading their brave men to the onset.

How appropriate that, amid such scenes as these, a monument should be reared to the "unknown and unrecorded dead" of the rank and file who followed these splendid leaders.

But above all, there stands hard by the heroic old town of Winchester, whose people, from 1861 to 1865, threw open their doors to the Confederate soldier, and esteemed it a sweet privilege to share with him their last crust of bread, and whose noble women were "ministering angels" in the hospital, and always ready to make any sacrifice, endure any hardship, suffer any privation or risk any danger for the land they loved so well and the cause they served so faithfully.

We would have expected these people to have honored the Confederate dead and accordingly we find that as early as the autumn of 1865 (before any similar movement, North or South, had been inaugurated), two ladies of Winchester (Mrs. Phil. Williams and Mrs. A. H. H. Boyd) conceived the plan of gathering into one cemetery and properly caring for the remains of the Confederate soldiers scattered through the Valley. They called around them their sisters, and went to work so vigorously that in October, 1866, they dedicated "Stonewall Cemetery," and announced that they had collected and buried in it the bodies of 2,494 Confederate soldiers.

They have continued to improve the cemetery, until it is now one of the most beautiful in the land. Each State has its own section, and the dead from Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Kentucky are all arranged in well kept graves, each one of which is marked with a neat head-board; and in the center of each section is a wooden shaft, appropriately inscribed to the fallen heroes of that particular State. Each section is under the charge of a committee of ladies, who vie with each other in honorable rivalry for the proper care of "*our graves*."



The plan is that each State shall substitute this wooden shaft by one of marble or granite, appropriately carved and inscribed, and when this design has been fully realized, there will be here a perpetual memorial of the gallant sons of all of these States who marched forth so gayly at their country's call and gave their lives so freely to the cause of constitutional freedom.

Always in the lead in efforts to honor our Confederate dead, a few ladies in Winchester organized themselves together as the "*Virginia Shaft Association*," and by their earnest efforts secured, paid for, and unveiled, on the 6th of June, a beautiful marble shaft for the Virginia section, which has been greatly admired, and is considered very cheap, at \$1,500. Cannot our devoted women of other States do the same for their respective sections?

But besides these marked graves, there have been gathered 829 soldiers, who were buried in separate coffins, but of whom nothing could be learned, save that they died in the gray uniform defending the "stars and bars." It is over these that the central monument to the "*unknown and unrecorded dead*" has been erected, and who so beautifully realize the inscription on one face of the monument:

"Who they were, none know;  
What they were, all know."

We regret that we have not space for a full description of the monument, which is forty-nine feet high, and of Italian marble, resting on a base of Richmond granite—the base and faces being beautifully carved and appropriately inscribed, and the crowning figure being a private soldier—not the jaunty militiaman, the disciplined "regular," or the "holiday" soldier of times of peace, but the veteran who followed Stonewall Jackson—standing with bowed head and hands folded upon his reversed rifle.

The monument is the work of Mr. Thomas Delahanty, of Philadelphia (a gentleman who lost a brother in the Confederate army), and is certainly most beautifully executed. The cost of the whole was \$10,000—of which the committee have paid all except \$1,500, which they would have realized by a collection on the day of the unveiling except for the rain, which dispersed the vast crowd. [Let us say, by way of parenthesis, that any one desiring the privilege of helping to complete this good work can do so by sending a contribution to *James B. Russell, chairman Finance Committee, Winchester*].

Nor will our limited space allow any detailed account of the ceremonies of unveiling the monument. By every train and every highway, the people poured into the old town, and a crowd assembled which the most careful estimates put at full 25,000. The military and civic procession was under charge of General J. E. Johnston, assisted by General Dabney H. Maury, Colonel L. T. Moore, Major R. W. Hunter, Major S. J. C. Moore, Major H. Kyd Douglass, General J. R. Herbert, Colonel H. E. Peyton, Captain Wm. N. Nelson, Colonel Wm. Morgan, Major F. H. Calmes, Colonel C. T. O'Ferrall, Captain S. S. Turner, General Geo. H. Steuart, Colonel R. P. Chew, Captain P. P. Dandridge, Captain Ran. Barton, Colonel Harry Gilmor, Colonel R. H. Lee, Captain Wm. L. Clarke, Dr. W. S. Love, Dr. S. Taylor Holliday, and Dr. Cornelius Baldwin—names which will all be recognized as

among our most gallant Confederate soldiers. In the line were (besides a number of artillery and infantry volunteer companies) several remnants of Ashby's old cavalry, the Maryland Confederate Army and Navy Society, 400 strong; survivors of Murray's company of the Maryland line, a large number of the old "foot cavalry" who followed Stonewall Jackson, and numbers of the men who rode with Ashby.

In carriages were Governor Holliday, General John T. Morgan, of Alabama; Rev. Dr. A. C. Hopkins, the chaplain of the old Second Virginia infantry; J. Wm. Jones, secretary Southern Historical Society; General Fauntleroy, General W. H. F. Lee, General Eppa Hunton, General Marcus J. Wright, Colonel Wm. Allan, Hon. A. M. Keiley, Judge Jos. H. Sherrard, president of the Monumental Association; Mrs. Mary E. Kurtz, president, and other lady officers of the Virginia Shaft Association, and a number of other invited guests.

As the procession moved through the principal streets, amid the waving of handkerchiefs and the cheers of the crowd (the veterans bearing a number of tattered Confederate battle-flags), one was very forcibly reminded of the brave old days when the battle raged to and fro through these streets.

At the cemetery, the monument was unveiled by Governor Holliday, Rev. Dr. Hopkins led in an appropriate prayer, Dr. J. Wm. Jones read the report of the monument committee, Governor Holliday made an eloquent and appropriate address in introducing the orator of the day, and General John T. Morgan, United States Senator from Alabama, made a magnificent oration worthy of the occasion and the reputation of this gallant soldier and distinguished statesman.

The people of Winchester threw wide open their doors, and entertained all comers with the princely hospitality which always characterized them.

It will be a sad pleasure to hearts all over the South, which bleed afresh as they think of manly forms which marched forth at the call of Duty, but came not back again to their accustomed places, to know that they sleep well beneath this green sod, with these noble women to deck their graves, these grand old mountains to sentinel their tombs, and these clear streams to murmur their praises.

But let us see to it that we build them a monument more enduring than marble, "more lasting than bronze," as we put on record the true story of their heroic deeds, and enshrine them forever in the hearts of generations yet unborn.

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No. 8.

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**Foreign Recognition of the Confederacy—Letter from Honorable  
James Lyons.**

WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS,  
GREENERIER COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA, August 21, 1875.

To Colonel ALLEN B. MAGRUDER, *Baltimore* :

Dear Colonel—I received your letter when I was too ill to reply to it, and have been since so fluctuating between convalescence and sickness as to be unable to prepare the statement of our conversation when I had the pleasure to see you at my house in Richmond, which will, I hope, excuse my delay. In that conversation I advanced the opinion that slavery was not the cause of the late war between the North and the South; that the real cause of the war was the reduction of the tariff by the compromise measures which were introduced by Mr. Clay, the love of power and the desire of aggrandizement being the real motives. In support of this view, which I have always entertained, I repeated the statement made to me by my friend James M. Mason. He told me in Washington, soon after the passage of the compromise bill, that Mr. Seward said to

him, "You have hit me in a vital point, and now I must recover by striking you in a vital point"; to which Mr. Mason replied: "What is that—slavery?" Seward said, "Yes." Without the protective tariff, the wealth and influence of the New England States would be very much diminished, and the popularity of Mr. Seward so far impaired as to destroy his hopes of the Presidency, unless he found a remedy for the disease. The agitation of the abolition of slavery commenced, therefore, at that time, in selfish and sordid considerations, and from those motives it was continued by its originators, the fanatics joining them and fanning the flame until Mr. Seward announced "the irrepressible conflict." There were, in point of fact, very few sincere fanatics at that time, and those not at all among the politicians. John Quincy Adams, the ablest and most daring of the agitators, as well as the most vindictive, because he and his father had been curtailed of their "fair proportions," as he thought, by not being elected to the Presidency for the second term, did not pretend to any false philanthropy or fanaticism, but put his action upon the ground that by the provision of the constitution which allowed fractional representation for "all others" besides the whites, the North was governed by the votes of slaves; and you doubtless recollect his ferocious declaration to Mr. Dillet, of Alabama, when he remonstrated against his abolition scheme, and said, "The gentleman from Massachusetts does not reflect how much blood will be shed and how many lives lost if his scheme succeeds"; and Mr. Adams roared out at the top of his voice, "Let it come, though *millions* be bathed in blood."

Soon after Mr. Seward left the gubernatorial chair of New York, he went to Washington to argue a cause in the Supreme Court (he told me, I think, that it was a patent case), and from Washington he came to Richmond. Mr. Webster, with whom it was my good fortune to hold the most cordial relations—and a man of larger heart and more genial nature I never knew—wrote me a very warm letter of introduction by him, and I entertained him at my house at night, because he said he had not time to stay to dinner next day. Mr. Stanard, Mr. Leigh, Mr. Johnson, and all the prominent lawyers of Richmond and many others were invited to meet him. In the course of the evening, when Mr. Seward and myself were sitting on a sofa, Messrs. Stanard and Leigh, who were among Seward's green ones, being on the opposite side of the room, the conversation turned upon the annexation of Texas, then



lately disposed of, and I said to Mr. Seward, "Governor, may I ask you one question?" "Oh, as many as you please," was the reply. I then said: "Did you confide in the opinion" (which, as Governor of New York, he had put forth, viz:) "that it was unconstitutional to annex Texas?" And with his peculiar laugh, he replied: "Oh, no; I was very much surprised to see that some of you men down South were green enough to be caught with that idea. If you had given us free territory every man of us would have voted for Texas."

(I was not one of the "green ones," but was always and to the bitter end in favor of the annexation of Texas, as, by the way, Mr. Clay told me he was, "with the consent of the North and peace with Mexico," when he explained his plan to me of dividing Texas into three free and two slave States). But that night fixed my opinion of Mr. Seward as a man destitute of all public principle, and I never spoke to him afterwards, except once, per force almost, in the library of the Supreme Court.

In further proof of the correctness of my opinion, I mentioned to you the fact that in the year 1859 (I think it was), at the residence of the late Robert C. Stanard, in the city of Richmond, I had a conversation with Mr. Jo. Holt, now the Judge Advocate-General, I believe, of the army, in relation to the abolition of slavery, in which I told him that I was very much surprised that he, a Kentuckian, should be in favor of it; and for the purpose of illustrating the injustice and inhumanity of it more strongly, I said, after pointing out the horrors to flow from it, commencing with the right of suffrage and political equality which must be conferred upon them, "Suppose, that to avoid these ills, we of the South were to emancipate all the slaves—then about two million five hundred thousand in round numbers—and could drive them all across the Potomac, what would you say to it?" He replied, "We would meet you on the north bank of the Potomac with all the muskets and bayonets we could command and drive them back or drive them into the river." "Then," said I, "you admit that you would inflict upon your white brethren of the South an evil so great that, rather than be subjected to it yourselves, you would put to death two million five hundred thousand of your pets, the objects of your philanthropy?" "Well," said he, "I can't help that." Not very long after that the election took place, followed by the war, the more immediate agents in producing which were Stephen A. Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois (which State unjustly denounced Mr. Davis lately). Mr. Douglas, in the hope of getting the South-

ern vote for the Presidency, had, when Hon. Jefferson Davis proposed to extend the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific ocean, met him by a counter proposition to repeal it, which was carried by Northern against Southern votes; and in a subsequent discussion with him before the people of Illinois, Mr. Lincoln was the first man who brought the abolition of slavery into the Presidential election by declaring that the country could not "be half free and half slave, but must be all free or all slave"; and with this idea, and with Douglas' repeal of the Missouri compromise, "fired the Northern mind" with the belief that the Southern people and their allies intended to carry slavery into the North; and Mr. Lincoln afterwards declared war against the South in defiance of his own maxim just quoted—not because the Southern people were attempting or intending to extend slavery over the North, but because they proposed to exempt the North from all risk of such evil, and asked only to be let alone and have their evils confined to themselves. The war progressed, however, and we of the South were all denounced as traitors, because we would not do that very thing for the alleged contemplation of which we had been previously denounced as the enemies of the country and of humanity, to wit: propagate slavery in the Northern States; and ten Governors sat in judgement upon us and doomed us, unheard, to extermination, for since the war of Alyattes against the Milesians (and including it), five hundred years before the birth of Christ, so cruel and savage a war has never been waged by any nation, however barbarous, against another, as that waged upon us. Besides the employment of countless mercenaries to slaughter our people, many of whom were blood relations of the assailants, our slaves were made, or attempted to be made, our masters; private property was taken or destroyed, including our dwellings, wherever a Sherman, a Sheridan, or a Hunter appeared, in violation of the rules of civilized modern war, and all our archives and judicial records which were accessible were destroyed or removed, with a view, of course, to destroy the titles to our property and make it almost impossible to recover it, where an invader or other wrong-doer had possession of it—an outrage previously unheard of in any country. Still, I repeat, that this infamous war was waged from no sympathy with or humanity for the negro, and from no love of country.

In proof of this, I will relate a conversation I had at my house, Laburnum, near Richmond, with Count Mercier, the French Minister, in the month of May or early part of June, 1862. He, it will

be recollected, visited Richmond by permission of the Northern Government, but was interdicted from holding direct intercourse with President Davis or any of his Cabinet, and he spent nearly two days of his time at my house, in Henrico. In point of fact, as the sequel will disclose, he was sent here (by Mr. Seward) with a view to make peace—in Seward's slang, "to save the life of the nation." In the course of a day's discussion in my library, he asked me a great many questions; among others, the question:

"Can you whip McClellan?" who was then lying with an army of two hundred thousand men within six miles of Richmond, confronted by General Lee.

I told him, in reply, that I felt sure we could and would, and if the Emperor of the French would open the ports and keep them open we would march to New York and not ask the loan of a man or a dollar. With great animation he sprang to his feet and said in French:

"If such be the temper of your people, you are invincible. But why do you think you will whip McClellan?"

I answered, "Because the President and General Lee tell me they believe we will."

Then he added, "But do you know how many men are bearing upon Richmond?"

I replied, "The President thinks there are two hundred thousand. General Lee thinks not so many—but more than one hundred and fifty thousand."

To which he replied, "They are both mistaken. There are two hundred and twenty-five thousand. General Burnside's force at Port Royal is a part of the force bearing upon Richmond—sent to Port Royal merely in the hope of inducing General Lee to detach a part of his army to meet it. I am just from the War Office, and have all the statistics here," (holding up a paper which he drew from his pocket); but, he added, "Can't this war be stopped? Can't you come back under the old flag?"

I said, "I suppose that is impossible, for Mr. Seward would not permit us to do so without the abolition of slavery, and it would be useless to propose that to the men from the extreme South."

To that he replied, "You are mistaken. If you will only return and acknowledge the flag, Mr. Seward will permit you to return without any conditions."

"What!" said I, "with the institution of slavery?"

"Yes," he said.

I then said, "But there is yet one thing more to be considered. To use the phrase which was so much hackneyed with respect to the Northeastern boundary question of 'indemnity for the past and security for the future,' we can't ask, I know, indemnity for the past, but we must have security for the future. We cannot live hereafter in the state of harassment and excitement in which we have lived for some years past."

Then drawing his hand across a piece of paper lying upon the library-table, upon the opposite sides of which we were sitting, he said:

"Mr. Seward will allow you to write your own guarantees." I expressed my individual readiness to consent to those terms. I had been in favor of the Southern convention which South Carolina proposed through Mr. Memminger, her commissioner, believing as I did, in which I am now confirmed, that if all the Southern States met in convention, as proposed by South Carolina, such guarantees would be asked of the Northern people as they would grant, and which would protect us, and in that event there would be no secession, and I certainly did not wish secession if we could be protected in the enjoyment of our constitutional rights, and that I believe was the general sentiment of the South. I believe I have given you almost, if not exactly *verbatim*, these conversations to which I referred in my conversation with you. I will add that the day following the conversation with the French Minister, a large company of gentlemen dined with him at my house, and he left there after ten o'clock at night in a rain, in order, as he said, to send a dispatch to Norfolk to fire up a steamer which could take him or his dispatches, I forget which, to New York before the next Atlantic steamer sailed.

The battle of Cold Harbor and the other battles around Richmond occurred not long afterward, and I had no doubt of our acknowledgment by the French Government, and was very much surprised that it did not come.

Some time afterward the French Consul, Monsieur Paul, drove up to my house one Sunday afternoon, and very soon entered into conversation about the acknowledgment of the Confederate Government by the Emperor of the French, and asked me if we could not pass some bill for the gradual abolition of slavery in fifty or sixty years. Maybe it might do even if it was longer, and said that if that were done the Emperor would immediately acknowledge us, but that the French people would not be satisfied without



such a provision for the abolition of slavery. They did not care how distant it was, so the fact was secured as the price of recognition, and the Emperor would be fully justified.

I expressed my individual willingness to accede to those terms, and promised to see the President upon the subject next morning when I went into Congress, and if he agreed with me I would immediately introduce a bill for the purpose.

"But," said I, "Monsieur Paul, what guarantee can you give us that, if we take so important a step, the Emperor will acknowledge us?"

He replied, "Mr. Lyons, nobody can guarantee the Emperor, but you may be sure that the Emperor will do what I tell you he will do," which I considered as but another mode of saying that he had been authorized to do what he had done.

It is due to Mr. Davis to say that I saw him next morning, at his own house, before Congress met, as soon as I went into town, and told him what had passed between the French Consul and myself. His answer was, "I should concur with you in accepting these terms but for the constitutional difficulty. You know that Congress has no jurisdiction over the subject of slavery." "True," I said, "but that difficulty may be gotten over, in my opinion, without any violation of the constitution. Let the bill providing for the gradual abolition of slavery also provide that it shall not take effect until the States have, by acts of their respective Legislatures, duly passed, approved and ratified it, which you know will be just as good as if passed beforehand, authorizing Congress to do the thing. I will not be guilty of the presumption of offering such a bill upon my simple responsibility, but if I may say that you concur with me I will introduce the bill to-morrow." He then asked me why the French Government could not deal with the States in the matter, so as to avoid all constitutional questions. I told him I had put that very question to the French Consul, and his answer was, "France does not know the States, but she knows the Confederate Government and President Davis."

Mr. Davis then said, "Well, I must consult the Cabinet, and if they agree with you I will send for you." And there the matter ended.

Yours truly,

JAMES LYONS.

## The Battle of Williamsburg—Reply to Colonel Bratton.

By Colonel D. K. McRAE.

WILMINGTON, N. C., June 3d, 1879.

REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary, Richmond* :

My Dear Sir—The June number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, being volume VII, No. 6, of the series, has been placed in my hands by a friend, who called my attention to a "paper" purporting to be a "narrative of Colonel Bratton, Sixth South Carolina regiment," of the operations of his regiment at Williamsburg, May 5th, 1862. This "paper" seems to have been written in 1868, and was "originally prepared for General E. P. Alexander." The "paper" does not confine itself to a "narrative of the operations" of that regiment, but goes on to describe the action of General J. A. Early's brigade, on the left of our line, in an encounter it had with a brigade of General W. S. Hancock, in the evening of that day, and the author allows himself to criticise the conduct of the officer then in command of the Fifth North Carolina regiment, which made part of Early's brigade, and which bore, I think I may say, a conspicuous part in that encounter—and to express the opinion that but for "bad management" (which, in the connection it bears, has reference to the officer in immediate command) the attack would have been effective.

The language of Colonel Bratton is: "I have never, on any field during the war, seen more splendid gallantry than on that field of Williamsburg, but that splendid gallantry was thrown away, and wasted by bad management, when it would have been entirely effective if properly directed." The compliment is a fit one to the Fifth North Carolina regiment. No troops could have behaved more courageously, and certainly none suffered more disastrously. A casualty list of two hundred and ninety killed and wounded, out of a total of four hundred and ten, rank and file; of ten commissioned officers killed and ten wounded of twenty-four who entered the fight, bespeaks a mortal combat and the steadiness of those engaged. The exalted encomium which its distinguished adversary passed upon it when he said, "The State of North Carolina should write *immortal* on the banner of its Fifth regiment," was a tribute worthy to be rendered by a heroic enemy. A glowing testimony also to its "splendid gallantry" may be found in the columns of the New York *Herald*, published a few days after the battle.

I am quite aware that General Joseph E. Johnston has made a very summary disposition of that action and of the troops engaged in it in his "Narrative." He says, at page 122: "Early's brigade advanced in two equal detachments, commanded one by Major-General Hill and the other by himself. They were separated in a thick wood, and General Early, in issuing from it, found a redoubt near and in front of him. He attempted an assault, in which he was severely wounded; after which his two regiments were quickly defeated, with a loss of near four hundred men." I don't know where General Johnston obtained his information, but his *Narrative* is no more accurate than Colonel Bratton's. Early's brigade did not "advance in two detachments"; it advanced in single line of battle, as hereafter described.

If "one detachment was commanded by General Hill and the other by General Early," then Hill commanded the *two intermediate regiments* and Early commanded the two regiments on the flanks, and his command was "*separated*" at the start. Why I say so is, that the right and left regiments—the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia—were the two which participated in the fight; and the former got into it by advancing across the entire line of the two intermediate regiments—which were in the woods with General Hill—to the relief of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, already engaged.

If Early "attempted an assault" on a redoubt which, "in issuing, he found near and in front of him," then *he did* attempt to take the redoubt where Colonel Bratton was, and Colonel Bratton's mistake is only in thus designating the regiment, for this regiment that Early was leading was the Twenty-fourth Virginia. As the Fifth North Carolina had not then come up, I don't know how this is. But of this I am sure, that neither General Early, nor Colonel Terry, nor Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston, have ever supposed that they had a fight with friendly troops and received their wounds from Confederates. But if General Johnston's statement is correct, this must have been the case, for no "attempt to assault" a redoubt was made either by the Twenty-fourth Virginia or Fifth North Carolina after they came together. So if General Early was "severely wounded" in assaulting the redoubt described by General Johnston, then Colonel Bratton is entitled to the credit of it.

The Fifth North Carolina pursued the retreating enemy until part of his forces, in some confusion, ran into a redoubt, and others, with less disorder, went behind it, and it then halted, and

its commanding officer applied to General Hill for the force which had entered on the attack—and which then made part of his brigade, and which was near by—to enable him *to assault the redoubt*; and that same officer earnestly protested against being required to retreat from an enemy who was then retreating from him. But the force was withheld and the order to retreat was given. Neither of these regiments were “quickly defeated,” or defeated at all. The Fifth North Carolina was scarcely harmed at all until the retreat began. The loss was desperate in a few moments *after* the retreat began; but at the time it was ordered to retreat, it had advanced to within seventy-five yards of the enemy’s redoubt and not far from his battery, and it was holding its ground in security when the order to retreat came. It was not strong enough to attempt the assault on the redoubt alone; but as it had advanced under orders from both Generals Hill and Early, and as there was ample power close by to make quick work of the assault, the reinforcements were confidently expected, and the order to retreat most earnestly deplored. I have had reason to suppose that General Early would long since have corrected this error of General Johnston, and I wonder that he has not done so.

But much allowance is to be made for the poor estimate formed of us by General Johnston. He was not on the field, and of course had no view of the transaction, and no report which reached him has ever given a correct account of it. Besides, the disaster suffered occurred after the troops were ordered to retreat, and General Johnston thinks a retreat ought to be conducted without loss—forgetting evidently that scarce any officer is as skilled in retreat as he is, for to be so would be at once to acquire the highest military quality and character. The most the friends of the brave troops who bore part in that action can say in reply to this slur upon them, will be to employ General Johnston’s own words with reference to himself in another part of his book: “It is sometimes necessary to go to the enemy for the truth.”

But to Colonel Bratton’s narrative. The bad management of which he complains is that when the Fifth North Carolina came within fifty yards of the enemy’s line, “it encountered a small fence, partly torn down by the enemy, *and unfortunately halted and commenced firing*”; whereas he thinks if it had pushed on against the four regiments of Hancock—one in a redoubt and supported by a battery of six guns (“four flags and a battery of six guns,” as he says)—the enemy’s rout would have been completed. I



shall hereafter reply more particularly to this complaint, but at present will notice other portions of the narrative.

After some explanations of *his* position with reference to certain redoubts to the left of our line on that day, Colonel Bratton says:

“The enemy, however, did not advance on me; but late in the evening our friends did—Early’s brigade charged my works from the left and rear. Nobody, either officer or scout, had come to the front to reconnoitre, and they did not even know where the enemy were. They charged me (two regiments of them) across the line of the enemy, one regiment against each of the works that my troops occupied. I did not know that they were near until they emerged from the wood on the charge, and seeing their mistake I rushed out to stop them and change their direction before they were exposed to the fire of the enemy; but they would not heed, and on they went until they reached my redoubt, when they for the first time learned where the enemy were. Two of Early’s regiments were stopped in the wood and proper direction given to them (the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Hoke’s North Carolina regiment). The two that charged my works were the Fifth North Carolina and a Virginia regiment commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel Early—a brother, I was told, of the General. *The Fifth North Carolina* charged across the entire front of the enemy to the redoubt occupied by my two companies, and on finding it already ours, with scarce a halt, changed direction and advanced most handsomely against the enemy (my two companies joining them in the charge) to within, I think, at least fifty yards of the enemy’s line, when they encountered a small fence, partly torn down by the enemy, and unfortunately halted and commenced firing.”

Now it is utterly impossible that this statement can be accurate—nay, it would be difficult to find an equal amount of error in a like compass—and however well intended the narrative may have been, its inaccuracy renders it valueless as a *historical paper*.

First. There was never a moment during the whole encounter when the Fifth North Carolina regiment was in position to “charge across the line of the enemy,” or to “charge across the entire front of the enemy to the redoubt occupied by ‘Colonel Bratton’s’ two companies.” No moment of time occurred when any portion of the enemy was, or could have been, *on the flank of that regiment*. It was face to face with his line of battle long before it came within reach of his small guns, and it so remained until it retreated under the order of General Hill, and it several times turned and delivered fire and received that of the enemy while retiring. No such charge “across the entire front of the enemy” was made—no such “change of direction” as that described occurred; and no such demonstra-

tion towards "the redoubt occupied by my (Colonel Bratton's) two companies," was or could have been made.

This regiment first appeared in the field at a distance of at least five hundred yards from the redoubt spoken of, to the south of it towards Fort Magruder, and of course at a still further distance from the enemy's line. The field was an open one towards and beyond the two redoubts held by Colonel Bratton's troops, and the view embraced its whole scope, including the extreme left redoubt or fort mentioned by Colonel Bratton as held by the enemy. Early's brigade officers had been informed by General Hill that there were two redoubts in that direction occupied by South Carolina troops. On emerging into the field the Fifth North Carolina regiment received a shot from a battery on the left beyond the two redoubts, and it promptly changed front to face that battery and to advance upon its supports. There being no indication of an enemy in its front before it changed direction, and the shot having indicated the position of the battery, the regiment was put in brisk motion upon its new direction; and supposing General Hill to be in the woods somewhere, where the centre of the brigade would be, I dispatched Major Sinclair to state to him the posture of affairs and to ascertain if that was the battery he desired the regiment to charge, and to urge upon him to expedite the advance of the regiments, which had not as yet appeared on the field—for at this time the Twenty-fourth Virginia, being Early's left regiment, was already engaged with the enemy to our left-front. Its firing could be seen and heard, and showed plainly where the enemy was. General Hill's order to me was, *yes*, to assail that battery with the bayonet, and do it quickly. While still at some distance from the two redoubts and while advancing at double-quick, Captain Sam. Early, of General Early's staff, rode to me from General Early. He came from the nearest redoubt, where Colonel Bratton was, and informed me that the General had been wounded and was obliged to retire, and that he directed me to advance as rapidly as possible, as the command of the brigade had devolved upon me. When nearing the redoubts, as my line of march would bring me between them, I requested Lieutenant-Colonel Badham, who was on the right of the regiment, to push forward to the redoubt on the right and notify the officer in command, who I had heard was Colonel Coward, that we were friends, advancing to attack the enemy, and he did so. It would seem, therefore, to be perfectly clear that in so far as the Fifth North Carolina is concerned, Colonel Bratton could not have

“rushed out to stop *them*” as “they emerged from the woods on the charge,” or “to change *their* direction before they were exposed to the fire of the enemy.”

They were in the right direction—their commanding officer being in communication with his two superior officers, both on the field, and being then actually engaged in obeying the orders of both of them.

Again, Colonel Bratton says: “Two of Early’s regiments were stopped in the wood and proper direction given to them (the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Hoke’s North Carolina regiment). The two that charged my works were the Fifth North Carolina and a Virginia regiment commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel Early.” Having shown that such a charge by the Fifth North Carolina was impossible, I proceed to show that the statement is not accurate, as to the Virginia regiment—and this is so for two reasons: First. There was no regiment in Early’s brigade, or on that field, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Early. Second. There was no such officer as Lieutenant-Colonel Early. Nor is the statement more *historic* that the Twenty-fourth Virginia regiment was “stopped in the wood and proper direction given to it.” The Twenty-fourth Virginia, being on the left of the brigade and nearest to the enemy, was the first to come in contact with him. It was never “stopped in the wood” by anybody. It encountered the enemy’s skirmishers to the west and rear of the redoubt, where Colonel Bratton was. It pushed these skirmishers out into the field, and had a brisk fight with the right of his line, to the left of the redoubt and beyond the front of it, while the Fifth North Carolina was getting up; and in this fight General Early, Colonel Terry, commanding the Twenty-fourth, and its Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston, were all wounded. What part Colonel Bratton’s command bore in that fight of course I do not know. I am sure, however, that no portion of it reported to or was seen by me when I took command of that regiment, as part of the brigade actually in the field, which I did as soon as I reached the redoubt, and while the Fifth North Carolina was pushing the enemy beyond the two redoubts. When Colonel Bratton further says: “The Twenty-fourth Virginia had meanwhile [that is, about the time the Fifth North Carolina reached the fence] emerged from the wood on the left, nearer to the enemy than my redoubt on which Early’s regiment charged, and was moving in fine style upon them. Early’s regiment never recovered from the confusion into which they were thrown by the taking of my works. They



were formed, however, and started forward, but went obliquely to the left to the wood, and I saw no more of them"—I am involved in utter confusion, because the Twenty-fourth Virginia was the first to emerge from the woods. It opened the fight and continued in it to the close. No other of the four regiments of Early's brigade than the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia did participate, and there was no Early's regiment to recover from confusion, nor any other regiment to take Colonel Bratton's works, than the Twenty-fourth Virginia.

In the charge made by the Fifth North Carolina on the right, the Twenty-fourth Virginia bore part on the left. It moved upon them under *my order*, and at that time there certainly was *no regiment* "which formed and started forward, but went obliquely to the left to the wood." General Early had been wounded and retired. I saw South Carolina soldiers in the redoubt, but supposed they were under orders to remain there. None of them joined the charge that I saw or heard of. So if any regiment of Early's brigade *did take Colonel Bratton's works*, it must have been the Twenty-fourth Virginia; and I have had frequent conversations with the officers of that regiment, and I make bold to say that if it encountered any Confederate troops, or took any work from friendly occupiers, they were wholly unaware of the fact. And if this taking of works did occur, it must have been when General Early was present with the Twenty-fourth Virginia; for when I reached the redoubt, simultaneously with the passage of the Fifth North Carolina between the two, I found the Twenty-fourth—which had already been engaged—in line, on the left of the redoubt, and prepared to advance with the Fifth North Carolina. Some of its men were about the redoubt.

Colonel Bratton further says:

"I met General Early near this redoubt, himself and horse both wounded, and told him that I had checked the enemy, and been there watching him for three or four hours, and asked him to give me a place in the charge. He said, 'Certainly, go.' I told him that some of my men were in that fort. He said, 'Take them and go toward the enemy.' I took my men out of the fort and moved them all forward into the gap left by the oblique movement of Early's regiment into the woods. We advanced to within a hundred yards of the enemy, when we were ordered by General D. H. Hill to move by the left flank into the wood."

In the connection in which Colonel Bratton makes this state-



ment it is evident that he fixes it at the time the Fifth North Carolina regiment was charging the enemy's line—and about the time it reached the *fence*—for he continues: "The Fifth North Carolina, *on our right*, as I said above, unfortunately stopped and commenced firing," &c. This statement to me is a bundle of inexplicabilities.

1. General Early was not at that time on the field. He had left before the North Carolina regiment had come parallel with the redoubt.

2. There could have been no gap "left by the oblique movement of Early's regiment into the wood," because there was no *Early's* regiment, and neither of the other two regiments—the Thirty-eighth Virginia, Colonel Whittle, or the Twenty-third North Carolina, Colonel Hoke—had been on the field, but had both "been stopped in the woods," and General Hill was with them.

3. It was I who ordered the advance of the Twenty-fourth Virginia to that charge on the left of the Fifth North Carolina, and if there was any gap between the two regiments filled by Colonel Bratton's troops, I never heard of it. I accredited the Fifth North Carolina and the Twenty-fourth Virginia with that charge in a letter to the Governor of North Carolina, written a few days after and which was extensively published, and also in my report as brigade commander to General Hill. I certainly made no mention of any South Carolina troops, for I was not aware of the presence of any; nor did I ever hear any complaint of the omission.

The Colonel's further narrative is equally a mistake: "The Twenty-fourth Virginia on my left was not in time to engage them simultaneously with the Fifth North Carolina regiment, and also met the concentrated fire of nearly the whole of the enemy's line, but being nearer to cover, did not suffer so terribly in retiring, but were completely used up, thus leaving my regiment advancing alone to share the same fate."

Now, how could it be possible that the Twenty-fourth Virginia "was not in time," when it was already there, and had engaged the enemy, and had driven him, and had lost by wounds its Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel before the Fifth North Carolina got up, and when General Early had already been wounded while leading it? It would seem from this that Colonel Bratton's regiment was left to advance alone after the Twenty-fourth Virginia had retired, and was not ordered "by General D. H. Hill to move by he left flank into the wood" until after it was "used up."

Now the fact is the Twenty-fourth Virginia joined the Fifth

North Carolina in that charge. They were both under my command; they charged simultaneously—the Twenty-fourth against the right of the enemy's line posted in the woods, the Fifth North Carolina against the left and centre in the open field; and both retreated simultaneously, by my order, in obedience to an order from General Hill, sent through my Adjutant, *and against my recommendation.*

As to the *unfortunate stoppage* of the Fifth North Carolina regiment at the fence, and the firing, it will need a detailed statement of the affair to place it in its true light, and it is time that this was done in the interest of history.

In order to a proper apprehension of the situation, the reader must imagine four regiments, constituting Early's brigade, in line of battle, facing east, in the following order, counting from its left: The Twenty-fourth Virginia, Colonel Terry; the Thirty-eighth Virginia, Colonel Whittle; the Twenty-third North Carolina, Colonel John H. Hoke—the Fifth North Carolina being on the right. Fronting the brigade was a strip of wood of about two hundred yards' width; beyond which was a level open field, in shape of a parallelogram, about half a mile wide, running north about a mile and a half to a fort or redoubt, the extreme left of a line of works to the left of Fort Magruder—this last named work being at the skirt of this field and to the southeast of Early's brigade when formed as above described. There were two redoubts between Fort Magruder and the extreme left fort above mentioned. One of these—the nearer to this left redoubt—was advanced out into the field towards the east. In this were the two companies of Colonel Bratton's regiment. The other was to the west and rear of this, on the western skirt of this parallelogram, which ran north and south.

When the brigade was thus in line, General Hill made a short address to the command, informing it that a battery of the enemy was in the front beyond the woods, which was annoying Fort Magruder by a flank fire—and about Fort Magruder the main fighting was going on—and he desired the brigade to attack this battery and capture it, instructing the men to use the bayonet as the most efficacious mode of attack. The brigade was put in motion—thus in line of battle—through this strip of woods, and when near the opening the Twenty-fourth Virginia—with which General Early was—came upon the enemy, who had penetrated to *the* (our) left of the redoubt then occupied by Colonel Bratton and towards its rear. This regiment engaged the enemy promptly and drove him

beyond this redoubt; but it did not push the advantage, because the force in its front was too heavy, and its loss was already severe—General Early being among the first wounded, as also Colonel Terry and Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston. The regiment next to it, the Thirty-eighth Virginia, and that next to it, the Twenty-third North Carolina, were for some reason—which has never been given satisfactorily by General Hill or anyone—halted in the woods, quite near to the field, and were never brought upon the field. Colonel Whittle—who afterwards, I believe, perished in battle, and of whom I have no reproach to utter—did once make some explanation as to his regiment, but I confess I did not think it satisfactory. Why the Twenty-third was not advanced, no reason has ever been given to the public that I have ever heard. The Fifth North Carolina, being on the right, pushed forward to the field and found no battery or enemy in front; but immediately on emerging from the woods a shot from a battery on the left passed over it, and the fire of musketry showed a fight to be going on about where our left should come out of the woods, nearer to us than the battery from which the shot came, and near to a redoubt on the edge of a field. The regiment was immediately, by change of front, faced towards the battery and towards the musketry, and was put rapidly in motion; but finding that the regiment had been separated from the Twenty-third North Carolina, and that it had not come out, I dispatched Major Sinclair to tell General Hill—who I supposed would be in the woods where the centre of the line might be—of this battery on our left and of the fight going on, and to inquire of him if that was the battery he desired us to assail. I also requested Major Sinclair to say to General Hill that we were in open ground and the work would be stiff, and to urge him to expedite the advance of the two regiments, for I had the idea, from reading Jomini and such like, that the more force we had in a fight the better chance we would have of success. Major Sinclair found General Hill, with the two regiments—the Twenty-third North Carolina and Thirty-eighth Virginia—in the woods on my left-front, not far from the field, and they remained there facing my flank as I advanced beyond them. General Hill sent me an order by Major Sinclair “to move on the battery rapidly and use only the bayonet.” The regiment was advancing at double-quick, and I soon met Captain Sam. Early, of General Early’s staff, with orders to me from General Early to in-

form me that he had been wounded, and urging me to advance rapidly, and that the command of the brigade had devolved on me. The command lost no time; and as we were approaching the two redoubts, with space to pass between them, inasmuch as General Hill had informed us that they were occupied by South Carolina troops, Lieutenant-Colonel Badham, on the right of the regiment, at my request, rode forward to communicate to the officer in charge who we were, and that he did so I am sure, for the men in that redoubt cheered the regiment lustily as we passed. About this time the enemy's line opened fire upon us, but almost at once became discomposed by our advance, and soon broke into retreat; and what seemed to be one regiment, immediately in our front, was thrown into confusion, which increased until it ran into the extreme left redoubt. While the regiment was passing the first redoubt, I left its line for a few moments to put myself in command of the Twenty-fourth Virginia. I rallied some of its men who were around the redoubt spoken of by Colonel Bratton as that in which he was, and finding the Twenty-fourth prepared, I ordered its advance at the same time—a part of the enemy's line being in some woods in front of it, beyond a narrow field which opened at right angles with the parallelogram I have before spoken of. While all this was going on, I felt much concern because the two remaining regiments of the brigade put in no appearance. I saw that the enemy was disconcerted, and, if pressed with sufficient force, might be routed; but I saw also the hazard of advancing with so small a force against a superior enemy, with one regiment occupying a redoubt and supported by a formidable battery; for although the body of troops which ran into the redoubt was in confusion, and the others of what seemed to be from the flags three other regiments retreated to the rear of it, yet the battery had been retired en echelon with great precision, and there was no such manifest disorder as would justify storming the redoubt. So I hurried my Adjutant to General Hill, with substantially these instructions: "I am pushing the enemy rapidly. He is in confusion. Some of his troops have moved into a redoubt in seeming disorder. The battery is in full view and is under my fire. But he has a large force outside the works supporting, and I am too weak to go forward alone, and retreat is impossible without great loss. If he will throw out the two regiments to support me, I can capture the redoubt, and perhaps the battery. Tell him by all



means to support me, and not to order me to retreat." At this time the Fifth North Carolina had reached the fence about seventy-five yards from the redoubt; and as the enemy had ceased firing, I ordered a halt under cover of the fence—the Twenty-fourth Virginia being at this time in front of the woods. My Adjutant found General Hill with the two regiments in the woods near the opening, and delivered my message; when General Hill said: "Boys, do you hear that? Let us go to Colonel McRae's relief." But in a moment after he said: "No; go and tell him to draw off his men as he best can." My Adjutant returned in a very few moments, but he was delayed a little in delivering to me the order, as his horse took fright and dashed for the enemy's line, and he had to spring off to escape being carried in. It is a singular fact that the horse did run full into the enemy's lines, and then back again into ours. All this occurred within a very short interval, and during it the enemy had wholly ceased firing. I heard the order given in the redoubt to cease firing, and the appearances indicated there might be a feint to draw me on; but this did not stop the advance. I felt satisfied that disabled as the Twenty-fourth Virginia was, and disproportioned in numbers as my whole force was, that it would not do to storm the redoubt, supported, as it was, by the battery and three outside regiments; but at the same time I had advanced into the dilemma under orders, and confidently expecting to be supported by the two regiments (especially as the enemy had constantly given back) which had embarked in the attack, and I was not willing to retreat without completing the effort to capture the battery. If I had known that two companies of Colonel Bratton's had joined the Fifth North Carolina in the charge, and that the remainder of his regiment was in the gap between the Fifth and Twenty-fourth, I don't know but I should have pushed forward to the redoubt; but neither I, nor any officer or soldier of my command, as far as I have ever heard, were aware of any such thing; and I ought to have known it, for I rode over the field while exchanging communications with General Hill unmolested, except by one single discharge of grapeshot from a piece of artillery. As I had foreseen, the retreat was the signal for slaughter. As Colonel Bratton says, the regiment was demolished—"the enemy concentrating their overwhelming volleys upon it, as it came off through the open field"; and it is poor consolation now to find out that besides it and the Twenty-fourth Virginia, that the Sixth South Carolina was also "*used up*."

There is no doubt the brigade of General Hancock was in our hands. Besides the two regiments of Early's brigade, which were not called on to do any work, and Colonel Bratton's regiment, in immediate presence of the disaster, General Hill had two brigades—Rodes' and Rains'—in easy reach, and Hancock was out of reach of support. He could easily have been taken in flank while the Fifth North Carolina was in his front. Napoleon, with the same opportunity, would have made short work of it.

For myself I make no claim to military renown on the occasion referred to. I moved without discretion, under orders of superior officers—no suggestion made by me was acted on by General Hill—and both of those officers have long since exonerated me from all responsibility, and *both of them were afterwards promoted*. So I take for granted that the result which happened was contemplated for some wise purpose, and that I was only an instrument with which to consummate a military necessity, about which it was not requisite I should be informed. It is very certain that if a sacrifice was needed for the cause, the lot could not have fallen more appropriately than on the brave and faithful men and officers of the Fifth North Carolina regiment who fell upon that field.

D. K. McRAE,

*Colonel Fifth North Carolina, Commanding Early's Brigade, May 5, 1862,  
at Williamsburg.*

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**Our Fallen Heroes.**

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BY HON. A. M. KEILEY, OF RICHMOND, ON "MEMORIAL DAY," AT  
LOUDON PARK, NEAR BALTIMORE, JUNE 5, 1879.

[As a rule we do not publish "memorial addresses," because if we were to do so our *Papers* would have room for nothing else. But we are quite sure that our readers generally will thank us for printing the following appropriate and eloquent tribute of a gallant soldier to fallen comrades and to the cause for which they died.]

Of all the affecting pictures with which the great Greek epic is filled, none, I think, equals in dramatic power and interest that which portrays the melancholy pilgrimage of Hector's heavy-hearted sire to beg of the remorseless Achilles, for sepulture, the mangled body of his gallant son. The unnumbered woes and impending fate of his country, the peril of his crown, the slaughter of his people, the extermination of his race—all are forgotten, as, bowing his venerable head in the dust, he clasps his enemy's knees, and, with piteous tears and trembling tongue, begs the poor privilege of rescuing from further humiliation his beloved dead.

In the spirit of old Priam's tenderness and woe, and sharing also Priam's pride, we are here to-day to fulfill a duty not unlike his own—a duty, solemn and pathetic beyond all other services that fall to mortal lot.

At the grave all earthly ills concentrate, and Death is man's supreme failure; yet are we here to garland graves, and strew with flowers, failure.

It is an easy office, pleasant and not without profit, to kiss the hands that bear gifts: to crown with victorious laurels the front of success: to welcome conquering steps with triumphant hail: to

—“crook the pregnant hinges of the knee,  
Where thrift may follow fawning.”

But the hands we honor here to-day are empty; our salutation is “farewell,” not “hail”; not the vaunting bays, but sad-eyed immortelles form these garlands, and profit comes of scorn and slander, not of praise or even justice to these, our beloved dead!

So is it easy, borrowing enthusiasm from the splendors of success, and from the sympathies of those whom that success has benefited, to clothe with the glories of victory the tombs of those who made that victory possible; for such tombs themselves are trophies. But we stand in the presence of one of these great cata-

clysms of history, the air still palpitating with its uncalmed passions, to honor its victims—sympathy with whose cause is crime, defence of whose course is treason.

There are also tombs before whose portals men bow with a sorrow close akin to joy—a grief which Time, the mighty soother, has not only tempered by his lengthened lapse, but to which that lapse has brought the crowning solace of complete, however tardy, vindication of the fallen, in the world's acquiescence in their cause and the world's admission of its transcendent value. Thus men muse in Roman crypts before their thousand relics, august though ghastly, of imperial persecutions, and overleaping the centuries from the day when Numidian lions tore these living limbs asunder and the Appian Way blazed from Rome to Capua with their martyr fires, they quench their indignation at the merciless tyranny which doomed them, and lose their very pity at the doom itself, in contemplation of the final and full fruition of the martyrs' hopes—the final and consummate triumph of the cause for which they fell.

But all such inspirations fail us here. Here, and wherever in all our Southern land like pious ceremonies honor our brothers' graves, neither Time nor Triumph dulls the keen pang of loss and disappointment. We stand not only amid the fallen, but amid the apparent ruin of every hope for which they fell—confronted on every side with the symbols and consequences of that ruin, with absolute conviction that the discomfiture was utter, complete, irrevocable.

In the shadow of that mighty defeat whose chill gloom few rays of sympathy or even of justice have hitherto warmed or brightened, without hope of the reversal of the dread judgment which closed the record of their cause, we gather here to discharge the duty, doubly dear and imperative for the disaster which imposes it, of honoring the memory of these Confederate dead, and publishing our unquenchable affection for their names—and sorrow for their fate.

I need not aver in this presence that this pious service neither invites nor excuses any unpatriotic reopening of the closed accounts of our civil strife. The grave, which prays charitable silence for the dead, exacts it for the living. No discord should disturb the tranquility whose abode is here. Before the awful revelation of death, how petty and contemptible are the antagonisms of life!



Nor need much time be wasted in eulogy of these buried heroes, easy as the task would be, and pleasant the office, and just the praise.

What perils they gladly encountered! What wonders they achieved! What odds they met! Odds of numbers—their foe's strength being four-fold their own. Odds of appliances—so enormous that they sometimes had a grim ludicrousness about them. Who, for example, will hereafter believe that, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the gravest apprehension was felt that the aspirations of millions of American citizens for freedom would have to be ignominiously abandoned for want of a supply of percussion caps, or a single machine in the entire Confederacy for their manufacture? Odds of training in those fields which have grown to such paramount consequence since war has come to be almost a mechanic art. Odds of resources, so pitiable that at the last their subsistence was often the uncrushed and uncooked grain they shared with their starving horses.

Yet how superb their courage! Not only the courage that dares, but the grander courage that endures: not alone the heroism that braves death, but the higher heroism that laughs at despair. How lofty their fortitude! Whether on the soil of their own States, defending their own hearths, or pilgrims from Commonwealths a thousand miles away, whose hearths they should never see again; or exiles, like Maryland's immortal children, in a banishment whose tenderest alternative was a dungeon; how these gallant souls kept their faith bright as their bayonets, and marched gaily to death as to high carnival!

Is not the whole earth filled with their story? They might, indeed, have committed their fame, as did England's smitten chancellor, "to men's charitable speeches, to foreign nations and the next ages"; but there is no need. Some even of their brave foes have done them justice, and all the world knows well the story of that immortal band, "with tattered uniforms but bright muskets, which for four years carried the Revolt on its bayonets, opposing a constant front to the mighty concentration of power brought against it; which, receiving terrible blows, did not fail to give the like; and which, vital in all its parts, died only with its annihilation"—this band of rebels!

What vindication do they need from the reproach that may be thought to lurk in this epithet of "Rebel," by which it is the fashion in certain quarters now to designate these brave sleepers?

Should the eternal seal that closes their ears be broken this day, the epithet would bring no blush to any cheek that moulders here, as it brings none to that of any true comrade who survives to defend them.

We are children of a common country whose cradle was Rebellion. Read the history of all the Commonwealths that formed the Union in the history of one. Come with me to my own capital, where Virginia has essayed to rouse the emulation of her children by erecting statues to the worthiest of those who, in the past, have made her famous. Challenge them all, face to face, with the sentry's cry, and one answer alone will come from bronze or marble—"a Rebel,"—while crowning her Pantheon sits the world's synonym for every grace and virtue that ennobles man and adorns office—the arch-rebel of the eighteenth century—George Washington!

A hundred years and more ago, when, as Pitt said, "even the chimney-sweeps in London streets talked boastingly of their subjects in America," *rebel* was the uniform title of those despised subjects.

This sneer was the substitute for argument, which Camden and Chatham met in the Lords, and Burke and Barre in the Commons, as their eloquent voices were raised for justice to the Americans of the last century. "Disperse rebels" was the opening gun at Lexington. "Rebels" was the sneer of General Gage, addressed to the brave lads of Boston Common. It was the title by which Dunmore attempted to stigmatize the burgesses of Virginia, and Sir Henry Clinton passionately denounced the patriotic women of New York. At the base of every statue which gratitude has erected to patriotism in America, you will find "rebel" written. The springing shaft at Bunker Hill, the modest slab which tells where Warren fell, the monument which has given your fair city its proudest title, the fortresses which line our coast, the name of our country's capital, the very streets of our cities—all proclaim America's boundless debt to Rebels—not only to rebels who, like Hamilton and Warren, gave their first love and service to the young republic; but rebels who, like Franklin and Washington, *broke their oath of allegiance to become rebels*.

It was a rebellion that gave England her Great Charter, *habeas corpus*, her constitutional form, her parliamentary government. It was a rebellion which, after a hundred years of fierce unrest, has blossomed in our own day upon the soil of France into a republic,

which every well-wisher of liberty must pray may be perpetual. It was a rebellion *succeeding* that gave freedom to Holland and prosperity to Naples; it was a rebellion *failing* that keeps Poland dismembered and Ireland a province.

If this was the appropriate time or place much might be said of the causes, many and far reaching, which induced the strife, and of the many errors industriously spread to degrade and disparage the lost cause in the esteem of the world; and one thing in that connection has need to be said. There never was a more unfounded slander than the averment that the motive which welded the Southern people into a solid mass of revolt, was devotion to, or even [defence of slavery. It would be as false, as unjust and as unphilosophical, to describe the first rebellion as a contest for free tea, or a flame fed by a three-penny stamp on a lawyer's declaration. Not one in twenty of those who lie here, or in any Southern cemetery, owned or ever expected to own a slave.

As little is it true that the illustration or enforcement of any abstract theory of government, inspired the great sacrifices of the South. Men make, voluntarily, no such sacrifices for abstractions; and this war, on the part of the South, was eminently a volunteer war: no similar unanimity of popular support can be claimed for any appeal to arms in modern history.

For the right of secession, save as an incident to the higher right to which I shall presently refer, a corporal's guard would not have followed the recruiter's drum in any Southern State.

Undoubtedly it happened here, as in all great political movements, that personal, local and, in a word, petty purposes, contributed their trifling streamlets to swell the flood, and colored, when they did not control, the course of many who participated in the strife.

But the great consuming tide that bore aloft and onward that mighty though ill-starred movement for self-government, was born, like the master tides of the ocean, of two great impulses—one political, the other social—one the sturdy and cherished outgrowth of American freedom—a principle discredited now in many ways and many quarters, but destined to regain its sway in this Republic, as surely as the Republic is destined to become and remain the home of ordered liberty. The other a plant of hardier growth, of deeper root and lustier limbs, an exotic in no land, or clime, or age. One the love of State—the other the love of Home.

If America has made one valuable contribution to political

science, to governmental method, it is embraced and formulated in that derided phrase, "State sovereignty"—the independence, not of the Republic, but the independence of *States*.

"These United Colonies are and of right ought to be," not a free and independent nation, but "free and independent States," was the challenge of our fathers to a British King, in their Declaration of Independence, and the form in which they clothed their brave summons for room and recognition amid the sovereign states of the earth.

"Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence," is the sentence which opens the first constitution of the United States; and the second constitution, not expressing the same thought in equivalent language, trembled long on the verge of rejection on that account, and was finally supplemented by twelve amendments, every one of which is an assertion, in one form or another, of the idea of State independence.

When the first rebellion was over, and the belligerents authenticated peace by solemn treaty, the first article of that memorable covenant proclaimed, in unmistakable terms, the same principle, and published in official form the character of the communities which Great Britain had vainly attempted to conquer.

His Britanic Majesty acknowledges the United States, naming them State by State, to be "free, sovereign and independent States." Nor is there an official act or utterance of the cotemporaries of the foundation of the Government, which gives the color of authority to the consolidation theories now so prevalent.

True, the tide now sets otherwise, and the representatives of great Commonwealths shamefully vie with each other in abasement of their mother States at the foot of this new idol, called "The Nation"—a name unheard of in the better days. But let us not be disheartened. This imperial tendency is at once a heresy and an anachronism in American politics. At present its oppressions fall indeed on those who are familiar with oppression and powerless to prevent it, and whose remonstrances win but little heed; but it is, at the same time, debauching public sentiment, dwarfing the sense and love of independence, and developing public evil in ways and places which will, sooner or later, constrain that heed. Under its influence, a familiar tradition of executive tenure, sanctioned by the highest authority and universal observance, is scoffed at as a superstition. Congress is asked to engraft a monarchical form of communication between the legislative and



executive branches of the Government, upon our simple republican system. The extravagance and corruptions of imperialism pollute every fountain of power and patronage. A distinguished representative American tenders a costly site for a monument to Andre the spy, in appropriate recognition of his services in warring against State independence. And the present year is seen to be a favorable occasion to rescue from oblivion and give to the world a Tory history of the Revolution of 1776, buried for a century, but warmed into life by this prevailing fallacy, which assures it consideration, if not sympathy.

But we need have no fear for the future. The rugged, sinewy strength that comes of *love of State* has not fulfilled its mission, much less outlived its usefulness, in our country. Indeed, it never bore more rich and weighty fruit than in the very war which seemed to have destroyed it. At the bottom, it was the true source of the most enduring forces elicited in that struggle. The storm of sentimental enthusiasm for the flag, which gave fiery birth to the earliest efforts for the Union, died like a prairie conflagration. A ninety days' volunteer was its concrete expression. It was *loyalty to States* that on both sides fed the steady, consuming flames of battle, and fed them to the end. It was the labor of States that overthrew the South, and that defended it. It was the tough fibre of State allegiance that bore the exhausting strain of the contest. It was the old, fundamental doctrine of State allegiance that menaced the life of the Union, and it was that also which saved it.

Not only were powerful Union minorities in every Southern State constrained by loyalty to this principle to take their stand against their convictions of what was politic and best and wisest, but it is notorious that the great border States, without which the war would have been a fiasco, never wavered in their prayers and labors to maintain the Union, until the proclamation of April 15, 1861, summoned them to the decision of the momentous inquiry, "Is this a Union of affection and interest, or a Union of force?—a question whose other and fundamental form was, "Is the citizen's first allegiance due his State?"

All who lie here and crave our memorial offering, gave their lives in attestation of their allegiance to their States. And here in their midst, and in the presence of many who fought to uphold a contrary theory, I dare aver that in that fruitful vine of State loyalty, and there alone, we shall find a means and mode of reconciliation, which, as it wounds not self-respect and honor, may be perfect and perpetual—a consummation wished by all save those wretched

traders in strife, who, having labored painfully to induce the conflict, surpassed even those toils in their successful efforts to shirk its perils while it lasted and prolong its hates after it is dead—those patriots by proxy, who put the profits of their country's agony in their own pockets, and encountered its perils by a substitute. For myself I find reconciliation easy with him who says, "I answered the summons of Massachusetts or Ohio," for I answered the summons of Virginia, and hers alone.

Each year this platform of reconciliation will more and more assert itself, as each year the Government will more and more conform to its original conceptions.

Even now, with constantly increasing courage and frequency, we hear the voice of protest against the fatal tendencies of the war-engendered theories of American republicanism; and here, in the presence of these heroic dead, I salute every such warning note as a tribute of praise to their memory, none the less valuable for being undesigned.

Wherever, in all this land, a patriot tongue or pen gives expression to the theory of our government propounded in the Declaration of Independence, and formulated in our constitution; wherever an indignant protest is issued against the debauching tendency to erect the substance, and anticipate the forms of imperialism in the place of the democracy our fathers fought to found; wherever a judicial tribunal, passing upon the rights of citizens and States, republishes the old but ever-obligatory and ever-valuable confession of our political faith, that "the Federal Government is one of limited powers," and "that the powers not delegated to it, nor prohibited to the States by the constitution, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people"—then, my dead comrades, a wreath is laid, albeit by an enemy, on your humble graves, and a vindication, the weightier for being unconscious, is offered to your memories.

Those, indeed, write and speak for the common faith: *you died for it*: and in these days of shallow convictions, when opinion masquerades as belief, and speculation as fact, what State in Christendom is so rich in its heritage of heroism that it can afford to part with the fame, much less dishonor the memory, of citizens who were willing, for loyalty to a principle, to surrender ease and comfort, security and life!

Such was the first controlling motive of the rank and file of the South in the late war. Nobler far, and higher—of wider scope and more pervasive influences—was the second grand motive of their

action—and here, too, I doubt not, as in the former case, their brave foes shared the influence.

A few weeks since I noticed in the foremost of England's illustrated papers, a picture, representing a naked and rudely armed native of Zululand, wounded, resting on one knee, and surrounded by such numbers of his enemies as made resistance and escape equally impossible. The muzzle of a foeman's pistol touched his cheek, and he easily recognized that only a moment of life remained to him, but he filled it with a sentence worthy of a Regulus or a Cato: "Yesterday you learned how a Zulu can fight; learn now, how a Zulu can die."

What, in its last analysis, was the subtle spirit that blazed forth in that barbarian's noble defiance? Let me ask further: What was it that nerved the immortal three hundred to bar with their living bodies the Persian's march on trembling Sparta? What was it that held aloft the heaven-given banner under which Constantine strove so gallantly to stay the flood of Rome's decline? What was it that bore along in wondrous triumph that square of crimson silk which floated beneath the imperial eagles from the Ganges to the Tweed? What was it that inspired the Dutch burghers in the seventeenth century to whelm their fields under the sea, and Russian princes to fire their palaces in the nineteenth? What made a Swiss peasant sow his living body with Austrian spears, and a French country girl exchange the safe companionship of her herds for the lead of armies—for camp, and seige—for battle and the stake? What was the sufficing inspiration of these, and a thousand kindred heroisms, with which the story of the world is full? Love of country—not because it is fertile, for sterile Sparta gave it more resplendent growth than teeming Egypt; not because it is powerful, for imperial Rome never gave more glorious illustration of its force than did some of the savage tribes she easily subdued; not because it is beautiful, for the flat and weary plains of Holland witnessed a devotion as glorious as ever hallowed classic Attica or lovely France; not even because it is free, for out of the depths of a long inheritance of slavery have flashed at times such fires of patriot fervor that all the world, looking on, has prayed and hoped that they might prove the dawn of Liberty.

Not these considerations or attributes, not any nor all of these, gave vigorous birth and growth to such great sacrifices for fatherland. It was a sentiment, older and stronger than all the governments that are or have been—old as gray Time and wide as the pulsing sea—the great taproot of patriotism—fountain and centre



of all the social and civil virtues and sacrifices which make life beautiful and government strong—the love of our country because it holds OUR HOME!

For us and for these our comrades—the Confederate dead—the late war was emphatically a war for home. Even the slaves understood it, and to their undying honor, acted on it. To us the war shambles of the world were closed. No bounty enticed recruits. No emigrant ships flocked to our shores, burdened with patriots. It was *La Vendee* on the theatre of a continent.

These twin sentiments, fellow citizens, love of State and love of home, were the giant arms, compensating for poverty, weakness, starvation, disaster, wounds and death, which for four immortal years bore aloft that tattered standard, which flashed athwart the pathway of the nations like a hot meteor across the tranquil courses of the stars—which floated over Stuart's knightly plume—which fell in folds of woe on Stonewall Jackson's bier, and whose last furling broke the heart of Lee.

Great and powerful as our Republic is, it cannot afford to despise the strength born of these influences, or dispense with the aid of those who honor and yield to them. And let us never forget that naught but manly justice—the American love of fair play—is needed to yoke these influences, powerful and pervasive, to the burdened car of the common progress.

These Southern Commonwealths have never, indeed, been famous as money-getters, or inventors, or manufacturers; but we claim, with some pardonable pride, that they have never been laggards in patriotism. Whether in the first rebellion, when they camped by colonies in Massachusetts for her defence; or in 1812, when, without a sailor or a ship, they enlisted under the banner of "Free Trade and Sailor's Rights"; or in '46, when they bore off their full share of the laurels of the Mexican war—the trumpet has never summoned them in vain. And whenever this Government again becomes to them a symbol and surety of justice, and the phrase "equal, sovereign and independent States" ceases to be a mockery; when those who rule a powerful party in this country no longer regard the South as an Ireland to be insulted, or an India to be robbed—then again will these Commonwealths prove as of old a powerful factor in the advancement of the safety, honor and interests of the Union, and, most of all, in the scrupulous maintenance of its muniments of liberty.

How strongly all things tend to summon us to such generous oblivion of our late antagonisms!



But a week since I passed by the remains of the most formidable fortress erected on the soil of Virginia for her defence during the war, and its menacing form, that once trembled with the discharge of the heaviest seige guns, had become a very evangel of peace.

The thunders of its parting shot had scarcely died away in vanishing echoes before kindly nature, with Divine diligence, began to hide the scars of strife. Winter's frost vied with Summer's rains in beating down every sharp and angry lineament which marked it; and where these great levelers had encountered obstacles too powerful to be overthrown, earth's gay magician, laughing Spring, had smitten the brown soil with her fairy wand and summoned a mantle of green to cover every wound of war. The white blossoms of berries, and the pale blue of wild violets, spangled the frowning embrasures of the guns, and a thousand twittering swallows, tunneling the fort's grim face with the long archways to their nests, made the air alive with their merry *reveille* as we passed.

And where should this lesson of peace have freer utterance and more solemn and attentive heed than in the presence of the dead of either section?

Side by side on a hundred battlefields these children of a common mother still are lying. The grass which covers the blue grave and the gray mingles its leaves above and interlaces its roots below. One verdure adorns them through the long summer, and the snowy pall of winter which shrouds them both is woven of continuous threads. The shadows these humble hillocks cast may end in homes, and darken hearts separated by the width of a continent, but they begin together, and their origin is one. Their tenants, however once divided and discordant, slumber now in eternal amity.

Let us give ear to the lesson. The mighty and irreversible judgment of concluded war has determined that we who survive shall be and remain one people. With sacramental blood and fire that union has been ordained, and nothing is now needed to crown it with a happiness and prosperity rivaling its best estate, but the simple recognition that the strife is past—so long past that the face of continental Europe has twice been changed by bloody, almost universal war, since our arms were stacked and our banners furled. And surely we have a domain large enough to inhabit in peace. We said as Abram to Lot, "Separate thyself, I pray thee, from me," and you would not. Let us also forever say, with the patriarch, "Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between thee and me, and between my herdsmen and thy herdsmen, *for we be brethren.*"

Under the burden of colossal war, colossal debt, colossal corruption, the young Republic staggers indeed, but she never falls; and despite them all, she stands to-day in every element of enduring power, and chiefly in that master element—Liberty—easily first amid the states of Christendom. Is not the maintenance of that power, the transmission of that priceless boon, worthy the sacrifice of a passion or a prejudice—above all, of a revenge?

I said in opening that of all the beautiful pictures in Homer's immortal poem, the chief has ever seemed to me that which portrays the sad journeying of "God-like Hector's" father to beg the mangled body of his son from his merciless slayer; but in that rich picture, filled as it is with an infinite pathos, no scene so moves the heart as that which exhibits the fierce son of Peleus, saddened and softened by memories conjured up by the aged Priam, of his own far-off home, mingling his tears with those of his foeman, and after his charged heart had thus unburdened itself, tenderly raising the body he had trailed around the plains of Troy in savage rage, and, refusing all aid of others, reverently placing it with his own hands on the car which was to transport it to Ilium, and the rites of sepulture. One day the people of this Union may rise to the height of this heathen's magnanimity.

Until then to you, soldiers and sailors of the Confederacy, this pious office, begun by Baltimore's immortal women, in secrecy and stealth, in peril of insult and peril of dungeon, is confidently committed.

To Maryland, which, two hundred years ago, was baptized with the proud title of the "Land of the Sanctuary"; to Maryland, renowned for her welcome to the stranger among a people with whom hospitality is a habit; to the State of that Maryland line which in our first rebellion answered roll-call in every battle from Brooklyn Heights to Yorktown, and always answered with honor; to Maryland, whose gallant sons in the strife which filled these graves bore its burdens and braved its perils with a gay courage worthy the palmiest days of chivalry—we commit our dead. Guard them, Maryland!

If a tithe of the surpassing devotion, fervent courage, the quenchless affection, the indomitable purpose of Baltimore's immortal mothers and daughters, shall inspire the hearts which now continue their labors here, then, indeed, will this sacred trust be ever well fulfilled—until that day, happy for the glory and greatness of the Union, when the graves of all her gallant dead shall be our free Republic's common care, as their dauntless courage is her common glory.

**Sketches of Operations of General John C. Breckinridge.**

By Colonel J. STODDARD JOHNSTON, of his Staff.

No. 3—*Conclusion.*

Proceeding by horseback to Staunton, General Breckinridge went by rail to Richmond for consultation with General Lee, who had then become General-in-Chief of all the armies, and with President Davis, touching affairs in his Department. From Richmond he was summoned hastily by the announcement that Burbridge was moving from Kentucky with a heavy force through Pound gap, to the attack of Saltville. He reached Abingdon in time to direct the concentration of troops for its protection, by reason of which disposition Burbridge was successfully repulsed. His thorough knowledge of the country, both by a study of maps and by the personal inspection made when he entered upon his command enabled him to comprehend at once its strategic points, and had his orders been strickly carried out, Burbridge and his entire force would have been captured; but there was delay, and they escaped. The damage done by Burbridge in this raid was insignificant, while his repulse tended to inspire the troops and people with better hopes for the future. The command which General Breckinridge then had in Virginia, after the division which General John S. Williams had brought in the Department a few days before had left for Georgia, as it did a few days later, was very small and incapable of offensive operations. He had no infantry except a small brigade of reserves—men under and over the conscript age, while his cavalry was composed of the remnants of commands which had been depleted in battle or by capture. Morgan had been killed, and his command, under Duke, was his chief resource, though the bulk of it was of men without horses, lately returned from long imprisonment. Not long after this a threatening movement was made by the enemy from Tennessee. Breckinridge, not wishing to surrender any more territory in that direction, and to avoid the demoralization consequent upon a contraction of his lines, gathered together hastily such dismounted men as he could find, organized them, and went in person with them to meet the enemy. His success was beyond his expectations—having succeeded, by the force of his personal presence and direction, in defeating the enemy in a sharp engagement at Bull's gap, which caused him to retire towards Knoxville, and gave security to the border for some time.



The situation of affairs in Southwest Virginia was critical, however, in many respects, and called for qualities of the first order in its commander.

Civil government was almost suspended by the remoteness of the country from the seat of Government, but chiefly from the fact that the military feature had almost absorbed the civil in pursuits as well as the thoughts of men. It thus happened that for all the essential wants of the people they looked to the military commander of the Department, who consequently united in himself also many of the functions of civil governor. Complaints of all kinds were made to him, and redress from grievances sought through him; and if history shall accord to him praise for his military administration, it should give him no less credit for the wisdom, prudence and firmness with which he guarded the civil interests of the people within the sphere of his command. The armies at Richmond and elsewhere were dependent, as indeed were the people of a large part of the Confederacy, upon Saltville for their salt, and it devolved upon him to see that, notwithstanding the demand upon the railroad for transportation for other purposes was so great, it should not interfere with the shipment of the needed supplies of this prime article, whose value was so great that it was currently worth one dollar a pint before the Confederate currency had reached its maximum depreciation. The only lead mines in the Confederacy, from which the ammunition of the South was supplied, were in his Department, and he was charged with seeing to the shipment of a stated supply. So also were the chief iron furnaces and forges, from which were furnished material for horse shoes for the whole army and for the military foundry at Richmond. Besides all this, he held the chief source of supply for both bread and meat needed for the army at Richmond; at one time the beef being killed near Wytheville and shipped in the quarter by rail to the Chief Commissary of General Lee's army, for issue daily on its arrival. The regulation of all these details was in his charge, and required, in conjunction with the care and organization of a military force scattered as was his, the highest administrative skill. As one of his powers necessary to the finding and supply of the armies, his officers, both commissary and quartermaster, were empowered to impress articles necessary for public use; and in order to check the rapacity of speculators, he had the sole right to give permits for shipment of any articles from his Department. Yet he administered his office with such justice and purity that the citizen was secure against un-



reasonable seizure or oppression, and no charge could ever rest against him for the slightest impropriety in the exercise of so delicate a trust. With such power of controlling the shipment of articles of necessity which offered certain high profits, it would have been easy to have enriched himself by millions if he had perverted the functions of his position, but to his honor be it said, that he neither enriched himself or friends to the extent of a farthing. So governing the administration of his office that all his energies were devoted solely to the service of his people, content with the humble fare and the simplest form of a soldier's life.

His headquarters during the fall and winter of 1864-5 were at Wytheville, as more central than Dublin and near the scene of possible operations. In December, near its middle, General Stoneman advanced from East Tennessee with a heavy cavalry force, while Burbridge came from Kentucky, the two effecting a junction and capturing Abingdon before meeting with any serious resistance. They also subsequently captured Saltville and Wytheville; but such was the vigor of General Breckinridge's movements and the skill of his dispositions, that with his meagre force he repulsed them at Marion after an engagement lasting all day, and compelled their return to the points whence they came, without accomplishing any material results. In a few weeks all the railroad bridges which had been burned were rebuilt—salt making resumed, the lead mines in operation, and supplies going steadily forward as before. General Lee's expressions of gratification and thanks for such efficiency were frequent and of the most cordial character. In fact, from his earliest association with him—from Breckinridge's first visit to him in February, 1864, to confer with him pending his assuming command in Virginia—there had existed the warmest relations, and General Lee never missed an opportunity to give expression to his confidence and esteem. With Breckinridge the feelings were reciprocated, he entertaining an exalted respect for General Lee, both as a soldier and a man.

It was during the raid of Stoneman that the following occurred: General Breckinridge was at Saltville with his principal force, hoping to be able to defend it from capture against a superior force. He had lost much sleep, and in such cases possessed the faculty of going a long time without repose, and then making up for lost time by a long sleep, being able to sleep twenty-four hours after having been several nights with little or no sleep. He had his headquarters at the house of a citizen, and had succeeded in getting to

sleep, with injunctions not to be waked except for some urgent cause. After he had been quiet for several hours, an officer called to see him, but the gentleman of the house told him of the General's wishes, and remarked, in the presence of his daughter, a grown young lady: "We must be careful of the health of our General. Much depends upon him, for I regard him as one of the pillars of the Confederacy." "You had better call him one of its sleepers, father," was the daughter's ready reply, which amused the General greatly when afterward told him.

With those familiar with the ability shown by General Breckinridge in the administration of the Department of Southwestern Virginia, it was not a matter of surprise when in February early, or thereabouts, he was tendered the position of Secretary of War—its acceptance being strongly urged by General Lee in a private letter. Under the circumstances, he felt it his duty to accept—much dissatisfaction having been engendered against Mr. Seddon, whom he succeeded, and his popularity with the army and people being needed to buoy up the depressed feeling of the country. He accordingly repaired at once to Richmond—succeeded in command by General Echols—and at once entered upon the discharge of its duties. Without disparagement to any of the officers who had preceded him, it may be said with truth that he was the only commander of the territory embraced in his Department who left it with improved reputation. General Lee, early in the war, periled the reputation which he brought to the service by his inability to hold the line taken by him. General Floyd, General Wise, General Loring and others successively retired from the command, unable to meet the expectations of the Department, or the people among whom they served; while Breckinridge was called to Richmond to receive the highest evidence of the confidence of the Government, and left the Department as popular with his troops and with the people as he ever was at home, in the height of his political success.

Of his after service little need be said. He served too short a time as Secretary of War, and at a period too critical, to afford him opportunity for demonstrating his superior fitness for the position.

It is not improbable that he would have proven unsuited continuous service as Secretary of War for a long period. He had not the elements for a bureau officer. He was good at the organization of an army, but his success in this, where he had the opportunity to practice it, arose from his thorough knowledge of the officers and men under him. Abstractly, he had not a taste for that

plodding attention to details, that methodical measuring of every point, without reference to its importance, which is essential to the administration of such an office. His faculty was more of the executive turn. Phrenologically, his organs of perception were better developed than those of reflection. The same qualities which made him more an orator than a writer, more the leader of a congress than a cabinet officer, a better advocate before a jury than solicitor in chancery, fitted him also more for the success he won early and maintained as a General in the field, than for the less active and more confining duties of a secretaryship. Suffice it to say, that his brief term gave satisfaction to those who expected most from him, as did the subsequent close of his career as a Confederate officer and soldier.

When Richmond fell, he retired with Mr. Davis and the other members of his Cabinet to North Carolina by way of Danville. When, after the surrender of General Lee, it became evident that the fortunes of the Confederacy were desperate, President Davis directed him to meet General Sherman in company with General J. E. Johnston, who had solicited an interview, and to effect the best arrangement possible looking to a peaceful termination of the war. The interview took place at Durham station, North Carolina, and the result of it was the memorandum of a treaty of peace, which was signed by the opposing Generals subject to the ratification of their respective Governments. General Sherman at first declined to hold communion with General Breckinridge, lest, receiving him as a member of the civil government of the Confederacy, it would imply a recognition of its independent existence. But upon the suggestion that General Breckinridge was a Major-General in the army, he agreed to receive him as such. That the articles as signed bear the impress of General Breckinridge's concise and statesmanlike mind, it is not necessary to indicate by special reference save as to those sections or articles relating strictly to civil and constitutional points proposed to be settled by the treaty. While action by the Federal Government was pending, General Breckinridge repaired to Charlotte, North Carolina, where President Davis then was, and in a letter dated April 23d submitted to him various reasons why the war should close, and why it was his duty, as President of the Confederacy, to do all in his power to terminate it. The letter closed with the following:

"Whatever course you pursue, opinions will be divided. Permit me to give mine. Should these or similar views accord with your



own, I think the better judgment will be that you can have no higher title to the gratitude of your countrymen and the respect of mankind than will spring from the wisdom to see the path of duty and the courage to follow it, regardless alike of praise or blame."

The closing sentence may be said to be an epitome of the creed which the writer practiced through life, and which was the true secret of his greatness. He had "the wisdom to see the path of duty and the courage to follow it, regardless alike of praise or blame." The sentiment, illustrated as it was in every step of his grand career, deserves to be graven on his monument as an imperishable injunction to the youth of our country, who, cherishing the memory of one so exalted in the hearts of his people, might be sensibly impressed with the noble words which point the way at once to moral grandeur of character and to the loftiest success.

But it was not given to President Davis to consent, since on the day after General Sherman notified General Johnston that the treaty had been disapproved at Washington, and that the truce would terminate within the specified time—forty-eight hours. The next succeeding day, 25th, General Johnston proposed a meeting with General Sherman, and on the day following signed articles surrendering his army and all the forces east of the Chattahoochee river.

Upon receiving this notification the President and his Cabinet proceeded southward, hoping to be able to make their way to the Trans-Mississippi. They continued together till their arrival at or near Washington, Georgia, when, it becoming apparent that it was reduced to a mere question of personal safety, each adopted the plan he conceived best adapted to serve the purpose. Mr. Davis continued his route westward, and his fate is known. General Breckinridge, after a careful study of the question, determined to attempt his escape to Cuba from the Florida coast. In company with Major James Wilson and his faithful black servant Thomas, he made his way to the mouth of the Saint John's river, having been joined on the route by Colonel John Taylor Wood, an officer of the Confederate navy, and grandson of President Taylor, and Captain O. Toole. Here, after looking in vain for some friendly sail, and canvassing various plans for escape, they determined to attempt the voyage to Cuba in an open boat of eighteen tons burthen which they had secured. The expedient was desperate, but they felt that death was preferable to capture, and their preparations were soon made. It was impossible to procure any provisions for the trip, and the supply they had comprised enough for only a few meals; but the coast was a great resort for turtles, and their eggs were



abundant. Of these a large supply was placed in the boat, and with this outfit they put off from shore. At first they coasted for a more southerly offing, preferring not to put to sea till night, as there were cruisers in sight and they feared being picked up on suspicion. While thus engaged, they were hailed by a vessel bound for New York, but passed themselves off for fishermen. Pulling to sea near night they encountered a severe voyage. Instead of effecting the passage to Cuba in a few days, in consequence of adverse winds and their inferior sail, they were more than eight days at sea. Fortunately Colonel Wood was a skillful sailor, and was able to direct the sailing by the sun or stars, when not himself able to hold the helm, and fortunately, also, upon starting, the most rigid discipline was inaugurated, and the provisions and water dealt out in the most sparing rations. In spite of all economy, the water gave out, and their only supply afterwards was from rain which they caught in their hats or coats bowled to receive it. Finally when hope had nearly left them, they came in sight of Cardinas, which they reached on the 11th of June. They were cordially received by the Spanish Governor of the place, Colonel Bardaji, who tendered them the hospitalities of the city. After spending several days at Cardinas, they proceeded to Havana, where General Breckinridge was received with every mark of respect and hospitality. He remained long enough to recuperate from the effects of his sea voyage in the frail fishing boat, and in the course of a week or ten days sailed in an English steamer for England. Here he remained some months, when he came to Canada, where he was joined by his family. He resided in Canada chiefly at the pleasant little city of Niagara, where from his modest cottage he could look out on the blue Ontario, or across the narrow river and see the flag of the United States floating from Fort Niagara, as a perpetual warning that there were sentinals watching the border and forbidding his return to the people and the State he loved so well.

In August, 1866, he again went to Europe, taking his family with him, except his two eldest sons, and remained abroad nearly two years. His residence was chiefly in Paris, though he spent some time in England, visiting also Switzerland and Italy. He also made a trip to Egypt and the Holy Land. Returning to Canada in the fall of 1868, he found the sectional feeling so far abated that his friends counseled his return to Kentucky, and in the succeeding winter, having received assurances that he would not be molested, he returned to New York. His arrival in Kentucky, shortly afterwards, was hailed with every demonstration of affection by his

former neighbors, irrespective of antecedents, and with cordial welcome by the whole State. He constantly rebuked any effort to make any formal parade in his behalf, declining to permit ovations of a public kind, and content to receive the unstudied heart-welcome which everywhere greeted him. Returning home, he lost no time in useless repining, but went to work—resuming the practice of the law. He continued in active life, giving also, besides the law, his attention to several railroads projected in the State, until about a year before his death, when he was taken ill with pneumonia, and never recovered his health from that time. In the summer of 1874 he went to New York in hopes the sea air would prove beneficial, but in this, as in a visit to the Saint Lawrence, he was disappointed; and returned in the early autumn to Lexington. Here he remained with fluctuations of hope and despondency, tenderly nursed and confined to his room, with occasional drives in good weather, until a month or more before his death. At last it became apparent to himself as to his friends and family that death was steadily approaching, and he met it with the heroism which had characterized his whole life. It was met not with heathen stoicism, but, while avoiding all demonstration of religious sentiment, it was a stoicism tempered and sustained by the deep religious culture of his youth, the influence of which was manifested through his whole life.

Thus died, in the fifty-fifth year of his age, one who united in his character more of the elements of true manhood than usually fall to the lot of even the most favored. Fashioned of a manly type, handsome almost to the verge of beauty in his young manhood, yet not effeminate, nature seems to have gifted him at once with a comely person, a mind worthy to adorn its setting, a heart to guide both only to noble thoughts and deeds, and a tongue rivaling the persuasive force of Demosthenes, which knew no utterance but the truth. Intrepid in the pursuit of the right, he knew no compromise with wrong. Honored as few men ever were by the free voice of a people who loved to exalt him, he might have gained the highest round in the ladder of his country's fame, had he been willing to subordinate to ambition the convictions of his mature judgment. Adhering to these, he linked his destinies with a principle which failed, and died under the ban of the Government under which he lived, an alien in the very place of his birth. Thus dying it may be said he died in the cause for which he staked his life, as his liberty. But dying thus, who will say his life was a failure?

**Prison Experience.**

By JAMES T. WELLS, Sergeant Company A, Second South Carolina Infantry.

## No. 2.

About this time (January, 1864) General B. F. Butler was made Commissary of Prisoners, and in the discharge of his duty he paid us a visit. He was welcomed in such a manner as a parcel of defiant "Rebels" could welcome him, with hisses, curses and groans; notwithstanding which, he made us some good promises. Among others, that we should be better treated, have more wood, more food and plenty of clothes. As we knew this to be so many idle words, it produced no effect upon us. He did not seem to have formed a favorable impression of the Confederate authorities. One of his first acts towards better treatment was to relieve one of the white regiments as a guard, and place in its stead the Thirty-sixth North Carolina colored regiment. This was a severe blow to us. On the 25th of February they arrived, accoutred in their military glory. They were quite a curiosity to many, as they had never, previous to this time, seen any colored troops. The first day they came on guard will long be remembered by every prisoner in the camp. At the usual hour, they marched in with knapsack, haversack and canteen, equipped as for a march. They proceeded with military precision to unsling their knapsacks, and place them upon the ground, to mark the ends of their beats. The main street, along which they were stationed, was crowded with prisoners, all anxious to see the "monkey show." We knew their intense hatred to us, and we were well aware that the slightest demonstration on our part would be used as a pretext for firing into us. Notwithstanding this, some fellow, on mischief bent, deliberately crossed the line, and stole one of their knapsacks, which he tossed into the road, and the dismay and chagrin evinced by this ebony son of Mars can be imagined better than described. After calling in the officer of the guard, he related his story in the following pathetic style: "Fore God, if I bin here six monts, I never tief anything from dese buckra. I wouldn't care, if dey give me back dat garytype. Dat's all I wants." These are, as near as can be remembered, the exact words he used on the occasion. He never recovered his knapsack, nor his "garytype," for it was seen, long afterwards, in the possession of a prisoner, who used all kinds of expedients to keep it concealed, for had he been discovered his life



would have paid the forfeit. A guard of negroes was sent through the camp to search for it, and the manner in which they performed that duty was observable in the number of bleeding heads among the prisoners. They had beat them over the head in order to compel them to tell who did it. For this conduct, their officers praised them, and told them to shoot whenever they felt like doing so, and right well did they obey this order, as will be shown hereafter. Matters were thus proceeding from bad to worse. The shooting of a prisoner was looked upon as an every day affair, especially when said shooting was done by a negro. The colored troops came on guard only once in three days, and the day of their coming was always dreaded by the prisoners. In accordance with General Butler's promise, to give us more rations, our meagre supply of coffee was cut off. This was not so much of a deprivation to us as might be supposed, for the coffee was "slop water" in every respect. Some of the prisoners went so far as to say that the Commissary actually shook a small bag of coffee at each kettle (about forty gallons of water). This was a grim joke, but it had much the appearance of truth. Shortly after cutting off the coffee supply, our rations were reduced in other respects. Bread was issued in the afternoon. The men would eat it as soon as they received it. It does not take much time to consume eight ounces of soft bread. They would then, of course, be without bread until the following afternoon. About two or three ounces of meat was given for breakfast, and a cup of greasy water for dinner. Hitherto the sulter had been allowed to sell provisions in limited quantities to those who had the money with which to purchase. This privilege was also abolished, and we were compelled to rely upon the Government rations. As the United States officers used every means to induce the prisoners to take the oath, it is fair to presume that the "best Government the sun ever shone upon" was now reduced to the policy of starving men into allegiance to it. There was much work to be done on the outside of the pen, and the prisoners were induced to do it by promise of extra rations and tobacco, and the privilege of getting out every day. There were several of the details, each numbering about thirty men. One was sent to the wharf for the purpose of loading boats, another to the quartermaster's warehouse, &c. The Government never made anything by employing these "rebels," as they invariably "flanked" more than they received as pay. They were very useful to the men in camp, as by their aid many little comforts and articles of necessity were brought



in, when they were not overhauled and stopped. Our spirits were very much revived, about the 1st of March, by seeing several paragraphs in the papers relative to the exchange of prisoners, which had been broken up at the battle of Gettysburg by the United States officers, who flagrantly violated the terms of the cartel. This was a most interesting subject to us, especially the Gettysburg prisoners, who had been told that they were retained as "nest eggs," and that they would have no more fighting to do. On the 3d of March, the First division left for Dixie, and the 10th, the Ninth division, and on the 17th, five companies of the Second division left. We now began to regard an early return to the sunny South with some certainty, and many were the plans laid out for amusement and fun upon our arrival at home. These were all, however, doomed to bitter disappointment, as the next week brought us the news that Butler's plan of "swapping man for man" would not work. We now began to look forward to the termination of the war as the only end to our captivity. On the 23d and 30th of April, two boat loads of sick were taken off. Shortly after this our situation began to get worse. Warm weather was approaching, the camp was crowded, and hospital accommodations were very poor. The water, which could be used in the winter in moderate quantities only, was now in such a condition as to be totally unfit for use. In May, large numbers of the wounded from Grant's army were brought to the hospitals, situated on the point outside. This water was used to wash their wounds, and gangrene made its appearance. They were compelled to send to Baltimore for water, and it was brought in casks which had formerly contained vinegar, liquors of all description, and even oil. Our number now had increased to about 15,000 men, and we had a city of tents. The health of the men began to fail rapidly, and soon the prisoners' hospital was crowded. Fever in every shape abounded, and smallpox was epidemic. Nearly every tent contained one or two cases of this loathsome disease. It had become so common, that prisoners did not fear it. The hospital could not accommodate all the sick, and they were left in their tents, many of them with a blanket only to protect them from the damp ground, and entirely destitute of proper nourishment. Men who were seen in the morning, apparently in health, were taken to the "Dead House" in the afternoon, and some have been known to drop in the street, and die before they could be carried to the tents. Notwithstanding the enforcement of the most rigid sanitary measures, diseases of all kinds continued to

spread with an alarming rapidity. Add to this the short rations which were meted out to us, together with their miserable quality and the cruel treatment which we received at the hands of the negro soldiers, and you have but a faint idea of the suffering to which we were now subjected. Fears of death, either by disease or the hands of the negroes, forced many true Southern soldiers to think of taking the oath. This could readily be done, by application to the proper authorities, and a release obtained—only, however, to be drafted in the United States army. An opportunity to take the oath, and go into the United States army, was now freely extended to all the prisoners, as the officials gave notice that a “drawing for hostages in retaliation for the Fort Pillow massacre” was to take place at some early day. Preparations were accordingly made, and finally the 20th of May was announced as the day upon which to determine the fate of many men. The *ruse* took remarkably well, and some hundred or so flocked to the gate, to swear fealty to “Uncle Sam.” After this furor oath-taking was not so prevalent. Later in the summer, it again made its appearance, and this time the prisoners determined to take action to prevent it. This, however, had to be done with great secrecy, as the participators in it, if known, would have been severely punished. Meetings were held in the tents of the most prominent men in camp, and various schemes devised to prevent the depletion of our ranks in this manner. None of them had any effect, however, and more vigorous measures had to be adopted. Whenever it was known that a prisoner intended taking the oath (and it was very difficult to conceal the matter from his tent mates), a party would proceed to his tent the night previous, call him out and administer a severe flogging. They even went so far as to clip off the ears of one. Of course the parties who did this work were completely disguised. Thus it will be seen that Kuklux existed at Point Lookout before it did in South Carolina. The enforcement of these harsh measures decreased the number of oath-takers very materially, and the United States were compelled to seek elsewhere for recruits. Summer was now fairly upon us, and we began to feel its effects most severely. There was not a shade tree in the camp, and the only shelter we had from the scorching rays of the sun was our dilapidated tents. The glare of the sun upon the white ground and tents soon produced what is known as “moon blindness.” This is a disease which affects one only at night. Then one-half of the camp, at least, were totally blind, and had to be led

by those who were more fortunate. Their fear that this might terminate in total and permanent blindness was a source of extreme anxiety to most of the men, and began to tell most fearfully upon their health and spirits. Nothing was done by the authorities (if, indeed, anything could have been done) except the issuing of green shades for the eyes, and planting some small spots with oats, rye, &c., so that the eye might have a green spot to look upon. The health of the camp began to grow worse, and deaths were very numerous. Very little has been said so far as to the treatment which we received, and a few words on that subject would not be amiss. As a general rule, the treatment by the white soldiers was not so bad, and it would have been much better, no doubt, had it not been for the cruel policy of the United States Government, and the stringent orders to have that policy carried out. Our guards were relieved every morning, and fresh ones were mounted. A patrol of ten or twelve men was placed in the camp, whose duty it was to see that the prisoners retired to their tents at the proper hour and extinguished their lights. Their orders were to allow no one to walk about after "taps" were sounded, nor to allow any unnecessary noise or conversation in camp. The colored troops were very harsh in their treatment of us, and they were no doubt urged to do this by their officers, who were certainly the meanest set of white men that could be found anywhere. The negroes never let an opportunity pass to show their animosity and hatred towards us, and the man who shot a Rebel was regarded as a good soldier. They carried their authority to the extreme, and would shoot upon the slightest provocation. If a prisoner happened to violate even one of the simplest regulations, he was sure to be shot at, and should he be so unfortunate as to turn over in his sleep, groan or make any noise, which some were apt to do while sleeping, the tent in which he lay would be fired into. For instance, one night in Company G, Fourth division, some one happened to groan in his sleep. The negro patrol was near, heard it, and fired into the tent, killing two and wounding several others. These were killed while sleeping and were unconscious of having committed any offence whatever. None of the patrols were punished, but were praised for vigilance. Scores of incidents, similar in character and result, might be given, but it would only be consuming time. Suffice it to say that a man's life was in more danger than upon a picket line, for he was completely at the mercy of the cruel and malignant negro soldiery. Even the white troops were incensed against them,

and often "rocked" them while walking their posts—an act for which the prisoners were blamed, and for which they were fired into on more than one occasion. Shooting into the tents of prisoners became so common that the officers of the white regiments protested at last against their (the colored troops) being allowed in camp, and accordingly they were withdrawn at night, and white patrols substituted.

Desertions among the guard were of a frequent occurrence, and they often carried prisoners with them. One night, a sharp firing was heard on the bay shore, and next morning the bodies of several Confederates and Yankees were seen lying upon the beach. One boat load had made good their escape, but this was detected and fired into. The prison pen was so closely guarded that it was almost impossible to escape. In addition to the strong guard maintained around the pen, a block house, with a barricade, extended across the point about a mile from our quarters. Gunboats were constantly patrolling the bay and river. To go up the point was impossible, as the barricade was strongly guarded, and the Virginia shore was twelve miles from us, while the eastern shore of Maryland was twenty miles distant. Notwithstanding these disadvantages some few managed to get away.

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

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A LITTLE WORK ON THE PART OF OUR FRIENDS would be especially acceptable just now when we are passing through our usual "summer drought." Speak to your friends about our *Papers*, urge them to subscribe, and send us promptly their names and their money.

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IN THE RECENT DEATH OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON at Beaufort, South Carolina, a gallant soldier, a high-toned gentleman and a true patriot has joined the long line of illustrious comrades, who have "crossed over the river" before him. As illustrating an important part of his career, we propose beginning in our next number the publication of his military diary for the period in 1864, during which he commanded the old First corps, Army Northern Virginia. Thus one by one our leaders are passing away. Who shall be next?

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OUR ADVERTISEMENTS should attract the special attention of all interested in the matters of which they treat. We can fully vouch for each one of our advertisers, and can recommend them all the more confidently because most of them were true Confederate soldiers.

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OUR CORRESPONDENTS will please excuse any recent delay in answering their letters.

Besides the fact that our correspondence is always very heavy, and sometimes accumulates beyond our ability to attend to it promptly, the Secretary has been sorely afflicted in the loss of two of his children within two weeks of each other, and has been incapacitated for his usual work.

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MAJOR H. B. MCCLELLAN, the gallant and accomplished gentleman who rode with Stuart and Hampton as Assistant Adjutant-General of the cavalry corps, Army Northern Virginia, is so widely known that we doubt not the mistake in spelling his name, inadvertently made by the printer in the advertisement of his excellent school, was generally detected.

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### Book Notices.

*The Southern Student's Hand Book of Selections for Reading and Oratory.*  
By John G. James, Superintendent Texas Military Institute. New York, Chicago and New Orleans: A. S. Barnes & Co.

We are indebted to the publishers for a copy of this book, and, despite the edict of Senator Blaine (one of the heroic gentlemen "who were invisible in war and are now invincible in peace"), we most cordially commend it to our schools and families.

It is emphatically a *Southern* book, designed for Southern youth, and made of selections from Southern authors. And yet the charge that it is so sectional as to keep alive the bitter memories of the war, and sow seed which may ripen into a future "rebellion," is utterly false, as any candid man may see by reference to the book itself. It does teach that the men who fought for Southern independence were not "rebels" or "traitors," but as pure patriots as the world ever saw. Yet on the other hand, it teaches a full "acceptance of the situation" and of all the "logical results" of the war, and that henceforth the people of the South must meet all of their obligations as citizens of our common country. Mr. Blaine interprets "loyalty to the Union" to mean obedience to the behests of the ultra wing of the Republican party. The whole spirit of the selections of this book teaches obedience to the constitution and laws of the land.

If we find here and there a selection which a more rigid standard of excellence would have excluded, and miss some which we would have expected to find, yet it is due to Colonel James to say that he has performed his delicate task with sound judgment, rare discretion and fine literary taste, and has produced a book which deserves, as it will no doubt have, a wide circulation.

The type, paper, binding and general *make up* are in the usual good style of the great publishing house of A. S. Barnes & Co.

*Stories of the Old Dominion.* By Colonel John Esten Cooke. New York: Harper & Brothers

This is a charming book, designed for children and admirably fulfilling its design, but of deep interest to grown people as well. We learn through a private channel that Colonel Cooke wrote this book originally for his own children, and read to them each chapter as it was completed; and thus interesting his own children he has prepared a book which will make many other little eyes all over the land sparkle with delight, while it will at the same time impart, in the most pleasant manner, important historic information.

We are inclined to regard this as in many respects the very best book which Colonel Cooke's facile and prolific pen has produced. It is beautifully gotten up by the publishers.

*Annals of the Army of Tennessee.*

The first volume of this magazine can be had on application to the editor, Dr. E. L. Drake, Nashville, Tennessee.

It is a very valuable publication, containing most important "material for the use of the future historian." Dr. Drake has conducted the magazine with marked ability, and we sincerely hope that his enterprise may be liberally sustained. Send for a circular and secure a full set of the numbers.

*The Mining Record*, published by Colonel A. R. Chisolm, No. 61 Broadway, New York, is a very valuable publication, and none the less acceptable to us because all connected with it were gallant Confederates.



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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., September, 1879.

No. 9.

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**The Gettysburg Campaign—Full Report of General J. E. B. Stuart.**

[We published in our issue for August, 1876, a fragment of General Stuart's report of "operations *after* Gettysburg," which we found, in his own hand writing, among his papers which Mrs. Stuart kindly turned over to us, and which was all we could obtain at the time. We are now able, through the kindness of our friend Major H. B. McClellan, of the staff of the old cavalry corps, to give our readers the full text of this important report of the great campaign.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,  
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, August 20th, 1863.

To Colonel R. H. CHILTON, *Chief of Staff, Army of Northern Virginia*:

Colonel—I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the cavalry division, Army of Northern Virginia, from the time of crossing the Rappahannock on the 16th day of June, 1863, to the 24th day of July, 1863, when, having recrossed the Blue Ridge after the Pennsylvania campaign, our pickets were re-established on the south bank of the Rappahannock.

After holding in check a cavalry force at least double our own for months, with a command stretched on the outposts from the



Blue Ridge to the Chesapeake, engaging in numerous hand-to-hand encounters, illustrating the superiority of Southern cavalry, it was with *joy* that the order of the Commanding-General to "*advance*" was received by the cavalry.

I was instructed by the Commanding-General to leave a sufficient force on the Rappahannock to watch the enemy in front and move the main body parallel to the Blue Ridge and on Longstreet's right flank, who was to move near the base of the mountains through Fauquier and Loudoun counties.

The position of the enemy, as far as known, was as follows: His cavalry massed in Fauquier, principally from Warrenton Springs to Catlett station, with the Twelfth corps, and other infantry supports; the main body of Hooker's army being in Stafford and lower Fauquier, hastening to interpose itself between our main body and Washington, with a corps or two confronting A. P. Hill's corps at Fredericksburg, having made a lodgement on the south side of the river there near the mouth of Deep run.

I accordingly left the Fifteenth Virginia cavalry, Major Collins, W. H. F. Lee's brigade, on the lower Rappahannock, co-operating with A. P. Hill, and directed Brigadier-General Hampton to remain with the brigade on the Rappahannock in observation of the enemy during the movement of our forces, and directed also Fitz. Lee's brigade (Colonel T. T. Munford temporarily in command) to cross on the morning of the 15th at Rockford, and take the advance of Longstreet's column, via Barbee's cross-roads, and put Robertson's and W. H. F. Lee's brigades en route to cross the Rappahannock lower down (at Hinson's mill), while Jones' brigade followed with orders to picket the Aestham river the first day. The movement was not interrupted, the enemy having disappeared from our front during the night, and our march continued to within a few miles of Salem, to bivouac for the night. Scouting parties were sent to Warrenton, where it was ascertained the enemy had withdrawn his forces to Centreville the day previous.

General Fitz. Lee's brigade, having camped near Piedmont, moved on the morning of the 17th (Wednesday) by my direction towards Aldie via Middleburg, with the view, if possible, to hold the gap in Bull Run mountain, as a screen to Longstreet's movements. W. H. F. Lee's brigade was kept near The Plains reconnoitring to Thoroughfare gap, while Robertson's brigade was halted near Rectortown to move to the support of either.

I accompanied Fitz. Lee's brigade as far as Middleburg, where I



remained to close up the command and keep in more ready communication with the rear. The brigade moving to Aldie, being much worn and the horses having had very little food, was halted by its commander near Dover to close up, and pickets sent forward to the Aldie gap; these pickets were soon attacked by the enemy's cavalry advancing from the direction of Fairfax, and were driven back on the main body, which took a position just west of Aldie, on a hill commanding the Snickersville road, but which was liable to be turned by the road to Middleburg. Simultaneously with this attack I was informed that a large force of the enemy's cavalry was advancing on Middleburg from the direction of Hopewell. Having only a few pickets and my staff here, I sent orders to Munford to look out for the road to Middleburg, as by the time my dispatch reached him the enemy would be in the place, and retiring myself towards Rector's cross-roads, I sent orders for Robertson to march without delay for Middleburg and Chambliss to take the Salem road to the same place.

At Aldie ensued one of the most sanguinary cavalry battles of the war, and at the same time most creditable to our arms and glorious to the veteran brigade of Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee. They fought most successfully, punishing the enemy with great severity, and maintaining their position till the dispatch received from me made it necessary to move farther back on account of the threatening attitude of the force at Middleburg. This brigade captured one hundred and thirty-four (134) prisoners, among whom were a colonel and captain, several stands of colors, together with horses, arms and equipments. A large number of the enemy's dead, including a colonel, was left on the field.

Brigadier-General Robertson arrived at Middleburg just at dark. I ordered him to attack the enemy at once, and with his two regiments he drove him handsomely out of the place and pursued him miles on the Hopewell road, the force appearing to scatter. He captured a standard and seventy (70) prisoners.

Chambliss' brigade, approaching from that direction, caught that night and early next morning one hundred and sixty (160) and several guidons—the colonel and a small detachment only escaping. It was the First Rhode Island cavalry. Horses, arms and equipments were captured in proportion. Among the captured were included a number of officers.

Our own loss in Robertson's brigade was slight, except Major McNeal, Sixty-third North Carolina cavalry, whose wound deprived

us of the service of a most valuable officer, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cantwell, Fifty-ninth North Carolina troops, captured. Major Heros Von Bocke, of my staff, being sent by me with the attacking column, behaved with his usual fine judgment and distinguished gallantry.

Our loss in Fitz. Lee's brigade was heavier, as the fighting was more desperate and continued. His report, which I hope to forward with this, will state the casualties.

We occupied Middleburg that night, and on the 18th took position around the place with Robertson's and W. H. F. Lee's brigades, and directed Fitz. Lee's brigade to take position at Union, on my left, while Jones' brigade was expected to arrive that day. The enemy soon made such encroachments on our left that I deemed it requisite to leave Middleburg out of my line of battle, keeping pickets, however, close to the enemy. Slight skirmishing continued. A general engagement of cavalry was not sought by me, because I preferred waiting for the arrival of the cavalry still in rear (Jones' and Hampton's brigades), and I confined my attention to procuring, through scouts and reconnoitring parties, information of the enemy's movements. In one of these, Major Mosby, with his usual daring, penetrated the enemy's lines and caught a staff officer of General Hooker, bearer of dispatches to General Pleasanton, commanding United States cavalry near Aldie. These dispatches disclosed the fact that Hooker was looking to Aldie with solicitude, and that General Pleasanton, with infantry and cavalry, occupied the place, and that a reconnoissance in force of cavalry was meditated towards Warrenton and Culpeper. I immediately dispatched to General Hampton, who was coming by way of Warrenton from the direction of Beverly's ford, this intelligence, and directed him to meet this advance at Warrenton. The captured dispatches also gave the entire number of divisions, from which we could estimate the approximate strength of the enemy's army. I therefore concluded in no event to attack with cavalry alone the enemy at Aldie. As long as he kept within supporting distance of his infantry, at that point my operations became necessarily defensive, but masking thereby the movement of our main body by checking the enemy's reconnoissance and by continually threatening attack. Hampton met the enemy's advance towards Culpeper at Warrenton, and drove him back without difficulty, a heavy storm and night intervening to aid the enemy's retreat. On the 19th the enemy showed signs of an advance, and our pickets

beyond Middleburg were driven back upon the main body, composed of Robertson's and W. H. F. Lee's brigades, posted far enough west of the place not to bring it under fire. The enemy with a large force of cavalry advanced, attacking with dismounted men deployed as infantry. This attack was met in the most determined manner by these two brigades, which rough roads had already decimated for want of adequate shoeing facilities—Chambliss commanding Lee's brigade upon the left, and Robertson's on the right. Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee's brigade, in the meantime, was occupied with the enemy on the Snickersville turnpike opposite us. The enemy finally gained possession of a woodland in front of our line of battle, and while our brave men met and repelled every attempt to advance from it, yet our charges invariably brought us under a severe carbine fire from these woods, as well as a fire from the artillery beyond.

Appreciating this difficulty, I withdrew my command to a more commanding position, a half mile to the rear, where we possessed every advantage and could more readily debouche for attack. In withdrawing, while riding at my side, the brave and heroic Major Von Borcke received a very severe and it was thought fatal wound in the neck, from one of the enemy's sharpshooters, who from a stone fence a few hundred yards off poured a tempest of bullets over us. I will not pause *here* to record the praise due this distinguished Prussian.

The enemy did not attack our new position on the 19th.

Jones' brigade came up on the evening of the 19th, and was ordered to the left near Union—General Fitz. Lee's brigade being farther to the left, looking out for Snicker's gap and the Snickersville pike. Hampton's brigade arrived on the 20th—too late to attack the enemy still in possession of Middleburg. A continuous rain was also an obstacle to military operations. Skirmishing, however, continued, principally on our left beyond Goose creek, where Colonel Rosser, with his regiment (Fifth Virginia cavalry), attacked and drove the enemy's force across the stream in handsome style. He was supported by Brigadier-General Jones with a portion of his brigade.

I was extremely anxious now to attack the enemy as early as possible, having, since Hampton's arrival, received sufficient reinforcement to attack the enemy's cavalry; but the next morning (21st) being the Sabbath, I recognized my obligation to do no duty other than what was absolutely necessary, and determined, so far



as was in my power, to devote it to rest; not so with the enemy, whose guns about 8 A. M. showed that he would not observe it. Had I attacked the enemy, I would have encountered, besides his cavalry, a heavy force of infantry and artillery, and the result would have been disastrous, no doubt.

Hampton's and Robertson's brigades were moved to the front to a position previously chosen, of great strength against a force of ordinary size, or against cavalry alone; but although the enemy's advance was held in check gallantly and decidedly for a long time, it soon became evident that the enemy, utterly foiled for days in his attempt to force our lines, had, as usual, brought a heavy infantry force—part of the Fifth corps, under General Vincent—to his support, and its advance was already engaged in conjunction with the cavalry. I, therefore, directed General Hampton to withdraw to the next height whenever his position was hard pressed, and sent orders at once to Colonel Chambliss and General Jones—the former having informed me that the enemy was advancing in heavy force in his front—to afford all the resistance possible, and General Jones to join his left, and retiring apace with the main body, to effect a junction with it at Upperville, where I proposed to make a more determined stand than was compatible with our forces divided. The commands were from four to six miles apart.

In retiring from the first position before Middleburg, one of the pieces of Captain Hart's battery of horse artillery had the axle broken by one of the enemy's shot, and the piece had to be abandoned, which is the first piece of my *horse artillery which has ever fallen into the enemy's hands*. Its full value was paid in the slaughter it made in the enemy's ranks, and it was well sold.

The next position was on the west bank of Goose creek, whence, after receiving the enemy's attack and after repulsing him with slaughter, I again withdrew in echelon of regiments, in plain view and under fire of the enemy's guns. Nothing could exceed the coolness and self-possession of officers and men in these movements—performing evolutions with a precision under fire that must have wrung the tribute of admiration from the enemy even, who dared not trust his cavalry unsupported to the sabres of such men. In the meantime, Jones' and W. H. F. Lee's brigades were hotly engaged with another column of the enemy (moving parallel to this), and were gradually retiring towards Upperville; before reaching which point, however, the enemy had pressed closely up so as to render an attempt to effect a junction at Upperville haz-



ardous to those brigades, and also made it necessary for Hampton's and Roberston's brigades to move at once to the west side of Upperville, on account of the number of roads concentrating at that point so as to favor the enemy's flank movements. I was anxious, on account of the women and children, to avoid a conflict in the village; but the enemy, true to his reckless and inhuman instincts, sought to take advantage of this disinclination on our part by attacking furiously our *rear* guard. In an instant the same men who had with so much coolness retired before the enemy, wheeled about and with admirable spirit drove back the enemy—killing, wounding and capturing a large number. In this General Hampton's brigade participated largely and in a brilliant manner. His report, not yet sent in, will no doubt give full particulars.

After this repulse, which was not followed up, as the enemy's infantry was known to be in close supporting distance, I withdrew the command leisurely to the mountain gap west of Upperville.

The enemy attacked Brigadier-General Robertson, bringing up the rear in this movement, and was handsomely repulsed; the brave and efficient Colonel Evans, of the Sixty-third North Carolina troops, was, however, severely and it was feared fatally wounded, his body falling into the hands of the enemy. Jones' and W. H. F. Lee's brigades joined the main body near the gap, and positions were taken to dispute any further advance. The day was far spent. The enemy did not attack the gap, but appeared to go into camp at Upperville. In the conflicts on the left, the enemy was roughly handled. Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, Ninth Virginia cavalry, was very severely and it was believed fatally wounded, and left in the hands of the enemy. The reports of brigade commanders will show further details of these encounters.

Fitz. Lee's brigade, being before Snicker's gap, did not participate in these operations.

By night part of Longstreet's corps occupied the mountain pass, and the cavalry was ordered farther back for rest and refreshment, of which it was sorely in need, leaving ample pickets in front and on either flank. When the mist had sufficiently cleared away next morning, it was evident the enemy was retiring, and the cavalry was ordered up immediately to the front to follow. The enemy was pursued to within a short distance of Aldie, and a number captured. Colonel Rosser, Fifth Virginia cavalry, having been sent across from Snickersville early to reconnoitre, contributed very materially to the vigor of this pursuit. Major Eels, of his

regiment, a gallant and meritorious officer, was killed in a charge upon the enemy near Goose Creek bridge. Our lines were much further advanced than before, and Monday (the 22d) was consumed in their re-establishment.

Our loss in these operations was 65 killed, 279 wounded and 166 missing.

I resumed my own position at Rector's cross-roads, and being in constant communication with the Commanding-General, had scouts busily engaged watching and reporting the enemy's movements, and reporting the same to the Commanding-General. In this difficult search the fearless and indefatigable Major Mosby was particularly active and efficient. His information was always accurate and reliable.

The enemy retained one army corps (Fifth) at Aldie, and kept his cavalry near enough to make attacks upon the latter productive of no solid benefits, and I began to look for some other point at which to direct an effective blow. I submitted to the Commanding-General the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front, and passing through Hopewell or some other gap in Bull Run mountain, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac.

The Commanding-General wrote me authorizing this move if I deemed it practicable, and also what instructions should be given the officer left in command of the two brigades left in front of the enemy. He also notified me that one column should move via Gettysburg and the other via Carlisle towards the Susquehanna; and directed me, after crossing, to proceed with all dispatch to join the right (Early) of the army in Pennsylvania.

Accordingly, three (3) days' rations were prepared, and on the night of the 24th the following brigades: Hampton's, Fitz. Lee's, W. H. F. Lee's, rendezvoused secretly near Salem depot. We had no wagons or vehicles, except six pieces of artillery and caissons and ambulances.

Robertson's and Jones' brigades, under command of the former, were left in observation of the enemy on the usual front, with full instructions as to following up the enemy in case of withdrawal and joining our main army.

Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee's brigade had to march from north of Snicker's gap to the place of rendezvous. This brigade was now for the first time for a month under the command of its noble Briga-

dier, who, writhing under a painful attack of inflammatory rheumatism, nevertheless kept with his command until now.

At one o'clock at night the brigades, with noiseless march, moved out. This precaution was necessary on account of the enemy's having possession of Bull Run mountain, which in the daytime commanded a view of every movement of consequence in that region. Hancock's corps occupied Thoroughfare gap.

Moving to the right we passed through Glasscock's gap, without serious difficulty, and marched for Haymarket. I had previously sent Major Mosby, with some picked men, through to gain the vicinity of Dranesville, find where a crossing was practicable, and bring intelligence to me near Gum Spring to-day (25th).

As we neared Haymarket we found that Hancock's corps was en route through Haymarket for Gum Spring, his infantry well distributed through his trains. I chose a good position and opened with artillery with effect on his passing column, scattering men, wagons and horses, in wild confusion—disabled one of the enemy's caissons, which he abandoned, and compelled him to advance in order of battle to compel us to desist.

As Hancock had the right of way on my road, I sent Fitz. Lee's brigade to Gainesville to reconnoitre and devote the remainder of the day to grazing our horses, the only forage procurable in the country. The best of our information represented the enemy still at Centreville, Union Mills and Wolf Run Shoals. I sent a dispatch to General Lee concerning Hancock's movement, and moved back to deceive the enemy to Buckland. It rained heavily that night. To carry out my original design of passing west of Centreville would have involved so much detention on account of the presence of the enemy, that I determined to cross Bull run lower down and strike through Fairfax for the Potomac next day. The sequel shows this to have been the only practicable course. We marched through Brentsville to the vicinity of Wolf Run Shoals, and had to halt again in order to graze our horses, which hard marching without grain was fast breaking down. We met no enemy to-day (26th).

On the following morning (27th), having ascertained that on the night previous the enemy had disappeared entirely from Wolf Run Shoals, a strongly fortified position on the Occoquan, I marched to that point and thence directly for Fairfax station, sending General Fitz. Lee to the right to cross by Burke station, and effect a junction at Fairfax Courthouse, or farther on, according to cir-



cumstances. Fairfax station had been evacuated the previous day, but near this point General Hampton's advance regiment had a spirited encounter with and chase after a detachment of Federal cavalry, denominated "Scott's Nine Hundred," killing, wounding and capturing the greater portion, among them several officers; also horses, arms and equipments. The First North Carolina cavalry lost its Major in the first onset—Major Whittaker—an officer of distinction and great value to us.

Reaching Fairfax Courthouse, a communication was received from Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee at Annandale. At these two points there were evidences of very recent occupation; but the information was conclusive that the enemy had left this front entirely, the mobilized army having the day previous moved over towards Leesburg, while the local had retired to the fortifications near Washington. I had not heard yet from Major Mosby, but the indications favored my successful passage in rear of the enemy's army. After a halt of a few hours to rest and refresh the command, which regaled itself on the stores left by the enemy in the place, the march was resumed for Dranesville, which point was reached late in the afternoon. The camp fires of Sedgwick's (Sixth) corps, just west of the town, were still burning, it having left that morning, and several of his stragglers were caught. General Hampton's brigade was still in advance, and was ordered to move directly for Rowser's ford of the Potomac—Chambliss' brigade being held at Dranesville till Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee could close up. As General Hampton approached the river, he fortunately met a citizen who had just forded the river, who informed us there were no pickets on the other side and that the river was fordable, though two feet higher than usual. Hampton's brigade crossed early in the night, but reported to me that it would be utterly impossible to cross the artillery at that ford. In this the residents were also very positive—that vehicles could not cross. A ford lower down was examined and found quite as impracticable from quicksands, rocks and rugged banks. I, however, determined not to give it up without trial; and before twelve o'clock that night, in spite of the difficulties to all appearances insuperable, indomitable energy and resolute determination triumphed, every piece was brought safely over and the entire command in bivouac on Maryland soil.

In this success the horse artillery displayed the same untiring zeal in their laborious toil through mud and water, which has distinguished its members in battle. The canal, which was now the



supplying medium of Hooker's army, soon received our attention. A lock-gate was broken, and steps taken to intercept boats—at least a dozen were intercepted; and the next morning several, loaded with troops, negroes and stores, were captured by Colonel Wickham, Fourth Virginia cavalry, commanding rear guard. I ascertained that Hooker was on the day previous at Poolesville, and his army in motion for Frederick. I realized the importance of joining our army in Pennsylvania, and resumed the march northward early on the 28th. General Hampton was sent by Darnestown to Rockville, and the other brigades took the direct route to the same place. General Hampton encountered small parties of the enemy, which, with a number of wagons and teams, he captured, and reached Rockville in advance of the main body. The advance guard of W. H. F. Lee's brigade had a running fight with the Second New York cavalry, but the speed of their horses deprived us of the usual results in captures. At Rockville, General Hampton encountered what he believed to be a large force of the enemy, and moving up W. H. F. Lee's brigade quickly to his assistance, I found that the enemy had already disappeared, having retreated towards the Great Falls.

Rockville was speedily taken possession of. This place is situated on the direct wagon road from Washington City to Hooker's army, and consequently on his route of communication with Washington after crossing the Potomac. The telegraph line along it was torn down for miles. Soon after taking possession, a long train of wagons approached from the direction of Washington, apparently but slightly guarded. As soon as our presence was known to those in charge, they attempted to turn the wagons and, at full speed, to escape; but the leading brigade, W. H. F. Lee's, was sent in pursuit. The furthest wagon was within only three or four miles of Washington City, the train being about eight miles long. Not one escaped, though many were upset and broken so as to require their being burnt. More than one hundred and twenty-five best United States model wagons and splendid teams, with gay caparisons, were secured and driven off. The mules and harness of the broken wagons were also secured. The capture and securing of this train had for the time scattered the leading brigade. I calculated that before the next brigade could march this distance, and reach the defences of Washington, it would be after dark: the troops there would have had time to march to position to meet attack on this road. To attack at night with cavalry,

particularly unless certain of surprise, would have been extremely hazardous; to wait till morning would have lost much time from my march to join General Lee, without the probability of compensating results. I, therefore, determined, after getting the wagons under way, to proceed directly north so as to cut the Baltimore and Ohio railroad (now becoming the enemy's main war artery) that night. I found myself encumbered by about four hundred prisoners, many of whom were officers. I paroled nearly all at Brookeville that night, and the remainder next day at Cookesville. Among the number were Major Duane and Captain Michler, Engineers, United States army. At Cookesville our advance encountered and put to flight a small party of the enemy, and among the prisoners taken there were some who said they belonged to the "*Seven hundred loyal Eastern shoremen.*"

Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee reached the railroad soon after daylight, the march having continued all night. The bridge was burnt at Sykesville, and the track torn up at Hood's mill, where the main body crossed it. Measures were taken to intercept trains, but trains ran to the vicinity of the obstruction, took the alarm and ran back. The various telegraph lines were likewise cut, and communications of the enemy with Washington City thus cut off at every point, and Baltimore threatened. We remained in possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad nearly all day.

The enemy was ascertained to be moving through Frederick City northward, and it was important for me to reach our column with as little delay as possible, to acquaint the Commanding-General with the nature of the enemy's movements, as well as to place with his column my cavalry force. The head of the column, following a ridge road, reached Westminster about 5 P. M. At this place our advance was obstinately disputed for a short time by a squadron of the First Delaware cavalry, but what were not killed were either captured or saved themselves by precipitate flight. In this brief engagement two officers of the Fourth Virginia cavalry, Lieutenants Pierre Gibson and Murray, were killed—gallant and meritorious, they were noble sacrifices to the cause. \*[The ladies of the place begged to be allowed to superintend their interment, and in accordance with their wishes the bodies of these young heroes were left in their charge.] The fugitives were pursued a long distance on the Baltimore road, and I afterwards heard created a great panic in that city, impressing the authorities with the belief

that we were just at their heels. Here, for the first time since leaving Rector's cross-roads, we obtained a full supply of forage, but the delay and difficulty of procuring it kept many of the men up all night. Several flags and one piece of artillery, without a carriage, were captured here; the latter was spiked and left behind. We camped for the night a few miles beyond the town (Fitz. Lee's brigade in advance), halting the head of the column at Union Mills, midway between Westminster and Littlestown, on the Gettysburg road. It was ascertained here that night by scouts that the enemy's cavalry had reached Littlestown during the night and camped. Early next morning (June 30th) we resumed the march, direct by a cross route for Hanover, Pennsylvania—W. H. F. Lee's brigade in advance, Hampton in rear of the wagon train, and Fitz. Lee's brigade moving on the left flank between Littlestown and our road. About 10 A. M. the head of the column reached Hanover, and found a large column of cavalry passing through, going towards the gap of the mountains which I intended using. The enemy soon discovered our approach, and made a demonstration towards attacking us, which was promptly met by a gallant charge by Chambliss' leading regiment, which not only repulsed the enemy, but drove him pell-mell through the town with half his numbers, capturing his ambulances and a large number of prisoners—all which were brought safely through to our train, but were closely followed by the enemy's fresh troops. If my command had been well closed now, this cavalry column, which we had struck near its rear, would have been at our mercy; but owing to the great elongation of the column, by reason of the two hundred wagons and hilly roads, Hampton was a long way behind, and Lee was not yet heard from on the left. In retiring with the prisoners and ambulances, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Payne, Fourth Virginia cavalry, temporarily in command of the Second North Carolina cavalry, was taken prisoner in a gallant attempt to cut off a body of the enemy by a flank movement on the town. The delay in getting up reinforcements enabled the enemy to regain possession of the town, by no means desirable to hold, as it was in a valley completely commanded by the heights in our possession, which were soon crowned by our artillery. Our position was impregnable to cavalry, even with so small a force. We cut the enemy's column in twain. General Fitz. Lee, in the meantime, fell upon the rear portion, driving it handsomely and capturing one of Kilpatrick's staff, and many other prisoners.



Our wagon train was now a subject of serious embarrassment, but I thought by making a detour to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. I, therefore, determined to try it, particularly as I was satisfied from every accessible source of information, as well as from the lapse of time, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be near the Susquehanna.

My numerous skirmishers had greatly diminished, almost exhausted, my supply of ammunition. I had this immense train in an enemy's country, very near a hostile army, and besides about four hundred prisoners, which had accumulated since the paroling at Cookesville. I, therefore, had the train closed up in park, and Hampton, arriving in the meantime, engaged the enemy farther to the right, and finally with his sharpshooters dislodged the enemy from the town—the enemy moving towards our left, apparently to reunite his broken column, but pressing us with dismounted men on our left flank. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was put at the head of the column, and he was instructed to push on with the train, through Jefferson, for York, Pennsylvania, and communicate as soon as practicable with our forces.

Hampton's brigade brought up the rear. We were not molested in our march, which, on account of the very exposed situation of our flank, and the enemy's knowledge of it, was continued during the night. The night's march, over a very dark road, was one of peculiar hardship, owing to the loss of rest to both men and horses. After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax to their endurance. Whole regiments slept in the saddle, their faithful animals keeping the road unguided. In some instances they fell from their horses overcome with physical fatigue and sleepiness.

Reaching Dover, Pennsylvania, on the morning of the 1st of July, I was unable to find our forces. The most I could learn was that General Early had marched his division in the direction of Shippenburg, which the best information I could get seemed to indicate as the point of concentration of our troops. After as little rest as was compatible with the exhausted condition of the command, we pushed on for Carlisle, where we hoped to find a portion of the army. I arrived before that village by way of Dillstown in the afternoon. Our rations were entirely out. I desired to levy a contribution on the inhabitants for rations; but was informed before reaching it that it was held by a considerable force of militia, infantry and artillery, who were concealed in the buildings, with



the view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town. They were frustrated in their intention, and although very peaceable in external aspect, I soon found the information I had received was correct. I disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I, therefore, directed General Lee to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place.

Although the houses were used by their sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired except the United States cavalry barracks, which were burnt by my order; the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender, as in the case of General Ewell. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was charged with the duty of investing the place—the remaining brigades following at considerable intervals from Dover. Major-General W. F. Smith was in command of the force in Carlisle. The only obstacle to the enforcement of my threat was the scarcity of artillery ammunition. The whereabouts of our army was still a mystery; but during the night I received a dispatch from General Lee in answer to one sent by Major Venable from Dover, on Early's trail, that the army was at Gettysburg, and had been engaged on this day (1st July) with the enemy's advance. I instantly dispatched to Hampton to move ten miles that night on the road to Gettysburg, and gave orders to the other brigades with a view to reaching Gettysburg early next day, and started myself that night.

My advance reached Gettysburg July 2d, just in time to thwart a move of the enemy's cavalry upon our rear, by way of Hunters-town; after a fierce engagement, in which Hampton's brigade performed gallant service, a series of charges compelling the enemy to leave the field, and abandon his purpose. I took my position that day on the York and Heidelberg roads, on the left wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the morning of the 3d of July, pursuant to instructions from the Commanding-General (the ground along our line of battle being totally impracticable for cavalry operations), I moved forward to a position to the left of General Ewell's left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching towards Hanover on the left, and reaching to the base of the mountain spurs among which the

enemy held position. My command was increased by the addition of Jenkins' brigade, who here, in the presence of the enemy, allowed themselves to be supplied with but ten rounds of ammunition, although armed with the most approved Enfield musket. I moved this command and W. H. F. Lee's secretly through the woods to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear; but Hampton's and Fitz. Lee's brigades, which had been ordered to follow me, unfortunately debouched into the open ground, disclosing the movement and causing a corresponding movement of a large force of the enemy's cavalry. Having been informed that Generals Hampton and Lee were up, I sent for them to come forward, so that I could show them, at a glance from the elevated ground I held, the *situation*, and arrange for further operations. My message was so long in finding General Hampton that he never reached me, and General Lee remained, as it was not deemed advisable at the time the message was delivered for both to leave their commands.

Before General Hampton had reached where I was, the enemy had deployed a heavy line of sharpshooters, and were advancing towards our position, which was very strong. Our artillery had, however, left the crest, which it was essential for it to occupy, on account of being too short range to compete with the longer range guns of the enemy, but I sent orders for its return. Jenkins' brigade was chiefly employed dismounted, and fought with decided effect until the ten rounds were expended, and then retreated under circumstances of difficulty and exposure, which entailed the loss of valuable men.

The left, where Hampton's and Lee's brigades were, by this time became heavily engaged as dismounted skirmishers.

My plan was to employ the enemy in front with sharpshooters and move a command of cavalry upon their left flank from the position lately held by me; but the falling back of Jenkins' men (that officer was wounded the day previous before reporting to me, and his brigade was now commanded by Colonel Ferguson, Sixteenth Virginia cavalry) caused a like movement of those on the left, and the enemy, sending forward a squadron or two, were about to cut off and capture a portion of our dismounted sharpshooters. To prevent this, I ordered forward the nearest cavalry regiment (one of W. H. F. Lee's), quickly to charge this force of cavalry. It was gallantly done, and about the same time a portion of General Fitz. Lee's command charged on the left—the First

Virginia cavalry being most conspicuous. In these charges the impetuosity of those gallant fellows, after two weeks of hard marching and hard fighting on short rations, was not only extraordinary, but irresistible. The enemy's masses vanished before them like grain before the scythe, and that regiment elicited the admiration of every beholder, and eclipsed the many laurels already won by its gallant veterans. Their impetuosity carried them too far, and the charge being very much prolonged, their horses, already jaded by hard marching, failed under it. Their movement was too rapid to be stopped by couriers; and the enemy, perceiving it, were turning upon them with fresh horses. The First North Carolina cavalry and Jeff. Davis legion were sent to their support; and gradually this hand-to-hand fighting involved the greater portion of the command, till the enemy was driven from the field, which was now raked by their artillery, posted about three-quarters of a mile off—our officers and men behaving with the greatest heroism throughout.

Our own artillery commanding the same grounds, no more hand-to-hand fighting occurred, but the wounded were removed and the prisoners (a large number) taken to the rear. The enemy's loss was unmistakably heavy; numbers not known. Many of his killed and wounded fell into our hands.

That brave and distinguished officer, Brigadier-General Hampton, was seriously wounded twice in this engagement. Among the killed was Major Conner, a gallant and efficient officer of the Jeff. Davis legion. Several officers and many valuable men were killed and wounded, whose names it is not now in my power to furnish, but which, it is hoped, will be ultimately furnished in the reports of regimental and brigade commanders.

Notwithstanding the favorable results attained, I would have preferred a different method of attack, as already indicated; but I soon saw that entanglement, by the force of circumstances narrated, was unavoidable, and determined to make the best fight possible. General Fitz. Lee was always in the right place, and contributed his usual conspicuous share to the success of the day. Both he and the gallant First Virginia begged me (after the hot encounter) to allow them to take the enemy's battery, but I doubted the practicability of the ground for such a purpose.

During the day's operations, I held such a position as not only to render Ewell's left entirely secure, where the firing of my command, mistaken for that of the enemy, caused some apprehension,



but commanded a view of the routes leading to the enemy's rear. Had the enemy's main body been dislodged, as was confidently hoped and expected, I was in precisely the right position to discover it and improve the opportunity. I watched keenly and anxiously the indications in his rear for that purpose—while, in the attack which I intended (which was forestalled by our troops being exposed to view) his cavalry would have separated from the main body, and gave promise of solid results and advantages.

After dark I directed a withdrawal to the York road, as our position was so far advanced as to make it hazardous at night, on account of the proximity of the enemy's infantry.

During the night of the 3d of July, the Commanding-General withdrew the main body to the ridges west of Gettysburg, and sent word to me to that effect, but his messenger missed me. I repaired to his headquarters during the latter part of the night, and received instructions as to the new line, and sent in compliance therewith a brigade (Fitz. Lee's) to Cashtown to protect our trains congregated there. My cavalry and artillery were somewhat jeopardized before I got back to my command, by the enemy's having occupied our late ground before my command could be notified of the change; none, however, were either lost or captured.

During the 4th, which was quite rainy, written instructions were received from the Commanding-General as to the order of march back to the Potomac, to be undertaken at nightfall. In this order two brigades of cavalry (Baker's and Hampton's) were ordered to move, as heretofore stated, by way of Cashtown, guarding that flank, bringing up the rear on the road via Greenwood to Willamsport, which was the route designated for the main portion of the wagon trains and ambulances, under the special charge of Brigadier-General Imboden, who had a mixed command of artillery, infantry and cavalry (his own).

Previous to these instructions I had, at the instance of the Commanding-General, instructed Brigadier-General Robertson, whose two brigades (his own and Jones') were now on the right near Fairfield, Pennsylvania, that it was essentially necessary for him to hold the Jack Mountain passes. These included two prominent roads—the one north and the other south of Jack mountain, which is a sort of peak in the Blue Ridge chain.

In the order of march (retrograde) one corps (Hill's) preceded everything through the mountain; the baggage and prisoners of war, escorted by another corps (Longstreet's), occupied the centre,



and the Third (Ewell's) brought up the rear. The cavalry was disposed of as follows: two brigades on the Cashtown road under General Fitz. Lee, and the remainder (Jenkins' and Chambliss'), under my immediate command, was directed to proceed by way of Emmettsburg, Maryland, so as to guard the other flank. I dispatched Captain Blackford, Corps Engineers, to General Robertson to inform him of my movement and direct his co-operation, as Emmettsburg was in his immediate front and was probably occupied by the enemy's cavalry. It was dark before I had passed the extreme right of our line; and having to pass through very dense woods, taking by-roads, it soon became so dark that it was impossible to proceed. We were in danger of losing the command as well as the road. It was raining also. We halted for several hours, when, having received a good guide, and it becoming more light, the march was resumed and just at dawn we entered Emmettsburg. We there learned that a large body of the enemy's cavalry (the citizens said 15,000, which I knew, of course, was exaggerated) had passed through that point the afternoon previous, going towards Monterey, one of the passes designated in my instructions to Brigadier-General Robertson. I halted for a short time to procure some rations; and examining my map, I saw that this force could either attempt to force one of those gaps, or foiled in that (as I supposed they would be), it would either turn to the right and bear off towards Fairfield, where it would meet with like repulse from Hills' or Longstreet's corps, or, turning to the left before reaching Monterey, would strike across by Eiler's gap towards Hagerstown, and thus seriously threaten that portion of our trains which, under Imboden, would be passing down the Greencastle pike the next day, and interpose itself between the main body and its baggage. I did not consider that this force could seriously annoy any other portion of the command, under this order of march prescribed—particularly as it was believed that those gaps would be held by General Robertson till he could be reinforced by the main body. I, therefore, determined to adhere to my instructions, and proceed by way of Cavetown, by which I might intercept the enemy should he pass through Eiler's gap.

In and around Emmettsburg we captured sixty or seventy prisoners of war, and some valuable hospital stores en route from Frederick to the army.

The march was resumed on the road to Frederick till we reached a small village called Cooperstown, where our route turned short to the right. Here I halted the column to feed, as the horses were

much fatigued and famished. The column, after an hour's halt, continued through Harbaugh's valley by Zion church, to pass the Catoctin mountain. The road separated before debouching from the mountain—one fork leading to the left by Smithtown, and the other to the right, bearing more towards Leitersburg. I divided my command in order to make the passage more certain—Colonel Ferguson, commanding Jenkins' brigade, taking the left route, and Chambliss' brigade, which I accompanied, the other. Before reaching the west entrance to this pass, I found it held by the enemy, and had to dismount a large portion of the command and fight from crag to crag of the mountains to dislodge the enemy, already posted. Our passage was finally forced, and as my column emerged from the mountains it received the fire from the enemy's battery, posted to the left on the road to Boonsboro'. I ascertained, too, about this time, by the firing, that the party on the other route had met with resistance; and sent at once to apprise Colonel Ferguson of our passage, and directed him, if not already through, to withdraw and come by the same route I had followed. Our artillery was soon in position, and a few fires drove the enemy from his position.

I was told by a citizen that the party I had just attacked was the cavalry of Kilpatrick, who had claimed to have captured several thousand prisoners and four hundred or five hundred wagons from our forces near Monterey; but I was further informed that not more than forty wagons accompanied them, and other facts I heard led me to believe the success was far overrated.

About this time, Captain Emack, Maryland cavalry, with his arm in a sling, came to us and reported that he had been in the fight of the night before, and partially confirmed the statement of the citizen, and informed me, to my surprise, that a large portion of Ewell's corps trains had preceded the army through the mountains.

It was nearly night, and I felt it of the first importance to open communication with the main army, particularly as I was led to believe that a portion of this force might still be hovering on its flanks. I sent a trusty and intelligent soldier, Private Robert W. Goode, First Virginia cavalry, to reach the Commanding-General by a route across the country, and relate to him what I knew, as well as what he might discover en route, and moved towards Leitersburg as soon as Colonel Ferguson came up, who, although his advance had forced the passage of the gap, upon the receipt of

my dispatch turned back and came by the same route I had taken, thus making an unnecessary circuit of several miles, and not reaching me till after dark.

Having heard from the Commanding-General at Leitersburg about daylight next morning (six o'clock), and being satisfied that all of Kilpatrick's force had gone towards Boonsboro', I immediately, notwithstanding the march of a greater portion of both the preceding nights, set out towards Boonsboro'. Jones' brigade had now arrived by the route from Fairfield. Soon after night, Brigadier-General Jones, whose capture had been reported by Captain Emack, came from the direction of Williamsport, whither he had gone with the portion of the train which escaped.

The enemy's movement had separated him from his command, and he had made a very narrow escape. He informed me of Imboden's arrival at Williamsport.

Having reached Cavetown, I directed General Jones to proceed on the Boonsboro' road a few miles, and thence proceed to Funks-town, which point I desired him to hold, covering the eastern front of Hagerstown.

Chambliss' brigade proceeded direct from Leitersburg to Hagerstown, and Robertson's took the same route, both together a very small command.

Diverging from Jones' line of march at Cavetown, I proceeded with Jenkins' brigade by way of Chensville towards Hagerstown. Upon arriving at the former place, it was ascertained that the enemy was nearing Hagerstown with a large force of cavalry from the direction of Boonsboro', and Colonel Chambliss needed reinforcements. Jenkins' brigade was pushed forward, and arriving before Hagerstown, found the enemy in possession, and made an attack in flank by this road—Jones coming up further to the left, and opening with a few shots of artillery. A small body of infantry, under Brigadier-General Iverson, also held the north edge of the town, aided by the cavalry of Robertson and Chambliss. Our operations were here much embarrassed by our great difficulty in preventing this latter force in mistaking us for the enemy—several shots striking near our column. I felt sure that the enemy's designs were directed against Williamsport, where, I was informed by General Jones, our wagons were congregated in a narrow space at the foot of the hill near the river, which was too much swollen to admit their passage to the south bank. I, therefore, urged on all sides the most vigorous attack to save our trains at Williamsport. Our



force was very perceptibly much smaller than the enemy's, but by a bold front and determined attack, with a reliance on that Help which has never failed me, I hoped to raise the siege of Williamsport, if, as I believed, that was the real object of the enemy's designs. Hagerstown is six miles from Williamsport—the country between being almost entirely cleared, but intersected by innumerable fences and ditches. The two places are connected by a lane and perfectly straight "macadamized" road.

The enemy's dismounted skirmishers fought from street to street, and some time elapsed before the town was entirely clear—the enemy taking the road first towards Sharpsburg, but afterwards turned to the Williamsport road. Just as the town was cleared, I heard the sound of artillery at Williamsport.

The cavalry, except the two brigades with General Fitz. Lee, were now pretty well concentrated at Hagerstown, and one column, under Colonel Chambliss, was pushed directly down the road after the enemy, while Robertson's two regiments and Jenkins' brigade kept to the left of the road, moving in a parallel direction to Chambliss. A portion of the Stuart horse artillery also accompanied the movement.

The first charge was gallantly executed by the leading brigade (Chambliss'), now numbering only a few hundred men—the Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia cavalry participating with marked gallantry. The column on the flank was now hurried up to attack the enemy in flank; but the obstacles, such as post and rail fences, delayed its progress so long, that the enemy had time to rally along a crest of rocks and fences, from which he opened with artillery, raking the road. Jenkins' brigade was ordered to dismount and deploy over the difficult ground. This was done with marked effect and boldness—Lieutenant-Colonel Witcher, as usual, distinguishing himself by his courage and conduct. The enemy, thus dislodged, was closely pressed by the mounted cavalry, but made one effort at a counter charge, which was gallantly met and repulsed by Colonel James B. Gordon, commanding a fragment of the Fifth North Carolina cavalry—that officer exhibiting, under my eye, individual prowess deserving special commendation. The repulse was soon after converted into a rout by Colonel Lomax's regiment, Eleventh Virginia cavalry, Jones' brigade, which now took the road, and under the gallant leadership of its Colonel, with drawn sabres, charged down the turnpike under a fearful fire of artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Funsten behaved with conspicuous gal-



lantry in this charge, and Captain Winthrop, a volunteer aid of Lieutenant-General Longstreet, also bore himself most gallantly.

The enemy was now very near Williamsport, and this determined and vigorous attack in rear soon compelled him to raise the siege of that place and leave in hasty discomfiture by the Downsville road. His withdrawal was favored by night, which set in just as we reached the ridge overlooking Williamsport.

An important auxiliary to this attack was rendered by Brigadier-General Lee, who reached the vicinity of Williamsport by the Greencastle road very opportunely, and participated in the attack with his accustomed spirit.

Great credit is due the command for the fearless and determined manner in which they rushed upon the enemy, and compelled him to loose his hold upon the main portion of the transportation of the army.

Without this attack, it is certain that our trains would have fallen into the hands of the enemy. For, while some resistance was made by General Imboden, still the size and nature of his command, the peculiar conformation of the ground—overlooked by hills and approached by six plain roads—go to show conclusively that not even a display of Spartan heroism on the part of his command could have saved those wagons from the torch of the enemy. I communicated with him, after opening the road, by a Lieutenant whom I met but a short distance from the town. Officers present with General Imboden during the attack assure me I am right in the foregoing opinion.

I was apprized, when about midway, that Lieutenant-General Longstreet had arrived at Hagerstown.

As a part of the operations of this period, I will here report that about sixty of the wagons belonging to Lee's brigade, while in the special charge of General Imboden en route to Williamsport, near Mercersburg, were captured by the enemy. A court of inquiry has been convened to inquire into the circumstances of this capture. I, therefore, forbear animadversion on the subject.

My command bivouacked near Hagerstown, and I took position that night on the road leading from Hagerstown to Boonsboro'. The next day, July 7th, I proceeded to Downsville, establishing there a portion of Wofford's brigade, sent me for the purpose by General Longstreet, and posted Jenkins' cavalry brigade on that portion of our front in advance of the infantry. Robertson's brigade, being small and the enemy being least threatening from that

direction, was assigned to the north front of Hagerstown, connecting with General Jones on the right on the Cavetown road. The Maryland cavalry was ordered on the National road and towards Greencastle on a scout. On the 8th the cavalry was thrown forward towards Boonsboro', advancing on the different roads in order, by a bold demonstration to threaten an advance upon the enemy, and thus cover the retrograde of the main body. The move was successful, the advance under General Jones encountering the enemy on the Boonsboro' road at Beaver Creek bridge, from which point to the verge of Boonsboro' an animated fight ensued, principally on foot, the ground being entirely too soft from recent rains to operate successfully with cavalry. This contest was participated in in a very handsome manner by the other brigades (Fitz. Lee's, Hampton's, now commanded by Baker, and W. H. F. Lee's, commanded by Chambliss) and the Stuart horse artillery. Prisoners taken assured us the main cavalry force of the enemy was in our front, which, notwithstanding their known superiority in numbers and range of fire arms, was driven steadily before us; our brave men, nothing daunted or dispirited by the reverses of the army, maintaining a predominance of pluck over the enemy calculated to excite the pride and admiration of beholders. Just as we neared the village, Jenkins' brigade, under Ferguson, moved up on the Williamsport road, driving the enemy on that flank in such a manner as to cause him to begin his withdrawal from the village to the mountain pass. His batteries had been driven away from the hill by the Napoleons of McGregor's battery—which, for close fighting, evinced this day their great superiority over rifle guns of greater number. About this time I was informed that the enemy was heavily reinforced, and that our ammunition, by this protracted engagement, was nearly exhausted; and despairing of getting possession of the town, which was completely commanded by artillery in the mountain gap, and believing that in compelling the enemy to act upon the defensive all that day retreating before us, the desired object had been fully attained, I began to retire towards Funkstown, except Jenkins' brigade, which was ordered to its former position on the Williamsport road. The enemy, observing this from his mountain perch, tried to profit by it with a vigorous movement on our heels, but was foiled.

As the last regiment was crossing the bridge over Beaver creek, a squadron of the enemy, more bold than its comrades, galloped forward as if to charge. Steadily a portion of the First North Caro-

lina cavalry awaited their arrival within striking distance; but before reaching their vicinity, the enemy veered off across the fields, when a Blakely gun of Chews' battery, advantageously posted on a point, marked their movement, and although the squadron moved at a gallop, never did sportsman bring down his bird with more unerring shot than did the Blakely tell upon that squadron. In vain did it turn to the right and left—each shot seemed drawn to the flying target with fatal accuracy, until the enemy, driven by the shots of the Blakely and followed by the shouts of derision of our cavalry, escaped at full speed over the plain.

The command moved leisurely to the vicinity of Funkstown and bivouacked for the night.

The fight of the 8th administered a quietus to the enemy on the 9th, and my command kept the position, in front of Funkstown, assigned to it the night before.

The left of our main line of battle now rested just in rear of Funkstown—on the Antietam—and some infantry and artillery was thrown forward as a support to the cavalry beyond. The enemy advanced on the 10th on the Boonsboro' road, and our cavalry was engaged dismounted nearly all day. General Jones was farther to the left on the Cavetown road, and the infantry was placed in position, covering Funkstown, with dismounted cavalry on each flank. The enemy's advance was handsomely repulsed, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Witcher's cavalry, on foot behind a stone fence immediately on the left of the turnpike, performed a very gallant part, standing their ground with unflinching tenacity.

On the left a portion of Fitz. Lee's brigade under Captain Wooldrige, Fourth Virginia cavalry, who handled his skirmishers with great skill and effect, compelled the enemy's infantry to seek cover in a body of woods, at some distance from our lines.

In this day's operations the infantry before mentioned participated very creditably indeed in the centre, and I regret exceedingly that I have not the means of knowing the regiments and commanders, so as to mention them with that particularity to which by their gallantry they are entitled; but their conduct has no doubt been duly chronicled by their commanders and laid before the Commanding-General, a part of which was under his own eye.

Owing to the great ease with which the position at Funkstown could be flanked on the right, and by a secret movement at night the troops there cut off, it was deemed prudent to withdraw at night to the west side of the Antietam, which was accordingly done.



July 11th was not characterized by any general engagement, except that General Fitz. Lee, now on the right towards Downsville, was compelled to retire upon the main body; and the main body having assumed a shorter line, with its left resting on the National road, just west of Hagerstown, Chambliss' brigade was sent to that flank and General Fitz. Lee's also. The enemy made no movement on Jones' front, embracing the Funkstown and Cavetown roads.

On the 12th firing began early, and the enemy having advanced on several roads on Hagerstown, our cavalry forces retired without serious resistance, and massed on the left of the main body, reaching with heavy outposts the Conococheague on the National road. The infantry having already had time to entrench themselves, it was no longer desirable to defer the enemy's attack.

The 13th was spent in reconnoitring on the left—Rodes' division occupying the extreme left of our infantry, very near Hagerstown, a little north of the National road. Cavalry pickets were extended beyond the railroad leading to Chambersburg, and everything put in readiness to resist the enemy's attack.

The situation of our communications south of the Potomac caused the Commanding-General to desire more cavalry on that side, and accordingly Brigadier-General Jones' brigade (one of whose regiments, Twelfth Virginia cavalry, had been left in Jefferson) was detached and sent to cover our communication with Winchester.

The cavalry on the left consisted now of Fitz. Lee's, W. H. F. Lee's, Baker's, and Robertson's brigades—the latter being a mere handful.

On the 13th skirmishing continued at intervals; but it appeared that the enemy, instead of attacking, was entrenching himself in our front, and the Commanding-General determined to cross the Potomac. The night of the 13th was chosen for this move, and the arduous and difficult task of bringing up the rear was, as usual, assigned to the cavalry. Just before night, which was unusually rainy, the cavalry was disposed from right to left to occupy, dismounted, the trenches of the infantry at dark—Fitz. Lee's brigade holding the line of Longstreet's corps, Baker's of Hill's corps, and the remainder of Ewell's corps.

A pontoon bridge had been constructed at Falling Waters, some miles below Williamsport, where Longstreet's and Hill's corps were to cross, and Ewell's corps was to ford the river at Williamsport



—in rear of which last, after daylight, the cavalry was also to cross, except that Fitz. Lee's brigade, should he find the pontoon bridge clear in time, was to cross at the bridge; otherwise, to cross at the ford at Williamsport. The operation was successfully performed by the cavalry. General Fitz. Lee, finding the bridge would not be clear in time for his command, moved after daylight to the ford, sending two squadrons to cross in rear of the infantry at the bridge. These squadrons, mistaking Longstreet's rear for the rear of the army on that route, crossed over in rear of it. General Hill's troops, being notified that the squadrons would follow in his rear, were deceived by some of the enemy's cavalry, who approached very near in consequence of their belief that they were our cavalry. Although this unfortunate mistake deprived us of the lamented General Pettigrew, whom they mortally wounded, they paid the penalty of their temerity by losing most of their number in killed or wounded, if the accounts of those who witnessed it are to be credited.

The cavalry crossed at the fords without serious molestation, bringing up the rear on that route by 8 A. M. on the 14th. To Baker's (late Hampton's) brigade was assigned the duty of picketing the Potomac from Falling Waters to Hedgesville. The other brigades were moved back towards Leetown—Robertson's being sent to the fords of the Shenandoah, where he already had a picket, which, under Captain Johnston, of the North Carolina cavalry, had handsomely repulsed the enemy in their advance on Ashby's gap, inflicting severe loss, with great disparity in numbers.

Harper's Ferry was again in possession of the enemy, and Colonel Harman, Twelfth Virginia cavalry, had in an engagement with the enemy gained a decided success, but was himself captured by his horse falling.

Upon my arrival at the Bower that afternoon (15th), I learned that a large force of the enemy's cavalry was between Shepherdstown and Leetown, and determined at once to attack him, in order to defeat any designs he might have in the direction of Martinsburg. I made disposition accordingly, concentrating cavalry in his front, and early on the 16th moved Fitz. Lee's brigade down the turnpike towards Shepherdstown, supported by Chambliss, who, though quite ill, with that commendable spirit which has always distinguished him, remained at the head of his brigade. Jenkins' brigade was ordered to advance on the road from Martinsburg towards Shepherdstown, so as by this combination to expose one

of the enemy's flanks—while Jones, now near Charlestown, was notified of the attack, in order that he might co-operate; no positive orders were sent him, as his precise locality was not known.

These dispositions having been arranged, I was about to attack when I received a very urgent message from the Commanding-General to repair at once to his headquarters. I, therefore, committed to Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee the consummation of my plans, and reported at once to the Commanding-General, whom I found at Bunker Hill.

Returning in the afternoon, I proceeded to the scene of conflict on the turnpike, and found that General Fitz. Lee had, with his own and Chambliss' brigades, driven the enemy steadily to within a mile of Shepherdstown—Jenkins' brigade not having yet appeared on the left. It, however, soon afterward arrived in Fitz. Lee's rear and moved up to his support.

The ground was not practicable for cavalry, and the main body was dismounted and advanced in line of battle. The enemy retired to a strong position behind stone fences and barricades near Colonel Boteler's residence, and it being nearly dark, obstinately maintained his ground at this last point until dark, to cover his withdrawal.

Preparations were made to renew the attack vigorously next morning, but daybreak revealed that the enemy had retired towards Harper's Ferry. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was heavy. We had several killed and wounded; and among the latter, Colonel James H. Drake, First Virginia cavalry, was mortally wounded, dying that night (16th), depriving his regiment of a brave and zealous leader and his country of one of her most patriotic defenders.

The Commanding-General was very desirous of my moving at once into Loudoun a large portion of my command; but the recent rains had so swollen the Shenandoah that it was impossible to ford it, and cavalry scouting parties had to swim their horses over.

In the interval of time from the 16th to the 22d of July, the enemy made a demonstration on Hedgesville, forcing back Baker's brigade. Desultory skirmishing was kept up on that front for several days with the enemy, while our infantry was engaged in tearing up the Baltimore and Ohio railroad near Martinsburg. Parts of Jones' brigade were also engaged with the enemy, in spirited conflicts, not herein referred to, resulting very creditably to our arms,

near Fairfield, Pennsylvania, and on the Cavetown road from Hagerstown—the Sixth and Seventh Virginia cavalry being particularly distinguished. Accounts of these will be found in the reports of Brigadier-General Jones and Colonel Baker.

It soon became apparent that the enemy was moving upon our right flank, availing himself of the swollen condition of the Shenandoah to interpose his army, by a march along the east side of the Blue Ridge, between our present position and Richmond.

Longstreet's corps having already moved to counteract this effort, enough cavalry was sent, under Brigadier-General Robertson, for his advance guard through Front Royal and Chester gap, while Baker's brigade was ordered to bring up the rear of Ewell's corps—which was in rear—and Jones' brigade was ordered to picket the lower Shenandoah as long as necessary for the safety of that flank, and then follow the movement of the army. Fitz. Lee's, W. H. F. Lee's, and Jenkins' brigades, by a forced march from the vicinity of Leetown through Millwood, endeavored to reach Manassas gap, so as to hold it on the flank of the army; but it was already in possession of the enemy, and the Shenandoah, still high, in order to be crossed without interfering with the march of the main army, had to be forded below Front Royal. The cavalry already mentioned, early on the 23d, by a by-path reached Chester gap, passing on the army's left, and, with great difficulty and a forced march, that night bivouacked below Gaines' cross-roads, holding the Rockford road and Warrenton turnpike, on which near Amissville the enemy had accumulated a large force of cavalry. On the 24th while moving forward to find the locality of the enemy, firing was heard towards Newling's cross-roads, which was afterwards ascertained to be a portion of the enemy's artillery firing on Hill's column marching on the Richmond road. Before the cavalry could reach the scene of action, the enemy had been driven off by the infantry, and on the 25th the march was continued and the line of the Rappahannock resumed.

In taking a retrospect of this campaign, it is necessary, in order to appreciate the value of the services of the cavalry, to correctly estimate the amount of labor to be performed, the difficulties to be encountered, and the very extended sphere of operations, mainly in the enemy's country.

In the exercise of the discretion vested in me by the Commanding-General, it was deemed practicable to move in the enemy's rear, intercepting his communications with his base—Washington



—and inflicting damage upon his rear, to rejoin the army in Pennsylvania in time to participate in its actual conflicts. The result abundantly confirms my judgment as to the practicability as well as utility of the move. The main army, I was advised by the Commanding-General, would move in two columns for the Susquehanna. Early commanded the advance of that one of these columns to the eastward, and I was directed to communicate with him as early as practicable after crossing the Potomac and place my command on his right flank. It was expected I would find him in York. The newspapers of the enemy, my only source of information, chronicled his arrival there and at Wrightsville on the Susquehanna with great particularity. I, therefore, moved to join him in that vicinity. The enemy's army was moving in a direction parallel to me. I was apprized of its arrival at Taneytown when I was near Hanover, Pennsylvania, but believing from the lapse of time that our army was already in York or at Harrisburg, where it could choose its battle-ground with the enemy, I hastened to place my command with it. It is believed that had the corps of Hill and Longstreet moved on, instead of halting near Chambersburg, that York could have been the place of concentration instead of Gettysburg.

This move of my command between the enemy's seat of government and the army charged with its defence, involved serious loss to the enemy in men and material, over one thousand prisoners having been captured, and spread terror and consternation to the very gates of the capital. The streets were barricaded for defence, as was also done in Baltimore on the day following. This move drew the enemy's overwhelming force of cavalry from its aggressive attitude towards our flank near Williamsport and Hagerstown to the defence of its own communications, now at my mercy. The entire Sixth army corps, in addition, was sent to intercept me at Westminster, arriving there the morning I left, which, in the result, prevented its participation in the first two days' fight at Gettysburg.

Our trains in transit were thus not only secured, but it was done in a way that at the same time seriously injured the enemy. General Meade also detached four thousand troops, under General French, to escort public property to Washington from Frederick—a step which certainly would have been unnecessary but for my presence in his rear—thus weakening his army to that extent. In fact, although in his own country, he had to make large detach-



ments to protect his rear and baggage. General Meade also complains that his movements were delayed by the detention of his cavalry in his rear; he might truthfully have added, by the movement in his rear of a large force of Confederate cavalry, capturing his trains and cutting all his communications with Washington.

It is not to be supposed such delay in his operations could have been so effectually caused by any other disposition of the cavalry. Moreover, considering York as the point of junction, as I had every reason to believe it would be, the route I took was quite as direct and more expeditious than the alternate one proposed; and there is reason to believe on that route that my command would have been divided up in the different gaps of South mountain, covering our flank, while the enemy, by concentration upon any one, could have greatly endangered our baggage and ordnance trains, without exposing his own.

It was thought by many that my command could have rendered more service had it been in advance of the army the first day at Gettysburg, and the Commanding-General complains of a want of cavalry on the occasion; but it must be remembered that the cavalry (Jenkins' brigade) specially selected for advance guard to the army by the Commanding-General, on account of its geographical location at the time, was available for this purpose, and had two batteries of horse artillery serving with it. If, therefore, the peculiar functions of cavalry with the army were not satisfactorily performed in the absence of my command, it should rather be attributed to the fact that Jenkins' brigade was not as efficient as it ought to have been, and as its numbers (3,800) on leaving Virginia warranted us in expecting. Even at that time by its reduction incident to the campaign, it numbered far more than the cavalry which successfully covered Jackson's flank movement at Chancellorsville, turned back Stoneman from the James, and drove 3,500 cavalry under Averill across the Rappahannock.

Properly handled, such a command should have done everything requisite, and left nothing to detract, by the remotest implication, from the brilliant exploits of their comrades, achieved under circumstances of great hardship and danger.

Arriving at York, I found that General Early had gone, and it is to be regretted that this officer failed to take any measure, by leaving an intelligent scout to watch for my coming, or a patrol to meet me to acquaint me with his destination. He had reason to expect me, and had been directed to look out for me. He heard

my guns at Hanover, and correctly conjectured whose they were; but left me no clue to his destination on leaving York, which would have saved me a long and tedious march to Carlisle and thence back to Gettysburg. I was informed by citizens that he was going to Shippensburg. I still believed that most of our army was before Harrisburg, and justly regarded a march to Carlisle as the most likely to place me in communication with the main body. Besides, as a place for rationing my command, now entirely out, I believed it desirable.

The cavalry suffered much in this march, day and night, from loss of sleep and the horses from fatigue, and while in Fairfax for want of forage, not even grass being attainable.

In Fauquier the rough character of the roads and lack of facility for shoeing added to the casualties of every day's battle, and constant wear and tear of man and horse reduced the command very much in numbers. In this way some regiments were reduced to less than one hundred men; yet when my command arrived at Gettysburg, from the accessions which it received from the weak horses left to follow the command, it took its place in line of battle with a stoutness of heart and firmness of tread impressing one with the confidence of victory which was astounding, considering the hardness of the march lately endured.

With an aggregate loss of about 2,200 killed, wounded and missing, including the battle of Fleetwood, June 9th, we inflicted a loss on the enemy's cavalry confessedly near 5,000.

Some of the reports of subordinate commanders are herewith forwarded—others will follow—and it is hoped they will do justice to that individual prowess for which Confederate soldiery is most noted, and which the limits of personal observation, and this report, deprive me of the power of doing.

Appended will be found a statement of casualties and a map; also a list of non-commissioned officers and privates whose conduct, as bearers of dispatches and otherwise, entitle them to favorable mention.

The bravery, heroism, fortitude and devotion of my command is commended to the special attention of the Commanding-General, and is worthy of the gratitude of their countrymen.

I desire to mention, among the Brigadier-Generals, one whose enlarged comprehensions of the functions of cavalry, whose diligent attention to the preservation of its efficiency, and intelligent appreciation and faithful performance of the duties confided to

him, point to as one of the first cavalry leaders on the continent and richly entitle him to promotion. I allude to Brigadier-General Fitz. Lee.

I cannot here particularize the conduct of the many officers who deserve special mention, of less rank than Brigadier-General, without extending my remarks more than would be proper. To my staff collectively, however, I feel at liberty to express thus officially my grateful appreciation of the zeal, fidelity and ability with which they discharged their several duties and labored to promote the success of the command.

Major Heros Von Borcke, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General—that gallant officer from Prussia, who so early espoused our cause—was disabled in Fauquier, so as to deprive me of his valuable services on the expedition; but it is hoped the command will not long be deprived of his inspiring presence on the field.

Major Henry B. McClellan, my Adjutant-General, was constantly at my side, and with his intelligence, ready pen and quick comprehension, greatly facilitated the discharge of my duties.

The untiring energy, force of character and devotion to duty of Major A. R. Venable, my Inspector-General, and Lieutenant G. M. Ryals, C. S. A., Provost-Marshal, deserve my special gratitude and praise.

The same qualities, united to a thorough knowledge of much of the country, are ascribable to Captain B. S. White, C. S. A., who, though still suffering from a severe wound received at Fleetwood, accompanied the command, and his services proclaim him an officer of merit and distinction.

Chief Surgeon Eliason, Captain Blackford, Engineers; Captain Cooke, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant Dabney, Aid-de-Camp; Assistant Engineer F. G. Robertson, and Cadet Hullihen, C. S. A., and Lieutenant H. Hagan, Virginia provisional army, all performed their duties with commendable zeal and credit.

Major Fitzhugh, Chief, and Captain J. M. Hanger, Assistant Quartermaster, and Major W. J. Johnson, Chief Commissary, discharged their arduous duties in their usually highly creditable manner.

First Lieutenant R. B. Kennon, P. A. C. S., temporarily attached, on two different occasions was entrusted with duties attended with great peril, which he performed in a highly successful and satisfactory manner—once in testing experimentally, at night, an un-

known ford on the Potomac, and again in bearing a dispatch to the Commanding-General from Emmettsburg.

Grateful to the Giver of all Good for the attainment of such results with such small comparative losses, I have the honor to be,  
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART, *Major-General.*

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*List of Inclosures.*

A—Report of operations of General Fitz. Lee's brigade in an engagement at Aldie, Colonel T. T. Munford commanding, and inclosing regimental reports of First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Virginia cavalry.

B—Report of Brigadier-General W. E. Jones of engagement near Upperville, June 21st, 1863.

C—Report of Brigadier-General William E. Jones of operations of his brigade from the 29th June, 1863, to the 14th July, 1863, inclosing regimental reports of the Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh and Twelfth Virginia cavalry.

D—Brigadier-General Wade Hampton's report of the operations of his brigade in the battle of Gettysburg, July 3d, 1863.

E—General Order No. 74, headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, directing the retrograde movement from Gettysburg.

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*Memoranda.*

Privates Benjamin F. Weller, Company "E," and Robert W. Goode, Company "G," First Virginia cavalry, as couriers at these headquarters, rendered distinguished service, exhibiting rare intelligence, great daring and heroism.

My field telegraph operator, J. Thompson Quarles, was present throughout, and when no opportunity offered for practicing in his profession, was active and enterprising in the discharge of other duties assigned him.

Acting Surgeon S. A. Nelson, Fourth Virginia cavalry, was ever faithful and indefatigable in his operations, and was ever ready and willing for duty.

J. E. B. STUART, *Major-General Commanding.*



**"Barbara Frietchie"—Refutation of Whittier's Myth.**

Whittier's famous poem has been several times shown to be founded on a myth; but as it is being continually republished in collections of his poems, and has been introduced into several school readers which are widely circulated, it seems proper that we should place in permanent form the refutation of this slander of "Stonewall" Jackson and the brave men he led:

*Letter from General J. A. Early.*

Having seen in a recent number of the *Dispatch* a communication from Frederick, Maryland, to the *Baltimore Sun*, in relation to a letter from "An ex-Confederate" to the Los Angeles (California) *Bulletin*, endorsing the authenticity of the oft-repeated story of Barbara Frietchie's flaunting the "old flag" in the faces of General Jackson and his troops, and being fired upon by the General's order, and also an article in the supplement to the *Sun* of the 24th instant containing two letters from Frederick to disprove the story; and having been appealed to twice to take some notice of it—once when it appeared in a historical magazine published in Philadelphia, I believe; and again when Whittier's poem on the subject appeared in a reader or book containing "choice selections" or something of the kind, designed for use in the schools, I take this occasion to tell the true story of the flag flaunting before our troops as they passed through Frederick, Maryland, in September, 1862.

In the first place, I must give an extract from what the writer in the *Sun* calls Whittier's "lofty numbers," as follows:

"On that pleasant morn of the early fall,  
"When Lee marched over the mountain wall—  
"Over the mountains winding down,  
"Horse and foot, into Frederick town,  
"Forty flags, with their silver stars,  
"Forty flags, with their crimson bars,  
"Flapped in the morning wind: the sun  
"Of noon looked down, and saw not one.  
"Up rose old Barbara Frietchie then,  
"Bowed with her foreshore years and ten;  
"Bravest of all in Frederick town,  
"She took up the flag the men hauled down.  
"In her attic-window the staff she set,  
"To show one heart was loyal yet."

It must be confessed that these *are* pretty tall figures; especially when it is remembered that General Lee's army crossed the Potomac a short distance above Leesburg, in Loudoun county, and did

not have to cross any mountains at all to get into Frederick. Then, too, if there were "forty flags, with their silver stars," and "forty flags, with their crimson bars," flapping "in the morning wind" over the "clusted spires of Frederick," there must have been eighty in all; though if the poet means to assert that the flags which had the silver stars were the same that had the crimson bars, forty was a goodly number to have floating over one little town. If the flag which Barbara picked up had been "hauled down," then it must have been hauled down from a standing flag-staff; and it must have been rather a "lofty" feat for her to pick that up, too, and set it in her attic-window. But I suppose it was an allowable poetic license for Mr. Whittier to convert the Potomac river into a "mountain wall," and one dingy old flag, hoisted probably over a quartermaster's office, into—

"Forty flags, with their silver stars,  
Forty flags, with their crimson bars."

Eighty or forty, as the case may be, however, he ought to have accounted for the other seventy-nine or thirty-nine, and not left them to be trampled in the dust by the "Rebel tread" that came up the street with "Stonewall Jackson riding ahead," even by poetic license. If they were forty regimental flags, and they were flapping in the morning wind that morning, then they must have been flapping over forty regiments, which incontinently fled on the approach of the "Rebel tread," one of them dropping its flag in the panic. Now, I suppose it is useless to quarrel with the license which a poet takes with his subject, but I presume it is allowable to say that our poet in this case has taken an equal license with all the other facts of the case.

General Jackson had been severely injured by a fall of his horse on the 5th, and his corps reached the vicinity of Frederick on the afternoon of the 6th of September, 1862, under the command of General D. H. Hill. One division (Jackson's own), under the command of General Starke, marched through Frederick that evening, and camped in the vicinity—one brigade of the division, under command of General (then Colonel) Bradley T. Johnson (a citizen of Frederick up to the beginning of the war), being posted in the town to preserve order and prevent any depredations on the citizens. The other divisions were halted and camped near Monocacy Junction, near which General Jackson also camped; and I am very confident that he did not go into Frederick until the morning of the 10th, when his command marched for the capture of Harper's Ferry. The General went through Frederick, with a cavalry escort, in advance of his troops, who did not pass through the town until he was some distance beyond it.

The so-called "ex-Confederate" in California who says that "Stonewall Jackson ordered his dust-browed ranks to halt in front of Mrs. Frietchie's house, and that a bullet from his gun was one of the many that hit the flag she held," if he indeed was ever a Confederate soldier, has strayed as far from the truth in the tale

he tells as he has from the land of his birth. It is possible that he may have once been in the Confederate army, but if so I venture to affirm that all the shooting he ever did was with a "long bow." If he heard General Jackson give any such order as that mentioned by him and described in Whittier's poem, or witnessed any firing, by his or any other officer's command, upon a flag in Barbara Frietchie's or any other woman's hand, then he heard and witnessed what was heard and witnessed by no other mortal man. Neither General Jackson nor any other officer in our army was capable of giving such a command.

On the morning that we passed through Frederick, on the expedition for the capture of Harper's Ferry, the two following incidents occurred, one of which I witnessed in person and the other was described to me by an entirely reliable officer of Hays' Louisiana brigade: As my brigade, of Ewell's division, was marching through the town, on the street which connects with the road to Boonsboro', a young girl about ten or eleven years old was standing on the platform in front of a framed wooden house, on the left side of the street as we marched, with a small flag (United States), of the size commonly called candy flags, in her hand, which she was slowly waving while reciting, in a dull, monotonous tone, "Hurrah for the Stars and Stripes! Down with the Stars and Bars!" By her side stood another girl about five or six years old, looking as if she did not know what it all was about, and the girl who was going through the performance seemed to have no heart in the matter, but to be merely going mechanically through a recitation she had been taught. The doors and window-shutters of the house were closed, and not another human being was visible about it. The men, as they passed, laughed and joked pleasantly about the affair, but not a rude or unpleasant remark was made by them. The only indication of a disposition to interfere with the girl was by a one-legged man who had been accompanying one of my regiments on horseback during the campaign. When I got up I found him somewhat excited, and upon my asking him what was the matter, he called my attention to the girl with the flag, and said he had a good mind to get down and take the flag from her. He had evidently taken two or three extra drinks, and I told him he was a fool—to go on and let the girl alone—she could do no harm with her candy-flag; and thereupon he moved on.

The other incident occurred farther on—I think just across the bridge in the western part of the town. As the Louisiana brigade (Hays') was passing, a coarse, dirty-looking woman rushed up a narrow alley with a United States flag, very much soiled, which she thrust out of the alley, when an Irish soldier in the brigade, with his ready Irish wit, made a remark about that "dom'd ould dirty rag," as he called it, which sent her back with her flag in a hurry, and no effort to take the flag from her was made. Upon these two incidents, I presume, are based Mr. Whittier's "lofty numbers" and the disputed claims to the honor and glory of having flaunted the "Union flag" in the faces of Stonewall Jackson's "ragged



Rebels" as they passed through Frederick. The story told by the Frederick correspondent of the *Sun* about a flag being stricken from the hand of a Mrs. Quantrill by one of our officers, is, I think, as groundless as that told in Whittier's verses. If any such incident had occurred, and it had been the subject of reprimand or disapproval by his superior officers, I think I would have heard of it. I have witnessed a number of instances of the display of small flags, or the Union colors, as they were called, by ladies in the enemy's country as we passed through their towns, but I never heard of an instance in which any violence or rudeness was used by our officers or soldiers on such occasions; though, when the exhibitions became obtrusive, our boys were always ready with a good-natured witticism or jest that put an end to these exuberant displays of patriotism. I have also seen ladies, even in Pennsylvania, wave their white handkerchiefs to our troops. Whoever is disposed to claim the honor of either of the two incidents in Frederick that I have mentioned, is entirely welcome to do so.

I will add that I have been informed by a gentleman who was for a long time a citizen of Frederick that Mrs. Barbara Frietchie, or her husband, was a descendant of one of the Hessians that were brought over to thrash into obedience another set of "Rebels"; and if she had been the heroine of the incident which Mr. Whittier's prolific imagination has created, she would only have been acting in accordance with the traditional principles of the family. I believe Mr. Whittier's Quaker ancestors were somewhat in sympathy with the cause for which the Hessians fought, and hence, perhaps, his admiration for the supposed exploit of one of their descendants. I have seen within the last year or two a letter or statement from Barbara Frietchie's niece denying that her aunt had hoisted the flag or been fired on, but saying that she had driven off some of "the ragged, lousy Rebels" from her house with a broomstick—and who would not run from an old woman with a scurrilous tongue in her mouth and a broomstick in her hands?

J. A. EARLY.

LYNCHEURG, April 26, 1875.

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*Letter from Mrs. Frietchie's Nephew.*

I have just read a communication to the *Sun* purporting to set forth certain facts in relation to the life and character of the late Barbara Frietchie, the heroine of Whittier's celebrated war poem. It may not be improper to state that I am the nephew of "Dame Barbara," and had the settling up of her husband's estate in the capacity of administrator. This necessarily threw me into frequent communication with that aged and venerable dame.

Barbara Frietchie, my venerable aunt, was not a lady of twenty-two summers, as your correspondent alleges, but an ancient dame of ninety-six winters, when she departed this life; and it is but truth to add that she never saw the inside of the Federal hospital



in this city: Nor did she depart this life in September, 1863, but died on the 18th of December, 1862. Nor did any of the Federal soldiers from the hospital attend the old lady's remains to their last resting place. This, to my certain knowledge, was a fact, no orders to that effect having been given. Therefore, none of these convalescing invalid soldiers were at my old aunt's funeral. So much for this branch of your New York correspondent's statement.

Now, a word as to the waving of the Federal flag in the face of the Rebels by Dame Barbara on the occasion of Stonewall Jackson's march through Frederick. Truth requires me to say that Stonewall Jackson, with his troops, did not pass Barbara Frietchie's residence at all; but passed up what in this city is popularly called "The Mill alley," about three hundred yards above her residence, then passed due west towards Antietam, and thus out of the city.

But another and still stronger fact with regard to this matter may be here presented, viz: the poem by Whittier represents our venerable relative (then ninety-six years of age) as nimbly ascending to her attic window and waving her small Federal flag defiantly in the face of Stonewall Jackson's troops. Now, what are the facts at this point? Dame Barbara was, at the moment of the passing of that distinguished General and his forces through Frederick, bedridden and helpless, and had lost the power of locomotion. She could at this period only move, as she was moved, by the help of her attendants.

These are the true and stern facts, proving that Whittier's poem upon this subject is fiction, pure fiction, and nothing else, without even the remotest semblance or resemblance of fact.

VALERIUS EBERT.

FREDERICK CITY, MD., August 27th.

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**Capture of Fort Pillow—Vindication of General Chalmers by a Federal Officer.**

The charges in reference to the "Fort Pillow massacre" have been several times fully met and refuted, but they are reiterated again as often as they can serve a purpose. General Chalmers recently made on the floor of the House of Representatives a triumphant vindication of General Forrest and his command, which we would publish in full but that we expect to get the facts in another form. In the meantime, the following letter from Dr. C. Fitch, who was surgeon in charge of Fort Pillow at the time of its capture, ought to settle the question, even with the most ultra partisans:

CHARITON, IOWA, May 13, 1879.

General CHALMERS, *M. C. from Mississippi* :

Sir—I have seen at different times and in various papers the charge made against you that you murdered a babe and had been engaged also in murdering several whites and negroes at Fort Pillow, on the 12th of April, 1864.

I have no especial acquaintance with you; have only seen you twice in my life—once on the 12th and again on the 13th of April, 1864, but I desire to give you my recollection of that battle.

I was acting surgeon of the post at the time—the only surgeon there. I first saw you on the 12th, on the bluffs above, where the greatest number was killed—the greatest slaughter having occurred under the bluffs next to the river. I was under the bluffs most of the time. The greater portion of the officers that commanded the two negro regiments were killed in the fort before there was a charge made. They were picked off by sharpshooters—there being several points much higher than the miserable earthworks, from which it was quite easy for sharpshooters to pick out almost any man they wished. Booth, his Adjutant, and several other officers were killed early in the afternoon. I had my field hospital under the bluffs next to the river.

When Forrest's forces charged into the miserable fort, the two negro regiments and the men of the Thirteenth Tennessee cavalry came down under the bluff where I was, followed by quite a number of the soldiers of Forrest's command. I did not see but few officers among Forrest's soldiers under the bluffs—none above the ranks of lieutenant and captain. I was taken up the bluffs by a lieutenant of Mississippi Rebel cavalry, and when I arrived on the bluff within the fort, there were but a few Rebel soldiers there. Forrest was up there, sighting a piece of artillery on the little gunboat up the river. I saw him sight it several times and fire on the gunboat, after which I passed outside the earthworks. I do not think Forrest knew what was going on under the bluffs. After I had passed out of the earthworks, I met a few ambulances, with their drunken, cowardly crew, who were about to take off my boots, when you came riding near by. Seeing you had on the evidences of being a General, I called to you. You rode up to me and asked me what was wanted. I asked you if you would allow those fellows to strip a prisoner of his boots. You cursed them, and put a guard over me, giving orders to the guard to shoot down the first one that molested me.

I again saw you on the 13th; rode part of the way from the camp to the river and went aboard Platte Valley steamboat with you, and saw you several times on the boat. I had the wounded taken on board the boat. I do not believe that there was a babe there for any one to kill, as early in the morning all of the women and all of the non-combatants were ordered on to some barges, and were towed up the river to an island by a gunboat before anyone was hurt. I fail to see how you could have gotten on that island

to kill that babe. I do not believe you knew what was going on under the bluffs, as I did not see you under there while I was there, but saw you ride up, as I have stated, from an opposite direction, after I had gotten upon the bluffs, and the most of the work was over before I left, next the river.

The most of the men of the Thirteenth regiment were deserters from Forrest's command. I have examined a great many of them myself who told me they were. There seemed to be a great hatred on the part of Forrest's men towards many of them—personal feeling—as I heard many of Forrest's men charge the soldiers of the Thirteenth regiment with doing many things that were mean towards their friends since they had deserted Forrest and joined the Thirteenth Federal regiment.

I am not aware that there was any formal surrender of Fort Pillow to Forrest's command. I looked upon many things that were done as the result of whiskey and a bitter personal hate, especially as regards the Thirteenth regiment. There was considerable alcohol outside of the fort, which Forrest's men must have got hold of long before the charge was made. I have always thought that neither you nor Forrest knew anything that was going on at the time under the bluffs. What was done was done very quickly.

I know that you treated me kindly on the 12th and 13th. I could tell you many things about Fort Pillow, doubtless, if I had time. If I believed what is published about your being such an inhuman creature on that occasion, I should so tell you.

If you wish to learn about me further, talk with General Weaver, M. C. from Iowa; Hon. A. C. Dodge, Henry Clay Dean, of Iowa; Belknap, ex-Secretary of War; George W. McCrary, and Hon. R. B. Hayes. The latter and myself were young men living in Fremont while it was called Lower Sandusky. Call on him and ask him if he knew one C. Fitch, who read medicine with Dr. L. Q. Ranson, of Fremont? I have not seen President Hayes for twenty-eight years. I have been living here in Chariton since '52, and most of the time practicing surgery and medicine. I was acting surgeon at Fort Pillow on the 12th of April, 1864; was not before the Wade Committee.

If you wish to write to me asking any questions, I will try to answer them honestly and fairly.

I looked upon you on the 12th and 13th of April, 1864, as far as I could see, as anything but a cold-blooded murderer. I took you to be rather a good-feeling man. Your conduct towards me was that of a gentleman. I do not believe what is charged against you on that occasion.

General, call on President Hayes and give him my respects, if you feel at liberty to do so. I have not had any correspondence with him nor seen him for twenty-eight years. I am not a politician. General Weaver knows me well, I think. Give him my respects.

Yours, truly,

C. FITCH, Chariton, Iowa.

**Operations in Trans-Mississippi Department in June, 1863.**

[Our readers will be glad to see the following reports, which have never been published, and which will be followed by other reports of the Trans-Mississippi Department.]

*Report of General E. Kirby Smith.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT TRANS-MISSISSIPPI,  
SHREVEPORT, LA., June 17, 1863.

General S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va.:*

General—I have the honor to forward herewith Major-General Taylor's report of the operations of his forces in North Louisiana from the 3d to the 8th of June. I respectfully call the attention of the War Department to the ability and energy displayed by that gallant officer in the discharge of his duties as District Commander.

Major-General Walker's division, Tappan's brigade, together with Colonel Harrison's and Colonel Bartlett's commands of the cavalry, are still in the country opposite Vicksburg. Major-General Taylor, with his forces in lower Louisiana, is personally superintending the operations on this side of the Mississippi, for the relief of Port Hudson. He has been instructed to throw provisions into Port Hudson and Vicksburg whenever it is possible to do so. Under my instructions he has placed himself in communication with General Johnston, and he will use every effort to co-operate with him in his operations for the defence and relief of Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant,

E. KIRBY SMITH,  
*Lieutenant-General Commanding.*

The original, of which the foregoing is a copy, bears the following endorsement, to wit:

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,  
SHREVEPORT, June 17, 1863.

E. Kirby Smith, Lieutenant-General Commanding.  
General Taylor's Report.

Forwarding Major-General Taylor's report of the operations of his forces in North Louisiana, from 3d to 8th June, 1863.

Received Adjutant and Inspector-General's office July 6, 1863.

Respectfully submitted to Secretary of War.

H. L. CLAY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*  
ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE, July 8, 1863.



Respectfully referred to the President for his information.

J. A. SEDDON, *Secretary of War.*

10th July, 1863.

Returned to Secretary of War. The operations of General Taylor are highly commendable.

J. D.

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*Report of General R. Taylor.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WESTERN LOUISIANA,  
ALEXANDRIA, June 11, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. R. BOGGS, *Chief of Staff:*

General—I reached this place last night, having left Richmond forty-eight hours previously. I shall leave in a few minutes for Morgan's Ferry, on the Atchafalaya river, as Banks is reported to be using the west bank of the Mississippi for the transportation of his supplies, &c. I deem it of great importance that the most vigorous movement should be made by a portion of our forces against the enemy opposite Port Hudson; and it is necessary that I should give my personal supervision to the arrangements and perhaps take command of the expedition. In my report of operations of the forces in the parishes of Madison, Tensas and Carroll, dated at Richmond on the 8th instant, I gave you the information which had been gained of the enemy's positions in that section. As it was pretty well cleared of the enemy's troops, I thought that Tappan's brigade and Harrison's cavalry force would be sufficient to open and keep up communication with Vicksburg. I instructed Brigadier-General Hebert to have a supply of beef cattle ready to swim across in order to victual the troops. If General Grant's position on the Yazoo now should be shaken or broken by General Johnston, and the enemy should retreat, as they would have to do, from a point below Vicksburg, a considerable force could be highly available along the west bank of the Mississippi; if the Yazoo is used as his line of retreat, our light batteries could only be used against his transports. I have for the present suspended the withdrawal of Walker's division, and shall hold it in its present position until the enemy's movements and the condition of affairs around Vicksburg are more fully developed. As there are troops enough in the lower portion of the State for the expedition against the enemy, who is opposite Port Hudson, it is not necessary at this moment to withdraw General Walker's division, as I contemplated at the time of my report from Richmond. I shall either take com-

mand in person of the expedition against Banks' army, opposite Port Hudson, or, if the enemy attempt to cross below Vicksburg, of the forces in Madison parish. My experience of the past few weeks satisfies me that it is necessary that I should rely upon myself not only to devise the plans, but also to execute them, in order to insure their being carried out vigorously.

On my arrival here I received several reports from Brigadier-General Monton (the substance of which *have* been communicated to you by Major Sarget), which are exceedingly unsatisfactory, and indicate that no movements commensurate with the forces under his command have been made, and that little activity has been displayed by that officer. While an excellent officer in the field, of great gallantry and fair qualifications, he is, I fear, unequal to the task of handling and disposing of any large body of troops; and I shall, therefore, at the earliest practicable moment, give my personal supervision to that command. From General Monton's reports I am quite in the dark as to the condition of affairs on the lower Teche, and as to the presence or absence of the enemy's troops on this side of Berwick's bay.

I have sent one of my staff officers to communicate in person with General Johnston, and instructed him to give to that officer a statement of the disposition of our forces, and ascertain in what manner I could best co-operate with him from this side of the river.

I have to-day sent a battery of light artillery to Brigadier-General Hebert, which will place twelve pieces in the command of that officer. I do not include the artillery of General Walker's division.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. TAYLOR, *Major-General Commanding.*

The foregoing letter bears the following endorsements, to wit:

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN LOUISIANA,  
ALEXANDRIA, June 11, 1863.

Major-General R. Taylor,  
Informing as to his movements and dispositions of forces.

Secretary of War.  
Special.

This report contains a clear statement of the expedition against Milliken's bend, by General Taylor, which awakened so much hope and which is here shown to have been abortive.

## Letter from General R. E. Lee.

[The following letter of General Lee explains itself and is of great historic value. It was not intended for publication, and is written with that caution so characteristic of the man. But *anything* from our grand old Chief is highly prized, while it deepens the regret that he was not spared to fulfill his purpose of writing the history of his campaigns.]

LEXINGTON, VA., 15 April, 1868.

WILLIAM M. McDONALD, *Cool Spring, near Berryville, Clarke Co., Va.:*

My Dear Sir—I thank you for your kind letter of the 3d instant, which I have been unable to answer till to-day. I hope that your school history may be of such character as will insure its broadest circulation, and prove both interesting and instructive to the youth of the whole country.

As regards the information you desire, if you will refer to my official report of March 6th, 1863, which was published in Richmond in 1864, you will find the general reasons which governed my actions; but whether they will be satisfactory to others is problematical. In relation to your first question, I will state that in crossing the Potomac I did not propose to invade the North, for I did not believe that the Army of Northern Virginia was strong enough for the purpose, nor was I in any degree influenced by popular expectation. My movement was simply intended to threaten Washington, call the Federal army north of that river, relieve our territory and enable us to subsist the army. I considered it useless to attack the fortifications around Alexandria and Washington, behind which the Federal army had taken refuge, and indeed I could not have maintained the army in Fairfax, so barren was it of subsistence and so devoid were we of transportation. After reaching Frederick City, finding that the enemy still retained his positions at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, and that it became necessary to dislodge him, in order to open our communication through the Valley for the purpose of obtaining from Richmond the ammunition, clothing &c., of which we were in great need, after detaching the necessary troops for the purpose, I was left with but two divisions (Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's) to mask the operation. That was entirely too weak a force to march on Baltimore, which you say was expected, even if such a movement had been expedient.

As to the battle of Gettysburg, I must again refer you to the official accounts. Its loss was occasioned by a combination of circumstances. It was commenced in the absence of correct intelligence. It was continued in the effort to overcome the difficulties by which we were surrounded, and it would have been gained could one determined and united blow have been delivered by our whole line. As it was, victory trembled in the balance for three days, and the battle resulted in the infliction of as great an amount of injury as was received and in frustrating the Federal campaign for the season.

I think you will find the answer to your third question in my report of the battle of Fredericksburg. In taking up the position there, it was with the view of resisting General Burnside's advance after crossing the Rappahannock, rather than of preventing its passage.

The plain of Fredericksburg is completely commanded by the heights of Stafford, which prevented our occupying it in the first instance. Nearly the whole loss that our army sustained during the battle arose from the pursuit of the repulsed Federal columns into the plain. To have advanced the whole army into the plain for the purpose of attacking General Burnside, would have been to have insured its destruction by the fire from the continued line of guns on the Stafford hills. It was considered more wise to meet the Federal army beyond the reach of their batteries than under their muzzles, and even to invite repeated renewal of their attacks. When convinced of their inutility, it was easy for them, under cover of a long, dark and tempestuous night, to cross the narrow river by means of their numerous bridges before we could ascertain their purpose.

I have been obliged to be very brief in my remarks, but I hope that I have been able to present to you some facts which may be useful to you in drawing correct conclusions. I must ask that you will consider what I have said as intended solely for yourself.

Very respectfully and truly, yours,

R. E. LEE.

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

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RENEWALS OF OLD SUBSCRIPTIONS are always in order, and are receivable at this office, no matter by whom the original subscription was obtained. We find that where subscriptions are originally obtained by agents, there is a strong disposition to wait until the agent can "call again" before renewing the subscription. This is very well where we have a *local* agent, for in that case the agent is sure to call. But a large part of our list of subscribers is obtained by traveling agents, who cannot go back promptly to call on parties when their subscriptions expire. E. g., on the 1st of July about three hundred and fifty of our subscriptions expired; we have not been able to send an agent after them, and very few have as yet responded to our postal card notification. We beg that our friends will help us to secure new subscribers, and to induce old ones to renew. And we are very anxious to secure *reliable agents* in every community. We can afford to pay *liberal commissions to efficient agents*, and we beg that our friends will help us to obtain such agents.

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THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA MEMORIAL VOLUME, which the Secretary of our Society has compiled at the request of the "*Virginia Division, Army of Northern Virginia Association*," has been unexpectedly delayed, but will now be pushed to completion. Besides a Roster of the Army of Northern Virginia, it will contain the addresses delivered at the great Lee memorial meeting in Richmond, in November, 1870, by President Davis, General Early, Colonel C. S. Venable, General John S. Preston, General John B. Gordon, Colonel Charles Marshall, General Henry A. Wise, Colonel William Preston Johnston and Colonel R. E. Withers, and the annual addresses before the Virginia Division, Army of Northern Virginia, by Colonel C. S. Venable, Colonel Charles Marshall, Major John W. Daniel, Captain W. Gordon McCabe, Private Leigh Robinson and Colonel William Allan.

The book will be neatly gotten up, and will be mailed for \$2, \$2.25 or \$2.50 according to binding. It will be published *only for subscribers*, and in order to secure a copy you should send your name *at once* to J. William Jones, Box 61, Richmond, Virginia.

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THE QUESTION OF THE WEARING OF BREASTPLATES by soldiers in the United States army has had a somewhat amusing ventilation in the *Nation* recently. Captain J. A. Judson, who was Assistant Adjutant-General of Hatch's cavalry brigade, made a very fierce attack on General Dick Taylor's statement that he saw "breastplates and other protective devices" on the persons of Federal [soldiers at Middleburg and Winchester, on Jackson's Valley campaign. The gallant Captain waited until after the death of General Taylor to say that he "states what he knew to be a deliberate false-

hood," and uses other very ugly language concerning General Taylor's narrative, recalling to any fair minded man the old fable about "*kicking the dead lion*." The editor of the *Nation* says in a note that as General Taylor's narrative had appeared in the *North American Review* a year before his death, "some of the severity of language expended on it would have been more appropriate at an earlier date."

In a subsequent issue of the *Nation*, W. S. Symington, of Baltimore, who was Adjutant of the Twenty-first Virginia regiment at the time, testifies that he *saw* at Middleburg and Winchester "several breastplates on dead Federal soldiers."

Colonel William LeRoy Broun (now professor in Vanderbilt University, then in charge of the arsenal at Richmond) publishes in the same issue a statement to the effect that a few days after the "Seven Days' Battles" around Richmond, he "*saw and carefully examined two steel breastplates taken from the bodies of two Federal soldiers*." And Mr. S. W. Thaxter writes from Portland, Maine, that Captain Judson "is in error in asserting that breastplates were not worn by cavalry soldiers in Banks' army in May, 1862. The writer found one which a soldier left in bivouac, and tested its quality as a protective device by fastening it to a tree and piercing it several times with carbine shots, much to the chagrin of the owner, who soon discovered his loss."

But the editor of the *Nation* caps the climax in disposing of Captain Judson by the following note :

The case in regard to the breastplates seems closed. Mr. Henry C. Wayne, formerly in charge of the Bureau of Clothing, Equipage and Equipment of the Quartermaster-General's Office, United States army, writes to the *Savannah Morning News*, of July 19, that they were introduced into the army shortly before the rebellion, by General McDowell, "for the protection of our officers and men in Indian fighting against lances, arrows and *armes blanches* generally." He had borrowed the idea from the French Cuirassiers, during a trip to Europe for purposes of inspection.—*Ed. Nation*.

We may add that our Southern papers have teemed with proofs that the aforesaid breastplates *were* frequently worn by Federal soldiers during the war, and if any one is still skeptical, if he will call at the office of the Southern Historical Society we will take him across the hall to our Virginia State Library and show him several beautiful specimens of these "protective devices," which were taken from the persons of Federal soldiers and have been preserved as war relics.

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GENERAL J. R. CHALMERS' ADDRESS ON "FORREST AND HIS CAMPAIGNS" will be published in our next issue, and will be found a most valuable contribution to the history of the war in the West.



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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., October, 1879.

No. 10.

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#### Meeting at the White Sulphur Springs.

On the 15th of August, at 11 o'clock A. M., a large crowd assembled in the ball-room of the famous Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in response to the announcement that General J. R. Chalmers, of Mississippi, would deliver an address before the Southern Historical Society.

It was a brilliant assemblage, composed of a large number of prominent ex-Confederates, representing every State, many of the most gallant soldiers of the different armies of the Confederacy, prominent citizens of every profession, a bright galaxy of belles and beaux and a number of ladies and gentlemen from the North.

General W. H. F. Lee called the meeting to order, and on his motion General D. H. Maury was invited to preside, and Dr. J. William Jones to act as secretary. At the request of the President, Rev. Dr. M. D. Hoge, of Richmond, offered a fervent and appropriate prayer.

General Maury then spoke as follows:

#### REMARKS OF GENERAL MAURY.

In 1868, a few Confederate officers of the Western and Southern armies organized in New Orleans the *Southern Historical Society*, for the purpose of collecting and preserving for the uses of history



the authentic records of our "War between the States," then scattered and perishing in private hands all through the country.

In August, 1873—by the request of its founders—the Society was reorganized by a convention held at the Montgomery White Sulphur Springs and its domicile transferred to Richmond. Since that time the progress of our work has been marked by increased energy and success. The State of Virginia gave us an office in her capitol, and we hold there the most valuable and important collection of historical documents relating to the causes, the conduct and the consequences of the great civil war now in existence. Historians in Europe, as well as in America, have learned this fact and are availing themselves of it.

The "Archive Bureau" at Washington recognizes it, and the present Secretary of War has, with an enlightened liberality worthy of his high office, given us free access to all of the historical archives of the Government, while he receives from us as freely copies of all documents needed to complete the files of his office.

By this co-operation the most complete data attainable will be secured for the future historian, who will transmit to posterity the story of the greatest civil conflict that has ever divided a Christian people.

We have availed ourselves of the presence of this high company, assembled from all parts of our common country, to invite you to listen to the story of the character and career of one of the most remarkable Americans that ever lived.

It was my privilege to have been much associated with him—to have closely observed his conduct during the war and since its close. At one time he came under my command, and it is with peculiar satisfaction that I now remember my first and only instructions to him. They were in these words: "General, I charge you with the defence of North Mississippi. In doing this I wish you to feel untrammelled in your action by any reference to me. I cannot spare you a man, but let me know when I can aid you with supplies. And rest assured that you shall have full credit for the success I know you will achieve, and that I will be responsible for any disasters which may befall." He cleared Mississippi in a few weeks of every enemy.

I congratulate you that on this occasion we shall learn about the character and campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest from his next in command—one of his most tried and trusted generals, who was himself an eyewitness of and an active participant in many of the glorious actions he will recount.

I have the pleasure of introducing to you General James R. Chalmers, of Mississippi, who gallantly rode with Forrest in the days of war, and now efficiently serves his State and country in the councils of the nation.

General Chalmers was received with loud applause, and was frequently interrupted with applause as he delivered the following eloquent sketch of



**Forrest and his Campaigns.***Gentlemen of the Southern Historical Society:*

Believing it to be the duty of each Southern participant in the great war of secession to contribute his pebble to the monumental pile you are building up for Confederate history, I have gladly accepted your invitation to address you on this occasion. We may expect our opponents to color unfavorably for us, if not to mistate the facts as to the cause and the conduct of that war; and it is due to ourselves, to our dead comrades and to our posterity, that we should leave behind us such material for the future historian as will enable him to do us justice if he will. We should seek no controversy as to its cause or its conduct, but should never shrink from its defence when the occasion demands it. All we ask is an impartial statement in history of our cause, as we understood it; and it devolves on the survivors of the struggle to correct whatever we believe to be erroneous statements in regard to it, whenever and wherever they are made.

“CASUS BELLI.”

“The right to judge of infractions of the constitution and the mode and measure of redress,” were no new questions in our politics. They were discussed in the conventions which formed the constitution, and subsequently whenever the General Government was supposed by usurpation of power to infringe on rights reserved to the people of the States united. Massachusetts threatened secession in the war of 1812, when her commerce was crippled; South Carolina threatened nullification in 1832, when a high protective tariff discriminated heavily against her interest. Every State of the North practiced nullification against the fugitive slave laws as fast as they came under the control of the Republican party. Eleven States of the South attempted to practice secession when the General Government fell into the hands of the Republican party, whose leaders had denounced the constitution as “a covenant with the devil,” and the Union as a “league with hell.” No honorable man can read the last speech of Jefferson Davis, in the United States Senate, or the letters of Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee, when about to resign their positions in the United States army, and say that the Confederate leaders left the Union “from choice or on light occasion.” They loved the Union formed of States united by the constitution; they feared a Union consolidated in the hands of men who denounced the constitution. They seceded not, as falsely charged, “to shoot the Union to death,” but mainly to preserve alive the institution of slavery, guaranteed by the constitution of the United States, and which they feared would be destroyed by the Republican party. Time has proved that their fears were not without foundation. Mr. Lincoln and two-thirds of his party in Congress then denied any purpose to destroy slavery,

but every Republican leader now shamelessly boast that this was the great object of the war.

#### SECESSION DEAD.

The democracy under Jackson denied the right of secession; the great majority of Southern Democrats under Calhoun believed in it. The attempt to secede resulted in war. The right of secession was decided against us by the wager of battle. We yield obedience to the judgment without even a desire to set aside the verdict. The property we sought to save was destroyed by war, and we have now neither the interest nor the inclination to assert the right, even though it were freely admitted to exist. Slavery is dead, and no Southern statesman would restore it if he could. Its destruction was perhaps as necessary to the preservation of the Union as the death of Christ was necessary to the salvation of man. But while we rejoice that the plan of salvation was accomplished, no Christian loves the Judas who for money betrayed Him with a kiss, nor the Pontius Pilate who dared not resist the clamor of the mob, crying for his crucifixion, nor the fierce fanatics who drove the nails into His flesh. And no Southern man can love the John Logans and Ben. Butlers, who were devoted disciples of secession until the hour came, and then betrayed us for office; nor the weakness of Andrew Johnson, who permitted the murder of Wirz and Mrs. Surrat; nor the fierce fanatics who dissolved the Union they professed to save, changed the constitution they pretended to fight for, and by reconstruction laws placed intelligence and virtue under the heels of ignorance and vice.

While the loss of life was fearful and the destruction of property greatly to be deplored, there was much in the war of secession that will be remembered with pride by both Union men and Confederates.

The very fact that there was a war growing out of a question of constitutional rights, should be a source of pride, as evidence that no large body of our people will ignobly submit to what they believe to be a violation of their rights. When Northern men believed it necessary to fight for the Union, we honor those who fought and those who died for their faith. When Southern men fought for their constitutional property and rights, he deserves to be a tyrant's slave who does not honor those who fought and fell for a cause they believed to be right. But while we would cherish all its glorious memories and point our children to the brilliant examples of valor on both sides in the war, we have no desire to revive the bitter hates of the strife.

#### BELIEF IN SECESSION A SOURCE OF WEAKNESS.

The majority in the South had been educated to believe that secession was the remedy to which a State might peaceably resort in the last extremity to redress actual or apparent wrongs, and that

the time for its exercise had come. One-half, if not two-thirds, of the South further believed that after perhaps a skirmish or two over the forts in the South, the North would, as Greeley expressed it, "permit the erring sisters to go in peace."

We did not anticipate a war of much magnitude, and were totally unprepared for it. The arms that were moved South in Buchanan's administration were old-fashioned guns, removed at the express request of the Ordnance Department to make room for new and better arms; and the charge that they were removed by Secretary Floyd in anticipation of war, is as ridiculous as it is false. The idea that we were engaged in peaceable secession was not only prevalent in the South, but led to what will be regarded by the student of military operations as fatal and palpable military blunders.

Had we realized in the beginning that we were engaged in a great revolution, and not a peaceful effort to secede and form a new Union, we would have had no constitutional scruples about seizing or purchasing cotton, and establishing, when there was no blockade to prevent, a basis of credit in Europe that would have given us unlimited supplies and sinews of war. But no warrant of authority could be found for such a proceeding in the constitution, which Southern men carried with them into secession as the children of Israel carried the ark of covenant into the wilderness; and statesmen, withdrawing from threatened usurpation of power in the old Union, could not begin a new Union by usurpation of power themselves. If we had not believed in the right of peaceable secession, and had not respected the rights of States which had not declared for it, the disastrous blunder in selecting the sites of Forts Henry and Donelson, the key to our centre, would not have been made. Tennessee would have been sooner occupied, and Kentucky and Missouri might never have been lost to our cause. If Mr. Davis had not believed that he was engaged in building up a new Union under all the forms of law and order, he would have been free to place himself at the head of his troops, and the brilliant military genius displayed at Buena Vista, at the head of an invading army of natural soldiers, might have won greater victories on wider fields.

Hamley, a recent writer on the operations of war, says: "Confronting all Europe, and destitute of all the material of war except men, France poured forth armies half clad, half fed, half armed, but filled with intelligence, valor and zeal. Old traditions of methodical war, where troops slept under tents and were fed from magazines, were of no value to armies which possessed neither tents nor magazines. . . . The old system of Frederick met the new system of Napoleon and was shattered to pieces."

Southern volunteers poured forth filled with the same intelligence, valor and zeal, and surpassed the Frenchmen in this, they were trained horsemen and accustomed to firearms from their youth. They were equally fearless and impetuous, and under a Napoleonic leader, like the French conscripts, would have been



veterans in the first engagement, and the battle of Bull Run might have been re-enacted on many fields.

But what the effect might have been of an offensive war, pushed boldly into the Northern States, when their people were divided in sentiment, and before their armies had been trained and prepared for battle, I leave to the student of military operations to discuss and decide. If I were called on to describe in brief our conflict, I should write thus: the North succeeded because law and constitution were made to bend to every military necessity, while time and West Point discipline made of Northern men the best soldiers in the world. The South failed because the most pressing military necessities were disregarded when in conflict with constitution and law, while West Point discipline chilled the ardor and time destroyed the advantages of the best natural soldiers that ever lived. But I am not here to mourn over what might have been.

#### LIEUTENANT-GENERAL N. B. FORREST AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

I have selected as my subject on this occasion the campaigns of Lieutenant-General N. B. Forrest, who was my immediate commander during the last year and a half of the war, and who, if not the greatest military genius, was certainly the greatest revolutionary leader on our side. He was restrained by no knowledge of law or constitution. He was embarrassed by no preconceived ideas of military science. His favorite maxim was, "war means fighting, and fighting means killing." Without the slightest knowledge of them, he seemed by instinct to adopt the tactics of the great masters of the military art, if there be any such art.

Hamley says "nothing is more common than to find in writings on military matters reference to 'the rules of war,' and assertions such as some general 'owed his success to knowing when to disperse with the rules of war.' It would be difficult to say what these rules are or in what code they are embodied." Colonel T. W. White, a clear-headed officer of my command, expressing the same idea more quaintly, said: "It all consists in two words—luck and pluck." Forrest possessed both of these in an eminent degree; and his successes, many of which were achieved with men who had never been drilled one hour together, illustrated what might have been accomplished by untrained Southern soldiers.

#### HIS LIFE BEFORE THE WAR.

In February, 1841, when I was but ten years of age, I remember well a small company of volunteers who marched out of the town of Holly Springs, Mississippi, for the relief of Texas, then threatened by invasion from Mexico. In that little band stood Bedford Forrest, a tall, black haired, gray eyed, athletic youth, scarce twenty years of age, who then gave the first evidence of the military ardor he possessed. The company saw no fighting, for the danger was over before it arrived, and the men received no



pay. Finding himself in a strange country without friends or money, Forrest, with the characteristic energy which distinguished him in after life, split rails at fifty cents per hundred and made the money necessary to bring him back to his family and home.

Without tracing him through the steps by which he accumulated a fortune, it is enough to say that at sixteen years of age he was left fatherless, with a mother and large family to support on a small leased farm, and at forty years of age he was the owner of a large cotton plantation and slaves, making about one thousand bales of cotton per annum, and engaged in a prosperous business in Memphis, the largest city of his native State. His personal courage had been severely tested on several occasions; notably at Hernando, Mississippi, where he was assaulted in the streets by three Matlock brothers and their overseer Bean. Pistols and bowie-knives were freely used, and after a terrible fight, in which thirteen shots were fired, the three Matlocks and Forrest all wounded, his assailants fled and left him master of the field.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF A CAVALRY BATTALION.

On the 14th of June, 1861, Nathan Bedford Forrest was enrolled as a private in a Confederate cavalry company, and went into camp near Randolph, Tennessee. About the 10th of July, 1861, Hon. Isham G. Harris, the great war Governor of Tennessee, knowing Forrest well and having a high regard for the man, telegraphed him to come to Memphis, and there, through the aid of General Polk, procured authority for him to raise a regiment of cavalry for Confederate service. This was somewhat difficult authority to obtain at that time, for in the beginning of the war neither side regarded cavalry as of much value for fighting purposes; and it is, perhaps, more due to Forrest than to any other man, that the cavalry was subsequently so largely increased and played such an important part on both sides. But Forrest's men were not properly called cavalry—they more nearly resembled the dragoons of the sixteenth century, who are described as "mounted foot soldiers." Jackson's corps were called "web-footed cavalry," and Forrest's troopers might well be called "winged infantry."

On the 20th of July, Forrest mustered his first company into service, and about the same time smuggled out of Louisville, Kentucky, though closely watched, pistols and saddles to equip them. During the second week of October, 1861, he organized a battalion of eight companies, of which he was elected Lieutenant-Colonel, and the day after its organization moved for Fort Donelson, and commenced his active and brilliant career, which knew no cessation until the armies of the South were surrendered. I shall not in this address undertake to follow in detail his successful and marvellous career, nor shall I indulge in any flowers of rhetoric to adorn my story. I will attempt by a plain and simple recital of his most prominent deeds, to raise up the monument he hewed out for himself, and leave to other hands to polish its surface and crown it with appropriate wreaths of beauty.

## HIS FIRST BATTLE.

After having seen some service in marching and scouting, but with little time or inclination for drill, on the 28th of December, 1861, Forrest, with three hundred men, met the enemy for the first time, about four hundred and fifty strong, near Sacramento, Kentucky. This fight deserves especial notice, not only because of its success and the confidence inspired in the raw Confederate cavalry, but because it displayed at once the characteristics and natural tactics which were subsequently more fully developed and made Forrest famous as a cavalry leader. He had marched his command twenty miles that day, when he found a fresh trail where the enemy's cavalry had passed. Putting his command at a gallop, he traveled ten miles further before he struck the rear guard. His own command was badly scattered, not half up with him; but without halting, he rushed headlong at them, leading the charge himself. When he had driven the rear guard on to the main body, and they turned on him with superior force, he quickly dismounted his men and held the enemy in check until his command came up, and ordered them to attack in flank and rear. This movement was successful, and the retreat of the Federals soon began. Quickly mounting his men, he commenced one of his terrible pursuits, fighting hand-to-hand with pistol and sword—killing one and wounding two himself—continuing the chase for many miles, and leaving the road dotted with wounded and dead.

His Major, a celebrated preacher and subsequently an equally celebrated Confederate Colonel, D. C. Kelly, saw him then for the first time under fire, and thus vividly describes the wonderful change that always took place in his appearance in a fight: "His face flushed till it bore a striking resemblance to a painted Indian warrior's, and his eyes, usually so mild in their expression, blazed with the intense glare of a panther's about to spring on his prey. In fact, he looks as little like the Forrest of our mess table as the storm of December resembles the quiet of June."

Those who saw him when his brother Jeffrey fell, who was born after the death of his father, and who was educated and almost idolized by his brother, say that the blaze of his face and the glare of his eyes were fearful to behold, and that he rushed like a madman on the foe, dealing out death with pistol and sword to all around him—like Hector fighting over the body of Patroclus:

"Yet, fearless in his strength, now rushing on  
He dashed amid the fray; now shouting loud,  
Stood firm; but backward not a step retired."

This first fight, as I have said, illustrated the military characteristics of the man, and justified the remark of General Dick Taylor, that "he employed the tactics of Frederick at Leuthen and Zorn-dorf, without even having heard these names." First, his reckless courage in making the attack—a rule which he invariably followed

and which tended always to intimidate his adversary. Second, his quick dismounting of his men to fight, showing that he regarded horses mainly as a rapid means of transportation for his troops. Third, his intuitive adoption of the flank attack, so successfully used by Alexander, Hannibal and Tamerlane—so demoralizing to an enemy even in an open field, and so much more so when made, as Forrest often did, under cover of woods which concealed the weakness of the attacking party. Fourth, his fierce and untiring pursuit, which so often changes retreat into rout and makes victory complete. If our Confederate leaders had pursued their victory at Manassas, Shiloh and Chickamauga as Forrest pursued this his first victory; as he pursued Streight in the mountains of Alabama; as he pursued Sooy Smith from West Point; as he pursued Sturgis from Tishemingo creek; as he pursued every advantage obtained over an enemy—the cause that we lost might perhaps have been won. Fifth, following, without knowing it, Napier's precept of the art of war, he was always in front, making personal observations and sending back orders for moving his troops, "while his keen eye watched the whole fight and guided him to the weak spot." As Scott said of Wellington—

"Greeting the mandate which sent out  
Their bravest and their best to dare  
A fate their leader shunned to share.  
He his country's sword and shield  
Still in the battle front revealed,  
And where danger fiercest swept the field,  
There came like a beam of light."

This practice brought him into many personal conflicts; and General Dick Taylor has well said: "I doubt if any commander, since the days of lion-hearted Richard, has killed as many enemies with his own hand as Forrest." This exposed him also to constant danger, and he had twenty-seven horses killed and wounded under him in battle and was twice severely wounded himself. This practice led to imitation by his general officers; and at Hurt's cross-roads, the day before the battle of Franklin, I witnessed what I will venture to say was never seen on any other battlefield during the war, Forrest with two divisions and three brigade commanders all on the skirmish line in the fight.

#### FORT DONELSON AND SHILOH.

At Fort Donelson his regiment bore a conspicuous part in the fight, covered General Pillow's flank in the most important sortie that was made on our side, captured a battery of six guns, and retreated in safety, when the garrison surrendered. At Shiloh, without taking any part in the main battle, he rendered signal and efficient service. Our army had been withdrawn early Sunday evening, and when officers and men were sleeping, fondly dreaming that their victory was complete, Forrest, without any orders



from any superior officer, had pressed his scouts to the river and discovered that reinforcements of the enemy were arriving. I was then in command of an infantry brigade, which, by some oversight, had not received the order to retire, and having continued the fight until dark, slept on the ground where Prentiss surrendered. About midnight, Forrest awoke me, inquiring for Generals Beauregard, Bragg and Hardee, and when I could not tell him the headquarters of either, he said, in profane but prophetic language, "If the enemy come on us in the morning, we will be whipped like hell." With promptness he carried the information to headquarters, and, with military genius, suggested a renewal at once of our attack; but the unlettered Colonel was ordered back to his regiment "to keep up a vigilant and strong picket line," which he did, and gave timely notice of the Monday's attack. On the day after Shiloh, General Sherman was attempting to press our army in retreat, and the advance guard of his division was composed, as he tells us, of two regiments—Seventy-seventh Ohio infantry and Dickey's Fourth Illinois cavalry. Forrest, with three hundred cavalry, was watching them. Just as they were attempting to cross a small ravine and were in some confusion, he made a charge so fierce and sudden that infantry and cavalry were all driven back together. Forrest, charging in among them with pistol and sabre, pursued to within one hundred and fifty yards of the division in line of battle, while cries of "kill him," "knock him off his horse," were heard all around him. The enemy lost fifteen killed and twenty-five prisoners, while Forrest was severely and his horse mortally wounded.

General Sherman, in his report of it, says: "The enemy's cavalry came down boldly at a charge led by General Forrest in person, breaking through our lines of skirmishers, when the infantry, without cause, threw away their muskets and fled. The ground was admirably adapted to a defence of infantry against cavalry, being miry and covered with fallen timber. As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's cavalry began to discharge their carbines and fell into disorder. I instantly sent orders to the rear for the brigade to form in line of battle, which was promptly executed." The success and result of this attack can be best estimated by considering this further extract from General Sherman's report: "The check sustained by us at the fallen timbers delayed our advance, so that night came on us before the wounded were provided for and the dead buried; and our troops being fagged out by three days' hard fighting" (it will be remembered that this was the only fighting they had on the third day), "exposure and privation, I ordered them back to their camps where they now are."

#### A BRIGADIER-GENERAL—CAPTURE OF MURFREESBORO'.

On the 10th of June, 1862, before he had recovered from his wound, at the earnest solicitation of prominent citizens of North Alabama, he was ordered to Chattanooga to take command of four



regiments of cavalry, which had seen but little if any service. He arrived on the 19th of June, and began at once to have his horses shod and his men made ready for a move. He was then but a Lieutenant-Colonel, though assigned to this command as a Brigadier-General, to which rank he had been recommended for promotion, and the appointment was subsequently made on the 21st of July. After some delay and trouble with his Colonels, growing out of the question of rank, he moved from Chattanooga on the 8th of July, with about two thousand cavalry rank and file. In five days he had crossed the mountains, fought a severe battle at Murfreesboro', and with his two thousand cavalry, by hard fighting and a successful bluff, captured General Crittenden, with seventeen hundred infantry, four pieces of artillery, six hundred horses, forty wagons, twelve hundred stands of arms and ammunition, and a large quantity of clothing and supplies. A Union writer estimated their loss at one million dollars. In five days more he had driven the Union cavalry from Lebanon, captured three picket posts around Nashville with one hundred and forty-three prisoners, burned four important bridges near the city, a railroad station and a large supply of railroad wood, and made his escape from General Nelson, who was pursuing him with a largely superior force. On the 21st July, 1862, the day his commission as Brigadier-General bears date, while he was tearing up railroad track, burning bridges and doing much damage, he was so completely surrounded that his escape seemed impossible, and a telegram was actually sent to General Buell that he had been captured, with eight hundred men; but when the mountain passes were all guarded, and the enemy moving on him on every road, he coolly and quietly led his men out of the trap set for him, by taking the dry bed of a creek, with steep banks, that concealed him from view, running parallel with the McMinniville road, and passing almost under the troops drawn up in line of battle on this road to intercept him.

On the 23d he joined Bragg at Sparta, where he was for the first time furnished with a section of artillery, and as our army moved into Kentucky, was ordered to assist in protecting its left flank, which he did.

#### ORGANIZES A NEW COMMAND IN MIDDLE TENNESSEE.

But Forrest was best suited to independent action; and, at his own request, turned over his brigade in Bragg's army on the 27th of September, 1862, at Bardstown, Kentucky, and in five days had marched one hundred and sixty-five miles and was at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, to organize a new command.

By the first November, 1862, he had organized a new brigade, thirty-five hundred strong, and being anxious to retake the capital of his State, had persuaded General Breckinridge, then in command, to permit him, with his own force and three thousand infantry under General Roger Hanson, to attempt it. The movement was made; but just when the attack was about to begin, and when Forrest felt confident of success, an order came to retire.

## HIS FIRST RAID INTO WEST TENNESSEE.

On the 10th of December, 1862, Forrest was ordered to move with his new brigade of raw cavalry, armed only with shot guns and such weapons as they picked up in the country, across the Tennessee river to destroy the railroad communication between Louisville and Memphis. He called attention to the almost unarmed condition of his command; but, in reply, was ordered by General Bragg to move at once. Sending an agent forward to smuggle percussion caps out of Memphis, he started. By the 15th he had crossed the Tennessee river at Clifton, swimming his horses and ferrying over his men, artillery and train, with a leaky old ferryboat, in a cold, pelting rain, that destroyed most of his small supply of percussion caps. Fortunately, his agent arrived that night with a fresh supply, and he began his arduous task on the 16th, after sinking and concealing his ferryboat to make safe his return. In two weeks' time, with about three thousand raw and almost unarmed cavalry, in a small district of country, surrounded on three sides by the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers; and on the fourth by the Memphis and Charleston railroad, thronged with Union soldiers, marching an average of twenty miles a day, he fought three heavy battles, had almost daily skirmishing, burned fifty railroad bridges, destroyed so much of its trestlework as to render the Mobile and Ohio railroad useless there the rest of the war, captured eighteen stockades, with two thousand five hundred prisoners, took and disabled ten pieces of field artillery, carried off fifty wagons and ambulances, with their teams, captured ten thousand stands of arms and one million rounds of ammunition, and then crossing the Tennessee river, seven hundred yards wide, in a few skiffs and one ferryboat, navigated by poles, his horses swimming, while an enemy ten thousand strong was attempting to cut off his retreat, he returned to his camp on the 1st of January, 1863, with a command stronger in numbers than when he started, thoroughly equipped with blankets and oil cloths, their shot guns replaced with Enfield rifles, and with a surplus of five hundred rifles and eighteen hundred blankets and knapsacks. While the army of Virginia can justly boast of its unsurpassed infantry under Jackson, the West is equally proud of the matchless achievements of Forrest and his cavalry. He had scarcely returned from this expedition, when he was ordered to assist Wheeler in his attack on Dover. Returning from this, he was constantly engaged in the battles and skirmishes around Spring Hill and Thompson station; and on the 24th of March, 1863, with his own command captured Brentwood, with seven hundred and fifty-nine prisoners, and destroyed a railroad bridge and block-house in a short distance of Nashville.

## CAPTURES STREIGHT.

On the 23d of April, 1863, he was ordered to the relief of General Roddy, who was threatened with a heavy force at Tusculumbia.

Starting from Spring Hill, Tennessee, and moving with his extraordinary celerity, he crossed the Tennessee river on the 27th and on the 28th joined Roddy, who was holding the enemy in check at Town creek. Before him was General Dodge, with about eight thousand infantry; and just as Forrest opened an artillery fire on him, a scout reported Colonel Streight, with two thousand two hundred cavalry, moving through Newburg towards Moulton, and before him lay unprotected the iron works of Monte Vallo, the workshops at Selma, and all the railroads of Alabama and Georgia; where he would strike, no one could tell. Forrest saw at once that the movement of Dodge was a feint, to cover the operations of Streight; and leaving a few regiments to keep up a show of resistance, he fell back that night toward Courtland, to prepare for the pursuit of Streight, which he commenced early on the morning of the 29th March, 1863. The story of that celebrated pursuit, which lasted four days and nights, almost without cessation; the constant skirmishing, amounting often to heavy battles; the flanking of the bridge over Black creek, through the aid of Miss Emma Sanson, who, mounting behind him on his horse, piloted him to an old ford; the courage and simplicity of that same country girl, spreading out her skirts and telling him to get behind her when they dismounted at the ford under fire of the enemy; the fierce fighting at Sand mountain at dusk, where men fought by the flash of their guns, and where Forrest had one horse killed and two wounded under him; the weird midnight attack, when he rolled his guns silently by hand to within one hundred and fifty yards of his unconscious foe, and awoke the slumbering echoes of the mountain with the thunder of his artillery; the sharp crack of the rifle and the Rebel yell, before which the enemy fled; and the final stratagem by which seventeen hundred Federals were captured by six hundred Confederates—has been so often and so vividly told, that it needs no repetition, until some Southern *Waverly* shall perpetuate it in romance, or some Southern Homer shall embalm it in undying verse.

#### THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

From this time to the battle of Chickamauga he was constantly engaged and rendered effective service, both in Middle and East Tennessee. In the battle of Chickamauga, his men, dismounted, fought with the infantry until the retreat began, when, mounting his men, he pursued to within three miles of Chattanooga. He captured a Federal officer in a tall tree that had been conveniently arranged for an observatory; mounting to his place, he could see the enemy retreating along the roads and in the town of Chattanooga in great confusion and chaos. He communicated these facts to headquarters, and urged an immediate advance of the Confederate army upon them. Had his example or his advice been followed, Sherman's march to the sea might never have been made.



## HE LEAVES BRAGG'S ARMY.

On the 3d of October, 1863, he was ordered by General Bragg to turn over his command, except Dibrell's brigade, to General Wheeler for an expedition into Tennessee. Regarding this as derogatory to him, he resigned his commission. General Bragg was my first brigade commander, and I was more attached to him than any General under whom I served. I knew him to be a pure and unselfish patriot, and in the fall of 1861 bore from him to President Davis the strikingly unselfish proposition to turn over to General A. S. Johnston, for active service in Kentucky, his well-drilled army at Pensacola, and to receive raw recruits in its place, if he could not be taken with his men; and I would say nothing now even to wound his memory. But the promotion of Wheeler over Forrest, which he, in an honest desire to promote the good of the service, recommended, was unfortunate.

Wheeler, a brave, generous, unselfish and educated soldier, did not desire it, and suffered in public estimation when it was thrust on him. Forrest, though a great strategist, trusted largely for tactics and many military details to officers under him; and if Wheeler had remained second to Forrest, as he was perfectly willing to do, a more splendid combination for cavalry operations could scarcely have been made. Thus ended Forrest's career in Bragg's army; but before we turn from this Department, I must recall an anecdote strikingly illustrative of the estimation in which Forrest was held by the people, and which he always told on himself with great delight. When Bragg was retreating from Tennessee, Forrest was among the last of the rear guard, and an old lady ran out of her house to the gate, as he was passing, and urged him to turn back and fight. As he rode on without stopping, she shook her fist at him in great rage and said: "Oh! you great, big, cowardly rascal, I only wish old Forrest was here; he'd make you fight!"

## ORGANIZES A NEW COMMAND IN WEST TENNESSEE AND NORTH MISSISSIPPI.

Mr. Davis refused to accept his resignation, but promoted him to the rank of Major-General, and assigned him to the command of North Mississippi and West Tennessee, and gave him permission to take with him his old battalion, now known as McDonald's, and Morton's battery, which he had organized, and whose guns he had captured—the whole force amounting to three hundred men and four guns. He reached Mississippi with this force on the 15th of November, 1863, and after reporting to General Joseph E. Johnston, and receiving the assistance of Major-General S. D. Lee to pass the enemy's line on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, he reached Jackson, Tennessee, on the 6th day of December, 1863, and for the fourth time during the war began to organize a new command. At this time West Tennessee was full of little com-



panies of from ten to thirty men willing to fight, but unwilling to go far from home or into the infantry service. The arrival of Forrest was the signal for all these men to rally around him, and by the 23d of December he had collected a force of about three thousand men, all unarmed except about two hundred. In the meantime, General Hurlbut was not idle, and General Sherman, who was determined to capture Forrest if possible, was directing the movements against him.

The rains had been heavy and the streams were all full. The Tennessee was behind him and on his left, the Mississippi on his right, and before him were the Forked Deer, Hatchie and Wolf rivers, and General Hurlbut at Memphis, with twenty thousand troops, watching every probable crossing place of these rivers, while troops were moving from Union City, Fort Pillow and Paducah, on his flank and rear. Loaded down as he was with three thousand unarmed men and a heavy train of supplies, escape would have seemed impossible to a less daring and less wary man. But one of the greatest secrets of Forrest's success was his perfect system of scouts. He kept able and reliable scouts all around him and at great distances, and always knew where his enemy was, what he had, what he was doing, and very often for days in advance what he was about to do. While the enemy were watching for him at Purdy and Bolivar, he unexpectedly crossed the Hatchie at Estenaula—not, however, without some sharp fighting before he got away. And when they were expecting him to cross the Wolf near its headwaters, he made a bold dash for Memphis and crossed one regiment, having only two armed companies over Wolf river bridge, in nine miles of that city. By skillful handling of his five hundred armed men, and the occasional display of his large number unarmed, he fought several successful skirmishes, captured the bridge over Wolf river near Lafayette station, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and held the enemy in check at Collierville until he passed into Mississippi, with thirty-five hundred men, forty wagons loaded with subsistence, two hundred beef cattle and three hundred hogs. The correspondent of the *Cincinnati Commercial*, writing from Memphis, January 12, 1864, says: "Forrest, with less than four thousand men, has moved right through the Sixteenth army corps, has passed within nine miles of Memphis, carried off one hundred wagons, two hundred beef cattle, three thousand conscripts and innumerable stores, torn up railroad track, cut telegraph wire, burned and sacked towns, run over pickets with a single derringer pistol, and all, too, in the face of ten thousand men."

General Forrest was met near Lafayette by General Chalmers, with twelve hundred men, who covered his further march into Mississippi, and who from then, until the close of the war, was his second in command.

The next month was occupied in obtaining arms for his recruits and reorganizing his command into four brigades. When this took

place, many officers who had been commanding little squads as companies were thrown out of office. This occasioned great dissatisfaction, and about one-third of the recruits deserted and went back to West Tennessee. Before this organization was completed, General Sherman commenced his movements in Mississippi.

#### THE DEFEAT OF GENERAL W. SOOY SMITH.

On the 3d of February, 1864, General Sherman began his movement from Vicksburg to Meridian, Mississippi, and at the same time sent a force up by Yazoo City, to take Forrest in rear at Grenada, and ordered General W. Sooy Smith to "move from Collierville on Pontotoc and Okalona," &c., and to meet him at Meridian, Mississippi, as near the 10th of February as he could.

General Sherman says "General Polk seemed to have no suspicion of our intention to disturb him." If this were true, he certainly could not say the same thing of Forrest. He knew that Smith's cavalry was preparing to move some time before it did move. On the 8th two infantry columns moved—one on Panola and the other on Wyatt—and on the 9th, one day before the cavalry started, Forrest, then at Oxford, telegraphed Chalmers, at Panola, to skirmish with the infantry, but that this was a feint, and he must be ready to intercept the cavalry, which he predicted would strike for Columbus and the prairie country of east Mississippi, where we had government works and a large quantity of corn. McCulloch's and Richardson's brigades were then stretched out from Panola to Abbeville, watching the crossings of the Tallahatchie river, while Jeff. Forrest's brigade was at Grenada, watching the forces at Yazoo City, and Bell, at Oxford, organizing. On the 10th Smith started from Collierville. On the 11th McCulloch moved to Oxford on converging lines with him. By the 14th it was manifest that Smith was moving for the prairie, and Forrest ordered a concentration of his command near West Point to intercept him, and this was accomplished by the 18th—Jeff. Forrest reaching there on the 17th. His brigade was thrown forward towards Aberdeen, and continued skirmishing with the enemy until the 20th. On the 20th Bell's brigade was sent to keep on the flank of the enemy and cover Columbus, and McCulloch and Richardson moved up to support Jeff. Forrest, and all fell back, slowly skirmishing to West Point. A telegram received here announced that General S. D. Lee, with three brigades, would be with us early on the 22d, and Forrest retired behind Suqua-ton-cha creek, of steep banks and miry bottom, and over which there were but few bridges, easily defended. This was a perfectly safe position, where he could easily hold the enemy in check until Lee could arrive. Smith was in a complete *cul-de-sac*, formed by the Suqua-ton-cha on his right, the Tibbee before him, and the Tombigbee on his left; and Lee and Forrest united could have crossed the Suqua-ton-cha behind him and captured his command. Early on the morning of the 21st a heavy fire was opened on our

pickets, composed of two regiments, dismounted and thrown out in front of the bridge, four miles west of West Point. Forrest soon came up to where I was standing on the causeway leading to the bridge, and as it was the first time I had been with him in a fight, I watched him closely. His manner was nervous, impatient and imperious. He asked me what the enemy were doing, and when I gave him the report just received from Colonel Duff, in command of the pickets, he said, sharply: "I will go and see myself," and started across the bridge, which was about thirty yards long, and then being raked by the enemy's fire. This struck me at the time as a needless and somewhat braggadocia exposure of himself, and I followed him to see what he would do. When we reached the other bank, the fire of the enemy was very heavy, and our men were falling back—one running without hat or gun. In an instant Forrest seized and threw him on the ground, and while the bullets were whistling thick around him, administered a severe thrashing with a brush of wood. A short time afterward I saw this scene illustrated in *Harper's Weekly*, as Forrest breaking in a conscript. He stood a few minutes, and when the fire slackened a little, ordered up his escort and McCulloch's brigade; and they soon came. Leaving McCulloch in position, he mounted with his escort, a splendid company of seventy-five young men, who each seemed inspired with the reckless courage of their leader, and dashed off through the woods to the flank and rear of the enemy. He soon discovered that the attacking force was small; and at once suspecting it to be the attack of a rear guard to cover a retreat, he ordered the first division forward, and the enemy fell back rapidly before him until they reached a wood four miles north of West Point, where they made a stand in force. After a heavy fight, in which he lost eighty killed and wounded, and the enemy as many, and where he took seventy-five prisoners, he drove them back again, and continued the pursuit until dark, when he bivouacked on ground prepared by the enemy, and where he found forage and camp fires all ready for his use. Continuing the pursuit early on the morning of the 22d, he overtook the main body of the Federals drawn up in line of battle at Okalona, a town situated in an open prairie. Up to this time he had with him only his first division, not exceeding two thousand men. Before him, in an open prairie, where all the movements of each side could be seen, was Sooy Smith, with seven thousand picked Federal cavalry, selected especially, it is said, to crush the Confederate leader. If Sooy Smith had fallen back from his dangerous position at West Point to draw Forrest from a junction with Lee, he had acted with wisdom and skill; and now the long-looked for opportunity seemed to have arrived, when, with a superior force of well drilled and splendidly armed cavalry, in an open prairie peculiarly fitted for cavalry operations, the cherished object of General Sherman could be accomplished. A less impetuous man than Forrest might have paused before such a situation; but he never hesitated a moment. His



two brigades of the first division had been ordered forward on two different roads, converging at Okalona, and on they came at a run; and at this moment Bell's brigade, which had been watching the flank of the enemy, came in from an opposite direction. Forrest, putting himself at the head of one regiment of this brigade, mounted, made his favorite flank attack, while his three brigades, quickly dismounted, attacked in front; and, after a short fight, the enemy, as if paralyzed with fear, fled almost without a struggle, leaving a small battery of artillery and about thirty killed and wounded. Sooy Smith, in his report, accounts for his defeat thus: "After the Fourth regulars had driven one entire Rebel brigade out of town three times, a portion of McCrillis' brigade, sent to the support of the Fourth, stampeded at the yells of our own men charging, and galloped back through and over everything, spreading confusion wherever they went and driving Perkins' battery of six small mountain howitzers off the road into a ditch." Forrest pursued with his accustomed vigor; and twice after this the enemy seemed to have regained their courage, and making bold stands, fought for a time with stubbornness and skill. In their first stand Colonel Jeff. Forrest was killed, and in the last, which occurred about sundown, General Forrest and three hundred men, some distance in advance of his main body, was repulsed, and only escaped capture by taking shelter, dismounted, in a ravine, which he held by hard fighting, until rescued by gallant old Bob McCulloch, Colonel of the Second Missouri cavalry, who never failed to come when needed, but never received the promotion he deserved.

#### SHERMAN'S MARCH TO MERIDIAN.

General Sherman, in the meantime, had marched to Meridian, and says: "We staid in Meridian five days, expecting every hour to hear of General Sooy Smith, but could get no tidings of him whatever."

As this was an important movement, and as its main object was, as we believe, defeated by Forrest, we must pause to consider the situation at that time. General Sherman expresses it in these words: "The Rebels still maintained a considerable force of infantry and cavalry in the State of Mississippi, threatening the river, whose navigation had become to us so delicate and important a matter. Satisfied that I could check this by one or two quick moves inland, and thereby set free a considerable body of men held as local garrisons, I went up to Nashville and represented the case to General Grant." General Sherman further says: "A chief part of the enterprise was to destroy the Rebel cavalry commanded by General Forrest, who were a constant threat to our railway communications in Middle Tennessee, and I committed this task to Brigadier-General W. Sooy Smith. General Hurlbut had in his command about seven thousand five hundred cavalry, scattered from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth, Mississippi, and we proposed to make up an aggregate cavalry force of about seven thousand 'effective,' out of these and the



twenty-five hundred which General Smith had brought with him from Middle Tennessee. With this force General Smith was ordered to move from Memphis, straight for Meridian, Mississippi; and to start by February 1st. I explained to him personally the nature of Forrest as a man and of his peculiar force; told him that in his route he was sure to encounter Forrest, who always attacked with a vehemence for which he must be prepared, and that after he had repelled the first attack, he must in turn assume the most determined offensive, overwhelm and utterly destroy his whole force. I knew that Forrest could not have more than four thousand cavalry, and my own movement would give employment to every other man of the Rebel army not immediately present with him, so that he (General Smith) might act on the hypothesis I have stated." Again, referring to the same subject, General Sherman, in his Memoirs, says: "The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the roads inland, so to paralyze the Rebel forces that we could take from the defence of the Mississippi river the equivalent of a corps of twenty thousand men, to be used in the next Georgia campaign, and this was actually done. At the same time, I wanted to destroy General Forrest, who, with an irregular force of cavalry, was constantly threatening Memphis and the river above, as well as our routes of supply in Middle Tennessee. In this we utterly failed, because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill his orders, which were clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instruction to him of January 27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations to him at the same time." As this letter is very important in this connection, and has never been published, I give it in full:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,  
MEMPHIS, July 27th, 1864.

Brigadier-General WILLIAM SOOY SMITH, *Commanding Cavalry, &c.*:

Dear General—By an order issued this day, I have placed all the cavalry of this department subject to your command. I estimate you can make a force of full seven thousand men, which I believe to be superior and better in all respects than the combined cavalry which the enemy has in all the State of Mississippi.

I will, in person, start for Vicksburg to-day, and with four divisions of infantry, artillery and cavalry, move out for Jackson, Brandon and Meridian, aiming to reach the latter place by February 10th. General Banks will feign on Pascagoula, and General Logan on Rome.

I want you, with your cavalry, to move from Collierville on Pontotoc and Okalona, thence sweeping down near the Mobile and Ohio railroad, disable that road as much as possible, consume or destroy the resources of the enemy along that road, break up the connection with Columbus, Mississippi, and finally reach me at or near Meridian, as near the date I have mentioned as possible.

This will call for great energy of action on your part; but I believe you are equal to it, and you have the best and most experienced troops in the service, and they will do anything that is possible. General Grierson is with you, and is familiar with the whole country. I will send up from Hains Bluff an expedition of gunboats and transports combined to feel up the Yazoo, as the present stage of water will permit. This will disconcert the enemy. My movement on Jackson will also divide the enemy, so that by no combination can he reach you with but a part of his force.

I wish you to attack any force of cavalry you meet, and follow them southward, but in no event be drawn into the forks of the streams that make up the Yazoo, nor over into Alabama.

Don't let the enemy draw you into minor affairs, but look solely to the greater object to destroy his communication from Okolona to Meridian, and then eastward to Selma. From Okolona south you will find abundance of forage collected along the railroad, and the farms have standing corn in the fields. Take liberally of all these, as well as horses, mules, cattle, &c. As a rule, respect dwellings and families as something too sacred to be disturbed by soldiers; but mills, barns, sheds, stables and such like things use for the benefit and convenience of your command.

If convenient, send into Columbus and destroy all the machinery there, and the bridge across Tombigbee, which enables the enemy to draw the resources of the east side of the Valley, but this is not of sufficient importance to delay your movement.

Try and communicate with me by scouts and spies from the time you reach Pontotoc, avoid any large force of infantry, leaving them to me. We have talked over this matter so much that the above covers all points not provided for in my published orders of to-day.

I am, yours, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General Commanding.*

While General Sherman admits the defeat of General W. Sooy Smith and censures him severely, he claims that his own movement was a complete success, and said, in general orders dated Meridian, Mississippi, February 18th, 1864: "Having fulfilled and well all the objects of the expedition, the troops will return to the Mississippi river."

Now we know that the whole North expected Selma to be destroyed or Mobile taken by him, and were sadly disappointed when he returned, after tearing up a few miles of railroad track, which were soon replaced or repaired.

General Boynton, who took issue with General Sherman, says: "This impression" (that Mobile or Selma was to be taken) "was current at General Grant's headquarters and at Washington, and General Grant himself had written to Halleck, under the date of January 15th, 1864, in the same letter which unfolded the spring campaign, as follows: 'I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian with his spare force—the cavalry coming from Corinth and destroying the railroad east and south of there so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He will then return unless the opportunity of going into Mobile appears perfectly plain.' Again, writing to General Thomas at Chattanooga, January 19th, General Grant said: 'He (Sherman) will proceed eastward as far as Meridian at least, and will thoroughly destroy the roads east and south of there, and if possible will throw troops as far east as Selma, or if he finds Mobile so far unguarded as to make his troops sufficient for the enterprise, will go there.' It will be observed in General Sherman's letter of instructions to General Smith, he mentions as objects of attack Columbus and Selma, where we had important government works, but gives no instructions to attack Forrest; on the contrary, intimates that an attack will come from him, and the movement seemed

to me intended to elude and not attack Forrest. That General Smith so understood his instructions is evident from his reports. In his report February 26th, 1864, by letter to General Sherman in person, he says: 'I moved the infantry brigade temporarily assigned to my command, first on Panola and then on Wyatt, and drew Forrest's forces and attention to those points, while I threw my whole force to New Albany, where I crossed the Tallahatchie river without opposition. Forrest then fell back to Grenada, and I moved on by way of Pontotoc.' In his more formal report of his operations made March 4th, he repeats the same thing more in detail, and seems to take credit to himself for having deceived and eluded Forrest. General Sherman says that Smith might safely have acted on the hypothesis I have stated, that 'my movements would give employment to every other man of the Rebel army not immediately present with him' (Forrest); and yet, when Sooy Smith turned back from West Point, S. D. Lee was in one day's march of a junction with Forrest. If General Sherman accomplished all he intended, why was Smith ordered to Meridian, and why did he wait there five days for him? If the chief part of the enterprise was to destroy Forrest, why was Smith ordered to 'move straight for Meridian, Mississippi,' when Forrest was not there and not expected there? Why order Smith to move through East Mississippi when Forrest was in West Mississippi? Why send infantry to make a feint on Panola and Wyatt, when Smith was moving for Pontotoc one hundred miles east of Panola? And lastly, if Smith was sent out especially to destroy Forrest, why does Sherman say, 'I told him that *in his route he was sure to encounter Forrest?*'"

I have no desire to take part in the controversy between Smith and his friend Boynton with General Sherman. Smith may have violated the verbal instructions given him by General Sherman, and he undoubtedly deserved the censure he received for being outgeneraled and whipped by an inferior force. But we cannot consent to this achievement of Forrest's being underrated, by admitting that Sherman's march to Meridian accomplished all that was intended.

Thus ended Sherman's effort to crush Forrest and set free the large number of men required to hold him in check. Mississippi, with its immense stores of corn and beef, was still held, and the railroads soon repaired to feed our army in Georgia. But the student of military operations will be puzzled to understand how Sherman, with four divisions of infantry and a small force of cavalry, crossed such streams as the Big Black and Pearl rivers and passed through the centre of Mississippi, in the face of two divisions of infantry and four splendid brigades of well equipped and well drilled cavalry under West Point officers, almost without firing a shot, while a man who could not drill a company, with three thousand cavalry, one-half raw troops, saved the State by defeating General Grant's Chief of Cavalry with seven thousand picked troops.

It reminds us of what Macauley says of Cromwell: "It is a remarkable circumstance that the officers who had studied tactics



in what were considered as the best schools, under Vere, in the Netherland's, and Gustavous Adolphus, in Germany, displayed far less skill than those commanders who had been born to peaceful employments, and never saw even a skirmish until the civil war broke out. Cromwell never fought a battle without gaining a victory; he never gained a victory without annihilating the force opposed to him." . . . "In what respect does Cromwell, who never drew a sword till upwards of forty, yield to any of these famous commanders? And how immeasurably superior to them all is he as an improver of victory?"

I would not by this disparage military education. I would not, if I could, disturb a single leaf in the laurel crowns which decorate so justly the heads of those whom nature and education have combined to make great generals. I do not concur in the sentiment so often expressed, that "the Confederacy died of West Point"; but I do believe that many a brilliant citizen soldier was neglected, and his usefulness paralyzed, if not destroyed, by the West Point influence which barred the doors to promotion. General Joseph E. Johnston, considered by many the first of Confederate generals, has said, "if Forrest had been an educated soldier no other Confederate general would have been heard of," and yet the treatment of Forrest furnishes a striking example of what I have said.

#### THE THIRD RAID INTO WEST TENNESSEE.

In the first week of March, 1864, a small brigade of Kentucky infantry, seven hundred effective, under General Buford, was turned over to Forrest to be mounted, and General Buford assigned to command of his Second division. Forrest, ever anxious to be moving, determined at once to move into West Tennessee and Kentucky, to annoy the enemy and recruit his command, especially his new Kentucky brigade. In ten days he mounted his new brigade, and on the 15th of March commenced his movement, which resulted in the capture of Union City, with four hundred and seventy-five prisoners, with their arms, ammunition and three hundred horses; the attack on Paducah, where a large quantity of supplies were obtained, and his Kentucky brigade increased to seventeen hundred fighting men; the route of a Federal regiment at Bolivar, and the capture of Fort Pillow. This last fight, for political purposes, has been, by false testimony, and I believe willful perjury, represented as a bloody massacre. The willful and malicious assaults of a partisan press, who have recently revived these slanders for partisan ends, has called forth from Dr. Fitch, of Iowa, who was the Union surgeon at Fort Pillow, a complete vindication of the Confederates, which has been published in your *Monthly Papers*, and as I have recently published a statement on this subject, I will not detain you now with its repetition. You will pardon me, however, for saying that I regarded one of my highest duties in life well performed when, as a representative in Congress, I placed on the records of the country a refutation of this infamous slander



on Forrest and his cavalry. It was said that Forrest's demand for a surrender at Paducah, coupled with an implied threat that he would not be responsible for the consequences if compelled to take the place by assault, showed a predetermination to cold-blooded murder. This was the form of his first demand for surrender made at Murfreesboro', and he practiced it afterwards just as he practiced his flank attack, and for the same purpose, and with the same effect, to intimidate his adversary.

Again he gathered up a large quantity of supplies and recruits, and again General Sherman attempted to have him captured, as will be seen from the following telegrams, taken from the Congressional report on the conduct of the war:

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 2, 1864.

General MCPHERSON, *Huntsville*:

I would not give orders about Forrest, who is in your command, only the matter involves Kentucky also. As soon as he is disposed of, I will leave all matters in your Department to you. Veatch is posted near Purdy to cut off his escape by the headwater of the Hatchie. Hurlbut, with infantry and cavalry, will move towards Bolivar with a view to catch Forrest in flank as he attempts to escape. Brayman will stop a few veteran regiments returning, and will use them as far out as Union City.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General*.

NASHVILLE, April 11, 1864.

To General MCPHERSON, *Huntsville*:

. . . If you have at Cairo anything that could go up the Tennessee, and move inland on Jackson or Paris even, it would disturb Forrest more than anything Hurlbut will do from Memphis.

W. T. SHERMAN, &c.

NASHVILLE, April 18, 1864.

To General MCPHERSON, *Huntsville*; General BRAYMAN, *Cairo*; General HURLBUT, *Memphis*; and General SLOCUM, *Vicksburg*:

General Grant has made the following orders. . . . General Sturgis has started this morning to assume command of all the cavalry at or near Memphis, with which he will sally out and attack Forrest wherever he may be. General Grierson may seize all the horses and mules in Memphis to mount his men and be ready for the arrival of General Sturgis, and Buckland's brigade of infantry should be ready to move out with the cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General Commanding*.

To further show the great danger apprehended from Forrest at this time and the number of troops held to watch him, I cite the following dispatch from General Sherman:

NASHVILLE, April 19, 1864.

To General RAWLING, *Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.*:

. . . At Memphis are Buckland's brigade of splendid troops (two thousand), three other white regiments, one black artillery at Fort Picker-

ing, twelve hundred strong; about one thousand men floating, who are camped in the fort; near four thousand black troops; three thousand enrolled and armed militia, and all Grierson's cavalry, ten thousand nine hundred and eighty-three, according to my last returns, of which surely not over three thousand are on furlough. Out of this a force of about twenty-five hundred cavalry and four thousand infantry could have been made up, and by moving to Bolivar could have made Forrest come there to fight or get out. I have sent Sturgis down to whip Forrest, and, if necessary, to mount enough men to seize any and all the horses of Memphis and wherever he may go.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General Commanding.*

And again, writing to General Thomas, at Chattanooga, from Nashville, April 25, he says: "The only danger I apprehend is from resident guerillas and Forrest coming from the direction of Florence. I did want A. J. Smith about Florence to guard against that danger." While the enemy's coils were being prepared for him, Forrest was quietly gathering recruits and supplies. His first division had left him on the 15th, under orders of General Polk, to guard against a threatened raid from North Alabama on Columbus, Mississippi. General Veatch had been posted at Purdy, with ten thousand infantry, to guard the headwaters of the Hatchie, and was ordered away, to General Sherman's intense disgust, as shown in his dispatches. As soon as Veatch left Purdy, Buford, with a heavy subsistence train, drawn by oxen, moved out by the Purdy road, while Forrest, with his escort and the remnant of his old battalion—in all about three hundred men—moved so as to protect Buford's flank from a heavy force moving from Memphis under Sturgis, and evidently intended, as Sherman had suggested, to capture the Confederates while crossing the Hatchie river at Bolivar. Forrest reached Bolivar first, and posting his three hundred chosen veterans in the fortifications, well constructed by the Federals when they held this place, he coolly received the attack of not less than two thousand cavalry, repulsed them with serious loss, and they retired evidently believing Forrest's whole command present. He then moved on, having suffered no serious loss, save the wounding of his gallant Adjutant, Major Strange. Hurlbut was severely censured, removed from his command at Memphis, and General C. C. Washburn put in his place. When, a short time after this, Forrest came into Memphis and captured Washburn's uniform from the room in which he slept, it is said that Hurlbut curtly remarked: "They removed me because I couldn't keep Forrest out of West Tennessee, but Washburn couldn't keep him out of his bedroom."

#### THE DEFEAT OF STURGIS.

Forrest reached Tupelo, Mississippi, on the 5th of May, 1864, and was busily engaged in reorganizing his command, now considerably increased by recruits and the addition of General Gholson's brigade, recently converted from State into Confederate troops.

On the 26th, by order of General S. D. Lee, Department Com-

mander, Chalmers, with McCulloch's and Neely's brigades was ordered to Monte Vallo, Alabama, to protect the iron works of that region. On the 31st Forrest started with Buford's division for Tuscumbia to assist Roddy in meeting a movement in that quarter, and had reached Russellville, Alabama, when he received information that Sturgis, with eight thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry and six batteries, was moving from Memphis into Mississippi, parallel with the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Forrest began at once to concentrate his scattered command.

Rucker, from Oxford, with three small regiments, was thrown across the Tallahatchie at New Albany, and commenced to retard the enemy's advance. This little brigade, under Rucker, who was second only to Forrest as a fearless fighter—composed of three regiments, under three dashing young Colonels, Duff, Bill Taylor and Alex. Chalmers—was highly complimented by Forrest for gallantry in performing this duty. On the 9th Forrest took position with two brigades of Buford's division, Johnson's brigade of Roddy's division and Rucker's brigade of Chalmers' division, east of the Hatchie, near Rienzi, to dispute the passage of Sturgis over that river, supposing he was moving to reinforce Sherman in Georgia. The scouts now reported Sturgis moving south towards Forrest's camp at Tupelo. Chalmers, with two brigades, was then at Monte Valle, Alabama; Roddy, with one brigade, near Tuscumbia; Gholson, with one brigade, near Jackson, Mississippi. General S. D. Lee, now in command, determined to fall back toward Okalona until he could concentrate his forces, and left that night by rail, after ordering Forrest to get in front of Sturgis and retard his advance. Forrest moved before day to take position at Bryce's cross-roads, on a dividing ridge where the waters of the Hatchie rise and run north and of the Tallahatchie rise and run south, and when in four miles of that place he learned that the enemy had already occupied it and were now between him and his headquarters at Tupelo.

He had with him there his three smallest brigades, the effective strength of which at that time he reported as follows: Lyons', eight hundred; Rucker's, seven hundred, and Johnson's, five hundred; while Buford, with Bell's brigade, about fifteen hundred strong, and two batteries of artillery, were some distance in the rear. Ordering them to move instantly up, which they did, coming eight miles in a gallop, he moved forward with the men he had and opened the fight, and at the same time ordered Buford to send one regiment across the country to attack the enemy in rear. The battle raged fiercely for some hours with doubtful success, and eight hundred Federals and six hundred and forty Confederates fell dead and wounded around Bryce's house. One peculiarity of Forrest's fighting was his almost reckless use of artillery, and on this occasion he had eight pieces of artillery that were boldly handled by Captain Morton, a beardless youth, with the face of a woman and the courage of a lion. The Federals made several splendid charges, that were repulsed at



short range by the artillery, double-shotted with cannister. The Confederates insist that both the Federal infantry and cavalry were in this fight. The Federal cavalry officers who censured Sturgis, say they had cavalry alone, and that instead of falling back with his cavalry on to his infantry, prepared in line, he undertook to hold the position with his cavalry, and bring up his infantry five or more miles at double-quick, and that they arrived broken down and unformed just as the cavalry were driven back on them, and all went pell-mell together. Be this as it may, when Forrest captured Bryce's house, the enemy's infantry in column were in full view coming up. He turned loose on them his own eight pieces of artillery and six more just captured, and about that time Barteau's regiment struck them in rear, and the flight commenced.

A more terrific pursuit was never seen. The negroes had been sworn on their knees in line before starting from Memphis to show no quarter to Forrest's men, and on their shirts and banners was inscribed, "Remember Fort Pillow." This had a double effect: it made the Federals afraid to surrender, and infuriated Forrest's men; and it is said that nineteen hundred were killed in this pursuit, which was continued sixty miles. The exact truth as to this fight will, perhaps, never be known; but taking either the Federal or Confederate accounts of it, it was the most brilliant victory of the war on either side. Forrest reports his force as thirty-two hundred cavalry and eight pieces of artillery. The Federal report places Sturgis' force at thirty-three hundred cavalry, fifty-four hundred infantry and seventeen pieces of artillery. With a superior force of cavalry, he might well have expected to hold, with them alone, his position, well selected at Bryce's cross-roads, until his infantry could come up. Sturgis was as much astonished at his defeat as any one, and was so terribly mortified that when A. J. Smith moved out after Forrest, a confidential spy from Memphis reported that Sturgis was sitting in a hotel soliloquizing, "It can't be done, sir!" and when asked what could not be done, he said, "They c-a-n't whip old Forrest!"

In this battle, two thousand prisoners were taken, all the artillery (seventeen pieces), the whole ordnance train, well supplied with ammunition and many articles of value to us; the ambulance and wagon train, filled with most acceptable supplies, especially coffee, which the hungry Confederates had not tasted for many days.

General Sherman, in a cipher dispatch, dated June 20th, 1864, says: "He whipped Sturgis fair and square, and now I will put him against A. J. Smith and Mower, and let them try their hand." By this victory Forrest not only saved Columbus and the rich prairie region of Mississippi again, but he saved Mobile also by the withdrawal of A. J. Smith's division, which had been ordered to its attack.

Roemer, speaking of the battle of Arbela, says: "From that great day when in person Alexander led the Macedonian horse, he ranks the first of cavalry generals of all times, and the tactics



there displayed were in every respect the same which now receive the sanction of modern science—sudden deployment and bold attack, outflanking the enemy's wings, dividing the enemy's forces, rallying, attacking the rear, supporting the menaced point, and, to crown all, a pursuit of six hundred stadia (seventy-five miles) in twenty-four hours. Never was there a greater achievement in ancient or modern warfare."

When a new edition of Roemer's work on cavalry is written, it is to be hoped that the battle of "Tishmingo Creek," or "Bryce's Cross-roads," as the Federals call it, will not be forgotten, where the battle was fought and a pursuit of sixty miles made all in thirty hours.

#### THE FIRST INVASION OF A. J. SMITH INTO MISSISSIPPI.

That you may appreciate the immense work Forrest was now doing, besides keeping about thirty thousand men constantly engaged to watch him, I call attention to the following telegrams from General Sherman. His telegram from Nashville, dated April 4, 1864, to General Rawlings, shows that General Corse was sent up Red river to bring A. J. Smith "with all dispatch to Vicksburg and up the Yazoo river and rapidly occupy Grenada. His appearance there, with ten thousand men, will be a big bombshell in Forrest's camp, should he, as I fear he will, elude General Hurlbut. At Grenada, Smith will do all the mischief he can, and then strike boldly across the country by Aberdeen to Russellville and Decatur." This movement was defeated by the victory over Sooy Smith and the advance into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. A little later A. J. Smith was ordered to assist in taking Mobile; and this was broken up by the defeat of Sturgis, as shown by the following telegram from General Sherman to Honorable E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, dated Big Shanty, June 14, 1864: "I have just received news of the defeat of our party sent out from Memphis, whose chief object was to hold Forrest there and keep him off our road. I have ordered *A. J. Smith not to go to Mobile*, but to go out from Memphis and defeat Forrest at all costs."

Again, as early as June 6, General Sherman telegraphed General Thomas to prepare a cavalry raid for Opelika, Alabama; but when it was ready to move he was afraid to let it start, and telegraphed to General Rousseau, at Nashville, June 20th, . . . "wait and see what Forrest will do." And on the 29th June to the same officer: "Do not start until we know something definite of General A. J. Smith." To the same officer on the 30th June: "The movement I want you to study and be prepared for is contingent on the fact that General A. J. Smith defeats Forrest or holds him well in check." And July 6th to the same officer: "That cavalry expedition must be off now. . . . I have official information that General A. J. Smith is out from Memphis, with force enough to give Forrest full occupation."

On the 24th June General Sherman telegraphs, through his aid, L. M. Dayton, to General Thomas: "General A. J. Smith moves

from Memphis via Corinth to engage Forrest. . . . Smith has nine thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry." General Smith moved slowly and cautiously; Generals S. D. Lee and Forrest were concentrating forces and fortifying at Okalona to meet him. The first division was thrown forward above Pontotoc, to watch Smith, with orders to skirmish with him slightly, but let him come on. Smith reached Pontotoc on the 11th of June and halted until the 13th, as if hesitating what to do. On the 13th Smith turned east and moved rapidly towards Tupelo, as if alarmed, but repulsed, with promptness and severe loss to us, two flank attacks made on him during the day. During the night Smith entrenched himself at Harrisburg, the site of an old town on the hill above Tupelo, with nine thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry and twenty pieces of artillery. Major-General S. D. Lee, now in command of the Confederate forces, had seven thousand cavalry, twenty-one hundred dismounted cavalymen acting as infantry and twenty pieces of artillery.

The enemy had greatly the advantage in force and position. General Smith, with a splendid corps of infantry, hardened by long and active service, was in an entrenched position on a hill covered with timber. General Lee, with dismounted cavalry, was in an open field where every man he had and every movement he made could be plainly seen.

The enemy would not come out of his entrenchments. General Maury from Mobile was telegraphing for help against a threatened assault, and General Lee determined to attack the enemy in position. Brave men never marched more fearlessly to death than did Forrest's cavalry on that occasion, as the terrible slaughter testified, including among the killed and wounded three brigade commanders and almost every regimental commander engaged. We were badly defeated, and in a very short time, but the enemy never moved from his entrenchments to improve his victory, and on the next day moved off rapidly again as if in retreat. General Forrest dashed after the rear guard in his usual style of pursuit, when just under the hill beyond the little prairie, above Town creek (where it is said De Soto fought the Indians, and where old bayonets and musket balls were found in the earth, mingled with Indian arrow heads), Forrest suddenly came upon the enemy's infantry drawn up in line to receive him. He attacked at once, and was driven back with heavy loss, and severely wounded himself. Thus ended two sharp defeats in two successive days, for which General Lee has been somewhat censured, as he was in immediate command. General Jordan, the biographer of Forrest, who wrote under his supervision (and to whose valuable book I am greatly indebted for many details used in preparing this address), leaves the impression that General Lee made the fight from supposed necessity and without the concurrence of Forrest.

I know that this is not the true statement of the case.

Lee, Forrest, Buford and I were riding to the front when the

battle was about to begin. Buford said to Lee and Forrest, who had spent the night and morning together in consultation: "Gentlemen, you have not asked my opinion about this fight; but I tell you, we are going to be badly whipped." Forrest replied, sharply: "You don't know what you are talking about; we'll whip 'em in five minutes." Buford replied: "I hope you may be right, but I don't believe it."

Forrest was a great general; but he never rose to that greatness and dignity of soul which enabled Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg to assume the responsibility of a failure.

#### THE SECOND INVASION OF A. J. SMITH.

On the 19th of July, 1864, General Grant telegraphed from City Point, Virginia, to General Sherman: "I see by Richmond papers of yesterday that Smith has left Tupelo. Although they call it a retreat, I judge from S. D. Lee's dispatch that Forrest has been badly whipped. Smith, however, ought to be instructed to keep a close watch on Forrest and not permit him to gather strength and move into Middle Tennessee."

General Sherman gave the order, but he no longer talks so flipantly about whipping Forrest as he had done. He telegraphs General Washburn, July 25th: "It was by General Grant's special order General Smith was required after his fight to pursue and continue to follow Forrest. General Smith must keep well after Forrest, and rather watch him closely, than attempt to pursue him; but when he does fight, he should keep the advantage." General Washburn replies, Memphis, August 4th, 1864: "Forrest is below Okalona; I am moving in that direction, while Smith is after him with five thousand cavalry and ten thousand infantry." On the 11th Washburn further telegraphed: "In addition to his own proper force, ten thousand strong, he has three thousand colored troops from Memphis, three Minnesota regiments sent me from Saint Louis, and four thousand cavalry."

On the 4th of August General Sherman telegraphed General Grant: "General Washburn is moving from Holly Springs on Columbus, Mississippi. He thinks that Forrest is dead, from the wound he received in his battle with General Smith."

If this movement of General Washburn was not a myth, as he was never heard of in the field, he must have suddenly returned, when he learned that Forrest was not dead. The only time he was ever known to be in the neighborhood of Forrest, was when he ran out of his bedroom in Memphis, in light marching order, leaving his uniform behind, which Forrest captured and afterward restored to him. Washburn, in return, sent to Forrest some gray cloth, gold lace and trimmings to make him a Confederate uniform.

General Smith moved slowly, repairing the railroad from Grand Junction to Abbeville as he came.

On the 8th of August Forrest again took the field in a buggy, though still suffering severely from his wound.



On the 18th the enemy had completed the railroad to Abbeville, thrown a pontoon bridge across the Tallahatchie river at that place, and commenced his movement on Oxford. Feeling unable to contend with A. J. Smith, with his largely superior command, he determined to make a counter movement on Memphis with one-half of his command, leaving the other half under his first division commander—the whole force not then exceeding four thousand effective. He conceived this idea on the morning of the 18th of August, 1864, and sending out men to cut the telegraph wires in rear of Smith, promptly at 5 P. M. of the same day he started, saying to his second in command, "If you can hold them back two days, I will be in Memphis." Believing it the best method of delaying the enemy, the officer left in command determined to threaten an attack. Early on the morning of the 19th, taking his escort and Colonel Burrows' regiment, two hundred and fifty strong, having placed his command in a strong position behind Hurricane creek to receive any return attack that might follow, he moved on Abbeville, captured forty pickets on the Oxford road, and charged into town. As the Confederates came in, a large force of Federal cavalry went rushing out. Colonel Burrows, a dashing preacher, who fought as well as he prayed, wanted to charge after them; but the officer in command ordered a halt until he galloped to the top of the hill and saw a heavy force drawn up behind it, evidently to receive a pursuing charge, and withdrew. The return attack came, and was severely repulsed, and the enemy were held back more than two days without discovering the absence of Forrest. This affair at Abbeville and the affair at Town creek, where Forrest's command was so quickly cut to pieces and himself severely wounded in a similar trap, led me to believe that A. J. Smith had studied Forrest more closely than any other Federal general who met him. The movement on Memphis had the desired effect to draw Smith back. A similar movement by Van Dorn on Holly Springs drew Grant from Oxford; and it is believed that a similar movement, made when our army lay at Canton, Mississippi, twenty thousand strong, while Memphis was lightly garrisoned, would have drawn Grant from before Vicksburg. The railroad could have put them in Panola in two days—three days' marching would have put them in Memphis; and, with the Mississippi river in our possession at Memphis and Port Hudson, Grant would have starved sooner than Pemberton.

#### IN SHERMAN'S REAR IN MIDDLE TENNESSEE.

This campaign ended on the 23d of August, and Forrest, without any time to rest, was ordered to the defence of Mobile. On his way to Mobile, he was met by his new Department commander, General Dick Taylor, and I give their interview and its results in the graphic language of the latter.

"General Maury was informed by telegraph of my presence, that I assumed command of the Department, and would arrest Forrest's movement. An hour later, a train from the north, bringing Forrest



in advance of his troops, reached Meridian, and was stopped, and the General, whom I had never seen, came to report. He was a tall, stalwart man, with greyish hair, mild countenance, slow and homely of speech. In a few words he was informed that I considered Mobile safe for the present, and that all our energies must be directed to the relief of Hood's army, then west of Atlanta. The only way to accomplish this was to worry Sherman's communications north of the Tennessee river, and he must move his cavalry in that direction at the earliest moment. To my surprise, Forrest suggested many difficulties and asked numerous questions: how he was to get over the Tennessee? how he was to get back if pressed by the enemy? how he was to be supplied? what should be his line of retreat in certain contingences? what he was to do with his prisoners, if any were taken? etc. I began to think he had no stomach for the work, but at last, having isolated the chances of success from cause of failure, with the care of a chemist experimenting in his laboratory, he rose and asked for Fleming, the superintendent of the railway, who was on the train by which he had come. Fleming appeared—a little man on crutches (he had recently broken a leg), but with the energy of a giant—and at once stated what he could do in the way of moving supplies on his line, which had been repaired up to the Tennessee boundary. Forrest's whole manner was now changed. In a dozen sharp sentences he told his wants; said he would leave a staff officer to bring up his supplies; asked for an engine to take him back twenty miles north to meet his troops; informed me he would march with the dawn, and hoped to give an account of himself in Tennessee. Moving with great rapidity, he crossed the Tennessee, captured stockades, with their garrisons, burned bridges, destroyed railways, reached the Cumberland below Nashville, drove away gunboats, captured and destroyed several transports, with immense stores, and spread alarm over a wide region. The enemy concentrated on him from all directions, but he eluded or defeated their several columns, recrossed the Tennessee river, and brought off fifteen hundred prisoners and much spoil. Like Clive, nature made him a great soldier; and he was without the former's advantages. Limited as was Clive's education, he was a Borson of erudition compared with Forrest." Such was the quick resolves, the prompt execution and the brilliant result of the first short meeting between these two remarkable men. One, small in statue, but keen in intellect and polished by education—the other, rough and powerful in body and mind. It was Richard, with a battle-axe, that could cleave the bar of iron, meeting Saladin, whose keen scymeter could cut the pillow of silk. Forrest admitted that he was more awed by Dick Taylor's power of will than any man he ever met, or, as he expressed it, "I lost my charm when I met Dick Taylor."

The consternation of the enemy at his movements can be best appreciated from their telegrams to each other at the time.

Grant telegraphs to Sherman from City Point, Virginia, September

12th, 1864: "It will be better to drive Forrest from Middle Tennessee as a first step." Same day General Sherman telegraphs General Webster at Nashville: "Call forward from Kentucky any troops that can be spared there, and hold all that come from the rear until Forrest is disposed of."

On the 28th he telegraphs General Webster: "I will send up the road to-night another division, and want you to call forward from the rear all you can get."

On the same day General Sherman telegraphs General Grant: "I send back to Stevenson and Decherd General Thomas to look to Tennessee, and have ordered a brigade of the Army of Tennessee to Eastport, and the cavalry across to that place from Memphis. . . . Forrest has got into Middle Tennessee, and will, I feel certain, get on my main road to-night."

General Thomas telegraphs to General Sherman from Nashville, October 3d, 1864: "Rousseau will continue after Forrest. . . . Major-General Washburn is coming up the Tennessee river with ten thousand cavalry and fifteen hundred infantry, and will move toward Athens for the purpose of striking Forrest's flank, or cutting off his communication with Bainbridge. General Morgan, as I telegraphed you last night, is moving from Athens on Bainbridge. So it seems to me there is a fair chance of hemming Forrest in and destroying his command. The river is not fordable, and if we seize his means of crossing at Bainbridge, he will be unable to cross anywhere else, and, I think, Rousseau ought certainly to destroy him." And it appears from the report of General Thomas, that Rousseau had four thousand cavalry.

#### AT JOHNSONVILLE.

With all these efforts made to capture him, Forrest again made his escape. As soon as he reached the south side of the Tennessee river in safety, he turned on his pursuers, laid an ambushade of about three hundred men, under Colonel Kelly, for the enemy attempting to land at Eastport, captured seventy-five prisoners, three pieces of rifled field artillery, sixty horses; sunk one gun and two caissons in the river, and drove a large number of the enemy into the river, many of whom were killed or drowned. And then striking boldly for Johnsonville, Sherman's chief depot of supplies on the Tennessee river, captured one gunboat, two transports and one barge, heavily laden with supplies; destroyed three gunboats, thirteen transports, eighteen barges and buildings, quartermaster and commissary stores, to the value of eight million dollars, as estimated by Federal officers. General Sherman, whose soul had been greatly vexed by Forrest, writing to General Grant, November 6th, 1864, about the movements of Hood, says: "And that devil Forrest was down about Johnsonville making havoc among the gunboats and transports." Forrest's reputation was now world-wide; and in reading recently a description of the great Tamerlane, I was struck with the wonderful resemblance between their military careers.

The author of "Soldiers and their Science" says of Tamerlane; "Born to comparatively humble fortunes, irresistible obstacles seemed to lie across the path of his ambition, and yet one by one he overcame them. . . . His plans were deeply meditated; before embarking in an enterprise he examined the avenues of retreat, and he himself tells us that the principles of his tactics were uniform. It was his maxim that success came not from the greatness of armies, but from skillful and judicious measures. Shepherds and hunters, mounted on light hardy horses, and wielding the javelin and the bow, followed the standard of Timour; he covered them neither with defensive armor nor unfamiliar weapons. He respected and even drew advantage from that untamed and adventurous spirit, which, regarding close restraint as insupportable, gave so large a scope to daring intelligence and prowess. . . . He relied much on rapidity of movement, and often disconcerted his enemies by falling on them unawares, and cutting them up in detail—in his own words, he charged quick and hot on the foe, and never let the plain of battle cool. He at least had made, if not announced, the discovery, since attributed to Marshall Saxe, 'that the secret of an army's success is in its legs.' . . . On all occasions his march was preceded by clouds of flying scouts, who, piercing the country in every direction, kept him constantly informed as to its varied resources and the dispositions of the enemy." With change of name a better description of Forrest could scarce be written.

#### HOOD'S NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN.

The day after Johnsonville was destroyed, Forrest received orders to join General Hood in his march on Nashville. His movements in this campaign were marked by his usual energy, judgment and success, but were mostly of that ordinary character that marks cavalry acting as a part of an army of mixed forces.

#### SCHOFIELD HALTED AT SPRING HILL.

There were two movements, however, that deserve especial notice. When Hood was ready to advance from Columbia, Forrest crossed Duck river about night in three places, and early the next morning whipped the Federal cavalry at Hurt's cross-roads and drove the most of it towards Nashville, and then turned on the infantry and held them in check at Spring Hill until Hood's infantry came up. The head of the column reached Spring Hill some time before night and our army went into camp, while the enemy marched along by them and, as General French expressed it, "lit their pipes by our camp fires." This movement marks a new era in the use of cavalry to arrest and capture retreating infantry, which deserves the especial study of military men. It was subsequently copied by Sheridan in the capture of General Lee; and if it had been practiced by Wilson on Hood as he retreated from Nashville, the Confederate army would have been captured.



I think I risk nothing in saying if Forrest had been in command of our army, General Schofield would never have marched by Spring Hill, and the disastrous battle of Franklin, where the gallant Cleburne and so many brave men fell, would never have been fought.

Poor Cleburne! he was a noble specimen of the Irish gentleman. I knew him as a promising young lawyer, and watched with interest his brilliant career in arms. He supplied my division with ammunition on the morning of Franklin, and we parted to meet no more. I shall never forget the solemn scene that occurred when his body passed through Memphis, after the surrender, to its final resting place in his adopted State of Arkansas. Like the burial of Sir John Moore, it was a sad and silent scene as we laid him down on the steamer's deck. Around him stood Jefferson Davis, Isham G. Harris, and the few Confederate generals then in Memphis. Respect for the prejudices of our recent captors prevented a greater demonstration. An Irishman approached, and in humble accents asked permission to kiss the coffin of his dead commander. Mr. Davis nodded a silent assent. Kneeling and making the sign of the cross on his breast, the humble soldier lingered a moment in prayer, and then pressed his lips with fervor on the head of the coffin. Not a word was said; but each hat was involuntarily lifted from the head and silent tears stole down the manly cheeks of those who were present.

#### THE RETREAT FROM COLUMBIA.

Another incident of this disastrous campaign deserves especial mention, as illustrative of the character and service of General Forrest. When Hood's army had been defeated at Nashville and driven back in almost utter despair to Columbia, where it stood broken and sullen on the south bank of Duck river, General Forrest, who had been operating around Murfreesboro', came in on the 18th of December. The inspiring effect of his presence was felt by all, and was thus described by my Adjutant, Captain W. A. Goodman, a man of brilliant intellect, cool in battle and untiring in his devotion to the cause and the discharge of his duty: "At no time in his whole career was the fortitude of General Forrest in adversity and his power of infusing his own cheerfulness into those under his command, more strikingly exhibited than at this crisis. Broken and defeated, as we were, there were not wanting many others as determined as he to do their duty to the last, and who stood out faithfully to the end; but their conversation was that of men who, though determined, were without hope, and who felt that they must gather strength from despair; but he alone, whatever he may have felt (and he was not blind to the danger of our position), spoke in his usual cheerful and defiant tone, and talked of meeting the enemy with as much assurance of success as he did when driving them before him a month before. Such a spirit is sympathetic; and not a man was brought in contact with



him who did not feel strengthened and invigorated, as if he had heard of a reinforcement coming to our relief." General Forrest was by unanimous consent selected to cover the retreat from Columbia, and to assist his cavalry, now reduced to three thousand, he was assigned a division of selected infantry, numbering only fifteen hundred, but composed of as brave men and gallant officers as ever lived—not the least of whom was that gallant Mississippian, General Featherstone, whose subsequent conduct at Sugar creek deserves to be long remembered.

The advance of the enemy crossed Duck river on the night of the 21st December, and on the 22d Forrest fell back slowly until he reached a gorge between two hills, three miles from Columbia. Here he had slight skirmishing, but held his position easily for the night. On the 24th Wilson's cavalry corps, ten thousand strong, and Wood's division of infantry, crossed, and the pursuit began in earnest. There was heavy fighting during the day, in which both infantry and cavalry were engaged, and at night he camped at Pulaski. On the morning of the 25th he fell back to a strong position on Anthony's hill, seven miles beyond Pulaski. The situation now seemed desperate. It was only forty miles to the Tennessee river, where Hood was crossing, and the infantry had not all reached there, while the trains were some distance behind. Wilson, with ten thousand cavalry, and Wood's division of infantry, were close on him, while A. J. Smith and Schofield were moving on from Columbia. Forrest, with his forty-five hundred, as undaunted as Zenophon with his celebrated ten thousand, calmly awaited their approach, and his men gathered courage from their leader. Wilson came on, and, as General Thomas says, "Wood kept well closed up on the cavalry"; and I give the result in the language of General Thomas' report: "During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly entrenched at the head of a heavily wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road and into which Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's skirmishers. He then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking; but before this could be accomplished the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers." In this fight, which General Thomas treats as a mere skirmish, the Confederates captured fifty prisoners, three hundred cavalry horses, one gun of Company I, Fourth United States artillery, with eight horses, and the killed and wounded were estimated at one hundred and fifty, while the brilliancy and vim of the Confederate charge astonished the Federals so much that they attacked no more that day. Forrest then retired to Sugar creek and halted for another fight. Having selected an excellent position for his infantry and artillery, and thrown up temporary breastworks of rails, he ordered Colonel Dillon, with the Second Mississippi cavalry, to cross the creek above, mounted ready for a flank attack, and again quietly waited their coming. About daylight on the 26th they were heard crossing the

creek in a dense fog. Nothing could be seen, but the commands to halt and dismount could be distinctly heard. Hood's ordnance train had just left Sugar creek, and orders from the river came to hold the enemy back if possible; and every Confederate felt the importance of the crisis. On came the enemy in the fog to within thirty yards of Featherstone's breastworks, when a deadly fire was opened on them, the long pent-up Rebel yell burst forth, and the Federals fled in dismay through the creek, with the Confederates after them, while Dillon, charging in the rear, completed the rout. The enemy were severely punished, but more frightened than hurt, and left behind them one hundred and fifty horses and many overcoats, that were of great value to shivering men; but the grand result was that the pursuit was permanently checked and the enemy came no more. General Wilson, who ignores this fight, says he was out of rations; could not bring Forrest to a fight, and heard the main body of Rebels had already crossed the Tennessee, and therefore halted. The truth is the infantry had not all reached the river, and the ordnance train left Sugar creek that morning. General Thomas, speaking of Hood's army, says: "With the exception of his rear-guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble. . . . The rear-guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last."

Forrest was now admitted by all to be a

#### MILITARY GENIUS,

which a distinguished military writer thus describes:

There is no art that requires greater natural gifts than the art of war: mind and body must here co-operate, and both must be sound and vigorous.

The talent to seize, as it were, with a glance, the advantages and disadvantages which may arise from the situation of ground or troops, and to single them out from all other objects—this characterizes the man born to become a general. This coup d'oeil, namely, the comprehensive one, which, in unexpected results and in the most violent changes of fortune and calculations, enables the general to discern quickly and to judge correctly of his situation, and then, with firm determination, to extort, as it were, from fortune that which she will not freely give; or prudent and judicious, to extricate himself from a dangerous position; this is not to be acquired; this can be reduced to no general formula, nor be delineated upon plans and blackboards; but is, in the strictest sense of the word, military genius.

#### FALL OF SELMA.

General Forrest was now promoted to Lieutenant-General, and his command largely increased and reorganized. The First division, commanded by Chalmers, was composed of all the Mississippi cavalry, reorganized into three brigades, under Armstrong, Wirt Adams and Starke.

The Second division, commanded by Buford, was composed of the Kentucky brigade and the Alabama cavalry.

The Third division, commanded by W. H. Jackson, was composed of all the Tennessee cavalry in two brigades, under Bell and

Campbell—a force of not less than ten thousand effective men if they could have been concentrated.

At the same time Major-General James Wilson was reorganizing his cavalry just north of the Tennessee river, at points favorable for the passage of that stream, either to invade Mississippi or Alabama; and on the 18th of March he crossed near Chickasaw station, Alabama, with seventeen thousand men, five thousand of whom were dismounted, according to Andrews' history of the Mobile campaign.

On the 16th of March, 1865, General Dick Taylor held a council of war in West Point, Mississippi, at which were present Forrest, Chalmers, Buford and Jackson, and it was then determined that the object of Wilson's movements was the destruction of the iron works at Monte Vallo and the shops at Selma, and it was decided that all our forces should move by the shortest lines to Selma, and engineer officers were sent at once to construct pontoon bridges over the Black Warrior at Cahawba. On the 24th of March, Wilson started from Chickasaw station. On the 25th two brigades of the First division started from Pickensville, Alabama, and Jackson from West Point, Mississippi. The bridge across the Warrior had not been completed when Armstrong's brigade reached it, and it was detained here one day. On the 30th they reached Marion, Alabama, and finding that nothing had been done towards bridging the Cahawba, a staff officer was sent by railroad to Selma for pontoon boats, and the division commander was preparing to move on, when an order came from General Forrest, telling him of the enemy's movement on Tuscaloosa, and ordering him to halt and await orders. This caused a delay of one day, when General Taylor, at Selma, hearing of it, telegraphed orders for the First division to move to Plantersville. Before the division could reach Plantersville, orders came from General Forrest to move to Randolph, about twenty miles further north. Before the division could reach Randolph, Forrest had been driven from there, and it turned to Plantersville again. The Ochmulgee swamp had now to be crossed, and Armstrong's brigade was five hours in going one mile across it. When this brigade had gone over, it was utterly impassable to the artillery and Starke's brigade; and these, under the direction of a neighborhood guide, were moved to a crossing five miles above, and after working all night, got over about daylight the next morning, and moving rapidly reached Selma just in time to see it burn.

Forrest, moving with Jackson's division, heard of Croxton's movement on Tuscaloosa, and changed the march of this division by that place. Jackson gallantly met and defeated Croxton, but by this movement was thrown so far out of his line of march that it was impossible for him to reach Selma in time to assist in its defence, and it fell. The fall of Richmond soon followed the fall of Selma, and the Confederate flag went down to rise no more forever.



## HIS FAREWELL ADDRESS.

It has been said that Forrest was uneducated, and this is true; but his ideas, when properly clothed in correct language, were pointed and strong, and he was exceedingly tenacious that his own ideas, and not those of the writer, should be expressed by those who wrote for him. His strong and touching final address to his troops, though shaped by another, was his own creation, and he felt all that the language imported when he said: "Civil war, such as you have just passed through, naturally engenders feelings of animosity, hatred and revenge. It is our duty to divest ourselves of all such feelings, and as far as in our power to do so, to cultivate friendly feelings towards those with whom we have so long contended and heretofore so widely differed. Neighborhood feuds, personal animosities and private differences should be blotted out, and when you return home a manly, straightforward course of conduct will secure the respect even of your enemies. Whatever your responsibilities may be to government, to society, or to individuals, meet them like men. . . . I have never on the field of battle sent you where I was unwilling to go myself, nor would I now advise you to a course which I felt myself unwilling to pursue. You have been good soldiers; you can be good citizens. Obey the laws, preserve your honor, and the government to which you have surrendered can afford to be and will be magnanimous." Like the cause he loved, he is dead. In coming years, when the bitterness of strife has passed away, when that mystic harp, whose chords connect the graves of the dead with the hearts of the living, shall vibrate the music of a restored Union, and some blind old bard shall sing the praises of American heroes, while eager children listen to their deeds of valor, the story of none will awaken loftier feelings of emulation than—

Forrest—the wizard of the saddle.

At the conclusion of General Chalmers' address, on motion of Attorney-General Field, of Virginia, the thanks of the meeting were returned to General Chalmers for his "able and eloquent address," and a copy solicited for publication.

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**Prison Experience.**

By JAMES T. WELLS, Sergeant Company A, Second South Carolina Infantry.

**No. 3—*Concluded.***

A great article of trade, crochet needles, was turned out by lathes made for that purpose; so also were pen handles, bodkins, &c. In fact, every little article needed could be made in our canvass city, even to the ingeniously constructed tools with which the men worked. There were the tailors, shoemakers, wash-men, barbers, &c. We also had eating houses with very little to eat in them; but you could get a good cup of coffee and a piece of fried rat for twenty-five cents. This may seem a joke, but rats were eaten and with much gusto. The first engine made in camp excited much curiosity and wonder among the prisoners, and was visited by a large number of them. It was indeed a curiosity, and a description of it may not be out of place. The boiler was made from an old camp kettle, the mouth of which was plugged up with wood. The pistons and connecting rods were made of wood, and the valves and heads were contrived from old mustard boxes. It does not seem possible that this could be done, yet it was, and the machines were of sufficient power to drive turning lathes, from which pen handles, bodkins, &c., were turned out. The first of these wonderful machines was made by a Georgian, who could neither read nor write. In a short while there were seven of them in different parts of the camp, and as they would whistle every morning previous to commencing work, it reminded one of the machine shops in large cities. Another remarkable curiosity was a clock, the works of which were made completely of bone. When it was completed, it was placed inside of a Confederate canteen, and was exhibited to any one who wished to see it for a cracker. It would be an endless task to enumerate the many little curious and ingenious articles which could be seen about the camp; but it must be remembered that among fourteen thousand or fifteen thousand men there must necessarily be some of ability and ingenuity. Many of them were good writers, and the daily bulletins posted in different parts of the camp attested the fact that they had been accustomed to writing for the public. There were portrait and landscape painters, and many fine pictures were produced there. One, "The Prisoner's Dream of Home," was greatly admired and coveted by many, but money could not purchase it from the owner. The

officers would frequently purchase articles from the prisoners, but they could not pay them in money. They would give pass-books to the sutler, upon which you were credited to the amount agreed upon. As you could not purchase eatables from the sutler, this mode of trading did not suit the prisoners; and here the "Detailers" from the camp were of great value to us. They would take out rings, chains, &c., and dispose of them for greenbacks to the runners on the boats plying between Point Lookout and Washington and Baltimore. These runners were great speculators in these little trinkets, which were readily bought by the citizens of the two cities, who sympathized with the South. There was quite a manufactory of wooden-ware, such as tubs, buckets, piggins and pails, carried on in the camp. These were made of cracker-boxes. The Yankees often wondered at the ingenuity and fertility of the prisoners, for they did not imagine that there was much of it among a parcel of Southern soldiers. Many a prisoner learned to read and write, for we had a fine school here, under the immediate control of a South Carolinian. About six hundred scholars attended, and books were furnished liberally by the Christian Commission and ladies in Baltimore. Of course, in order to get through with so many, different hours were set apart for different recitations. There were ten or twelve teachers, whose names cannot be remembered now. All the primary branches were taught, as well as those of an advanced character. An old dilapidated cook-house was set apart as a school-room during the week, and as a place of worship on Sundays. The Sunday-school was large and flourishing. We had divine worship nearly every Sunday, conducted either by the prisoners, or by some preachers from Baltimore. The music at the Sunday-school was always a subject of comment and praise, and it was really of a fine quality, for there were some fine teachers of vocal music attached to the school, and they had large classes. The prayer meetings in different parts of the camp was quite a feature also. There was a large class engaged in the study of phonography, and many of them, no doubt, made good reporters, as they were quite proficient at the time they left. While these good features were very prominent, there were also many bad ones. Gambling houses were very numerous, and the beach during the day presented a strange appearance, as the gambling booths were arranged in perfect order and were always crowded. They were generally decorated by a small, fancy-colored streamer flying from the top, and under them games of every kind were always in progress.

Cards, monte, roulette, keno, faro, chuck-a-luck, and, in fact, every game of chance known, was freely indulged in. Greenbacks and Confederate money were both legal, and passed at the regular rates of exchange. It is strange that the authorities allowed this, yet they did. Various kinds of currency were in circulation, the principal of which was "hard tack" and tobacco. With a hard tack you could purchase a chew of tobacco, or *vice versa*. Some men followed this business regularly. Whenever any one wanted a chew of tobacco, he could cry out, "Here's your hard tack for your tobacco." Immediately some one would answer, "Here's your tobacco," and this would apply to anything which might be wanted. It was only necessary to cry out the fact, and the article required could generally be obtained. It would have amused any one, not accustomed to it, to have heard this. The Chesapeake bay afforded a fine opportunity for bathing, and we were allowed to enjoy this privilege two evenings in each week. The distance to which we were allowed to go was marked by bouys, but the filthy condition of the bay often precluded many from enjoying this sport. A negro sentry, while watching the men bathing one hot afternoon, fell off the parapet and broke his neck.

The carelessness of the negroes in handling their arms was notorious. One of them, in looking at the prisoners one day while bathing, placed his chin upon the muzzle of his musket, and rested his foot upon the guard. His foot slipped, the gun was discharged, and blew off the front part of his face. They would often endeavor to show their dexterity and skill with the musket before the prisoners, and, on one occasion, one was shot and killed. The summer had now passed away and we were still on this desolate spot. More "Exchange News" became rife, and our spirits became bouyant again, but only to sink again, for only one boat load was taken off. We saw that we were doomed to spend another winter in prison, and with our experience of the previous one we began to make preparation to meet it. We made brick as well as we could, and dried them in the sun, and put our tents in a more comfortable condition. Some were enabled to purchase empty cracker-boxes from the commissary and build themselves little huts. But these were limited in capacity, and rendered somewhat uncomfortable by the restrictions placed upon them. The authorities would occasionally tear them down to see that nothing contraband was in them. Our treatment had not improved; on the contrary, it grew more severe, and the cruelty of the United States officials towards



us seemed to know no bounds. Every day or two fresh orders were issued forbidding some privileges and abridging others. It would be a very difficult matter to describe our sufferings and privations during this terrible winter. Hunger and cold again forced many to forswear allegiance to the "stars and bars" and enlist under the flag of the enemy. All who did so were formed in a regiment of cavalry and sent to the Western frontier, and very many of them, as soon as an opportunity presented itself, deserted and returned to their native land. Nothing of importance occurred this winter. In the month of January, another boat load was taken from camp and sent to Dixie. This had occurred so often that it did not affect us much. About this time our suffering grew so intense from hunger and cold, that it did not seem possible for us to endure it. But the hope of seeing our dear old Dixie cheered us up, and the meeting with the loved ones at home was uppermost in every man's thoughts. On the 8th of February an unusual commotion was observed near the main entrance into the camp, and shortly after an order was posted on the bulletin board bidding the Gettysburg prisoners to hold themselves in readiness. With fear and trepidation we proceeded to obey the order, for we did not know what disposition was to be made of us. We were taken into a pen adjacent to the one we had occupied for the past eighteen months, and there we received the joyful intelligence that we were to be paroled. Several days were consumed in the process, and the night of the 11th, at 2 o'clock A. M., we were marched on board the steamer "City Point." At daybreak on the 12th we were well underway, and the place of our long and cruel captivity was fast receding from view. At noon, at that day, we passed Rip Raps, a barren rock where some of our gallant boys had been sent for some imaginary offence. A severe gale delayed our progress very materially, and the ice in James river was another obstacle. We had passed the grim walls of Fortress Monroe, and began to realize familiar scenes and places. About noon, on the 15th, we arrived at Varina Ferry, and were immediately transferred to our own boats, under the command of that courteous officer and gentleman, Captain Hatch. The officers of the boat had some difficulty in keeping the men in their proper places, for the river was full of torpedoes, and the boats had to be piloted very carefully. At 4 P. M. we landed at Richmond—dear old Richmond—and a happy day it was for us. The merchants near the wharf opened boxes of tobacco for us, and gave us bountifully of it. It would be difficult



to imagine a more joyful party, and the Provost Guard experienced much difficulty in maintaining order along the streets. By night we were all housed at Parole camp or in some of the hotels, and in a few days were furloughed to go to our homes and loved ones. Thus ended our captivity, which will never be forgotten by those who were unfortunate enough to be compelled to participate in it. But there is no cloud, however dark, without a silver lining, and the many friendships formed during our long imprisonment will last till life shall end. Our parting was trying, for it was sundering the ties which had been formed during months of suffering and privation, but we were consoled by the thought that we were soon to meet our loved ones at home.

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**Official Diary of First Corps, A. N. V., while Commanded by Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson, from May 7th to 31st, 1864.**

May 7th—During the morning there is occasional skirmishing on our lines, which are rectified and connected. At eleven o'clock P. M. we take up the line of march for Spotsylvania Courthouse, in a shady grove, where we rest an hour at dawn on the 8th, Kershaw leading. We find Fitz. Lee hotly engaged on the Todd's Tavern and Spottsylvania Courthouse road. We arrive in time to relieve him but not to save the Courthouse, which is, however, afterwards occupied by us, the enemy being driven out. Kershaw's and Humphreys' brigades are turned off rapidly to the left of the road, and, occupying some cover left by our cavalry, repulse the enemy with great slaughter. Wofford's and Bryan's brigades are sent against the Courthouse by a detour, and finally occupy it. During the fight with the two first named brigades, Haskell's battalion is sharply engaged and does good work. The enemy's forces comprise the Fifth corps (Warren's). Ewell's corps arrives in the afternoon, and the enemy makes another attack on our position with their Sixth corps, which is also repulsed, Rodes' division being thrown on Kershaw's right and relieving the attack. Commanding-General arrives with Ewell.

May 9th—Quiet in morning. Troops in line all day. Trenches dug. An attack by us is proposed, which is, however, deferred in expectation of one from the enemy. In the afternoon an attack by General Johnson is projected, to be assisted by the advance of our skirmishers. For some reason Johnson does not attack. The

enemy feels Field's skirmishers strongly late in the afternoon. At night Mahone's division is sent to the left of Field to hold the Shady Grove road.

May 10th—Reports current of the enemy having gained our rear towards Beaver Dam. Sharp skirmishing on the whole line during the morning and heavy shelling. Hutcheson, one of our couriers, killed at 10 A. M. The enemy begins a series of attacks on Field's position; they continue at times during the entire day; all of them repulsed until 7 P. M., when the last and most desperate is made against Anderson and Gregg. Some of the enemy succeed in gaining the works, but are killed in them. The attack is repulsed with great slaughter to the enemy and little loss to us. At the same hour (7 P. M.) an attack is made on Ewell's lines, and succeeds in breaking through Doles' brigade. The enemy is driven back, however, leaving many dead near the works. Late in the night, at 10 and 4 o'clock, renewed attacks (feeble ones) are made on Field.

May 11th—Day opened with confident expectation of a renewal of the attacks of the enemy. Early reports four lines forming to attack our position. The day passes, however, without an attack in force, but with the usual skirmishing. Towards evening indications are apparent of the intended withdrawal of the enemy, and preparations are made to move after him.

May 12th—At 4½ A. M. the enemy makes, with an overwhelming force, a sudden dash on J. M. Jones' brigade and breaks through Johnson's division, which is thrown back in great confusion. At the same time the artillery of that line, which had been withdrawn the night previous, just coming up to go into position, is captured, the horses killed and the cannoniers taken prisoners. Guns not taken off. Gordon, with Early's division, attacks the enemy to recover our position. Anderson's division (except Wright's brigade), which is left at the bridge on the left, is drawn to the right to drive back the enemy. A violent battle ensues, lasting without intermission until 12 M., in which the whole of the Second corps and part of the Third are engaged. It terminates on that part of the line by the enemy being driven from the ground they had gained, with the exception of a small part. During the action Wofford is sent to the support of Rodes. Between 9 and 10 o'clock A. M. Field sustains two violent assaults on a part of his line, which are again easily repulsed with great loss to the enemy. In the afternoon Jenkins and Humphreys are sent to report to General

Ewell. At night a part of Ewell's line is thrown back to a new position, leaving, however, eighteen guns in the hands of the enemy.

May 13th—Day quiet. In line before the enemy. Slight skirmishing and cannonading. Wofford, Bryan and Jenkins returned by Ewell. Report of General Stuart's death received.

May 14th—Usual skirmishing. Enemy beginning to disappear in front of Field. Towards the afternoon Kershaw's skirmishers occupy the enemy's breastworks, which had been abandoned. Field ditto. At night Field is ordered to withdraw to the vicinity of the church near Spotsylvania Courthouse. Kershaw is to push forward his skirmishers, but the night is so dark as not to permit it.

May 15th—Quiet. Thirteen caissons recovered from the enemy, who has retired from our immediate front. At 10 P. M. we receive orders to move to Early's right. The troops marched at 12 and 1 and we with them. As soon as day dawns they are got into position—Field on the line, Kershaw in reserve. No enemy in our immediate front. Headquarters established near a small house in rear of Crutchfield's.

May 17th—No change to-day. Quiet.

May 18th—At 4.45 A. M. the enemy makes an attack on Ewell with a furious cannonade. The attack is easily repulsed. All quiet on our line.

May 19th—Quiet on our part of the line. Towards evening Ewell undertakes a movement against the enemy's right—accomplishing, however, little save some information of the enemy's position. Kershaw is sent to occupy his trenches during his absence. Kershaw returns on the morning of the 20th.

May 20th—Quiet. Ewell's front reported to be uncovered.

May 21st—Ewell moves to our right and takes position along the Po. During the day the enemy is ascertained to be retiring from A. P. Hill's front. We prepare to move. Move in the afternoon by Dickerson's to the Mud Tavern, and thence down the Telegraph road, Ewell preceding us. Hill takes a western road. The supply trains and heavy baggage wagons moving via New Market, Chilesburg and Island Ford. We march all night, halting on the Telegraph road at 3 A. M. on the 22d. After two hours' rest the march is resumed. The head of our column reaches the Northanna at 12.15 P. M., May 22d. Corse's and Kemper's brigades, Pickett's division, join us. Barton with Hill's column temporarily. Troops are put in bivouac on the south side of Northanna.

May 23d—Enemy reported advancing down Telegraph road.

Our line is formed. The guard on the north side of the river is driven across. In the afternoon we sustain a severe cannonade, and have a chimney knocked over our party. At night the line is somewhat retired. Pickett reports to Hill.

May 24th—Day occupied in examining and improving the line. Rodes posted on our right, and at night Early and Gordon sent to his right. During the night the line is straightened by cutting off the angle near Law's brigade.

May 25th—Enemy strong in our front, and manifesting a disposition to extend to our right. Skirmishing in front.

May 26th—Lines unchanged. In the afternoon the enemy advances skirmishers on Law's and Ramseur's brigades, and is driven back. Wofford's and Bryan's skirmishers are also pressed.

May 27th—Early this morning the enemy is ascertained to have left our front and moved back across the river. The trains are at once sent back across Southanna by Ellet's bridge. The troops march by the Fredericksburg railroad. Pickett's division moves with Hill and joins us at night. We move by Ashland and camp between the Half Sink and Hughes' cross-roads.

May 28th—Move early for Atlee's station, or rather ordered to move early, but we are greatly impeded by the Second, which is on the same road and is ordered to move at the same hour. Order of march: Field, Kershaw and Pickett. We go into bivouac between Hundley's Corner and Walnut Grove church.

May 29th—Morning quiet. In the afternoon the enemy is reported advancing, and the troops are put under arms. Field is partly moved out, but returns and sends two regiments to fill with skirmishers the interval between Early's corps and Breckinridge.

May 30th—Early extends to the right, and attacks the enemy's left with Pegram's brigade. Pickett starts to support the movement by going through the breastworks, but soon abandons it and is put on Early's left. Field on his left and Kershaw on the left of the corps.

May 31st—Kershaw is taken out of line, and about 3 P. M. is sent to relieve the right of Early, the whole of whose corps is finally relieved by us, he taking our entrenchments. Kershaw moves down towards Gaines' mill in the endeavor to connect with Hoke. Pickett takes the right of Early's old line, and Field is put on his left. Hoke on extreme right.



## Editorial Paragraphs.

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THE REUNION OF THE VIRGINIA DIVISION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION will take place on Wednesday, October 29th, 1879, in the State Capitol at Richmond.

General Fitz. Lee is the chosen orator of the occasion, and will speak on "*Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.*" With his personal knowledge of the subject, and the earnest study he is giving the official reports and other authorities on both sides, we shall expect from our gallant friend, "General Fitz," a most entertaining address and a valuable contribution to this important chapter of our glorious annals.

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THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY will occur on Thursday, October 30th, 1879, in the State Capitol at Richmond.

Our programme, which has not yet been fully arranged, will be duly announced; but we are expecting a pleasant and profitable meeting.

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THE MONUMENT TO THE "UNKNOWN DEAD," at Winchester, Virginia, we have fully described as at the same time a beautiful work of art and a fitting tribute to the memory of those noble heroes who sleep around it. We are indebted to the committee for a beautifully executed photograph of the monument, which we doubly prize and appreciate as coming from that source, and so gracefully tendered.

The "monument fund" is not yet fully raised, and we really do not know how a true Confederate could make a better investment than by either making the committee a direct contribution, or buying this photograph, which is sold for the benefit of the fund.

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THE "MARYLAND SHAFT" for Stonewall Cemetery, Winchester, has been fully provided for. On returning from the unveiling of the monument at Winchester, the "Confederate Army and Navy Association" of Baltimore went to work at once, and in a few weeks had raised a sum amply sufficient to provide a "Maryland Shaft" for the Maryland section of the cemetery at Winchester. Well done for Maryland! And now what State will follow next? Let comrades in the other States see to it that their dead are thus honored.

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THE RECUMBENT FIGURE OF LEE, by Valentine, is certainly one of the most beautiful works of art in this country. Indeed, when the mausoleum at Lexington is completed, and this figure placed in it, there will be

universal rejoicing that the grave of Lee is so appropriately decorated, and pilgrims from every clime will pronounce it one of the finest works of art in the world.


*M. Miley*, of Lexington, Virginia, has sent us two superb photographs of this recumbent figure, which, in accuracy of likeness and elegance of finish, we regard as among the finest specimens of the photographer's art we have ever seen.

We have had occasion before to commend Miley's splendid photographs of Confederate leaders, and we do not hesitate to say that he has, by his beautiful art, placed all true Confederates under highest obligations for preserving such accurate likenesses of Lee, Davis, Breckinridge and others of our illustrious leaders.

The photographs which he now kindly sends us, reproduce to the life Valentine's Lee, with all of the beauties of the drapery, &c. They are sold for the benefit of the mausoleum fund.

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THE DEATH OF GENERAL JOHN B. HOOD, in New Orleans, August 30th, of yellow fever, is announced just as we are going to press, and we have only space to say that another gallant soldier, true patriot and high-toned gentleman has fallen at the post of duty, and will be universally lamented by his old comrades. Peace to his ashes! All honor to his memory!



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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va., November, 1879.

No. 11.

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**Operations in the Trans-Mississippi Department in June, 1863.**

[CONTINUED FROM SEPTEMBER NUMBER.]

The following report ought to have been published just after the letter of General E. Kirby Smith in our September number, and the endorsements which follow that letter were originally on this report. But we, unfortunately, had not at the time a copy of it, and are now indebted to the courtesy of Colonel Scott, of the Archive Bureau at Washington, for this report and the explanatory letter which follows.

*Report of General R. Taylor.*

DISTRICT WEST LOUISIANA, RICHMOND, 8th June, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. R. BOGGS, *Chief of Staff*:

General—I have the honor to report the events of the past few days. As soon as I learned of the capture of Richmond by Captain McLean, of Harrison's battalion—viz: on the night of the 3d ultimo—I ordered General Walker to push on a force of two hundred infantry to insure holding the bridge, adding to it two guns of Harrison's artillery. This force crossed the Tensas in a flat which I had secured the day before and reached Richmond at

sunset on the 4th. On the same day General Walker camped three miles from Dunlop's, on Tensas. I had succeeded in collecting material for a bridge (there being but one flat, the one above mentioned, on the river), and on the morning of the 5th commenced the work, superintending it in person. At 4 P. M. a substantial bridge was completed, when I pushed on to this point, sending notice to General Walker of the completion of the bridge. Arriving at dusk, I soon met Major Harrison from below. He reported the parish of Tensas and Lower Madison clear of the enemy. One of his companies, under Captain McCall, attacked on the morning of the 4th a negro camp on Lake Saint Joseph. He found them some ninety strong; killed the captain (white), twelve negroes and captured the remainder. Some sixty women and children in the camp were also secured. Captain McCall had sixty men. Major Harrison brought off some few arms, medicines, etc., from Perkins, Surget's Basin and Carthage, all of which points he found abandoned by the enemy. At several places much property had been burned. To finish the operations of Harrison's cavalry: On the morning of the 6th, whilst awaiting Walker's arrival, the enemy's cavalry was reported to me to be approaching from Milliken's Bend. Major Harrison with a hundred men advanced to meet them. Three miles distant he found them drawn up, one hundred and forty strong, charged them at once, broke their line, killing eight and capturing a lieutenant and twenty-four privates, and pursued them until fired upon by infantry in sight of the Bend.

I cannot speak too highly of Major Harrison as a cavalry officer. I do not think he has a superior in the service. Accordingly I have ordered some unattached companies to report to him to raise his command to a regiment. If furnished with anything like adequate means, he will protect thoroughly this section of the State. The night of my arrival at this place—viz: the 5th—was spent in procuring intelligence of the enemy's positions on this side the river. I found that this line of transit had ceased to be of importance to the enemy since he had established his right flank on the Yazoo at Hames' Bluff, and almost all the stores had been removed. Transports in large numbers were flying up the Yazoo. At Lake Providence the enemy had a few companies (perhaps four) and a large number of negroes drilling. Below that point to Milliken's he had a number of plantations at work under the new system. At Milliken's there was a negro brigade of uncertain strength, and four companies of Tenth Illinois cavalry (the force encountered by Harrison). There was a deadly feud between these negroes and the cavalry, and their camps were considerably separated; the negroes up the river. Between Milliken's and Young's Point (opposite the mouth of Yazoo), a distance of eleven miles, tents were scattered in large numbers, most of them empty or occupied by sick and convalescents. At Young's were some five or six hundred men, detachments and convalescents. Some wagons and mules were immediadely on the river's bank, evidently for convenient shipment up the Yazoo. Below Young's, around the point to op-



posite Vicksburg, and across by the Plank road to Bedford, there were a few pickets and some small bands of negroes. Harrison had cleared everything below Bedford.

All these facts were completely established during the night of the 5th, and early on the 6th, before Walker's division arrived at 10 A. M., as the enemy knew nothing of the presence of so large a force, believing Richmond to be occupied by Harrison's command alone, I determined to act at once. Accordingly General Walker was directed to cook two days' rations and be ready to move at 6 P. M. The distances from Richmond to Young's and Milliken's respectively are twenty and ten miles, and the road is common for five miles from Richmond. The intense heat of the weather rendered a night march desirable, and an attack at early dawn lessened the risk of annoyance from gunboats. I instructed General Walker to send one brigade to Young's, one to Milliken's and hold the third in reserve at a point six miles from Richmond. Twenty men from Harrison's command, acquainted with the country, were selected to accompany each of the attacking columns. My signal officer, Lieutenant Routh, with a party of his men, was ordered to accompany the column from Young's and make every effort to communicate with Vicksburg, and the great importance of so doing was impressed on all. The two columns, after clearing the points aimed at, were to march up and down the river respectively to Duckport, nearly equi-distant from Young's and Milliken's, where a road struck off from the river and fell into the Richmond road near the point of divergence mentioned above.

Arms, ordnance stores, medicines, etc., were ordered to be saved, and all other property, for which transportation could not be provided, was to be burned. Major-General Walker and his brigade commanders appeared to enter heartily into this plan, and as no troops were to be engaged except their division, I deemed it proper to leave the execution of it to them. McCullough's brigade was selected for Milliken's; Hawes' for Young's, and Randall's was to be in reserve at the intersection of the roads. General Walker decided to accompany this last. Despite my efforts the troops did not move until an hour after the appointed time. McCullough reached Milliken's about dawn, drove in the enemy's pickets and in obedience to orders attacked with the bayonet. The enemy, after a sharp struggle, was driven from his first position, a large levee covered by a hedge, with very heavy loss in killed. He retreated behind a second levee and under the bank of the river, near a small gunboat and two or three transports. Strict orders had been given to drive the enemy into the river, so as to permit no time for escape or reinforcements. On mounting the second levee in pursuit, our men came in sight of the gunboat and transports (mistaken by them for gunboats), and at once fell back and could not be induced to cross the levee. Confusion ensued, and the gunboat, which at the beginning had no steam up, brought her one gun to bear in the direction of our troops. McCullough dispatched to General Walker, four and a half miles distant, for assistance. Walker moved up

with Randall's brigade and some artillery, and found that McCullough had withdrawn out of reach of shells. After examining the position, General Walker reported to me that three additional gunboats, attracted by the firing, had arrived, that he could find no position from which to use his artillery, and that the prostration of the men from the intense heat prevented him from marching down to Duckport as directed. It is true the heat was intense, the thermometer marking ninety-five in the shade, but had common vigor and judgment been displayed the work would all have been completed by 8 A. M. McCullough's brigade lost some twenty killed and perhaps eighty wounded. A very large number of the negroes were killed and wounded, and unfortunately some fifty, with two of their white officers, captured. I respectfully ask instructions as to the dispositions of these prisoners. A number of horses and mules, some few small arms and commissary stores were also taken. In this affair General McCullough appears to have shown great personal bravery, but no capacity for handling masses.

I turn now to Hawes' operations: No report was received from him till late in the evening of the 7th—Lieutenant Routh, signal officer, returned and informed me that General Hawes was falling back; that he had asked General Hawes if any attempt was to be made to communicate with Vicksburg, in sight with a good glass, and received a negative reply. Lieutenant Routh then attempted to make his own way down the point, but meeting some armed Yankees and negroes was forced to return. Shortly after Lieutenant Routh's report, a man of the signal corps arrived with some "memoranda," which General Hawes directed him to read to me. From these it appears that General Hawes reached the rear of Young's, one mile distant, at 11 A. M. on the 7th; that he had consumed seventeen hours in marching nineteen miles over a good road without impediments. It further appears that a more favorable condition of affairs was found at Young's than General Hawes was told to expect, for late as he arrived he surprised the enemy. A number were found fishing some distance from the camp, and two or three were captured at this peaceful work. Two shots were fired by the enemy, both taking effect, one killing a horse and the other severely wounding in the arm one of the guides of Harrison's cavalry. General Hawes formed his line of battle, advanced in the open field to within half a mile of the enemy and then retired. I quote from the "memoranda": "He was satisfied he could carry the position, but did not think it would pay." General Hawes then returned to the junction of the roads in less time than he had taken to advance, leaving, as General Walker reported to me, over two hundred stragglers behind. Harrison's cavalry was sent to bring in these. They were, however, in no danger, as the enemy at the time were rushing aboard their transports and burning stores. General Walker desired me to see General Hawes to learn the reason of his conduct. I declined, directing his report to be written out, and informing General Walker that I should ex-

pect him to endorse fully and freely his own opinion upon it. Colonel Bartlett, with about nine hundred men, was ordered to march on Lake Providence, with instructions to break up the camps of negroes in that vicinity, who were being organized and drilled by the enemy, and thence push his cavalry down to Milliken's Bend, breaking up the plantations in cultivation by agents or contractors of the United States Government. On the 5th he was at Floyd, building a bridge across the Macon, distant about twenty-five miles from Lake Providence; since that date I have received no report from him. If he succeeds in the operations entrusted to him the west bank of the Mississippi river, from the mouth of Red river to the Arkansas line, will be free from the presence of the enemy. I shall use every exertion, by placing an adequate force of cavalry and light artillery on the bank of the river, to annoy and interfere with the navigation of the stream by transports, upon which Grant is dependent for his supplies by way of the Yazoo river.

As soon as Tappan's brigade can reach Richmond, I shall withdraw Walker's division to operate south of Red river.

An additional cavalry force is needed in this section, and I have the honor to request that Captain Nutt's company of mounted men may be immediately ordered to report to Colonel Harrison, in accordance with the understanding which I have with the Lieutenant-General Commanding on this subject. I regret exceedingly that I am unable to report results commensurate with the force employed on this expedition; much greater loss ought to have been inflicted upon the enemy, and the stores which he burned ought to have been captured for our use.

I beg the Lieutenant-General Commanding to believe that I used every personal exertion in order to insure success. Myself and staff acted as pioneers, bridge builders, scouts, quartermasters and commissaries. General Walker's division was suddenly and secretly thrown within six or eight miles of the enemy's line of camps on the Mississippi river; information of the most reliable character furnished to it of the enemy's strength and position, which in every instance was fully verified. Nothing was wanted but vigorous action in the execution of the plans which had been carefully laid out for it, to insure such successes as the condition of affairs would admit. Besides, the division commander had weeks before expressed to the Lieutenant-General Commanding his ardent desire to undertake this or a similar expedition. Unfortunately, I discovered too late that the officers and men of the division were possessed of a dread of gunboats, such as pervaded our people at the commencement of the war. To this circumstance, and to want of mobility in these troops, are to be attributed the meagre results of the expedition. I leave this evening for Monroe and Alexandria, to look after affairs in the southern portion of the State, which are every day increasing in interest.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. TAYLOR, *Major-General Commanding.*



*Letter from General R. Taylor.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST LOUISIANA,  
WASHINGTON, October 15, 1863.

Brigadier-General W. R. BOGGS, *Chief of Staff*:

General—It has just been brought to my attention by Major-General J. L. Walker, that the language of my report touching operations near Milliken's Bend reflects on him. He learns this from one of his staff just from Richmond. As I have not a copy of the report before me to verify the original words used, I respectfully ask the Lieutenant-General Commanding to convey to the War Department the statement that nothing in the report was intended to reflect directly or indirectly on General Walker. The plan was mine, and the position held by General Walker was strictly in accordance with my orders. The misconception existing at Richmond is calculated to injure unjustly a meritorious officer, and I ask that this communication be forwarded.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. TAYLOR, *Major-General*.

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First endorsement:

Headquarters Department Trans-Mississippi, Shreveport, Louisiana, 1st November, 1863.—Respectfully forwarded.

E. KIRBY SMITH, *Lieutenant-General Commanding*.

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Second endorsement.

Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, December 4th, 1863.—Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.

H. L. CLAY, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

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Third endorsement:

Noted—File with report, 8th December, 1863.

J. A. S., *Secretary*.

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**Official Diary of First Corps, A. N. V., while Commanded by Lt.-General R. H. Anderson, from June 1st to October 18, 1864.**

June 1st—It was our intention to-day to make a strong movement by our right—Hoke towards old Cold Harbor, and Kershaw towards Beulah church from the position to which he had gone last night—and orders were given to that effect. Hoke did not become engaged, but took a line on the right. Kershaw puts in his own brigade supported by another. Keitt's big regiment gives way, and in the effort to rally it Keitt is mortally wounded. Pickett is closed into the right on Kershaw, and the latter on Hoke. Field closes in on Pickett. In the afternoon a furious attack is made on the left of Hoke and right of Kershaw, enemy penetrating an interval between them. Clingman's brigade gives way. Wofford's, on his left, being flanked, does the same. The Fifty-third Georgia, on Wofford's left, ditto. Kershaw brings up the Second and Third South Carolina regiments and regains Bryan's lost ground and captures prisoners and a stand of colors. Hunton is sent to Hoke's support. Field sends Gregg's brigade to aid Wofford in retaking his position. The effort, however, is not made from Kershaw's direction, but Hunton assumes Hoke's left nearly on Clingman's original line, Wofford bending back his right to connect with him.

June 2d—The preceding is the condition of affairs to-day, and we await the expected attack of the enemy. Kershaw's salient is weak, but is supported by Anderson's and Law's brigades of Field's division. Heavy skirmishing continues during the whole day on our line. In the evening the Second corps under Early moves out by its left, except Ramseur's division, and attacks the enemy's right. He gains some advantages and forces back the enemy's right. In the morning Breckinridge is posted on the heights to the right of Hoke, and A. P. Hill, with two divisions, moves to that point by Gaines' mill. The enemy gives us a furious cannonade late.

June 3d—The expected battle begins early. Early renews his attack, but appears to cease in about two hours without gaining much. Meantime the enemy is heavily massed in front of Kershaw's salient. Anderson's, Law's and Gregg's brigades are there to support Kershaw. Assault after assault is made, and each time repulsed with severe loss to the enemy. At eight o'clock A. M. fourteen had been made and repulsed (this means, I suppose, fourteen lines advanced). Law wounded. At dark a final and furious

assault is made on Martin, the right brigade of Hoke. Hunton also severely engaged.

June 4th—Heavy skirmishing. In the afternoon the enemy becomes unusually quiet, and from this some new movement is apprehended.

June 5th—Quiet, and affairs unchanged.

June 6th—Enemy retires from Ewell's and Field's front. Hoke removed from the command of General Anderson. Enemy's line bends back from Pickett's.

June 7th—Early engaged in finding the enemy. Pickett's skirmishers supporting and co-operating with him.

June 8th—Orders are received to attack with Pickett at daylight to-morrow morning, if the enemy should be discovered to be withdrawing.

June 9th—Enemy still in force in front. Early removed from the left, and Field and Pickett extend to fill the old trenches as far as Dickerson's house.

June 10th, 11th and 12th—No change in our line. Affairs quiet.

June 13th—The enemy is discovered to have disappeared from our front. The troops are at once put in motion. Kershaw, Pickett and Field crossing the Chickahominy at McClellan's bridge—trains by New bridge. We march by Seven Pines and over to the Charles City road, move down that, turn off at Williams' and bivouac near the battlefield of Frazier's farm. A little skirmishing at Riddle's shop by A. P. Hill.

June 14th—Quiet. No enemy immediately in front. Supposed to have crossed the James. In the evening orders are received to take position on Three Mile creek.

June 15th—Gary reports the enemy advancing and passed Nance's shop. Movement suspended in consequence.

June 16th—Pickett and Field move at 3 and 5 A. M., cross James river at Drewry's Bluff, and move down the turnpike towards Petersburg to occupy the line abandoned by General Beauregard. We found a picket of the enemy on the turnpike near Chester, and the line occupied by the enemy. Reconnoitering, and an effort to get him out, we get the left, including Howlett's.

June 17th—During the day we possess ourselves of the line by an advance of Pickett and Field. On the night of this day there is heavy fighting at Petersburg, and urgent calls are made by General Beauregard for aid. Kershaw arrives near Perdue's.

June 18th—At 3 A. M. Kershaw moves for Petersburg, followed

by Field. Pickett occupying the whole line. We arrive at Petersburg, and Kershaw relieves Bushrod Johnson's division—Field taking position on Kershaw's right. A feeble attack is made in the afternoon on Elliott's brigade of Johnson's division.

June 19th—Sharp skirmishing during the day, and a sort of advance on Kershaw's right and Field's left during the night.

June 20th and 21st—Affairs unchanged.

June 22d—A. P. Hill goes out with Mahone and Wilcox—B. R. Johnson supporting—and drives the enemy from our right. It is a handsome affair—two thousand prisoners, four pieces of artillery, seven colors, being among the captures.

June 23d—Preparations made for the contemplated attack tomorrow. Field at night withdraws from the trenches—Bushrod Johnson relieving him—and moves to the left in support of and co-operation with Hoke. Field did not get out clear until dawn the next morning.

June 24th—At 7.05 A. M. our artillery opens, followed in a half hour by an advance of Hagood's brigade. The affair is a fiasco, and is not continued. Field leaves a brigade in Hoke's trenches, and returns with the balance of his division to be in reserve.

June 25—Usual skirmishing. At night two of Kershaw's brigades—Humphreys' and Kershaw's—are relieved by B. R. Johnson.

June 26—The enemy shows some disposition to dig up to us. Anderson's brigade of Field's division still with Hoke.

June 27—Some mortar firing.

June 28—Orders given to Field to go on the line to the left of the Rives house, the disposition being thus: Hoke on extreme left; Johnson on his right, and Field on right of Johnson. The change takes place on the night of the 28th, and Field does not get on the line until near morning. Until G. T. Anderson can be brought from the left of Hoke, Wofford occupies that portion of the line near the Rives house. Field's brigades are posted as follows, from left to right: Bratton, Benning, Gregg and Law.

June 29—Kershaw in reserve. Wofford taken out of Field's line and G. T. Anderson is retained in reserve for Field. At 12 M. orders are sent to Kershaw to move with three brigades to Reams' station to aid Mahone and the cavalry operating against the raiders. He returned about 11 P. M.

June 30—Unchanged.

July 1—At 2 A. M. Kershaw moves to the intersection of the

Weldon railroad with the line of breastworks to support Hill, who is to attack the enemy's force at Reams' station (Sheridan and the Sixth corps). That force, however, has disappeared in the night, and our troops returned to their positions.

July 2—Field still on the line, preferring not to be relieved.

July 3, 4, 5, 6, 7—All pass without change or incident.

July 8—We made in the afternoon something of a Chinese demonstration in the way of shooting and artillery firing to ascertain the enemy's strength.

July 9—No change.

July 10—Kershaw moves out on the railroad at night to cover the movement of some railroad trains laden with corn.

July 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16—Are passed without change or incident.

July 17—General Anderson makes a personal reconnoissance for an assault. At night two men desert from Law's brigade.

July 18—Further reconnoissance and preparation, in the course of which the desertions of the previous night are learned. The contemplated attack is in consequence abandoned.

July 19, 20, 21, 22—No change. Usual shelling and picket firing.

July 23—Kershaw moves at 6.30 A. M. for Chaffin's Bluff.

July 24, 25, 26—Affairs unchanged.

July 27—At 1.30 o'clock P. M., we received orders to move our headquarters to the north side of James river. Heth's division moved over. We arrived at Chaffin's at 8.30 P. M. Before our arrival four guns of the Rockbridge artillery, on the left of Kershaw, had been captured by the enemy.

July 28—In the morning we move with four brigades—Conner's, Lane's, Kershaw's and Wofford's—to dislodge the enemy from the Long Bridge road. The three first become engaged near Whitlock's and Darby's house, capturing one piece of artillery and about seventy-five prisoners, but without gaining the Long Bridge road. Our loss is about two hundred and fifty in killed, wounded and missing. At night the troops are returned to their positions about Fussell's mill. W. H. F. Lee's cavalry arrived at night on the north side of the James.

July 29—Nothing done in the morning. In the afternoon Kershaw and Conner move down to Darby's to occupy, with skirmishers, the junction of the Long Bridge and Darbytown roads. Field's division is sent to us from the south side and arrives at Tussell's mill about sundown. He came to Rice's turnout by rail. Fitz. Lee's division of cavalry is also sent to the north side.



July 30—In the morning the enemy is discovered to have abandoned the Long Bridge road and retired to the other side of the river, leaving a force at Deep Bottom on the right of our line. Heth's division is sent back to Rice's turnout. His trenches are occupied by Field. In the evening Kershaw recrosses to the south side by Chaffin's Bluff to halt for the night near the Clay house.

July 31, August 1 and 2—Affairs unchanged.

August 3—Colonel Carter, with some artillery, moves down the river, escorted by two regiments of cavalry, to annoy the enemy's transports.

August 4, 5—Quiet and without change.

August 6—General Anderson visits Richmond to meet the President and General Lee. Soon after I receive orders to join him with the staff.

August 7—Leave Richmond at 7.30 A. M. by rail and arrive at Mitchell's station at dark.

August 8—Last of Kershaw's division arrives to-day.

August 9, 10—Quiet. Waiting for our transportations.

August 11—Cutshaw's artillery horses and Fitz. Lee's cavalry division arrive. Hear of Early at Bunker Hill.

August 12—With Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, we move from Mitchell's station soon after sunrise and halt at Culpeper at midday. At 4. P. M. Kershaw moves for Hazel run, on the Graded road, followed by the artillery battalion, and camped for the night on Hazel river. Fitz. Lee's division moves from Culpeper Courthouse, and passes the infantry at night.

August 13—March resumed. Camp two miles north of Flint Hill.

August 14—March continues at sunrise. Troops arrive at Front Royal in afternoon. Kershaw posts a regiment on picket at the ford on the south fork on the Winchester road and one on the Berryville road, a mile from town.

August 15—Enemy reported to have a brigade of cavalry at Cedarville, on the Winchester pike, and an infantry force on the Berryville road. The enemy sends a scouting party across Island ford, which, however, soon retires.

August 16—About 12 noon information is received of the advance of four brigades of the enemy's cavalry to Cedarville. To hold Guard Hill and cover the passage of the Shenandoah, Wofford's brigade of infantry and Wickham's of cavalry and artillery are sent to seize the position, which is done with the loss of but

eight or ten men. Wofford, however, moves off to the right to attack the enemy's cavalry, which had now come up in force, and just at that moment, having charged and driven back our own cavalry, pitches into Wofford and drives him back in confusion and with loss. Brigade is subsequently moved across the river.

August 17—Our whole force moves across the river and follows the enemy down the Winchester pike. The enemy retired, burning the grain, barns and grass as he marched. Passing through Cedarville, Ninevah and Ragtown, we encounter, with the squadron of cavalry at our head, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, and give chase to them for four or five miles. Wickham, with the two brigades of cavalry, had turned off to the right and followed towards Whitepost the bulk of the enemy's cavalry. We camp on the Opequon near Frederick's mill, and Wickham is ordered across from the vicinity of Berryville.

August 18—Move soon after daylight for Winchester, where we meet General Early. Fitz. Lee's cavalry is thrown out to the front and Kershaw camped in woods to the right of the Berryville road.

August 19—No change in the position of our troops. Early moves with his force to the vicinity of Bunker Hill.

August 20—Without change.

August 21—At daylight we move with Kershaw and Cuttshaw by the old Charlestown road for Charlestown. Lomax's cavalry moves from Bunker Hill in the same direction via Leetown; Early's infantry by Smithfield and Fitz. Lee's cavalry by Berryville. About six miles from Summit Point we encounter the advance of Wilson's division of cavalry and drive it before us, skirmishing as far as Summit Point, where we arrive at 3.30 P. M. and camped, picketing all the roads. Fitz. Lee encounters Torbert's division and drives him through Berryville, and encamps one mile north of the town, on the Berryville and Winchester pike. Early arrives within two miles and a half of Charlestown and halts for the night. Casualties in all the skirmishes light.

August 22—March resumed at daylight for Charlestown. Meet General Early. Latter's troops encamped in front of Charlestown, ours back on the road we came, about two miles and a half from town.

August 23—Without change.

August 24—In the afternoon the enemy makes a slight demonstration with his cavalry on Early.

August 25—Kershaw moves at daylight with Cuttshaw to relieve

Rodes and Ramseur. Early's force moves to threaten Martinsburg, and Fitz. Lee (who has resumed command of all the cavalry) towards Williamsport.

August 26—Enemy in position and quiet until afternoon about 5 o'clock, when he advances four or five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry to feel our lines. The picket line of the Fifteenth South Carolina regiment, Kershaw's brigade, breaks, and about a hundred men of it are captured. The enemy soon retires. During the night we hear from Early, who is at Leetown, and it is determined to move for Brucetown at early dawn.

August 27—Move at day via Smithfield—McCausland's and Lomax's brigades of cavalry in our rear. Camp near Brucetown. The two cavalry brigades picket the line of the Opequon. Early moves to Bunker Hill.

August 28—McCausland moves his brigade towards Leetown, under orders from Fitz. Lee.

August 29—Early drives the enemy's cavalry through Smithfield. His troops afterwards return to camp.

August 30—Without change.

August 31—Bryan's brigade moves at daylight into Winchester to watch a probable movement of the enemy on Winchester from Berryville, where he seems to be in force. In the afternoon the whole division moves and takes its former camp near town.

September 1—Some cavalry skirmishing on the Berryville road. A small party of enemy's cavalry reported to have crossed Front Royal road toward's Newtown. Humphreys' brigade is sent down on Berryville road to support the cavalry; but the enemy's force having been exaggerated, it returns to camp. Wofford is posted near town on the Valley pike.

September 2—Enemy's cavalry at Berryville. It is proposed for Kershaw and Fitz. Lee to surprise him. As it is about being executed it is abandoned, the enemy having retired towards Charlestown. Early gets up towards Stone chapel and a small body of enemy's cavalry attack his rear.

September 3—Move at 12 M. from Winchester for Berryville by the pike. Strike the enemy about four miles from Berryville, and encounter the Eighth corps, which, after a short engagement, we drive away. The Sixth corps is meanwhile at Longmarsh run near Summit Point. General Humphreys wounded.

September 4—Between 9 and 10 A. M. General Early arrives to aid us, and proposes to attack by his left. Agreed to and he starts

to execute it. He accomplishes nothing, however, deeming the enemy's position too strong to be forced.

Septembr 5—Retire towards Winchester. Some skirmishing at the Opequon between Early's rear guard and the enemy's advance. Troops camp in same place on Berryville pike.

September 6—Without change.

September 7—A division of Yankee cavalry moves up as far as White Post and returns towards Berryville. Enemy's infantry reported crossing the Opequon and advancing. Our troops turned out to meet them. Enemy retire across the Opequon. Object of the movement supposed to be a reconnoissance.

September 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14—Without change.

September 15—Move at sunrise with Kershaw and Cuttshaw up the Valley pike and camp on North fork of Shenandoah, opposite Buckton.

September 16—Move at sunrise, cross North fork at Buckton ford, cross South fork at McCoy's ford, and camp at Bentonville.

September 17—Move at sunrise on the Mud turnpike, from which we turned off four miles north of Luray and camped four miles from Luray on the Sperryville and Luray pike.

September 18—Move at sunrise, cross Thornton's gap, pass through Sperryville, Woodville and camp two miles east of the latter.

September 19—Move at sunrise and arrive at Culpeper in time to meet a Yankee raiding party, Sixteenth New York cavalry, which is found to have passed down to Rapidan bridge and burnt it. We intercept the party on its return by Bryan's brigade near Poney mountain.

September 20—Move at 12 M. for Rapidan station.

September 21, 22—At Rapidan station awaiting the completion of the bridge.

September 23—Bridge finished. Move to Gordonsville.

September 24—Kershaw moves at sunrise to join Early, via Swift Run gap.

September 25, 26—We take up the march (headquarters) for Richmond, where we arrive on the 26th.

September 27—Move from Richmond to Swift run.

September 28—General Anderson receives orders to move to north side and assume command.

September 29—Move to north side early and find the enemy holding Fort Harrison, which he had taken by a coup de main.



One battalion of reserve, one hundred and fifty men, were in the fort. Gregg had previously repulsed an attack near Four-Mile run. In the afternoon Field arrives with Law's brigade just in time to aid Gregg's and Benning's brigade in repulsing a most violent assault on Fort Gilmer. Many negroes were killed in the ditch. General Lee arrives, and Bratton's and Anderson's brigades come over, making Field's full division. In the afternoon Colonel Montague with four regiments of Pickett's troops, pushes up towards Fort Harrison.

September 30—During last night Hoke came over with Kirkland's, Clingman's and Colquitt's brigades and Scales'. After reconnaissance, Fort Harrison is attacked by Law, Anderson and Bratton, and Clingman and Colquitt. The attack is repulsed.

October 1—Dispositions made for taking up a new line. A movement of the enemy to our left up the Darbytown and Williamsburg roads is discovered. Field, with Law's brigade and Montague's four regiments, is hurried off. On arriving at the point we find Moore's and Barton's brigades of reserves in the fortifications and the artillery at work. Montague is left on the New Market road and Law is posted in the salient on the Darbytown road.

October 2—Law and Montague are moved back to Chaffin's farm.

October 3, 4, 5—No change of note.

October 6—No change during the day. At night Field and Hoke are taken out of the trenches and sent to the vicinity of Curry's house, on the Darbytown road. Law's brigade was previously sent over to Gary.

October 7—At sunrise we move down the Darbytown road with Field and Hoke. The former encounters Kautz's cavalry in the exterior trenches. With Anderson's and Bratton's brigades and Gary and Law on the Charles City road, the cavalry is drawn off, leaving us nine pieces of artillery, ten caissons and prisoners. Field's division is then thrown to the left, on the outside of the exterior line, and Hoke on the inside of it. After crossing a thick abatis and an almost impenetrable swamp, the enemy is found in position near the New Market road. Field at once attacks him, and Major Johnson has a spirited artillery combat. Field's attack fails. Hoke cannot get at the enemy out of his trenches and does not move. In the afternoon the troops are posted behind Cornelius creek, General Gregg killed; Bratton wounded.

October 8, 9—Quiet and without change.

October 10—Field and Hoke move down in front of Cornelius creek and a line of rifle pits formed. Gary puts two regiments on the left of Field.

October 11, 12—Quiet. Troops occupied in strengthening their defences.

October 13—Early in the morning Gary's pickets are driven in on the Charles City road. He has hastily to send for the mounted regiment he had on the Nine-Mile road. A force of the enemy presses Field's left and endeavors to turn it. The Texas and Law's brigade are thrown rapidly to the left of the Darbytown road and the others moved up to it, Hoke closing in on Field. The day passes in efforts of the enemy to feel our lines or break through them. The enemy's cavalry on the Charles City road disappears and by night everything is again quiet, the enemy having retired. Gary's two dismounted regiments were sent to him in the morning, two regiments of Bratton relieving them. At night Field has four brigades on left of Darbytown road and Bratton on the right of it, Hoke touching his right, and Colquitt's brigade of his division extending to New Market road.

October 14, 15, 16, 17, 18—Are all without change of note.

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**History of Lane's North Carolina Brigade.**

By Brigadier-General JAMES H. LANE.

## No. 1.

[We are indebted to our gallant friend, General Lane, for a full history of his splendid brigade of North Carolinians. We shall continue the series from month to month until the whole is completed.]

## CAMPAIGN OF 1862—ORGANIZATION.

After the battle of Newberne, North Carolina, the Confederate troops at that place fell back to Kinston, fresh North Carolina troops were ordered to the same place, and soon afterwards the whole force was divided into two brigades. The first was placed under the command of General Robert Ransom, and the second, composed of the Seventh, Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third and Thirty-seventh North Carolina regiments, was commanded by General L. O'B. Branch. This brigade was known as the "Second North Carolina brigade" from the time of its organization until it was assigned to General A. P. Hill's command. It was then designated as the "Fourth Brigade of the Light Division" until orders were issued directing that all brigades, divisions and corps should be called by the names of their respective commanders. In obedience to these orders, this gallant body of North Carolina troops was then called "Branch's Brigade" until the battle of Sharpsburg, where the heroic Branch was killed. I was soon afterwards promoted to fill the vacancy caused by the death of General Branch, and from that time to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse this command was known in the Army of Northern Virginia as "Lane's Brigade."

## ORDERED TO VIRGINIA.

Early in May, 1862, this command was ordered to Virginia, and, on reaching Richmond, it was at once sent to Gordonsville. It remained there and at Rapidan station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, only a short time, when it was ordered to the Valley to join General Ewell, but, on reaching the base of the Blue Ridge, the order was countermanded and it was taken to Hanover Courthouse. From that point it was moved, on the 26th of May, to "Slash Church," near Peake's turnout on the Virginia Central railroad.

## BATTLE AT SLASH CHURCH AND HANOVER COURTHOUSE.

Early next morning General Branch sent the Twenty-eighth regiment under me to Taliaferro's mill to cut off a body of marauders, but it was itself cut off from the remainder of the brigade by an overwhelming force of the enemy—the whole of Porter's division and a part of Sedgwick's—and at Dr. Kinney's farm it fought most heroically. Lieutenant Pollock, of Fauquier county, Virginia, at one time on duty at General R. E. Lee's headquarters, informed me that he heard General Lee, on several occasions, speak in very complimentary terms of the retreat and escape of this regiment under such trying circumstances, as well as of its gallantry in the fight of that day. General Branch, with the other four regiments of his command, engaged the enemy at Slash church, but was overpowered and forced to fall back after a most gallant and stubborn resistance.

## OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL BRANCH.

Captain R. C. MORGAN, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

I have the honor to report, for the information of the General commanding the division, that in order to cover the railroad against small parties of the enemy, and at the same time carry out other views and wishes of General Johnston, which he had communicated to me, I moved my command on Monday from Hanover Courthouse to Slash church. The position was selected because, whilst fulfilling other requirements, it was at the mouth of a road leading to Ashland, which assured me of a means of retreat if assailed by the large forces of the enemy in close proximity to my front.

I took up the position with a knowledge of its danger, and all of my arrangements were made accordingly. No baggage train encumbered me, and my command bivouacked Monday night, infantry supports being thrown out for cavalry pickets. Tuesday morning the enemy were reported to be advancing on the road by Taliaferro's mills, and I sent Colonel Lane with his own (Twenty-eighth North Carolina) regiment and a section of Latham's battery to support the pickets and repel any small parties. At the same time Colonel Hardeman's Forty-fifth Georgia regiment was sent to repair the railroad at Ashcake, where it had been obstructed by the enemy the day before, and watch any approach of the enemy on that road. About the middle of the day the enemy opened fire



from a battery near Peake's crossing. Latham's battery very soon got into position to reply, and after a sharp action silenced it. In the meantime a severe cannonade had been going on in the direction of Lane, showing that he, too, had been attacked. As soon as the battery in the road had been driven off, I sent Colonel Lee with his own, the Thirty-seventh, and the Eighteenth, Colonel Cowan's regiment, to reinforce him. When these two regiments had proceeded about a mile and a half, the enemy was found strongly posted across the road. On learning this I galloped forward (leaving orders for Latham to follow me as quickly as possible), and was informed by Colonel Lee that the force of the enemy consisted of two regiments of infantry and some artillery.

My plan was quickly formed and orders given for its execution. Lee with the Thirty-seventh was to push through the woods and get close on the right flank of the battery; Hoke, as soon as he should return from a sweep through the woods on which I had sent him, and Colonel Wade's Twelfth North Carolina regiment was to make a similar movement to the left flank of the battery, and Cowan was to charge across the open ground in front. Hoke, supported by Colonel Wade, had a sharp skirmish in the woods, taking six prisoners and eleven horses, but came out too late to make the move assigned to him; and Lee having sent for reinforcements, I so far changed my plans as to abandon the attack on the enemy's left, and sent Lieutenant-Colonel Hoke to reinforce Colonel Lee, relying on the front and right flank attack.

Colonel Cowan, with the Eighteenth, made the charge most gallantly, but the enemy's force was much larger than had been supposed and strongly posted, and the gallant Eighteenth was compelled to seek shelter. It continued to pour heavy volleys from the edge of the woods, and must have done great execution. The steadiness with which this desperate charge was made reflectes the highest credit on officers and men. The Thirty-seventh found the undergrowth so dense as to retard its progress, but when it reached its position it poured a heavy and destructive fire upon the enemy. This combined volley from the Eighteenth and Thirty-seventh compelled the enemy to leave his battery for a time and take shelter behind a ditch bank.

For two hours the cavalry pickets had been coming in from the Ashcake road, reported a heavy force of the enemy passing to my right by that road, and Colonel Robertson, of the Virginia cavalry, who was near Hanover Courthouse, had sent me repeated messages

to the effect that a heavy body from that direction was threatening my line of retreat. I had already learned that my brigade was engaged with an entire division in its front, but continued the contest in the hope that the cannonade would attract to me some reinforcements—taking the precaution, however, to keep Campbell's Seventh North Carolina and Hardeman's Forty-fifth Georgia in order to cover the retreat in case my expectation should not be realized. Finding I could remain no longer without being surrounded, and hearing of no reinforcements, and feeling assured from the firing that Lane had made good his retreat to Hanover Courthouse, I determined to draw off. This, always difficult in the presence of a superior enemy, was rendered comparatively easy by the precaution I had taken not to engage my whole force. Campbell was ordered to place the Seventh across the road so as to receive the enemy if they should attempt to follow.

Orders were then sent to Lee and Cowan to withdraw in order. They were hotly engaged when the order was received, but promptly withdrew. Colonel Cowan, in an especial manner, attracted my attention by the perfect order in which he brought out his regiment, notwithstanding the severe and long continued fire he had received from both infantry and artillery. The regiments marched to the rear without haste or confusion and went up the Ashland road. A cautious attempt was made by the enemy to follow, but a single volley from the rear-guard of the Seventh arrested it. The march was continued without interruption to Ashland, where I was ordered by General Johnston to report to Major-General Hill. All my subsequent movements having been under orders received from him in person, they need not be detailed.

Having but one wagon and one ambulance, I was under the necessity of leaving a portion of my wounded. The enemy left a portion of their killed on the ground which we subsequently occupied.

My senior Surgeon established his hospital in a house on which the hospital flag was conspicuously displayed. It was not in or near the line of fire. I saw many shells thrown by the enemy explode immediately over and around this house. It could not have been undesigned.

Colonel Lane, with the Twenty-eighth regiment, has rejoined the brigade, but I have not received his report of the engagement he had with the enemy. As soon as received, it will be forwarded to you.

My loss (exclusive of Colonel Lane's command) was sixty-six killed and one hundred and seventy-seven wounded.

An entire division was engaged against me, and, as you are aware, a large part of General McClellan's army were in supporting distance.

The officers and men of my command conducted themselves in a very handsome manner, both in the engagement and in the march.

The enemy may have captured stragglers enough to offset the prisoners we took from them in the open field, but they took no body of my troops.

Twice during the day the enemy were driven back, the last time taking shelter behind a ditch bank at the edge of the woods. From this position I did not succeed in driving them.

I have the honor to be yours, very respectfully,

L. O'B. BRANCH,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

BATTLE OF HANOVER COURTHOUSE—COLONEL J. H. LANE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS BRANCH'S BRIGADE, June 4th, 1862,

Captain R. C. MORGAN, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the General commanding the division, the report of Colonel James H. Lane, Twenty-eighth North Carolina troops, of the action we had with the enemy at Dr. Kinney's, on the 27th ultimo. Colonel Lane conducted the expedition on which he had been sent by me with prudence and courage, and has entitled himself to my entire approbation.

The Twenty-eighth regiment has in it many recruits just recovered from the diseases incident to the commencement of camp life. Some of these, from physical exhaustion, separated from the regiment in the retreat—a portion of them may have fallen into the hands of the enemy's cavalry. If so, they are only trophies taken by an overwhelming force attempting to capture a single regiment, and will not more than counterbalance the prisoners taken by the Twenty-eighth from them.

My engagement of that day was for the purpose of reinforcing Colonel Lane, and was continued until I was assured that he had made good his retreat.

The Twenty-eighth regiment and the section of Latham's battery

which accompanied it, honorably sustained the credit of the Confederate arms. It ought to be stated to the credit of Latham's battery, that it reported to me from North Carolina only the evening before I left Hanover Courthouse, with only half enough men for the efficient service of the guns, and with horses entirely untrained.

Your obedient servant,

L. O'B. BRANCH, *Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-EIGHTH REGIMENT,  
NORTH CAROLINA VOLUNTEERS,  
NEAR RICHMOND, June 1st, 1862.

Brigadier-General L. O'B. BRANCH,  
*Commanding Second North Carolina Brigade.*

General—In obedience to your orders, I proceeded to Taliaferro's mill on the morning of the 27th of May with eight hundred and ninety (890) of my regiment and a section of Latham's battery, commanded by Lieutenant J. R. Potts. While I was there, examining the ground for a suitable position for my forces, information was received that the enemy was approaching *in the direction of Hanover Courthouse*. I immediately retraced my steps, marching left in front, and throwing out a platoon of Company G as flankers, under Captain George B. Johnston, to my right, the supposed direction of the enemy, while the other was thrown to my left and front, under Lieutenant E. G. Morrow. It was not until we had nearly emerged from the pine thicket in front of Dr. Kinney's that we discovered some of the enemy ambushed in the same, *to our left, and where we were not expecting them*. The regiment was immediately halted, faced by the rear rank, and wheeled to the right through the woods, pouring a deadly fire into a portion of the Twenty-fifth New York regiment, as they executed the movement. As soon as we cleared the thicket and appeared in the road, running by Dr. Kinney's to Richmond, another portion of the enemy, previously concealed in the wheat and behind the house immediately in front of us, opened a sharp fire, which was promptly returned by the Twenty-eighth.

The regiment was then ordered to charge, and did it most gallantly, many of them, shouting, leaped the ditch and high fence inclosing the field of wheat, while the rest rushed into the yard



and around the house. The enemy, armed with Springfield rifles, were "flushed" like so much game, and dropped back into the wheat before our unerring marksmen. Here and in the woods we killed and wounded not less than two hundred (200) and took a large number of prisoners, only about seventy-five (75) of whom we were able to send to the rear, and put in charge of a small detachment of cavalry, from the Fourth Virginia regiment, which was retiring from the mill. It was not until we had swept the Twenty-fifth New York regiment before us and passed nearly across the wheat field that we found ourselves in the presence of a whole brigade, commanded by General Martindale, about four hundred (400) yards distant from our extreme right—left as faced. The enemy opened a heavy fire on us from *two batteries*, planted upon an eminence between the balance of your brigade and ourselves, but fortunately fired too high, and gave us time to reform in an open field on the opposite side of Dr. Kinney's dwelling and in a direction perpendicular to our previous position. Our flag bearer was shot down while we were reforming, but one of his comrades seized the flag and bore it onward. It was here that I sent to you for reinforcements, stating that we had been cut off by an overwhelming force. I also sent a courier to Hanover Courthouse for assistance, with instructions to proceed to Hanover Junction, if none could be had there.

After we had reformed, the men, heated and excited, threw off their knapsacks, made heavier than usual by the drenching rain of the previous night, were advanced a short distance and made to lie down, while the section of artillery, previously planted in the road, was ordered to take a more commanding position in rear of the dwelling, between six hundred and seven hundred yards from the enemy's guns; after which we opened a brisk and well directed fire, forcing the enemy to withdraw one of his pieces, which was thrown forward a little on the same side of the road with ourselves. Lieutenant Potts and the men under him behaved with great gallantry and must have done considerable execution. This unequal contest was maintained for three long hours, in expectation of assistance either from you or Hanover Junction. During the artillery firing, Captain W. J. Montgomery, with his company, was ordered to the right to observe the enemy and check his advance up a hollow not far from the artillery, while Captain Johnston, with a part of his company, was sent to the left to reconnoitre. Company B, under Captain S. N. Stowe, and the

remainder of Company G, under Lieutenant Morrow, was held as a support to our two pieces. Captain Montgomery soon informed me that the enemy were throwing a large force through a wooded ravine on our right, to surround us. He was immediately recalled and ordered to follow the head of their line along a fence running parallel to the road, and the other companies of the regiment, except those named above, were directed to follow. After prolonging our line in this new direction, and finding the enemy still going on and throwing at the same time sharpshooters between our infantry and artillery up the hollow that Captain Montgomery was first ordered to defend, while their artillery was pouring a hot fire upon us (they having got our range), and as we could see a strong infantry reserve in rear of their batteries, it was deemed advisable to retire. I was not able to recall Captain Johnston from the left, and was forced to leave the dead and badly wounded on the field, together with an old ambulance, a two-horse wagon and our knapsacks. The twelve-pound brass howitzer also had to be left, as one of the horses was killed and three others badly wounded. We know the names of seven killed and fifteen wounded, as we retreated across the field to the road, under the enemy's fire, and a few in the woods where the engagement first commenced. Exposed all the previous night to a drenching rain, without tents, deprived of food, having marched over a horribly muddy road with unusually heavy knapsacks, and having fought bravely and willingly for three hours in anticipation of being reinforced, we were not in a condition to retreat. Many of my brave men fell from exhaustion on the road side, and I am sorry to inform you that many of them are still missing, but trust that in a few days the number will be greatly reduced as some are finding their way back to camp daily.

We were pursued by infantry, artillery and a regiment of cavalry beyond Hanover Courthouse, where I received a dispatch from you stating that you had yourself engaged another portion of the enemy.

Guns were placed on the railroad hill formerly occupied by the Twenty-eighth regiment as a camping ground, which prevented our retreating by the Ashland road, as we had anticipated, and forced us to take the right-hand road to Taylorsville, along which we were shelled a short distance. The cavalry pursued us beyond Colonel Wickham's farm, and were only prevented from making a charge by our throwing the regiment into a field and making it

march along the fences, while Lieutenant Potts protected our rear with his Parrott gun.

We succeeded in reaching Taylorsville about sunset, and for three days we were endeavoring to join the rest of the command and had scarcely anything to eat.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas L. Lowe and Major S. D. Lowe bore themselves well during the action, and were of great assistance, often in the execution of their duties passing through the hottest fires. Major Lowe was unaccountably separated from the regiment after passing Hanover Courthouse, and is still missing. Adjutant D. A. McRae and Captain Gibbon, A. C. S., also rendered me great assistance in carrying orders, and proved themselves brave men.

Both Surgeon Robert Gibbon and Assistant Surgeon R. G. Barham allowed themselves to be taken prisoners rather than leave the wounded. Surgeon Gibbon subsequently succeeded in making his escape, the wounded having been cared for and sent, in accordance with orders of a Federal officer, to a Federal hospital. We were at one time deceived by the flag of the Twenty-second Massachusetts regiment, which is nearly white, when our firing ceased, and John A. Abernathy, our regimental hospital steward, volunteered to meet it, and was fired upon by the enemy. Though Companies D and E took most of the prisoners, yet the new Springfield rifles, repeaters and swords, now in the possession of the regiment, show that all behaved well and it would be invidious in me to discriminate among the company officers and men, when all acted so well their respective parts. This is the first time that the Twenty-eighth has been under fire. Their bravery has been thoroughly tested in this unequal contest; and though they have proved themselves courageous, our escape from such an overwhelming force can be but regarded as providential.

Two companies of Colonel Lee's Thirty-seventh North Carolina volunteers, which were doing picket duty at Taliaferro's mill, came up during the artillery firing, and were ordered to keep themselves covered in the woods beyond Dr. Kinney's residence. I have not learned the casualties in these two companies. Colonel Lee will incorporate their report in his own.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE,

*Colonel Commanding Twenty-eighth Regiment North Carolina Volunteers.*

GENERAL R. E. LEE'S CONGRATULATORY LETTER TO GENERAL BRANCH.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

June 3, 1862.

Brigadier-General L. O'B. BRANCH, *Commanding, &c.*:

General—The report of your recent engagement with the enemy at "Slash Church" has been forwarded by Major-General Hill. I take great pleasure in expressing my approval of the manner in which you have discharged the duties of the position in which you were placed, and of the gallant manner in which your troops opposed a very superior force of the enemy. I beg you will signify to the troops of your command, which were engaged on that occasion, my hearty approval of their conduct, and hope that on future occasions they will evince a like heroism and patriotic devotion.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Through Major-General A. P. HILL.

## AFTER THE ABOVE BATTLE

our brigade moved to the south bank of the Chickahominy near Richmond, where it was assigned to General A. P. Hill's division. Here it remained doing picket duty until the ever memorable fights around Richmond. How it behaved in that series of engagements, will best appear from the following official reports.

JAMES H. LANE.

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**Reminiscences of Jackson's Valley Campaign.**

By General T. T. MUNFORD, of the Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.

[Our readers will thank us for the following interesting sketch of men and events of the brilliant campaign which probably contributed more to establishing Jackson's fame than any other part of his splendid career. We are very anxious to secure similar sketches from many others of our gallant soldiers, who were in position to know the inside history of the campaigns in which they were active participants.]

In writing these few reminiscences of Jackson's campaign of 1862 in the Valley, my object has been to develop some of the striking characteristics of the officers with whom I served. I wish to do justice to General Trimble, of Maryland—a gallant soldier of the old army in the olden times. It has been my aim to show some of Jackson's strategy in executing General Lee's plans, and his extreme reticence in keeping from his highest officers what he intended to do; where he was going; when he would move, and what he aimed to accomplish. I have a most kind remembrance and affection for General Ewell, Jackson's senior lieutenant, commanding his right wing, and wish to recall some of his oddities. He possessed more eccentricities than he thought Jackson displayed. He was a hard old customer, and could swear, when he chose to exercise that faculty, in a style that defies description. He spared no one when he was cross, but was nobly generous at all other times. My relations with him were always of the kindest character, as several letters from him to me would show. Long before the war ended he was a bright Christian soldier of the cross, with a joyous hope of meeting Jackson at the "grand reveille."

I desire to say a word or two for Ashby, who was often blamed for what he could not prevent, and often expected to perform impossibilities and to overcome obstacles which were insurmountable. I believe Ashby was more than a partisan leader, and was a peer of the best of the officers in his sphere of service. We must take into consideration the material he had to handle. The blunders that were made by the cavalry arose from a want of concert between the cavalry commanders, and a want of thorough discipline, and this latter in a great measure was caused by the fact that you could not exact of men rigid compliance with orders when they were rarely supplied with what they were entitled to receive. Another cause, not often considered or reflected upon, was that the cavalry furnished at first their own horses, and were required sub-

sequently to furnish their own horses *at their own expense*. When a man was *required* to go or to come, his horse had to *go* or to *come*, too. When a machine is not greased or is *improperly* used, it will first creak and then refuse to move. When a horse is not fed, and given no time to rest, and forced in the charge, *or on a raid*, and forced in the retreat, he cannot perform his duty, and the man upon his back has to bear the censure. A spavined or *jammed* horse, or when wounded, cannot carry a sound or an impetuous man. A dead horse cannot be replaced without money, which the man could not procure and the Government failed to supply. The man felt that at any moment he was liable to lose his horse. *Not the Government's horse*, which would be replaced, but his own horse, when he had no chance of getting another and no hope of being remunerated for his loss. You order a cavalryman to be drilled: his horse is not fit for duty; he cannot do it; he appears to be skulking. You order him to go into battle: his regiment is ordered off at a trot, a gallop; it is impossible for him to go. The more gallant he is, the worse he naturally feels. It is simply impossible for him to go. (His only chance is to scout and capture a picket or a straggler). How is he to get away?—"run the gauntlet," or he is forced into another arm of the service against his will. His comrades know his worth and deplore his lot—they know they may be at any moment in the same condition. The man cannot and the other men will not perform their duty under such circumstances—and for reasons like these, *a whole arm of the service* is weakened and demoralized, and the handful who could keep mounted had to do all the duty. General Ashby labored under all of these disadvantages in every company in his command, every day he had to move. Look at the map and see the country from which most of his men came; his picket-line ran from the Warm Springs, in Bath county, down the whole Valley and along the Potomac to Harper's Ferry, and around to near Leesburg in Loudon county. To accomplish what he did was wonderful! to expect more could not be realized. These things, and the censure that they produced, was the cause of the alienation that for a time existed between Jackson and Ashby. Others had to handle the same force after Ashby's death, but it *took time* to accomplish what never was given Ashby—as he could never get his men together under Jackson mounted.

Late one night, not long since, having concluded reading General Dick Taylor's narrative, entitled "Destruction and Reconstruc-

tion," I laid the book aside and for hours revolved in my mind the eventful scenes, so graphically described in his allusion to Ewell's division, in Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862. "Ewell's division?" Where are the general officers who left Swift Run gap on that memorable march? Where are the officers who commanded Taylor's brigade? The Lynchburg *Virginian* announced a short time since that General I. R. Trimble and General Nicholls, now Governor of Louisiana, were near by here, in Botetourt county, Virginia. Ewell, Taylor, Semmes, Peck, Stafford, Hays, Wheat—"all passed beyond the river." Trimble, with *one leg*, and Nicholls, with *one eye, one leg and one arm*, were there to recruit their shattered frames in the mountains of Virginia. Feeling it a duty to "render honor to whom honor is due," I shall begin my sketch by referring to Generals Jackson, Ewell and Trimble. Of the first two, General Taylor has said much. His trenchant pen spares neither friend nor foe. His admiration for them is endorsed by all who knew and served with them. Their *peculiarities* and *idiosyncrasies* were generally known. I propose to tell what Ewell thought of Jackson and said to me, and what he thought of Trimble. I have made above an explanation in defence of Ashby, believing it will make clear some of the difficulties he had to contend with, and put the kindly words of Taylor's narrative, and of General Jackson himself, in their proper light. I shall speak of Ashby again. Having served with them all, knowing them all personally, I do not hesitate to say I loved them all. They were my friends. I know there was at one time a bitter feeling between Jackson and Ashby—it was reconciled. I do not think that even General Jackson fully appreciated Ashby's troubles, because he complained of his disorganized command, and *no order* for the organization of his command was ever given until after Ashby was killed. I have in my possession at this time from General Jackson himself a note, asking for recommendations for field officers to command the twenty-six companies of Ashby's command, to whom one Major was attached—afterwards Colonel Funsten. General Beverly Robertson, of the old army, was assigned to General Jackson by the Department at Richmond while his cavalry command was at Harrisonburg, immediately before Jackson left the Valley. General Taylor thought General Jackson, the "*lemon squeezer*," was "*crazy*." General Ewell at one time thought him "*a crazy wagon hunter*," and "*an old fool*." All of us knew that General Ewell "*had a curious way*" of doing things, and a very free way of ex-



pressing himself. For example, General Trimble sent to him for some mounted men as couriers while we were at Swift Run gap. At that time General Trimble was a mile in rear of our camp. I happened to meet him immediately after he received the application, and he said: "Look here! send *that old man* Trimble a mounted man or two. Nobody is going to hurt him way behind me, yet he wants some cavalry to keep him posted; and he has a fellow named Kirkland over on the mountain, on picket, who wants *horsemen*. I expect if a fellow in the woods would say *boo*, the whole crew would get away." This sounded very "queer" to me. I had sent a scout over the river, and that evening a deserter from the Federal army was brought in, who informed me that General Shields, commanding about eight thousand troops, was preparing to move to Fauquier county, Virginia, to join General McDowell, who was there with thirty thousand troops. He was an intelligent young man, who "*guessed* he had seen enough of war and wanted to get out of the army." I took him to General Ewell's quarters, who gave him a searching examination. The next morning two more prisoners were brought in, who confirmed the report of the deserter, as they had three days' cooked rations. Ewell was crazy to attack Shields, and though awaiting orders from General Jackson, wrote to ask permission to be allowed to attack him. He did not know exactly where Jackson was, or what he was after, and was in a blaze. He ordered me to cook rations and be prepared to move with my regiment, to take a part of the Sixth Virginia cavalry and two guns of Brockenbrough's battery, and to impede Shields' movement in every possible way I could, by barricades, destroying bridges, worrying his train, and feints, and to keep him posted. I was to start at 12 at night, but to report to him before leaving. When I went to his quarters I found him in bed. He asked me to hand him a map, and with a miserable lard lamp he attempted to show me where General Jackson was. Before I knew what he was after, he sprung out of bed, with only a night-shirt on—no carpet on the floor—and spreading the map open on the floor, down on his knees he went; his bones *farely rattled*; his bald head and long beard made him look more like a witch than a Major-General. He became much excited, pointed out Jackson's position, General Shields', and General McDowell's, who was then at Warrenton, to act as McClellan's right wing. Then, with an ugly oath, he said: "This *great wagon hunter* is after a *Dutchman*, an old fool! General Lee at Richmond will



have little use for wagons if all of *these people* close in around him; we are left out here in *the cold*. Why, I could *crush* Shields before night if I could move from here. This man Jackson is certainly a crazy fool, an idiot. Now look at this," handing me a small piece of paper upon which was about these words:

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT, May, 1862.

General R. S. EWELL:

Your dispatch received. *Hold your position—don't move*. I have driven General Milroy from McDowell; through God's assistance, have captured most of his wagon train. Colonel S. B. Gibbons, Tenth Virginia, killed. Forward to Department at Richmond the intelligence.

Respectfully,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General*.

Ewell jumped to his feet, ran all over the room, and said: "What has Providence to do with Milroy's wagon train? Mark my words, if this old fool keeps this thing up, and Shields joins McDowell, we will go up at Richmond! *I'll stay here*, but you go and do all you can to keep *these people* from *getting together*, and keep me posted—follow Shields as long as it is safe, and *send me a courier to let me know the hour you get off*." (At that time Ewell had no idea what Jackson's plans were.) A courier from the Second regiment, looking for me, went to his quarters, and allowed his sabre to *jingle* and strike the steps as he ascended the stairs. Rapping at his door, he asked for me. General Ewell told him to come in and light the lamp. Turning to him he said: "*Look under the bed—do you see him there? Do you know how many steps you came up?*" "No, sir," said the courier. "Well I do, by every lick you gave them with that *thing* you have hanging about your feet, which should be *hooked up* when you come to *my quarters*. Do you know how many *ears you have?* You will go out of here less *one*, and *maybe both*, if you ever wake me up this time anight looking for your *Colonel*." The courier came to me, related what had occurred, and begged I would never send him to General *Ewell again*.

I followed Shields for three days. Have in my possession kindly words from General Ewell for services rendered, and en route to join him had an order to go to Richmond and endeavor to get arms for my men.

I joined the army at Winchester the night after they arrived after the battle, but continued with them to Martinsburg and Fall-

ing Waters, back to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry. 'Twas here General Jackson left us, having heard of the Federals reoccupying Front Royal; and then came our trials. As soon as the enemy found that Jackson had started back up the Valley, their cavalry became very enterprising and bold, and hung closely to our rear, annoying us by day and night. Jackson, the "*wagon hunter*," never gave up one after it came into his possession. If a tire came off a wagon, he would stop the *whole train* and wait for it to be *fixed* on, and let the "*rear guard*" hold its position. A man who never served in the cavalry under Jackson knows little of what was *required* of them. We skirmished all day and half the night, retiring en echelon. There was one *eternal* picking at each other. The artillery would seize a position and hold it as long as they *could*, then fall back to another, covered by the cavalry. I do not believe the world has ever produced a *grander, braver, nobler band of patriotic soldiers* than the artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia. On this retreat General George H. Steuart had command of the Second Virginia and the Sixth Virginia cavalry. Colonel Turner Ashby, just promoted, had his twenty-six companies of cavalry, but there was no concert between Ashby and Steuart.

General G. H. Steuart, a good infantry officer, was relieved from the cavalry regiments by urgent request, and they ordered to Ashby, after which time there were no more of the many blunders previously committed. Ashby had been a full colonel but a short time. The companies composing his command were generally recruited from the border counties all along the northern and western lines. They had never been in a camp of instruction. Many of them could not perform the simplest evolutions in company drill. Provided with just such arms as they could pick up, with no organization, it was simply impossible for him to do anything with them but to *lead them*. He complained bitterly in conversation with me, and said he had no help and no opportunity. A company was recruited in one of the border counties, and *there it stayed* after the Valley was left by Jackson.

I had the honor to serve with all of our best officers of the cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia. I have the highest admiration and affection for most of them, and would not detract from the glory that any of them have, but venture this tribute to Ashby, because I believe he was the peer of any and deserves equal praise. He was as brave and as modest about it as Hampton, with all the dash and fire of Fitz. Lee or Stuart. Neither of them had a

better eye for defence. They could not swoop down quicker when a flank was exposed or an opportunity given than he. They had better advantages in camp and by education, but he was a *natural* soldier, and had his life been spared, would have equaled Forrest in his boldest moves.

General Ewell formed the highest admiration for Ashby, and told me the day Ashby was killed, that such a man, with a good disciplined mounted regiment, and an infantry regiment attached to it, who could *swing* by a strap to each horse's neck, when "sharp, quick and devilish" work was wanted, would be equal to the best division in the army, and said he would rather have it. Then he said: "A man *could do something* without being cramped as I am, and never know what is to be done," and added: "I am thinking of asking the Department for such a command, or the privilege of raising such." In this conversation with me he was *still very uneasy about Richmond*, and intimated that Jackson would have his hands full before he got out of the Valley.

Ewell was deeply moved when Ashby fell, and remained on the field with me until all the prisoners and wounded men were taken back; *assisted* many of the *wounded* to mount behind the cavalry, who carried them from the field, and I saw him give what money he had to some of the Maryland troops who were too badly wounded to be carried from the field on horseback. The enemy were too near for ambulances to approach. The woods where the affair occurred was filled with outcropping lime-stone rocks, and there was no regular road. This fight has never been described fairly. I may attempt it hereafter, as I was second in command, and saw from an unbiased stand-point what was done by Ashby. I was to co-operate with him, and but for that ambuscade he fell in, he would have realized his well laid plan of success. Two hours before he was killed, he had won one of the most brilliant fights of that campaign—capturing "Sir Percy Windham," commanding the attacking brigade. His loss was deplored by our whole army.

The night after the battle of Cross Keys, I was at General Jackson's headquarters with Ewell, and heard the orders given for the next morning's work. My orders were to send and ascertain whether the road to Brown's gap was open, and to see if a bridge could be thrown across the South fork of the river. The Quartermaster ran a half-dozen wagons in the water, upon which some very long and thin plank were placed, so that, with their cadence

step, the men were in a swing. This really impeded the march, and caused our troops to go into the fight in detail, instead of in compact body.

The next day was a rough one for our army. Shields had secured a splendid position, well described by General Taylor. There was no field for the cavalry to operate in. When the enemy retired, it was through a piney country, with a single wagon road. We could only follow in a column of "twos." We followed them to near Conrad's store, securing many stragglers, wagons and several pieces of artillery. That night I returned to Ewell's quarters and took supper with him. Sitting in front of his tent, he turned to me, in his nervous way, and said: "Look here, Munford, do you remember a conversation we had one day at Conrad's store?" I laughed and asked, "To what do you allude?" "Why, to old Trimble, to General Jackson and that other fellow, Colonel Kirkland, of North Carolina?" I replied, "Very well." "I take it all back, and will never prejudice another man. Old Jackson is no fool; he knows how to keep his own counsel, and does curious things: but he has method in his madness; he has disappointed me entirely. And old Trimble is a real trump; instead of being over cautious, he is as bold as any man, and, in fact, is the hero of yesterday's fight. Jackson was not on the field. They will call it mine, but Trimble won the fight; and I believe now if I had followed his views we would have destroyed Fremont's army. And Colonel Kirkland, of North Carolina, behaved as handsomely near Winchester as any man in our army, leading his regiment, and taking a stone wall from the Yankees; he is a splendid fellow."

That night I addressed a letter to General Jackson, telling him of the difficulties which surrounded me, and of what Ashby had said to me of his troubles from the want of organization in his command, in response to which I have the following communication:

NEAR MOUNT MERIDIAN, June 12th, 1862.

Colonel T. T. MUNFORD, *Commanding Cavalry, Valley District* :

Colonel—I congratulate you upon your early reoccupation of Harrisonburg. I have directed the Inspector-General to organize the cavalry now under Major Funsten, and hope it will soon be of service to you. You had better order forward Chew's battery and your train in time to pass Mount Crawford before 12 o'clock M. to-morrow. In the morning I trust that I will make a timely move for the Valley pike, and expect to encamp this side of Mount Crawford.

Very truly, yours,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General*.



This was the first time his infantry had had a day's rest since the campaign opened, but there was no rest for the cavalry. We pushed on to Harrisonburg, and followed the enemy towards New Market, capturing many stragglers, wagons, horses and plunder, abandoned by the enemy. The following dispatches from General Jackson will explain themselves. Major Dabney and Major John E. Cooke have commented upon what happened. These papers will show that the cavalry did efficient service, and had the confidence of General Jackson. How, I may explain in another letter. When General Jackson left the Valley for Richmond, he did my regiment the honor to require it to follow him, and we served with him until he was killed. I have spun out a much longer letter than I contemplated when I took up my pen.

The Confederate cavalry have not one word to say against their brothers-in-arms of the artillery or infantry; but, although many a cavalry flag fluttered in the breeze defiantly after all others were furled and *had sunk to rest forever*, their sympathy and attachment for the other arms of the service has never abated. We know our men did their duty as well as they could, and we can stand the taunts of men who know not what they say.

THOMAS T. MUNFORD,  
*Late Brigadier-General Cavalry, Fitz. Lee's Division, A. N. V.*

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The following, from original autograph letters, which have never been published, illustrate the above sketch, and will prove of general interest:

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT, June 10, 1862.

Colonel MUNFORD, *Commanding Cavalry*:

Colonel—Major-General Jackson directs that you will organize so many of the *dismounted* men of your command as may be necessary to guard four hundred prisoners (400), under a discreet and diligent officer, to conduct all of the prisoners captured in the battles of June 8th and 9th, on foot towards their place of destination. You will instruct the commander of this detachment not to move the prisoners until those still in the rear are brought up and a *complete list* is made out for these headquarters, containing the name, rank, company and regiment of all the prisoners. You will further instruct this commander that the destination of these prisoners is to be Salisbury, North Carolina, to be reached by Lynchburg and Danville. You will also instruct him that as soon as he reaches Mechum's River depot, he shall telegraph Gene-

ral John H. Winder, Richmond, Virginia, stating the number of these prisoners and the route he will travel, and asking General Winder to provide the necessary rations and a guard to relieve your men and take the prisoners to Salisbury. Your detachment, as soon as relieved, will then return and report to you for duty. This telegram to General Winder should be *repeated* again and again till it is answered; but, meantime, the detachment of prisoners should be kept moving as fast as possible until General Winder sends to take charge of them. The commander of the detachment is hereby empowered to purchase rations, if necessary, for the prisoners and guard on Government account. But you will instruct him to call at once on Captain Cuntz, Issuing Commissary for this division, for so much as is immediately necessary. The commanding officer should also be instructed to use all care to prevent escape of prisoners, and to this end should see that his guard was adequately supplied with fire-arms and ammunition before it sets out.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. L. DABNEY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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NEAR MOUNT MERIDIAN, June 13th, 1862.

Colonel—Yours of this date has been received. I have given the Chief Commissary of Subsistence orders to supply the hospital near Harrisonburg with subsistence. Do not permit any letter to be sent by flag of truce, unless it is first read by yourself. Please turn over the guns to the agent. Major Harman may send for the wagons and ambulances. I am gratified to see you had anticipated me respecting the wounded.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General.*

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NEAR MOUNT MERIDIAN, June 13, 1862.

Colonel—Your second dispatch of yesterday has been received, and I congratulate you upon your success. Can you send one of the paroled Yankee doctors to attend to the wounded near the battlefield until Dr. McGuire can make some arrangements respecting them? Please send the captured horses to my camp, near Mount Crawford, to-day, and generally send all captures to the rear at the earliest practicable moment.

I wish you would send a scout in the direction of Conrad's store, and let it visit Keesletown and McGaheysville. It may not be ne-

cessary to go further than McGaheysville. It is reported that the enemy is still in that direction.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General.*

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NEAR MOUNT MERIDIAN, June 13, 1862.

Colonel—It is important to cut off all communication between us and the enemy. Please require the ambulances to go beyond our lines, and press our lines forward as far as practicable. It is very desirable that we should have New Market, and that no information should pass to the enemy. I expect soon to let you have two companies of cavalry from the Army of the Northwest. I will not be able to leave here to-day, and probably for some time; so you must look out for the safety of your train. Please impress the bearers of the flag of truce as much as possible with an idea of a heavy advance on our part, and let them return under such impression. While it is desirable for us to have New Market, you must judge of the practicability. The only true rule for cavalry is to follow as long as the enemy retreats. Beyond that, of course, you can, under present circumstances, do little or nothing; but every mile that you advance will probably give you additional prisoners, and especially so far as New Market, where you will get command of the road from Keesletown and Columbia bridge. I congratulate you upon your continued success.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General.*

Press our lines as far as you otherwise would have done before the flag of truce is permitted to pass them.

T. J. J.

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NEAR WEYER'S CAVE, June 17, 1862.

Colonel T. T. MUNFORD, *Commanding Cavalry, Valley District:*

Colonel—The arms you spoke of sending have not yet been received. Did you send them here or to Staunton? It is important that you picket from the *Blue Ridge* to the Shenandoah mountain, or to the mountain west of Harrisonburg. Until further orders, send your dispatches to Brigadier-General C. S. Winder, near Weyer's Cave. Do all you can to cut off communication across the lines between us and the enemy; also let there be as little communication as practicable between your command and that of the infantry. Let your couriers be men whom you can

trust, and caution them against carrying news forward, as it may thereby reach the enemy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General.*

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NEAR WEYER'S CAVE, June 17, 1862.

Colonel T. T. MUNFORD, *Commanding Cavalry, Valley District:*

Colonel—I congratulate you upon the success of yesterday. Send the prisoners to Staunton, and also the captured property, if you can spare it. If you have need of it, let it be accounted for to Major J. A. Harman, by your Quartermaster, as captured property, and as such taken up on his return. If you can meet me in Staunton by five o'clock to-morrow morning, I hope you will do so, as I desire to have a personal interview with you. Instead of sending your dispatches to General Winder, please continue to send them directed to me.

Your most obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General.*

P. S.—I do not wish you to leave your command, unless you can safely do so. I will be at Mount Sidney to-night about ten o'clock. Can you meet me there? I will be on my horse at the north end of the town, so you need not inquire after me. I do not desire it to be known that I am absent from this point.

T. J. J.

Encourage citizens in driving their cattle on this side of the lines, but do not take any further steps, and say to those who come on this side that for a few days they will have to remain on this side, as no one is permitted to pass the lines to the enemy's side.

T. J. J.

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**The Captured Guns at Spotsylvania Courthouse—Correction of General Ewell's Report.**

[The following letters explain themselves, and are published with great pleasure, as doing justice to a gallant and meritorious officer.]

*Letter from Major Page.*

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., September 15th, 1879.

S. V. SOUTHALL, ESQ.,

*Late Adjutant-General Artillery, Second Corps, A. N. V.:*

My Dear Sir—My attention was first called during the month of January last to General Ewell's report of the battle of Spotsylvania, May 12th, 1864. In consequence of an error therein contained, regarding myself, I have thought it my duty to write out a full statement of the whole affair, so far as regards my connection with it, and respectfully submit it to your consideration. The guns of my battalion had been withdrawn from the works, in accordance with orders, as you remember, on the previous evening, to a point about one and a half miles in rear of the salient, and near the Courthouse, where most of the artillery of the Second corps went into camp for the night, preparatory to marching next morning.

The enemy was reported to be moving from our front and towards our right. Horses, therefore, were not only unhitched but unharnessed; what few tents we had were pitched on account of the rain, and the whole camp reposed in a state of most profound security. About twenty minutes of four o'clock next morning, May 12th, I was awakened by Lieutenant S. H. Pendleton, of General Long's staff, who informed me that the enemy were reported to have returned as if for the purpose of attacking the salient, and that I was ordered to proceed at once to occupy that part of the line. The men were aroused, the horses were harnessed and hitched, and my battalion left camp in so short a time after the order was received, that it was not only generally noticed, but General Long, in his report, says that I moved my battalion with "great rapidity." Having consulted with Colonel Thomas H. Carter, my immediate superior officer, during the time of harnessing, &c., it was fully understood that Carter's battery, two rifles and two light twelves, should take the lead and occupy the salient itself—to be followed in order by Montgomery, four light twelves, who was to take position just to the left of Carter; Fry, two rifles under

command of Lieutenant Deas, to take position about one hundred yards to the right of Carter; and Reese, four rifles, about fifty yards to the right of Fry. Total, fourteen guns—two of Fry's guns having been sent, the day previous, on detached service, under the immediate command of Captain Fry.

As we ascended the hill, just before entering the long, narrow and difficult space between the woods on our left and line of works on our right, through which the column had to pass in order that the batteries might get into their respective positions, one of Montgomery's guns became detained by some accident, and thus escaped capture. There was a heavy fog and some scattering musketry, but no enemy visible, though they must have been much nearer than I had any idea of, as subsequent events showed. Arrived at the salient, and having explained to Captain William P. Carter that he was to occupy that point with his four guns, and having pointed out to Captain Montgomery the position for his three guns, just on Carter's left, I returned along the line of works by which we had come, in order to place Fry's two guns under Lieutenant Deas, and thence to Reese's battery. Having seen Reese going into position, I started off to return to Montgomery's battery (formerly commanded by me), but was astonished to find that the enemy had already captured that part of the line, together with Montgomery's three guns, Carter's four and Fry's two. Captain Carter, as I afterwards understood from some of the men who had escaped, had succeeded in getting two of his guns in position and fired twice. None of Montgomery's guns were in position. Lieutenant Charles L. Coleman, of this battery, fell mortally wounded, and his body was never recovered. It is said that while lying on the ground a corporal, in the confusion, asked him which way he should point the gun. "At the Yankees!" he replied, and those were his last words. Lieutenant Deas was wounded and captured while endeavoring, as usual, to do his utmost, regardless of odds, and if I remember rightly, he succeeded in firing once. In this condition of affairs, I returned to Reese's battery at once, and ordered Captain Reese to save his guns. Only one was saved, and this was brought off under the charge of a sergeant, whose name, I regret to say, I cannot recall. Captain Reese and the remaining three guns were captured, without the opportunity of firing a shot. This rifle gun of Reese's, therefore, and Montgomery's brass twelve-pounder, before mentioned, were the only two guns of my battalion that were saved, and I came off with them along

with Lieutenant Cochran, of Montgomery's battery, and perhaps others. The remaining twelve guns of my battalion were captured, to wit: five brass twelve-pounders and two iron rifles in and close to the salient; and five iron rifles some one hundred and fifty yards or more to the right. Had our guns been in position, my capture along with them might have been a necessity. As it was, I escaped just as I would have done from a captured wagon train. The seven guns in and near the salient could easily have been, and probably were, at once hauled off by the enemy, through an opening, just at the salient, in the works, made by us previously, for the express purpose of passing guns. I remained on the field until ordered by General Long to collect, at some point near the Courthouse, what men and material I had left, and there to await further orders—Montgomery, that gallant officer, remaining on the field with one gun.

About eight P. M., I received orders, through Lieutenant S. H. Pendleton from General Long, to report to General Ewell, at the Harris house, with the men I had, for the purpose of hauling off four brass guns, said to have been recaptured during the day. Sergeant S. S. Green (son of the late Doctor Green, U. S. N., and formerly of Culpeper), of Montgomery's battery, was with me, and volunteered to search for the guns, with the view of sending me word if he found them, so that I could join him with the rest of the men, about thirty all told. Sergeant Green, however, returned after about an hour's absence and reported that he had been unable to find any guns, although he had gone with the guide furnished by General Ewell. I reported this to General Ewell, but at once went, in person, with all the men, and forming them into a skirmish line, searched for those guns until about three A. M., when we were compelled to relinquish the work owing to the withdrawal of our picket-line. For the correctness of this statement, I refer you to Sergeant Green's letter, herewith inclosed. I remember distinctly that we found caissons but no guns. The manner in which we distinguished them as caissons was by feeling them, as it was too dark to see. When I returned to report to General Ewell, he was gone, nor do I remember ever to have spoken to him or thought about it since, as I considered that I had endeavored to do my duty to the best of my ability, and so thought the matter had ended, until I saw General Ewell's report. It appears, therefore, that if four guns were there to be hauled off, and I do not deny that they were, I failed to find them, but not without a

diligent search, in person, for the space of about five hours. General Ewell, therefore, fell into an error, unintentionally, no doubt, in supposing, as he states in his report, that I "left the duty to an orderly sergeant."

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. C. M. PAGE,  
*Late Major of Artillery, Confederate States Army.*

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*Letter from Sergeant Green.*

CHARLESTON, WEST VA., September 13, 1879.

Major R. C. M. PAGE:

My Dear Sir—Yours of the 19th ultimo has been received, but not without some delay, owing to my absence from this place at the time of its arrival.

I cheerfully give you my recollections of our attempt to find some guns, said to have been recaptured by our infantry on the 12th day of May, 1864, at the battle of Spotsylvania.

I was at that time first gun sergeant of Montgomery's battery, of the artillery battalion of which you were major.

My recollection of the main facts in this connection are clear. Three of the guns of our battery with others of the battalion, and many caissons, had been captured early on the morning of the 12th. On the night of the 12th you told me that you had information that some of the guns had been recaptured and run to some point not far back of where they had been captured in the morning. I volunteered to go with a squad of men to hunt them and bring them off. This was in the early part of a very dark, and, I think, rainy night. After a fruitless search, I returned and reported to you that I could not find them; which fact, I think, you reported to General Ewell (we then being at his headquarters). Within a few moments afterwards, we started again in search of said guns, you taking charge of the squad in person. We continued this search until the falling back of our skirmish line left us without any picket between us and the Federal army; but never succeeded in finding a single gun; though, I think, we did find one or two caissons.

The fact that you were along, and had charge in person, is distinctly impressed on my mind.



I remember you and myself, during one search, stumbling over a wounded soldier, covered with an oil cloth, but whom we could not see for the darkness of the night.

Hoping this may agree with your recollections on the subject,

I am, yours truly,

S. S. GREEN.

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*Letter from General A. L. Long.*

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA., September 15, 1879.

Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society :*

My Dear Sir—General Ewell in his report of the battle of Spotsylvania, May 12, 1864, states that Major Page “left the duty to an orderly sergeant” of getting off some guns said to be recaptured, and that “they were thus allowed to fall again into the enemy’s hands.”

In this statement General Ewell does unintentional injustice to Major Page, who was one of the most faithful and energetic officers in my command.

My recollection is that Major Page did everything in connection with these guns that a diligent officer could do.

Evidence, besides, has recently been placed in my possession, which shows conclusively that Major Page did not leave the duty of finding and removing these guns exclusively to a sergeant, but went, in person, to see about the matter.

The way in which General Ewell fell into error, was that Sergeant Green (a first-class man) volunteered to go for the guns, and not being able to find them, reported that fact to Major Page, who, in turn, reported it to General Ewell. But immediately thereupon Major Page went with the men, in person, to look for the guns, but did not so inform General Ewell, who was gone when he returned.

He made a diligent and faithful search, which was not relinquished till the withdrawal of our pickets. The result was the finding of some caissons only.

Very respectfully and truly, yours,

A. L. LONG,

*Late Brigadier-General and Chief Artillery, Second Corps, A. N. V.*

*Letter from Colonel T. H. Carter.*

RICHMOND, October 2d, 1879.

Doctor J. WILLIAM JONES,

*Secretary Southern Historical Society :*

My Dear Doctor—I have read the correspondence you handed me. It will correct all erroneous statements in General Ewell's report of the 12th October, at Spotsylvania Courthouse—an error made, of course, under a misapprehension of the facts, and calculated to do injustice to a faithful and gallant officer of my command. Moreover, I have just heard from an unimpeachable source that Mr. J. M. Stone, of Hanover, within the last week, has asserted positively, that he himself spent the greater portion of the night of the 12th October, in company with Major Page, searching for these guns. Mr. Stone was a member of Major Page's artillery battalion, which was a part of my artillery division. His statement fully confirms Sergeant Green's recollection of the search, and is conclusive. There was no more fair or ingenuous gentlemen in our army than General Ewell, and it is clear that he was misinformed in this matter.

Very truly, yours,

THOMAS H. CARTER,

*Colonel Commanding Artillery Division, A. N. V., in late war.*

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**General Longstreet's Report of Affair of October 27th, 1864.**

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, A. N. V.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. TAYLOR,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, A. N. V.:*

Colonel—On the 19th of October, having partially recovered from my wound received at the battle of the Wilderness, I reported for duty, and assumed command of the troops on the north side of the James river, consisting of the local defence troops, commanded by Lieutenant-General Ewell, Hoke's division, Field's division, and Gary's brigade of cavalry, as well as Pickett's division, holding the lines from the James river to Swift creek.

General Ewell's command was in position in the trenches, between the river and Fort Gilmer; General Hoke between the New Market and the Darbytown roads, and General Field took up the line to the Charles City road, both along the line of works which had been thrown up connecting Fort Gilmer with the exterior line, at the Charles City road. General Gary was picketing the White Oak swamp, the crossings of which had been obstructed, and had the main body of his cavalry to the left of and back of the outer line of works.

On the 25th of October, I was advised of the crossing of heavy bodies of the enemy to the north side of the river, continuing until the morning of the 27th.

General Field was directed to throw a strong regiment across the Charles City road, and every effort was made to strengthen my works and dispose of the force at my command, so as to cover the long line I had to defend as well as possible. Early on the morning of the 27th, it became evident that the enemy was moving to my left, and about nine o'clock heavy skirmishing, amounting in some places almost to attacks, was opened along my line, from the New Market to the Charles City road. Under cover of this fire the enemy pushed a column through the White Oak swamp, cutting out the obstructions at Hobson's crossing—a point about a mile and a half below the line of works—and driving off the cavalry pickets stationed there. Anticipating such a move, being convinced the skirmishing between the New Market and Charles City roads was but a feint, and that the real move was to flank our position, by crossing the swamp, and taking the unoccupied works on the Williamsburg and Nine-Mile roads, down which they would then

sweep, I had ordered Field and Hoke to move by the left flank, along the works, leaving only strong lines of skirmishers on the fronts they were leaving, and ordered Gary to the Nine-Mile road, to hold the works at that point. This movement was made rapidly and continued till the left of Field rested just beyond the Williamsburg road. Johnson's and Haskell's battalions of artillery were moved with the infantry, and placed in suitable positions along the line. When the head of the column reached the Williamsburg road, the enemy were already advancing a strong line of skirmishers on the works at that point. They were handsomely repulsed by our advance, by a portion of General Gary's command, and the column took position along the old line of works. Hardly had Field located himself when an attack in very heavy force was attempted on his front, over the open ground on each side of the Williamsburg road. This was repulsed with ease, and small loss to ourselves, but with heavy loss to the enemy, in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major Johnson's artillery assisted materially in this success. No other effort was made by the enemy at this point, and only a heavy artillery fire kept up for about an hour. In the meanwhile, Gary had moved a part of the way over to the Nine-Mile road, when he sent word to me that no enemy had appeared on that road, and that his scouts reported none as being about. He was then ordered to return and attack the force in front of Field, on the flank. While in the execution of these orders, he received information that the enemy were attacking the small force picketing the Nine-Mile road, and he withdrew his command to their assistance. Moving with promptness, he arrived only in time to see his small squadron driven out of the salient at that part of the line, by the heavy advance of the enemy's skirmishers, supported by a large force in line of battle, and about one hundred yards from the works. A piece of artillery had been captured. Immediately forming his line at right angles with the works, Gary charged down them, taking the enemy in flank, routing them and recapturing the piece of artillery. This was accomplished with such rapidity that our loss was but slight.

The fruits of these successes, so creditable to the officers and men engaged, and resulting in the complete defeat of a most determined effort to take Richmond on the north side, amounted to (11) eleven stands of colors, captured in the assault of Field's position, and about (600) six hundred prisoners, most of whom



were taken through the personal exertions of Captain Lyle, of Fifth South Carolina.

During the night the enemy withdrew their forces to their original positions.

For a more detailed account of the operations of the day, I have the honor to refer you to the accompanying reports of the subordinate commanders.

I am indebted to the members of my staff for efficient services rendered during the day.

I am, Colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET, *Lieutenant-General.*

*List of Casualties in the Engagement on the Williamsburg Road on October 27, 1864.*

COMMAND.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Field's Division :									
Law's Brigade.....	.....	1	.....	5	.....	2	.....	8	8
Gregg's Brigade.....	.....	4	.....	15	.....	.....	.....	19	19
Bratton's Brigade.....	.....	1	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	3	3
Benning's Brigade.....	.....	.....	1	4	.....	.....	1	4	5
Anderson's Brigade.....	1	1	.....	5	.....	3	1	9	10
Total Field's Division.....	1	7	1	31	.....	5	2	43	45
Gary's Cavalry Brigade.....	.....	2	.....	3	.....	3	.....	8	8
Artillery.....	.....	.....	1	8	.....	2	1	10	11
	1	9	2	42	.....	10	3	61	64

## Editorial Paragraphs.

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OUR NEXT NUMBER WILL COMPLETE VOLUME VII of our *Papers*, and with it will also expire the subscription of the larger proportion of our subscribers.

We hope that they will all make up their minds to *renew promptly*, and if any of them prefer to take a good start by sending their subscriptions even before they receive their last number, it will be all the better.

And will not our friends exert themselves to get us up clubs in their respective communities? We promise that there shall not only be no diminution in the interest and value of the *Papers*, but that they shall improve as the years go on.

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"THE HOOD ORPHAN FUND" is gradually increasing, but ought to be vigorously pushed *now*. He bequeathed them to the care of his old brigade, but comrades of the Army of Northern Virginia, whose fame he did so much to win, and of the Army of the Tennessee, whose annals his gallantry illustrated, Confederates generally, whose cause he served so faithfully, and lovers of patriotic devotion to duty everywhere, should esteem it a sacred privilege to see that these helpless orphans are not only placed beyond the fear of want, but that they are properly educated and provided for.

Funds intended for this noble object should be sent to the committee in New Orleans, who have charge of the matter, but if it will be any convenience to contributors, it would be to us a "labor of love" to receive and forward their donations.

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ORIGINAL REPORTS, LETTER BOOKS, and Documents of every description, bearing on the war, are still earnestly desired at this office; for, while we have already an invaluable collection, we are as anxious as ever to make it as full and complete as possible. And, where our friends have valuable documents which they are not willing to part with, but which they are willing to have copied, we beg that they will *send them at once to our office*, where they can be copied both for our own use and that of the War Department in Washington.

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OUR ANNUAL REPORT for the year ending 1st of November, 1879, will appear in our next (December) number, together with a report of our annual meeting.

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THE "ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA MEMORIAL VOLUME" has been delayed longer than was anticipated. But it is now fast approaching completion, and subscribers will be compensated for the delay by its containing, in addition to the matter promised, General Fitz. Lee's address on "*Chancellorsville*," to be delivered at the reunion on October 29th.

In order to secure the book, send on your subscriptions *at once*.



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Vol. VII.

Richmond, Va. December, 1879.

No. 12.

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Chancellorsville—Address of General Fitzhugh Lee before the Virginia Division, A. N. V. Association, October 29th, 1879.

*Mr. President, Comrades, and Ladies and Gentlemen :*

The musical echoes of the horn of the Alpine Chief, winding from highest mountain top to lowermost valley, were as sacred in the ears of his followers as the mystic fire which burned in the temple of the Virgins of Vesta, and its blast drew every man from his wife, his sweetheart and his fireside. So, an invitation to speak to this Association of the historic Army of Northern Virginia, should sound upon the ear of the Confederate soldier as a mandate from a band of brothers, chained to him by the loving links of a mighty past, and whose future is indissolubly wrapped up with his in one common destiny—for all time, for sunshine and for storms; irresistibly drawing him from all other obligations, it brings him, however unworthy, before you to-night, to discharge the duty assigned him by your partiality.

At your bidding, fellow soldiers, I strike the strings of the harp of Auld Lang Syne, whose notes now are chords of peace, while picturing, with poor brush, the camp fires of war. The ruddy

glow will light up familiar scenes to you, because once again in imagination you will see the fiery hoof of battle plunged into the red earth of Virginia's soil. I approach it, as was said by the sage of Monticello, in his famous inaugural, "with those anxious and awful presentiments which the greatness of the charge and the weakness of my powers so justly inspire, and I humble myself before the magnitude of the undertaking." Soldiers, your committee requested that I should present to your consideration, a field of conflict which brings before the military student as high a type of an offensive battle as ever adorned the pages of history. The military wisdom of those directing the tactical and strategical manœuvres upon the Confederate side, was equaled only by the valor of the troops entrusted with the execution. Aye, the heart of the Southron of to-day will beat with lofty pride, his cheek will mantle with crimson consciousness, and the eyes of his children's children, yet unborn, will flash with inherited fire, as is seen the splendid laurel wreath which fame hangs upon the Confederate colors, fluttering so victoriously to the breeze in those early days of May, 1863, when the "stem of the willow shoots out a green feather, and butter cups burn in the grass."

For giants were wrestling *there*, for victory upon the gory ground of Chancellorsville. To understand clearly the combination which resulted in this success to the Confederate arms, go over with me, as briefly as possible, the immediate preceding events.

When the sun of September 17th, 1862, with the mellow splendor of autumn, had gone down beneath the horizon, 35,000 Southern soldiers, living and dead, slept upon the field of Sharpsburg—some waiting for to-morrow's conflict, others resting where they wearied, and lying where they fell. They had successfully withstood the assaults of the Federal army, numbering in action, according to McClellan's report, 87,164. On the 19th the Army of Northern Virginia recrossed the Potomac, and for weeks its encampments whitened the charming region of the lower Valley. Nineteen days after the battle, Mr. Lincoln, President of the United States, ordered McClellan to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive them south. On the 10th October, four days after the date of that order, the dashing commander of the Confederate horse, J. E. B. Stuart, led his cavalry back into Maryland, and riding around both flanks and rear, made a complete circuit of McClellan's army, possibly to inquire why Lincon's orders were not obeyed.



McClellan reported Stuart's march. Halleck, then Commander-in-Chief at Washington, replies to him: "The President has read your telegram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be likely to make raids north of it." On the 25th October, McClellan telegraphs that his "horses are broken down from fatigue and want of flesh." Lincoln rejoins: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything? Stuart's cavalry out marched ours, having certainly done more marked service in the Peninsula and every where since." On the 3d of November, twenty days after he had been ordered, McClellan finished crossing his army over the Potomac—not in General Lee's front, but in Loudoun county—carefully interposing the burly Blue Ridge between it and the Army of Northern Virginia, and securely holding the passes. Leaving Jackson in the lower Valley, General Lee quietly moved Longstreet and the cavalry up the Valley, and crossing them, at passes south of those held by McClellan, moved into Culpeper county, so that when the Federal commander reached Fauquier county the Rappahannock rolled once more peacefully between them. On the 7th of November, McClellan telegraphs: "I am now concentrating my troops in the direction of Warrenton." An order prepared two days before relieved him from the command of his army. The storm of official displeasure which had been growing deeper and blacker, had burst at last above the head of the young Napoleon, and the fury of the gale was destined to sweep *him*, who was once the idol of the army and the people, from further participation in the struggle. To-day the tempest tossed winds are quiet beneath the rays of the sun of peace, and as its Governor, McClellan's command is the State of New Jersey. Burnside was his successor. He decided to make a rapid march of his whole force upon Fredericksburg, making that the *base* of his operations, with Richmond as the objective point. On the 17th of November his advance, Sumner's column, 33,000 strong, arrived in front of Fredericksburg. Had his pontoons arrived, Burnside says, "Sumner would have crossed at once over a bridge in front of a city filled with families of Rebel officers and sympathizers of the Rebel cause, and garrisoned by a small squadron of cavalry and a battery of artillery." On the 15th, General Lee learned that transports and gunboats had arrived at Acquia creek. On the 18th Stuart, forcing his way across the Rappahannock at the Fauquier White Sulphur Springs, in the face of

cavalry and artillery, made a reconnoissance as far as Warrenton, reaching there just after the rear of the Federal column had left. His report satisfied General Lee that the whole Federal army had gone to Fredericksburg. He had previously been informed as to Sumner's march. McLaws' and Ransom's divisions, accompanied by Lane's battery of artillery and W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry, were at once put in motion for that place, and the whole of Longstreet's corps followed on the 19th. On the 21st Sumner summoned the town to surrender under a threat of cannonading it the next day. To this General Lee replied that the "Confederate forces would not use the place for military purposes, but its occupation by the enemy would be resisted," and directions were given for the removal of the women and children as rapidly as possible. The threatened bombardment did not take place; but in view of the imminence of a collision between the two armies, the inhabitants were advised to leave the city, and almost the entire population, without a murmur, abandoned their houses. "History presents no instance of a people exhibiting a purer and more unselfish patriotism or a higher spirit of fortitude or courage than was evinced by the citizens of Fredericksburg. They cheerfully incurred great hardships and privations, and surrendered their homes and property to destruction rather than yield them into the hands of the enemy of their country."

While the poisoned cup was not passed around as at Capua before its inhabitants surrendered to Fulvius, they pledged their fortunes, their families and their household goods to the cause with the faith which characterized the Romans when they put up for sale the ground occupied by Hannibal's camps during his siege of the city, and it was bought at a price not at all below its value. The law passed at the instance of the Tribune Oppius forbade, in the dark days of Rome, any woman from wearing a gay colored dress, and that none should approach nearer than a mile of any city or town in a car drawn by horses, because the public need was so urgent that private expenses must be restrained by law so as to give more for defence. The women of Fredericksburg, equally as patriotic, obeyed "without a murmur," and bore their proportion of the burdens of the hour, for the confirmation of which they have the recorded words of Robert E. Lee. On the 22d November, one day after the demand for the surrender of Fredericksburg, Stonewall Jackson began his march from Winchester, and in eight days transferred his corps, with an interval of two days' rest, to the vicinity of Fredericksburg (Dabney, page 594).

The first of December found the Confederate army united. It was Burnside's intention to cross the Rappahannock at once upon the arrival of his army, but the delay in receiving his pontoons prevented the movement—they did not reach him until the 22d or 23d of November. Could he have done so, Longstreet's corps only would have been in his front, as Jackson did not arrive until the 30th. It is certain, however, he would have encountered the united Confederate army somewhere, for General Lee was the commander of its detached parts. While the two armies are putting on the war paint, go with me to the spot where once stood the Philips' house. This elevated site was on the second and highest elevation from the river on the Stafford side, and was selected by Burnside for his headquarters during the battle of Fredericksburg. A magnificent view of all the surrounding country might here be seen through the field-glasses of the Federal commander.

Descending the hill from the Philips' house en route to the river we reach the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad, which, crossing the river by bridge, first curves westward before taking its northeasterly course to Acquia creek; then we come to a bottom through which flows a small stream; then we ascend the elevated table-land comprising the Lacy farm, and crossing it reach the Lacy house, Sumner's headquarters, and which is directly opposite Fredericksburg and on the hill above the river. The Rappahannock, drawing its sources from the Blue Ridge mountains, drains the counties of Fauquier, Rappahannock and Culpeper, while the Rapidan, its twin sister, flowing through Madison, Green and Orange, unites with it some twelve miles above Fredericksburg. From that point the river tranquilly meanders through a beautiful country until, passing between the counties of Lancaster and Middlesex, it is lost in the waters of the Chesapeake bay. It is navigable for steamboats and small sailing vessels ninety-two miles from its mouth to Fredericksburg, the head of navigation.

There are two fords between the city and the junction of the Rapidan. Three miles above by the Spotsylvania side, or six by the Stafford side, is Banks' ford, and above that is the United States, or Mine, or Bark Mill ford. On the Rappahannock, above the union of the two streams, comes first Richards' ford, then Kelly's, which is some thirty miles from a point in Stafford opposite Fredericksburg—this well-known ford unites Morrisville and adjacent country in Fauquier to Culpeper. On the Rapidan above the junction, we have first Ely's ford, then the Germanna, then Mitchell's, Morton's,



Raccoon, Summerville, Rapidan station or railroad bridge, where the Midland road crosses the Rapidan; all of which put the people of Culpeper and Orange in communication with each other. Above Fredericksburg the hills close in abruptly on the river, and continue more or less so all along the left or Stafford bank. On the right bank, beginning at Taylor's, above Fredericksburg, the hills, at first curving off from the river gradually, return in that direction, until at the distance of some four and a half miles from Fredericksburg, they gently decline into a series of soft waves of land, which terminate at the valley of Massaponnax. The rim of highland thus described, which begins at Taylor's and ends near Hamilton's crossing, is the shape of a half of a vast ellipse.

At a point opposite to the town it detaches from its front, as it were, an elevated plain. On the edge of this plain, nearest to Fredericksburg, is the famous Marye house and hill, and at its base runs the stone wall, apparently built to hold the parapet of made earth and prevent its being washed away. The convex side of this encircling rim of highland and the river inclose the plains of Fredericksburg—an extensive piece of table-land two and one half miles across its greatest diameter. Hazel run, breaking between Marye's hill and Lee's hill (the latter so called because occupied by General Lee during the battle of Fredericksburg as headquarters), crosses the plain in its northerly course to the river. The Narrow Gauge railroad to Orange Courthouse and the Telegraph road to Spotsylvania Courthouse, twelve miles away to the south, take advantage of this opening to get through the hills. Lower down Deep run crosses the flats at its widest part, having drawn its source from the highlands; and still lower, beyond Hamilton's, flows into the river, a bolder stream than the other two, called the Massaponnax. On the eastern or lower side of the town debouches the River or Port Royal road, running parallel to the river. This road runs between earthen banks some three feet high; on which had been planted hedge rows of trees, principally cedar, whose roots held the ground firmly, making a low double rank of natural fortifications, some four and a half miles long, and affording an excellent place to align troops.

The railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, sixty-one miles distant, crosses this plain transversely, running easterly until it reaches the hills at Hamilton's around whose base it curves upon its southerly course. From the side of the town next to Marye's hill proceeds the Old turnpike and the Plank road. At the limits o



the town they are merged into one, which crosses Marye's hill some fifty yards north of the house, runs south to Salem church, six miles, where they separate, the Old turnpike being the right hand or more northern road. At Chancellorsville, twelve miles from Fredericksburg, they unite and continue the same road until Wilderness church is reached beyond—when they again separate, the Plank road running as before to the south. The Wilderness tavern is some miles further on towards Orange Courthouse on the Old turnpike, and some miles further on this road is crossed by Wilderness run, and here comes in the road from Germanna ford, on the Rapidan. The direct road from Kelly's ford on the Rappahannock to Chancellorsville crosses the Rapidan at Ely's ford.

By keeping this imperfect topographical description in view, it will facilitate a better understanding of the strategical and tactical operations of the opposing armies; for participation in battles, unless as a commander of rank, will give but little knowledge of localities, such knowledge being in inverse ratio to the closeness of your discharge of military duties.

Before dawn on the 11th of December the Confederate signal gun announced that Burnside's army was in motion. Two days and two nights were consumed in getting the Federal soldiers over a river three hundred yards wide, spanned by four pontoon bridges, the laying down of which was resisted by the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Twenty-first Mississippi regiments, comprising Barksdale's splendid brigade of McLaws' division, and the Third Georgia and Eighth Florida, of R. H. Anderson's division. With these six small regiments Barksdale held the Federal army at the river bank for sixteen hours, giving the Confederate commander ample time to prepare for battle (Longstreet's report).

The Federal army was divided into three grand divisions, the right under Sumner, the centre under Hooker, the left under Franklin. Sixty thousand troops and one hundred and sixteen cannon were under Franklin, opposing our right near Hamilton's crossing; he having Burns' division from the Ninth corps, of Sumner's command, and two divisions of Stoneman's corps, of Hooker's. Sumner had about twenty-seven thousand of his own and about twenty-six thousand of Hooker's troops, with one hundred and four cannon (Hunt's report), attacking our right at Marye's hill, making a grand total that Burnside had of 113,000 (his report); he had also one hundred and fifty-seven heavy guns in reserve. Burnside lost in killed, wounded and missing 12,353 (his report), and failing to

dislodge the Confederate army, recrossed the river. The Army of Northern Virginia was divided into two corps, under Longstreet and Jackson. The official returns on the 10th of December, 1862, one day before Burnside's advance, showed present for duty 78,228 (Walter Taylor's *Four Years with Lee*). Jackson's corps lost in killed, wounded and missing 3,415 (his report). Longstreet's loss was 1,894 (his report), making a total of 5,309. The battle of Fredericksburg was a grand sight as Lee witnessed it from the centre of his lines, on that memorable 13th of December, and Burnside through his field-glasses, from a more secure position two miles in rear of the battlefield, at the Philips' house, with the river flowing between himself and his troops. As the fog lifted it was like some grand drama disclosed by the curtain rolling up. The plain of Fredericksburg resembled the "field of the cloth of gold," where—

"The gilded parapets were crowned with faces,  
And the great tower filled with eyes up to the summit,  
To rain influence and to judge the prize."

The roar of three hundred cannon (the Federals alone had three hundred and seventy-five in their army) formed the orchestra, the city of Fredericksburg their audience.

"Hark! as those smouldering piles with thunder fall,  
A thousand shrieks for hopeless mercy call.  
Earth shook, red meteors flashed along the sky,  
And conscious nature shuddered at the cry."

As I stood at one time during the day on Hood's lines and saw this gorgeous military pageant beneath me—over one hundred thousand men in line of battle, a line of blue with bristling bayonets, both of whose flanks were visible—it was the grandest sight my eyes ever rested upon; and in history I cannot recall its parallel. The Federal plan of battle was defective, so far as trying to force General Lee's left, for that was impregnable. Were it possible to have carried Marye's hill, no Federal force could have lived there, for a concentrated converging fire from the heights in rear which commanded it, and of which Marye's was simply an outpost, would have swept them from its face. Holding fast with a small force in Fredericksburg, protected by reserve artillery in Stafford, and reinforcing Franklin with the bulk of Sumner, and Hooker swinging around by his left to have threatened the Confederate line of communication, would have drawn General Lee away from Marye's

and forced a battle on more equal terms as to position. The popular notion that General Jackson wanted to move down on the Federals after their repulse and drive them into the Rappahannock, is disposed of by his own report, in which he says: "The enemy making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself, but the first gun had hardly moved from the wood a hundred yards when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the projected movement should be abandoned." With the Federal defeat all was quiet along the Rappahannock, both armies "seeking the seclusion that a cabin grants" in winter quarters. Two more attempts were made to cross the army over the river by General Burnside, one at a point opposite Seddon's house, some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg, which President Lincoln stopped, because, as he said, no prominent officer in the command had any faith in it; and later a second attempt was made to cross above Falmouth. This movement was intended to flank Marye's hill by reaching the Plank road towards Salem church and beyond it. A glance at the topography of the country and the position of the Confederate army will show that such strategy possessed none of the elements of success. On the 25th of January an order from the War Department relieved Generals Burnside, Sumner and Franklin, his right and left grand division commanders, from duty, and placed Major-General Hooker in command of the army. They were removed, the order states, at their own request. But Burnside (Report of Committee on Conduct of War, page 721) says the order did not express the facts in the case as far as he was concerned. The day after Hooker was placed in command he read the following letter from Mr. Lincoln:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., January 26, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER :

General—I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons. And yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm. But I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong both



to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard in such way as to believe it of your recently saying, that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear the spirit you have aided to infuse into the army of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! beware of rashness! but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

The same day, in General Orders No. 1, Hooker assumed command, saying, among other things, "In equipment, intelligence and valor the enemy is our inferior. Let us never hesitate to give him battle wherever we can find him." Considering his enemy was in full view and there was no difficulty in finding him, his not attacking for over three months was a slight hesitation. Was it owing to their being inferior in equipment, in intelligence and valor? An interval of quiet now intervened, which was devoted to placing both armies in the best possible condition. Officers and privates amused themselves as best they could in passing the winter away. In the second Federal corps, for instance, we are told by its commander that the "higher officers spend their time in reading newspapers or books, playing cards, or the politician, drinking whiskey, and grumbling. Of course" (he says) "this charge does not include all by a long way, for it (viz: the corps) contains some of the finest officers that ever drew sword, from Major-General down"; and then signs it D. N. Couch,\* Major-General commanding. The monotony was occasionally relieved by cavalry reconnoissances, skirmishes and encounters.

One of these I shall mention briefly, because it was the hardest contested purely cavalry fight I participated in during the war, and because in it a young, rising and already celebrated artillerist closed a short but brilliant career.

In a dispatch to Halleck, Commander-in-Chief, dated March 16th,

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\*Letter to Seth Williams.—Page 776, Military Record of Rebellion.



6.30 P. M., Hooker says: "This morning I dispatched three thousand cavalry to attack and break up the cavalry camp of Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton in the vicinity of Culpeper" (page 799, Military Reports of Rebellion). Next, Butterfield, Chief of Staff to Hooker, in a dispatch to General Reynolds, of the First corps, gives the result: "I send you the following synopsis of Averell's affair. Captain Moore, of General Hooker's staff, who accompanied him, reports it as a brilliant and splendid fight—the best cavalry fight of the war—lasting five hours; charging and recharging on both sides; our men using their sabres handsomely, and with effect, driving the enemy three miles into cover of earthworks and heavy guns. Forces about equal." Stanton, Secretary of War, then telegraphs to Hooker: "I congratulate you upon the success of General Averell's expedition. It is good for the first lick. You have drawn the first blood, and I hope now soon to see the boys up and at them." It was Sir Walter Raleigh who said "that human testimony was so unreliable that no two men could see the same occurrence and give the same report of it." The official reports of Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee, written at the time, tell us that the fighting at Kelleysville, was done alone by a portion of Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, without any other support being nearer to them than the main army at Fredericksburg, and that Averell was driven back across the river defeated. The absence of four squadron on detached duty, and the detail of a large part of the command to go to their homes for fresh horses for the spring campaign, reduced the five regiments engaged to a total of less than 800 men in the saddle. The aggregate loss in men being 133, in horses 173. The latter is mentioned, because the ratio of horses killed to those wounded exceeded that of any cavalry engagement known to me. There were 71 horses killed, and 87 wounded, which, with 12 captured on picket, would make the 173. This fact shows the closeness of the contending forces. Stuart and Pelham, his Chief of Artillery, were accidentally at Culpeper Courthouse, in attendance on a court-martial as witnesses, their quarters being in rear of Fredericksburg. Pelham was in the act of getting on the cars to return to his camp, when, hearing there was a prospect for a fight, he borrowed a horse, and Stuart and himself joined me on the field, though the former did not assume command. Yes! Pelham fell at Kelleysville—a blue-eyed, light haired boy, a graduate of West Point of the class of 1861, and an officer of superb courage and dash.

A noble, young Alabamian, immortalized by Jackson saying, in

substance, of his behavior in command of the guns on the left at Sharpsburg, that an army should have a Pelham on each flank. At Fredericksburg, General Lee calls him, in his official report, "the gallant Pelham," for with two guns, away out on the plains in front of Hamilton's crossing, he enfiladed the advancing Federal lines of battle, halted and held for a time Doubleday's division of the attacking column, sustaining, as General Lee says (in his official report), the fire of four batteries "with that unflinching courage that ever distinguished him." An old farmer in Maryland, looking at Pelham's beardless face, girlish smile and slender figure, said to General Stuart, "Can these boys fight?" Aye! let Lee and Jackson tell. Let Stuart's general orders, March 30th, 1863, speak: "The Major-General Commanding approaches with reluctance the painful duty of announcing to the division its irreparable loss in the death of Major John Pelham, commanding the horse artillery. He fell mortally wounded in the battle of Kelleysville, March 17th, with the battle-cry on his lips and the light of victory beaming from his eye. His eye had glanced on every battlefield of this army from the First Manassas to the moment of his death, and he was, with a single exception, a brilliant actor in them all. The memory of the gallant Pelham, his many virtues, his noble nature, his purity of character, is enshrined as a sacred legacy in the hearts of all who knew him." Young as he was, "his mourners were two hosts—his friends and his foes." He was worthy to have his sword buried alongside of him, that no less worthy hand might ever wield it. An honor paid to chevalier Bayard by the Spanish General in Francis the First's fatal Italian campaign against Charles the Fifth. Sleep on, gallant Pelham, and may your spirit "look through the vista to the everlasting hills, bathed in eternal sunlight."

Spring had now arrived. "A thousand pearly drops, thrown by dewy morning into the valley's lap," could everywhere be seen. "And pushing the soil from her bonny pink shoulders, the clover glides forth to the world. Fresh mosses gleam in the gray, rugged boulders, with delicate May dew imperaled. In the aisles of the orchard fair blossoms are drifting. The tulip's pale stalk from the garden is lifting a goblet of gems to the sun." Hooker must move now. On the 11th of April, he tells Lincoln that he "will have more chance of inflicting a heavier blow upon the enemy by turning his position to my right, and, if practicable, to sever his connection with Richmond, with my Dragoon force, and such light batteries as may be deemed advisable to send with them." On the

13th he orders his cavalry forward to cross the upper fords of the Rappahannock, and swing from there around to Lee's rear. On the 14th they appeared and made a dash at Kelley's ford; but, in the words of W. H. F. Lee's report, "dashed back again from the fire of the picket of one hundred and fifty men, under Captain Bolling, Company G, Ninth Virginia cavalry." On the same day they succeeded in crossing at Rappahannock station, but on the appearance of reinforcements, recrossed. On the 15th they crossed at Beverley's and Welford's fords, but were driven back by W. H. F. Lee with Chambliss' Thirteenth Virginia cavalry. At 10.15 P. M. that night, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to Hooker:

"The rain and mud of course were to be calculated upon. General Stoneman is not moving rapidly enough to make the expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of which were unusually fair weather, and all free from hindrance from the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To reach his point, he has still sixty to go. By arithmetic, how many days will it take him to do it? Write me often. I am very anxious.

"A. LINCOLN."

Heavy rains stopped Stoneman, the Federal account tells us, and he was directed to remain on Hooker's right, threatening the upper fords. This cavalry force, according to the consolidated morning report of the Army of the Potomac for April 30th, 1863, had an aggregate of officers and men of 13,398 present for duty. His Chief Quartermaster, from Stoneman's new position, sent a return to army headquarters for rations for 12,000 men and 17,000 horses. This did not include a brigade of Pleasanton's division of three regiments and a battery under that officer left behind with Hooker.

The Federal army at this time consisted of seven corps, exclusive of the cavalry corps, viz: First, Reynolds; Second, Couch; Third, Sickles; Fifth, Meade; Sixth, Sedgwick; Eleventh, Howard, and Twelfth, Slocum—with three divisions to the corps, except Slocum, who only had two, making twenty divisions. Stoneman's cavalry corps consisted of three divisions, under Pleasanton, Buford and Averell. General Hunt, as Chief of Artillery, had about three hundred and seventy-five cannon. The Federal returns of April 30th, before mentioned, gives, under the head of present for duty, 130,260 enlisted men; an aggregate of officers and men of 138,378 present for duty, and a grand aggregate of 157,990 present; and under the head of present for duty equipped, there "is given only



those who are actually available for the line of battle at the date of the report." We find a total of officers and men of 133,708.

On the Confederate side, the force operating at Chancellorsville consisted of McLaws' and Anderson's divisions of Longstreet's corps (Hood's and Pickett's divisions of that corps, under Longstreet, were in the vicinity of Suffolk, on the south side of James river), and Jackson's corps, of A. P. Hill's, Early's, D. H. Hill's under Rodes, and Trimble's under Colston, and two brigades of cavalry under W. H. F. Lee and Fitzhugh Lee. Hampton's brigade was absent, having been sent to the interior to recruit, and W. E. Jones was in the Valley. Present, then, we find six infantry divisions or twenty-eight brigades, and the cavalry brigades of nine regiments. The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia nearest to the battle extant—viz: 31st March, 1863—shows in Anderson's and McLaws' divisions, 15,649; in Jackson's corps, 33,333; in reserve artillery, 1,621. That return puts the cavalry at 6,509. My brigade numbered about 1,500 (it will be remembered at Kelleysville, two weeks before, it numbered 800) and W. H. F. Lee's about 1,200, making 2,700 cavalry; and the discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that Hampton's and Jones' brigades were included in the return, because, though absent, they were included in the Army of Northern Virginia, and their returns sent to the Assistant Adjutant-General at army headquarters.

Add 15,649, and 33,333, and 1,621, and 2,700 together and you have present at Chancellorsville a Confederate total of 53,303, with some 170 pieces of artillery. My numbers differ from Walter Taylor's 57,112 by 3,809, which is the difference between 6,509 cavalry he gives and 2,700, about the actual number present. Allan makes our force out 58,200. Now let us see what 133,708 fighting men in blue did with 53,303 "boys in gray."

It will be demonstrated that "the finest army on the planet," as Hooker termed it, "was like the waves of the ocean driven upon the beach by some unseen force, and whose white crests were so soon broken into glittering jewels on the sand." On the 21st April Hooker telegraphs to General Peck, who at Suffolk was growing impatient, hoping to be relieved from the pressure against him by Hooker's movements: "You must be patient with me; I must play with these devils before I can spring." On the 26th April orders were issued for the Eleventh and Twelfth corps to march at sunrise on the 27th for Kelly's ford, and to be encamped there on the 28th by 4 P. M. Stoneman's headquarters were then at Warrenton



Junction. On 27th April, Lincoln, who knows something is going on, telegraphs at 3.30 P. M., "How does it look now?" Hooker replies: "I am not sufficiently advanced to give an opinion." On the 27th an order was sent to Couch, of the Second corps, to move two of his divisions to take post at United States ford, "the movement to be made quietly, and the officers and men to be restrained from exhibiting themselves." Troops to have eight days' rations. Bridge not to be laid at Banks' ford until the night of the 29th. On the 27th, the Fifth corps, Meade's, was moved to Hartwood church, and on the 28th to Kelly's ford. So much for the four corps and one division (Gibbons') that were moving up the river to cross and swing around on the Confederate left and rear. The remaining three corps—viz: First, Third and Sixth—were ordered to cross the river below Fredericksburg at the mouth of Deep run, "Franklin's old crossing," and at Pollock's mill creek—the First and Sixth to be in position to cross on or before 3.30 A. M. of the 29th, and the Third on or before 4.30 A. M. of same day. These three corps were to constitute the left wing of the army—were to hold and amuse General Lee and prevent him from observing the great flank movement of the right wing, and to pursue him, when manœuvred out of his entrenchments, by the approaching hosts on his left-rear.

The aggregate present for duty on 30th April, 1863, in the First corps was 17,130; in Third, 17,859; in Sixth, 22,425; total, 57,414; or taking those actually in line of battle, the present for duty equipped, and we have First corps, 14,728; Third, 16,491; Sixth, 21,182; total, 52,401. Hooker's original left wing was about equal in numbers then to General Lee's whole army, and his right wing, or marching column, of four infantry corps and one cavalry corps, would represent his numerical advantage in strength.

On the 30th, the Third corps was ordered to move by the shortest road on Stafford side to United States ford and Chancellorsville; and at 8 A. M. on that day, Sedgwick was ordered to make a demonstration on Hamilton's crossing, to see whether the Confederates still hugged their defences. On same day, Couch, of Second corps, was ordered to cross United States ford with two of his divisions—the third, Gibbon's, being left at Falmouth. On the night of the 28th, Howard's Eleventh corps crossed Kelly's ford, a force being put over below the ford in boats, which moved up and took possession of it. On the morning of the 29th, the Twelfth and Fifth crossed. The force then over the river moved in two columns for

the Rapidan—the Eleventh and Twelfth, under Slocum, for Germanna ford, the Fifth for Ely's. Pleasanton, with one brigade of cavalry, accompanied the infantry. On the 28th, Hooker's headquarters were at Morrisville; on the night of the 30th they were established at Chancellorsville, while Butterfield, his Chief of Staff, was left at Falmouth as a sort of connecting link between the two wings, and for the purpose of sending dispatches around generally.

While these movements were in progress, what was General Lee doing? His army rested from the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg to Jackson's position at Moss Neck, fourteen miles below it. Anderson's division was on the extreme left—Mahone's and Posey's brigades being near United States ford, and Wilcox's brigade was at Banks' ford. Next to Anderson came McLaws' division; then Jackson's corps. The country between the Rappahannock and Rapidan was occupied by Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry and two regiments of W. H. F. Lee's—the whole under Stuart, watching the fords of the upper Rappahannock. That stream protected Hooker's march up the river from view. Our pickets were not encountered until the night of 28th, when his advance crossed Kelly's ford.

The Confederate commander knew a movement was in progress. With the serenity of almost superhuman intelligence he waited for it to be developed before his plans were laid to counteract it, for he remembered the maxim of the great Napoleon, that when your enemy is making a mistake he must not be interrupted. His attention was first attracted by the enemy crossing in boats before light on the 29th, driving off the pickets and proceeding to lay down pontoons at two points—one, as we have seen, below the mouth of Deep run, the other a mile below. A considerable force he saw was crossed during the day and massed out of sight under the high banks of the river. Early's division of Jackson's corps, which was near Hamilton's crossing, was at once moved by its alert commander into line on the railroad, the right at Hamilton's, the left on Deep run, occupying at the same time the River road in his front by three regiments, keeping the enemy from advancing to it (Early's report). The remainder of Jackson's corps was that day moved from its camps near Grace church and Moss Neck to Hamilton's—Rodes, in command of D. H. Hill's division, going into line on Early's right, perpendicular to the railroad, and extending to Massaponnax creek. Ramseur's brigade occupied the south side of creek, guarding the ford near its mouth. Rode's line,

under the superintendence of Colonels Thompson Brown and Tom Carter, was rapidly and strongly fortified. A. P. Hill's and Trimble's division, the latter under Colston, were formed in rear. And so General Lee waited.

Every country boasts its beautiful river, In France, the Seine, with its hills and valleys, forests and meadows, villages, towns and populous cities. In England, the Thames, with its green fields and quiet hamlets. In Austria, the beautiful blue Danube. In Russia, the frozen Neva. In Germany, the castle-lined Rhine. In America, the Hudson, the Potomac and the Father of Waters; and yet their beauty and sublimity did not equal the Rappahannock when spanned by pontoons, over which thousands of armed men were crossing, and whose clear surface was soon to be crimsoned by the blood of heroes wrestling for supremacy along its banks.

Hooker's advance, it will be remembered, crossed Kelly's ford, away up beyond General Lee's left, on the night of the 28th (Tuesday). Stuart received the information at 9 P. M. that night at Culpeper, and W. H. F. Lee, near Brandy, at once sent the Thirteenth Virginia cavalry to reinforce the pickets, and they checked the advance one mile from the ford. Orders were issued by Stuart that the enemy be enveloped with pickets; that his route from Kelly's might at once be ascertained, and that his whole cavalry force of seven regiments be thrown in his front to dispute his advance on daylight of the 29th.

On the 29th, the enemy not advancing towards the position of the cavalry between Brandy and Kelly's, Stuart knew he must be going elsewhere; so leaving one regiment, the Thirteenth Virginia, in position, he moved around with the remainder to get on the road from Kelly's to Germanna, and at Madden's, the intersection of the Stephensburg and Richards' ford with the Kelly's and Germanna road, he saw long columns of infantry marching for Germanna. His advance, Fitz. Lee's brigade, charged into the column, scattered it at the point struck, and the road they were marching on was temporarily seized and held. From prisoners taken it was ascertained that two corps were on that road and one on the Ely's Ford road, all marching on Chancellorsville. He at once informed General Lee by telegraph from Culpeper Courthouse of the fact. He had previously secured intelligence that a large body of the enemy were passing up the river; on the forenoon of the 29th that they had crossed at Kelly's, and later, on same day, that they were marching on Chancellorsville. After reaching that point he knew,



too, the two wings of the Federal army were fourteen miles apart—the distance from Chancellorsville to Deep run, below Fredericksburg—and that his army was between them. “Beware of rashness,” General Hooker. Some 50,000 “rebellious Rebels” have, by your own act, been placed between your two wings, and what is worse for you, they are commanded by Lee and Jackson. Oh! “beware of rashness.” General Lee perfectly understood the military problem thus presented to him. Drive the wedge in and keep the two parts assunder. If possible, hold one part *still* by a feint, or, if necessary, *retard* its march by a fight. Concentrate upon and overwhelm the other. Sedgwick, in command of the troops in the Confederate front, lay quiet while Hooker was massing at Chancellorsville.

In a conversation with a Confederate officer at Lexington, on February 16, 1868, General Lee said, in regard to Chancellorsville, that “Jackson at first preferred to attack Sedgwick’s force in the plain at Fredericksburg, but he told him he feared it was as impracticable as it was at the first battle of Fredericksburg. It was hard to get at the enemy and harder to get away if we drove him into the river.” “But,” said he to Jackson: “If you think it can be done, I will give orders for it.” Jackson then asked to be allowed to examine the ground, and did so during the afternoon, and at night came to Lee and said he thought he (Lee) was right. “It would be inexpedient to attack there.” “Move then,” said Lee, “at dawn to-morrow (the 1st May) up to Anderson,” who had been previously ordered to proceed towards Chancellorsville; “and the next time I saw Jackson,” said General Lee, “was upon the next day, when he was on our skirmish line, driving in the enemy’s skirmishers around Chancellorsville.”

Let us follow the movements there first. Hooker, at Morrisville on the 28th, ordered his cavalry corps to cross the river that night or before 8 A. M. on the 29th, above Kelly’s ford. A portion to move via Raccoon ford on the Rapidan to Louisa Courthouse, thence to the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad, to operate upon Lee’s communications. Another portion was to follow the Orange and Alexandria railroad up through Culpeper, to occupy the Confederate cavalry and to mask the movement. Stuart received orders to get in front, if possible, of the enemy moving towards Chancellorsville, delay him and protect the left of the army. He left W. H. F. Lee with two regiments, the Ninth and Tenth Virginia cavalry, about eight hundred troopers (the remain-



ing two regiments of that brigade—viz: the Second North Carolina and the Tenth Virginia—being on detached duty) to contend, as best he could, with Stoneman's cavalry, numbering, by the return of April 30, 1863, an aggregate present for duty of 13,398, or "actually available for the line of battle," 11,079—and which force all crossed the river with Stoneman, except three regiments under Pleasanton, which were retained by Hooker for service with his army. Fitz. Lee's brigade alone accompanied Stuart. It crossed the Rapidan at Raccoon ford on the night of the 29th April, and moved down the Plank road towards Chancellorsville. Couriers were sent to Germanna and Ely's fords to notify the Confederate pickets of the enemy's approach. These couriers were captured, and hence the notice was not received by them. By the good management of Captain Collins, of the cavalry, the enemy's advance was checked for some time at Germanna, and his wagons and implements saved—for he was fortifying it—though some of his men were captured. At Wilderness tavern, the intersection of Stuart's route with the road from Germanna, the marching infantry column was again met, attacked and delayed. The Third Virginia cavalry was then in its front to check its march; but hearing that Meade, via Ely's ford, had already reached Chancellorsville, the march of the cavalry was directed to Todd's tavern, which was reached on the night of the 30th. Stuart, with his staff, then proceeded towards Fredericksburg, to report in person to General Lee, but had not gone a mile before he was confronted by the enemy's cavalry. He sent back for a regiment. The Fifth Virginia was sent, which attacked and routed the force in his front. Another body of the Federal cavalry then came up in rear of the Fifth, to whose assistance the remainder of Fitz. Lee's brigade marched; when, by a series of charges in the bright moonlight of that night, the enemy were defeated and scattered. This force proved to be the Sixth New York cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, who was returning from a reconnoissance made from Chancellorsville towards Spotsylvania Courthouse, and whose gallant commander was killed, for I know well he rode at the head of his men.

The Third and Fourth cavalry were placed on General Lee's right flank, as he was moving on Chancellorsville; the First, Second and Fifth Virginia on his left, and these five regiments, with a portion of the Fifteenth Virginia, did duty for the Army of Northern Virginia.

Military critics, in charging that Stuart was not in Hooker's front

as he marched towards Chancellorsville, should recollect that Stoneman's cavalry corps, five times as great in numbers as Stuart's command, crossed on Hooker's right, and had to be watched and met.

At midnight on the 29th April, Anderson's division, moving under orders, reached Chancellorsville. Posey and Mahone of that command were already there, having been withdrawn from United States or Bark Mill ford. Early on the morning of the 30th, Anderson retired to the intersection of the Mine and Plank roads, near Tabernacle church, and began to entrench—the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, Hooker's advance, skirmishing with his rear guard as he left Chancellorsville.

General Lee, having now decided to hold Sedgwick at arm's length while he hammered Hooker, entrusted the former duty to Early, giving him, in addition to his own division, Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division and the reserve artillery under Pendleton. At midnight on the 30th, McLaws marched for Anderson, reaching him before sunrise on the 1st of May. At dawn, on May 1st, Jackson, too, marched for Anderson's position, reaching it at 8 A. M. At that hour he found Anderson entrenching along his line. Assuming command, Jackson ordered the work to be discontinued and the troops to be put in readiness to advance. At 11 A. M., Anderson moved out on the Plank road towards Chancellorsville, with the brigades of Wright and Posey leading, while McLaws marched on the Old turnpike, his advance being preceded by Mahone's brigade of Anderson's division, with Wilcox and Perry of the same division co-operating; while Jackson's corps, less Early's division, like the "Old Guard of Napoleon," followed Anderson. Alexander's battalion of artillery accompanied the advance.

Hooker *concentrated* on the 30th his right wing at Chancellorsville, and was in high spirits, for he issued then his General Order No. 47, which curiously reads thus: "It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the Commanding-General announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth corps have been a succession of splendid achievements." "Beware of rashness!" General Hooker; your troops have only done some marching without opposition, and while you write, your enemy is closing in upon you.

On May 1st, Hooker, having been joined by Sickles' corps and

the two divisions of Couch's corps, which had crossed at United States ford, determined to advance towards Fredericksburg with the purpose of driving his enemy away from Banks' ford, six miles below, in order to open a shorter and more direct communication with his left wing—in ignorance of the objections General Lee had to such a movement, because it interfered with his plan to keep the wings apart. The Fifth corps was ordered down the River road, the Twelfth down the Plank road, with the Eleventh in its rear. A division and battery of the Second corps was sent to Todd's tavern, on the Spotsylvania Courthouse road from Chancellorsville. The other divisions and batteries to be massed near Chancellorsville; the Third corps to be massed on United States Ford road, about one mile from Chancellorsville, except one brigade and one battery at Dowdall's, on Plank road, west of Chancellorsville; Pleasanton's cavalry to be at Chancellorsville, and Hooker's headquarters were ordered to be established at Tabernacle church—the movement to be completed by two o'clock. *It was not completed.* Indeed, as the head of the Twelfth corps, marching on the Plank road, emerged from the forest, they saw the Army of Northern Virginia advancing in line of battle. Then dropped, a little, Hooker's self-confidence.

He says, fearing that he could not throw his troops through the forest fast enough, and apprehensive of being whipped in detail, he ordered his army to retire to their lines around Chancellorsville. Changing at this point his "offensive strategy" to "defensive tactics" was fatal to him.

When Anderson met the enemy, Wright was ordered to turn his right with his brigade, and at Catherine furnace he had a sharp encounter with a portion of the Twelfth corps. Night stopped it, and at 10 P. M. Jackson ordered him back to the Plank road, along which Posey had, in the meantime, advanced to within a short distance of the enemy's entrenchments around Chancellorsville. McLaws had moved up the Old turnpike, Semmes' brigade on his left, and Mahone's, Wofford's and Perry's brigades of Anderson's division on his right, in the order named. Sykes' regulars were first met. They attacked Semmes, but were repulsed. Kershaw's brigade went to Semmes' support, but was not engaged. Wilcox, with his brigade, was ordered to the right, on Mine (or River) road, the cavalry having reported an advance there. Meade, it will be remembered, was on that road. McLaws continued to go forward, and halting at dark, bivouacked along the heights just beyond the



point where the Mine road crosses the turnpike. General Lee's line of battle was now within a mile of Chancellorsville, and close up to the enemy's entrenchments. *Here*, as he says, the enemy had "assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed with trees felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent works."

The left of Hooker's lines, extending from Chancellorsville to the Rappahannock, covered the United States ford, where, using a pontoon, he communicated with Sedgwick. From Chancellorsville, the right of his line ran at first in front of the Plank road, but was then retired, until it met again at Dowdall's or Melzei Chancellor's, the line forming the arc—the road the chord. From Dowdall's the line ran west to Wilderness church. At that point separates the Plank road and Old turnpike, which from Chancellorsville had been the same road, the former being the most southerly one.

Hooker's line ran west from this point along the Old turnpike. His right was held by O. O. Howard's Eleventh corps—two regiments and two companies of Colonel Van Gilsa's brigade of Devens's division occupying the extreme right, at right angles to the Old turnpike and to the west of the line running, in part, along it to the north of it, and facing west. Howard's report, which I quote partly to show the different nations the Southern people were fighting, says: "Schurz prolonged Devens' line eastward. He had three regiments of General Schimmelfennig's deployed and two in reserve; also two regiments of Colonel Krzyzanowski's brigade. General Steinwehr had two regiments of Colonel Bushbeck's and four guns of General Wiederich's were posted on Steinwehr's right."

Hooker's line of battle was in the shape of a V, well spread open at the ends, the apex being at Chancellorsville.

The problem presented to General Lee's mind on Friday night, May 1st, was to decide how best to attack Hooker's army on the morning of May 2d. Time was an important element; for near Fredericksburg, in his rear, was Sedgwick, largely outnumbering the Confederate force in his front under Early. During the afternoon, General Lee wished to attack from his right and cut Hooker off from United States ford, severing his communications with Sedg-



wick, and rode down himself and examined the lines all the way to the river, but found no place where he could do so. Returning at night, he found Jackson, and asked him if he knew of any place to attack. Jackson said, "No." Lee said, "Then we must get around on the Federal right." Jackson said he had been inquiring about roads by the furnace. Stuart came up then, and said he would go down to the furnace and see what he could learn about roads. He soon returned with Rev. Dr. B. T. Lacy, who said "a circuit could be made around by Wilderness tavern"; and a young man living in the county, and then in the cavalry, was sent for to act as guide.

Ah! what an earnest talk Lee and Jackson had on the night of May the 1st. At sunset they took their seats on a log on the right or north side of the Plank road, and a little distance in the woods. Colonel Marshall, the well-known aide-de-camp of General Lee, was the only other person present, having been ordered to come to the spot for the purpose of writing a letter to Mr. Davis, dictated by General Lee. Marshall sat on the end of a fallen tree, within three feet of the two Generals, and heard every word that passed between them, and this is what he tells me Lee and Jackson talked about on that eventful night: "Jackson spoke to General Lee about what he had seen and heard during the advance, and commented upon the promptness with which the enemy had appeared to abandon his movement towards Fredericksburg when opposed, and the ease with which he had been driven back to Chancellorsville, and concluded by expressing the opinion very decidedly, and repeating it more than once, that the enemy would recross the Rappahannock before morning. He said, in substance, 'By tomorrow morning there will not be any of them this side of the river.' General Lee expressed the hope that General Jackson's expectations might be realized, but said 'he did not look for such a result; that he did not believe the enemy would abandon his attempt so easily,' and expressed his conviction that the main body of General Hooker's army was in his front, and that the real move was to be made from this direction, and not from Fredericksburg. On this point there was a great difference of opinion among our higher officers, and General Lee was the only one who seemed to have the absolute conviction that the real movement of the Federal army was the one he was then meeting. In this belief he never wavered from the first. After telling General Jackson that he hoped his opinion might be proved to be correct, General Lee

added: 'But, General, we must get ready to attack the enemy, if we should find him here to-morrow, and you must make all arrangements to move around his right flank.' General Lee then took up the map, and pointed out to Jackson the general direction of his route by the Furnace and Brock roads. Some conversation took place as to the importance of endeavoring to conceal the movement from the enemy, and as to the existence of roads further to the enemy's right, by which General Jackson might pass so as not to be exposed to observation or attack. The general line of Jackson's route was pointed out, and the necessity of celerity and secrecy was enjoined upon him. The conversation was a lengthy one, and at the conclusion of it General Lee said to Jackson 'that before he moved in the morning, if he should have any doubt as to whether the enemy was still in position, he could send a couple of guns to a spot close by, and open fire on the enemy's position, which would speedily settle the question.' From the spot referred to, two of our guns had to be withdrawn that afternoon, as the infantry were suffering from the fire they were drawing from the enemy. General Jackson then withdrew, and General Lee dictated to Colonel Marshall a long letter to President Davis, giving him fully the situation. In it he regretted he would not have the assistance of Pickett's and Hood's divisions, but expressed his confidence in the good judgment that had withdrawn and kept them from him, and closed with the hope that, notwithstanding all our dangers and disadvantages, Providence would bless the efforts which he was sure his brave army would make to deserve success."

I give all this, in detail, to show the errors writers upon Chancellorsville have fallen into in reference to the ORIGIN of Jackson's famous flank movement.

And as *settling* the question as to who originated this movement, I give the following extract from a letter written by General Lee to Rev. Dr. A. T. Bledsoe, in reply to one from Dr. Bledsoe, in which he asked the direct question as to whether Jackson's move originated with himself or was suggested by General Lee:

LEXINGTON, VA., October 28th, 1867.

Dr. A. T. BLEDSOE,

Office "*Southern Review*," Baltimore, Md.:

My Dear Sir—

In reply to your inquiry, I must acknowledge that I have not read the article on Chancellorsville in the last number of the *Southern Review*, nor have I read any of the books published on either side since the termination of hostilities. I have as yet felt no desire to

revive my recollections of those events, and have been satisfied with the knowledge I possessed of what transpired. I have, however, learned from others that the various authors of the life of Jackson award to him the credit of the success gained by the Army of Northern Virginia where he was present, and describe the movements of his corps or command as independent of the general plan of operations, and undertaken at his own suggestion and upon his own responsibility. I have the greatest reluctance to do any thing that might be considered as detracting from his well-deserved fame, for I believe that no one was more convinced of his worth, or appreciated him more highly, than myself; yet your knowledge of military affairs, if you have none of the events themselves, will teach you that this could not have been so. Every movement of an army must be well considered and properly ordered, and every one who knows General Jackson must know that he was too good a soldier to violate this fundamental military principle. In the operations around Chancellorsville, I overtook General Jackson, who had been placed in command of the advance as the skirmishers of the approaching armies met, advanced with the troops to the Federal line of defences, and was on the field until their whole army recrossed the Rappahannock. There is no question as to who was responsible for the operations of the Confederates, or to whom any failure would have been charged.

What I have said is for your own information. With my best wishes for the success of the *Southern Review* and for your own welfare, in both of which I take a lively interest,

I am, with great respect, your friend and servant,

R. E. LEE.

In a little pine thicket close by the scene of this conference, General Lee and staff bivouacked that night. During the evening reports reached him from Early that all was quiet along the Rappahannock. Wilcox was ordered back to Banks' ford, in consequence of other rumors. Lee's orders had been issued, his plans digested—his trusty Lieutenants were to carry them out; the Chief-tain slept. Hooker at Chancellorsville, one and a half miles away, was, however, awake, for at 1.55, on the morning of the 2d of May, he dispatched to Butterfield, to order the pontoon bridges taken up below Fredericksburg and Reynolds' corps to march at once to his headquarters.

The morning of May the 2d, 1863, broke clear. General Lee emerged from the little thicket and stood on its edge at sunrise, erect and soldierly, to see Jackson's troops file by. They had bivouacked on his right, and were now commencing the flank movement. About half an hour after sunrise Jackson himself came riding along. When opposite to General Lee he drew rein and the two



conversed for a few minutes. Jackson then started forward, pointing in the direction his troops were moving. His face was a little flushed, Colonel Marshall says, as it was turned back towards General Lee, who nodded approval to what he had said.

The sun rose unclouded and brilliant, gilding the hilltops and penetrating the vapors of the Valley. Rising as gorgeous as did the "sun of Austerlitz," which produced such an impression upon the imagination of Napoleon. It should be remembered by the people of the South, for its rays fell upon the last meeting, in this world, of Lee and Jackson. The Duke of Wellington is reported to have said "a man of refined Christian sensibilities is totally unfit for the profession of a soldier," but here were two devoted Christians, who faithfully performed all their duties; and so they parted.

General Lee was to keep 14,000 men in front of Hooker's 73,124 while Jackson moved around his right flank with 26,000. I say 73,124, because the Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth corps numbered, according to the return of April the 30th, an aggregate present for duty of 42,914; the Third, 18,986, and two divisions of the Second corps, 11,224. The total, then, would be 73,124—not including the three cavalry regiments under Pleasanton. The Second corps numbered 16,836; but Gibbon's division of that corps was with Sedgwick. Putting one-third of the whole as Gibbon's strength, we would have 5,612 men, leaving 11,224 for the other two divisions. The First corps, Reynolds, was not then present, and is, therefore, not included. On the 2d of May, it was marching from Sedgwick to Hooker, but it did not get to him until daylight on the 3d. This corps numbered an aggregate present for duty on the 30th of April, 19,595. After its arrival, that portion of the Federal army in General Lee's front amounted to 92,719. The strategy of General Lee was bold but dangerous.

At the battle of Austerlitz, when the Russians made a flank movement upon Napoleon's right, he moved at once upon the weakened lines of the Allies in his front and pierced them; cutting the Russian army in two parts, leaving some battalions to hold the right wing, he wheeled the remainder upon the left wing, or flanking force, and destroyed it; then, turning towards the right wing, he directed upon it a terrible onset, and it too was no more. I am told that the men of Anderson, which was one of the two divisions left in Hooker's front, after Jackson's departure, and who formed a thin gray line tipped with steel, were about six feet apart. How long would it have taken 73,124 men to have pierced



General Lee's centre? While the Commanding-General is thus situated—a condition which has Early's sincere sympathy, being in a similar situation in Sedgwick's front at Fredericksburg—let us follow Jackson. Turning to the left upon the Plank road, near Aldrich's, he moved rapidly diagonally across Hooker's line of battle, screened from view by the forest and by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which had been ordered to mask the movement, as well as to precede it. Birney of Sickles' corps, who with his division was wedged in between Howard's left and Slocum's right, on the crest of Scott's run as early as 8 A. M., reported to Sickles that a continuous column of infantry, trains and ambulances was passing his front towards the right. He ordered Clark's battery to go forward to a commanding eminence and fire into the column. At 12 M. Sickles ordered him to move forward, supported by Whipple's division and Barlow's brigade from Howard, pierce the column and gain the road they were moving over. This movement was reported to Hooker; he thought the Confederate army was in full retreat, and this is the explanation of his dispatch to Sedgwick on that day, ordering him to pursue the enemy on the Bowling Green road. It is dated at 4.10 P. M., and said: "We know the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains; two of Sickles' divisions are amongst them." Jackson, upon passing Catherine furnace, where a road came in from Sickles' line, a mile distant, directed Rodes to leave Colonel Best's Twenty-third Georgia regiment there to guard it. It was these troops Sickles reports as having attacked and captured four hundred of them. Pleasanton was with Sickles, in command of the Sixth New York, Eighth and Seventeenth Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel J. Thompson Brown, who had just passed this point with his battalion of artillery, halted, and at once put his guns in position. The two nearest brigades of Jackson's column—Archer's and Thomas' of Hill's division—supported him, and Sickles' advance was checked. They then renewed their march—Anderson having replaced them by Posey's brigade, supported by Wright's. Sickles, however, gained the road Jackson was marching upon, and was promised the co-operation of Howard and Slocum in pursuing the *flying* Confederates.

Jackson was marching on. My cavalry was well in his front. Upon reaching the Plank road, some five miles west of Chancellorsville, my command was halted, and while waiting for Jackson to come up, I made a personal reconnoissance to lo-

cate the Federal right for Jackson's attack. With one staff officer, I rode across and beyond the Plank road, in the direction of the Old turnpike, pursuing a path through the woods, momentarily expecting to find evidence of the enemy's presence. Seeing a wooded hill in the distance, I determined, if possible, to get upon its top, as it promised a view of the adjacent country. Cautiously I ascended its side, reaching the open spot upon its summit without molestation. What a sight presented itself before me! Below, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran the Federal line of battle. I was in rear of Howard's right. There were the line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of stacked arms in rear. Two cannon were visible in the part of the line seen. The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, smoking, probably engaged, here and there, in games of cards, and other amusements indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering beebes. The remembrance of the scene is as clear as it was sixteen years ago. So impressed was I with my discovery, that I rode rapidly back to the point on the Plank road where I had left my cavalry, and back down the road Jackson was moving, until I met "Stonewall" himself. "General," said I, "if you will ride with me, halting your column here, out of sight, I will show you the enemy's right, and you will perceive the great advantage of attacking down the Old turnpike instead of the Plank road, the enemy's lines being taken in reverse. Bring only one courier, as you will be in view from the top of the hill." Jackson assented, and I rapidly conducted him to the point of observation. There had been no change in the picture.

I only knew Jackson slightly. I watched him closely as he gazed upon Howard's troops. It was then about 2 P. M. His eyes burned with a brilliant glow, lighting up a sad face. His expression was one of intense interest, his face was colored slightly with the paint of approaching battle, and radiant at the success of his flank movement. Was he happy at the prospect of the "delightful excitement"—terms, Dick Taylor says, he used to express his pleasure at being under fire? To the remarks made to him while the unconscious line of blue was pointed out, he did not reply once during the five minutes he was on the hill, and yet his lips were moving. From what I have read and heard of Jackson since that day, I know now what he was doing then. Oh! "beware of rashness," General Hooker. Stonewall Jackson is praying in full view and in rear of your right flank!

While talking to the Great God of Battles, how could he hear what a poor cavalryman was saying. "Tell General Rodes," said he, suddenly whirling his horse towards the courier, "to move across the Old plank-road; halt when he gets to the Old turnpike, and I will join him there." One more look upon the Federal lines, and then he rode rapidly down the hill, his arms flapping to the motion of his horse, over whose head it seemed, good rider as he was, he would certainly go. I expected to be told I had made a valuable personal reconnoissance—saving the lives of many soldiers, and that Jackson was indebted to me to that amount at least. Perhaps I might have been a little chagrined at Jackson's silence, and hence commented inwardly and adversely upon his horsemanship. Alas! I had looked upon him for the last time.

While Jackson's column was moving to the Old turnpike, my cavalry, supported by the Stonewall brigade under Paxton, moved a short distance down the Plank road to mask the movement.

Rodes' division—Jackson's advance—reached the Old turnpike about three miles in rear of Chancellorsville, at 4 P. M. (General Lee's report). "As the different divisions arrived they were formed at right angles to the road"—Rodes in front; Trimble's division, under Colston, in the second line, two hundred yards in rear of Rodes, and A. P. Hill's division in the third line.

At 6 P. M., all being ready, Jackson ordered the advance. Howard, commanding Hooker's right, was at that moment at Dowdall's or Melzei Chancellor's, his headquarters. Carl Schurz was with him. Howard's right division was commanded by General Charles Devens. He reported the enemy's cavalry, with horse artillery, deployed in his front at 4 P. M.

Jackson's men burst with a cheer upon the startled enemy, and swept down in rear of Howard's line, capturing cannon before they could be turned upon them. Howard reports as the only fighting that parts of Schimmelfennig's and Krzyzancerski's brigades moved gradually back, keeping up a fire, and that "at the centre and near the Plank road there was a blind panic and a great confusion." Devens, the present Attorney-General, fell back rapidly, very rapidly, upon Schurz, the present Secretary of the Interior, commanding the next division, and Hooker's right flank was yielded up by Howard. Sickles, while trying to cut off Jackson, came near being cut off himself. Pleasanton, who was with him, says he sent back the Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, and hurled it at Jackson's corps, with heavy loss to them, but he gained fifteen



minutes, which enabled him to put twenty-two guns double-shotted with canister in position before the Rebels came in sight, supporting them by two small squadrons of cavalry.

"In rear of the Eleventh corps the Rebels came on," says Pleasanton, "rapidly but now in silence, with that skill and adroitness they often display to gain their object. The only color visible was the American flag with the centre battalion. To clear up this doubt, my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Thompson, First New York cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards of them, when they called out to him, 'We are friends! come on,' and he was induced to go fifty yards closer, when the whole line in a most dastardly manner opened on him with musketry, and dropped the American colors and displayed eight or ten Rebel battle flags. He escaped unhurt!" One of the most wonderful things of this most wonderful battle, is this statement that a mounted officer fifty yards from Rodes' line, should be fired at by the whole line and live to tell it!!

In his official report Rodes says, "the enemy, being taken in flank and rear, did not wait for an attack." Colston's division followed so rapidly, that they went over the works at Melzei Chancellor's with Rodes' men. Both divisions entered together a second piece of woods, filled with abatis. It was then dark and the whole line was halted to reform. There was then no line of battle between our troops and Chancellorsville, says Rodes, and so the gallant Crutchfield opened his batteries upon that point. "The enemy instantly responded," Rodes continues, "with a terrific fire, which silenced our guns, but did little execution on the infantry." The fire was probably from the twenty-two guns before mentioned. Hill then came up and his men were deployed in Rodes' front. At 9 P. M. Jackson ordered him to take charge of the pursuit (Hill's report). As soon as the fire from the enemy's artillery had ceased, Lane's brigade, Hill's advance, formed its line of battle—the Thirty-third North Carolina deployed in its front as skirmishers; the Seventh and Thirty-seventh North Carolina on the right of the road; the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth North Carolina on the left. Jackson was eager to push forward to cut Hooker off from the fords of the Rappahannock. Hill came up, stopping a few feet in front of his line. Jackson was then in sight and both some paces in front of Hill.

Sending the only staff officer to Hill to tell him to move forward as soon as possible, Jackson rode slowly along the pike towards the enemy. Captain Wilbourn, of his Signal corps, was on his left side,



two of the Signal corps just behind them, followed by couriers. Jackson was desirous of getting information useful to Hill's advance, thinking perhaps a skirmish line was still in his front. Jackson and his little party had ridden but a few rods, reaching a point near an old dismantled house to the right of the pike, when he was fired on by our troops to the right of the pike, the balls passing diagonally across—one musket firing first, perhaps accidentally. Many of his escort and their horses were shot down by this fire. Jackson, Captain Wilbourn and the few who were not dismounted wheeled their horses to the left and galloped in the woods to get out of range, but were then fired on by the troops to the left of the road, when within thirty yards of the line, having been taken for a body of the enemy's cavalry. By this fire General Jackson was wounded. The troops near the road did not fire, because they knew Jackson had passed out. For the minute particulars of this sad calamity, I must refer you to Captain Wilbourn's account, quoted in an article by General Early in the December, 1878, number of the *Southern Historical Papers*, for now I adopt the words of General Lee, as in bed that night, resting on his elbow, he listened to Captain Wilbourn's report, he said: "Ah! Captain, don't let us say anything more about it; it is too painful to talk about." The enemy then opened a furious fire of shot, shell and canister, sweeping down the road and the woods upon each side. A. P. Hill and Colonel Crutchfield were disabled by this fire, and among others General Nicholls, of the Louisiana brigade, the present Governor of his State, had his left leg torn off by a shell. Rodes, next in rank, assumed command of the corps, but relinquished it to General Stuart, who had been sent for, because, in his own modest words, he was "satisfied the good of the service demanded it."

"And shall Trelawney die! and shall Trelawney die!

Then thirty thousand Cornish boys shall know the reason why."

Stuart was near Ely's ford with the cavalry and the Sixteenth North Carolina infantry, having gone there after dark, to hold Averell still, who, having returned from his raid, was reported to be at that point. At 10.30 P. M., Captain Adams, of Hill's staff, summoned him to the command of Jackson's corps. Upon his arrival upon the battlefield, Jackson had been taken to the rear, but A. P. Hill, who was still there, turned over the command to him. With the assistance of Colonel E. P. Alexander, of the ar-

tillery, he was engaged all night in preparations for the morrow. At early dawn on the 3d, Stuart pressed the corps forward—Hill's division in first line, Trimble's in second and Rodes' in rear. As the sun lifted the mist, the ridge to his right was found to be a commanding position for artillery. Quickly thirty pieces, under Colonels T. H. Carter and Hilary P. Jones, were firing from it. Their fire knocked a piece of the door or pillar of the apartment Hooker was occupying at Chancellorsville against him, and struck him down senseless. Pleasanton says, when he saw him about 10 A. M. that day, "he was lying on the ground, usually in a doze, except when I woke him up to attend to some important dispatch." Couch was then temporarily called to the command. Stuart pressed onward. At one time his left was so strongly pressed that his three lines were merged into one while holding his position. He replied to a notice sent him that the men were out of ammunition, that they must hold their ground with the bayonet. About this time Stuart's right connected with Anderson's left, uniting thus the two wings of General Lee's army. He then massed infantry on his left, and at 8 A. M. stormed the enemy's works. Twice he was repulsed, but the third time Stuart placed himself on horseback at the head of the troops, and ordering the charge, carried and held them—singing, with a ringing voice, "*Old Joe Hooker, won't you come out of the Wilderness?*" An eye witness says of him that he could not get rid of the impression that "Harry of Navarre" led the charge, except that Stuart's plume was black, for everywhere the men "followed his feather."

Anderson gallantly moved direct upon Chancellorsville, while McLaws made a strong demonstration in his front. At 10 A. M. the position at Chancellorsville was won, and the enemy had withdrawn to a strong position near the Rappahannock.

Preparations were at once made to attack him again, when further operations were arrested by the intelligence received from Fredericksburg. It will be remembered that Sedgwick was originally left in front of Fredericksburg, with the First, Third and Sixth corps and one division of the Second corps. On the 30th of April at 12.30 P. M. Sickles left him. On the 2d of May the First corps was ordered away from him. Sedgwick was then left, Hooker says, with 32,420 men. By the returns of April 30th, the Sixth corps numbered an aggregate present for duty of 23,730. Giving Gibbon's division one-third of the Second corps' strength (being three divisions to the corps) he would have 5,612 present for duty. Add

that strength to that of the Sixth corps and you will have 29,342 for Sedgwick's total, exclusive of the reserve artillery. On May 2d, 9.55 A. M., Hooker telegraphs him: "You are all right. You have but Early's division in your front; balance all up here." Opposing Sedgwick, Early had his division, numbering by the returns of April 20th—the nearest one to the battle—an aggregate of officers and men of 7,879. Deducting losses since the date of the returns, this division carried into action about 7,500 officers and men (Early's narrative). Barksdale's brigade numbered 1,500 in the aggregate (Early's narrative). It was under Early's command. The total infantry, officers and men, would be then 9,000, or a little over 8,000 muskets. In addition, Early had Andrews' battalion of artillery of twelve guns; Graham's, four guns; a Whitworth gun posted below the Massaponnax, and portions of Walton's, Cabell's and Cutt's battalions of artillery, under General Pendleton—making in all some forty-five or fifty guns (Early's narrative), a less number than Sedgwick and far inferior in weight of metal.

At 9 P. M. on the 2d, after Jackson's success, Hooker telegraphs Sedgwick to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and to move up the road to Chancellorsville until he connects with him, destroying Early in his front. He tells him then that he will probably fall upon the rear of the troops commanded by General Lee, and between Hooker and himself Lee must be used up. This order was issued under the impression Sedgwick was on the north side of the river, but it found him below Fredericksburg on the south side. The night was so bright Hooker says that staff officers could see to write their dispatches by moonlight. Gibbon, near Falmouth, was also ordered to cross the river on the night of the 2d. Sedgwick, Hooker tells us, did not obey the spirit of the order, and delayed too long. Warren told him that if he (Warren) had not been there, Sedgwick would not have moved at all. At 11 P. M. Sedgwick received this order to cross (Sedgwick's report). Being already over, he began to move by the flank up the Bowling Green road towards Fredericksburg, leaving one division in front of Early's right. About daylight he occupied the town. Gibbon crossed early on the 3d, and at 7 A. M. was formed on Sedgwick's right. In moving forward to turn our left he was stopped by the canal. Sedgwick then determined to assault Marye's and the contiguous hills, and did so. His right column under Colonel Spear, consisted of four regiments; his left of two



regiments under Colonel Johns. Both columns, supported by four other regiments under Colonel Burnham, moved upon Marye's hill, while Howe's division advanced rapidly in three columns of assault on the left of Hazel run, upon Lee's hill. But what was Early doing? With his 9,000 infantry he occupied a line six miles long, from Hamilton's crossing to a point on the river above Fredericksburg. Sedgwick had, as stated before, 29,342 men. Add to that, four officers and an hundred men of cavalry, and thirty-three officers, and 1,103 men of artillery, and his whole force amounted to 30,582. Barksdale held the left of Early's lines from Taylor's hill to the hill in rear of Howison's house. Early's division was on the right from Hamilton's to Deep run, while between Deep run and the right of Lee's hill only pickets were placed, protected by a cross fire of artillery. Early's general instructions were to retard the enemy's advance in any direction if he moved, or to keep him still if he would remain so, or to join the main army of General Lee in the event of the enemy withdrawing from his front. These instructions were repeated on the 2d instant, but by a misapprehension of the officer conveying them, Early was directed to move unconditionally to General Lee. Leaving Hays' brigade and one regiment of Barksdale's at Fredericksburg, and directing a part of Pendleton's reserve artillery to be sent to the rear, he began his march. The mistake being corrected, Early returned to his position. Hays' brigade had been sent to reinforce Barksdale, when Sedgwick occupied Fredericksburg, at dawn on the 3d.

When Early began to withdraw, Professor Lowe went up high in a balloon, but discovered nothing. To quote General Early, "Professor Lowe's balloon reconnoissance so signally failed on this occasion, and in the operations around Chancellorsville, that they were abandoned for the rest of the war, and our men were deprived of the benefit of these, to us, cheap and harmless exhibitions."

Soon after daylight Sedgwick moved against Marye's hill, but was repulsed by Barksdale's infantry and Pendleton's artillery. His force also endeavored to turn the left of Early's division, commanded by Hoke, up Deep run, but the demonstration was checked. An attempt was also made to turn our extreme left near Taylor's house; it was prevented by General Hays and the arrival of General Wilcox from Banks' ford. The enemy then advanced against Marye's and the hills to the right and left of it. Marye's hill was defended by one small regiment, three companies of another and four pieces of artillery (Barksdale's report). Sedgwick said he



lost one thousand men in ten minutes there. Two assaults on Marye's hill were repulsed. A flag of truce was then sent by the enemy to obtain permission to provide for the wounded. The weakness of our lines was seen. A third assault was ordered, and was successful. We lost eight pieces of artillery upon that and the adjacent heights. Barksdale and Hays retired down the Telegraph road, and the enemy's advance was checked by Early, who sent three regiments of Gordon's brigade to reinforce them.

Wilcox threw himself in front of Sedgwick's advance up the Plank road, having with him about fifty cavalry, under Collins, and most gallantly disputed it—falling back slowly until he reached Salem church, five miles from Fredericksburg. Lieutenant Pitzer, of Early's staff, who was on Lee's hill when it was carried, galloped at once to General Lee, and so informed him. McLaws, with his three brigades and one of Anderson's, was ordered to reinforce Wilcox, that Sedgwick might be kept off Lee's rear. Wilcox was found in line at Salem. Kershaw and Wofford were placed on his right; Semmes and Mahone on his left. The enemy then advanced in three lines, principally upon Wilcox. After a fierce struggle, they were repulsed and fled in confusion, pursued for nearly a mile by Wilcox and Semmes, until met by the enemy's reserve. They then retired to their former position.

McLaws communicated with Early that night, asking his plans. Early replied he proposed to attack in the morning and drive the enemy from Marye's and Lee's hills, extending his left so as to connect with McLaws' right, and asking his co-operation. That night he received a note from General McLaws assenting to the plan and containing General Lee's approval of it too. Early on the morning of the 4th, Early advanced along the Telegraph road, regaining Marye's and the adjacent hills, but he could not hear McLaws' guns. McLaws says in his report that he agreed to advance, provided Early would attack first, and did advance his right (Kershaw and Wofford to co-operate with him); but finding his force insufficient for a front attack, he withdrew to his lines of the previous evening. In the meantime, Early was informed that Anderson was coming and not to attack until he was in position, connecting with Early's left, when, at a signal to be given by firing three guns rapidly, Sedgwick was to be assaulted by Anderson, McLaws and Early, under the immediate command of General Lee. Anderson reached Salem church about noon, but the attack did not begin until 6 P. M.—owing, General Lee says, to the difficulty of getting the troops in position. Stuart, with Jackson's

corps, was then left alone in Hooker's front. At 6 P. M. the signal was given. Anderson and Early moved forward at once in gallant style, driving Sedgwick across the Plank road in the direction of the Rappahannock. The approaching darkness, we are told by General Lee, prevented McLaws from perceiving the success of the attack, until the enemy began to cross the river below Banks' ford.

When the morning of the 5th dawned, Sedgwick "had made good his escape," and removed his bridges. Fredericksburg was also evacuated. Early, with Barksdale, was left to hold our lines as before, while Anderson and McLaws returned to Chancellorsville, which place they reached on the afternoon of the 5th in a violent thunder storm. At daylight on the 6th, these two divisions were ordered to assail the enemy's works in conjunction with Jackson's corps; but during the storm of the night before, Hooker retreated over the river.

The Confederate cavalry operations, from smallness of numbers, were much circumscribed. Hampton's brigade was south of the James river recruiting. Jones' brigade was in the Valley. Fitz. Lee's five regiments were divided—two operating on General Lee's right, next to the Rappahannock, while the remaining three marched with Jackson, and afterwards were on the extreme left, near Ely's ford. Two regiments, under W. H. F. Lee, was all the cavalry Stoneman had to contend against. The horse artillery kept pace with the infantry. Stuart's report says they led the attack on the 3d.

The cavalry corps of the enemy, according to the returns of April 30th, had an aggregate present for duty of 13,398. Hooker says (*Conduct of the War*, volume I, page 136): "My cavalry force numbered upwards of 13,000 men for duty at the time the cavalry left camp at Falmouth, and of this force but one brigade was retained for duty with the infantry." They were to cross the Rappahannock on the 29th, the same day as the infantry; one column was to move round through Culpeper and Louisa, to operate on the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad on General Lee's line of communication. This column was under Stoneman and Buford. Another column was to threaten Culpeper and Gordonsville, then to follow and join Stoneman. Stoneman marched to Thompson's cross-roads, and calling his regimental commanders together, tells them that "I have dropped in this region like a shell, and that I intended to burst it, expecting each piece or fragment to do as much harm and create as much terror as would result from

sending the whole shell, and thus magnify our small force into overwhelming numbers"; and he further says: "The results of this plan satisfied my most sanguine expectations." But what does Hooker say?—"On the 4th the cavalry column, under General Stoneman, returned. It is hardly necessary to say it accomplished nothing. One part of it, under Kilpatrick, crossed the Acquia and Richmond railroad, and the fact that on the 5th the cars carried the Rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy's communications had been interrupted, and an examination of the instructions General Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished less in so doing."

Averell, when starting with his column, was told by Hooker that "in the vicinity of Culpeper, you will be likely to come against Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry, consisting of about two thousand men, which it is expected you will be able to disperse and destroy without delay to your advance." Averell marched to Culpeper Courthouse on the 30th, then to the Rapidan, and says, "from prisoners taken and from contrabands, it was learned that at least two brigades of the enemy's cavalry were fleeing before us." All day May the 1st, W. H. F. Lee, with his two regiments and one piece of artillery, gallantly disputed his advance, and in compliance with the orders from General Lee, burnt the bridge over the Rapidan and withdrew towards Gordonsville. He reached that place at 11 A. M. on the 2d. At 6.30 A. M. on the same day, Averell, who never advanced closer than three miles of Orange Courthouse, countermarched and went back to the army. He arrived at 10.30 P. M. on the night of the 2d, on the north side of Ely's ford. Averell's losses, by his official report, were two officers and two men wounded and one man killed. He numbered, according to the same report, 3,400 sabres and six guns.

W. H. F. Lee then turned his attention to Stoneman, who was about Trevilians depot in Louisa county. On May the 3d and 4th, he pursued Wyndham's force, who represented the fragment of shell which was flying towards Columbia, and says he heard by telegrams from Richmond that the enemy were everywhere. On the 5th and 6th he harassed Stoneman's rear as he was returning to his army; on May the 8th he returned to Orange Courthouse, having accomplished as much as could possibly be expected with his small force. I leave my hearers to infer what Stuart would



have done in the enemy's rear with ten or twelve thousand cavalry, only opposed by two regiments.

And so ended the last of the Federal operations at Chancellorsville. The total losses on the Federal side was 17,197 (Hooker, *Conduct of War*, volume I, page 143). Total loss on Confederate side was 10,281. Colonel Baldwin, Chief of Ordnance, reported thirteen cannon, 1,500 rounds of artillery ammunition, large lot of harness, wheels, &c., and 19,500 muskets and rifles and 300,000 rounds of infantry ammunition.

In an address of this sort it is impossible to do justice to the many splendid feats of valor performed by the troops. I must refer all to the official reports. They will show the difficulties and dangers which, under God's blessing, were surmounted by the valor and fortitude of our army.

The prominent points of this contest were: Jackson's fight of the 2d, Stuart's of the 3d, and the operations of Early and Barksdale, of Anderson, McLaws and Wilcox. In his official report, General Lee says that "the conduct of the troops cannot be too highly praised. Attacking largely superior numbers in strongly entrenched positions, their heroic courage overcame every obstacle of nature and of art, and achieved a triumph most honorable to our arms. I commend to the Department the brave officers and men mentioned by their superiors for extraordinary daring and merit, whose names I am unable to enumerate here; among them will be found some who have passed by a glorious death beyond the reach of praise, but the memory of whose virtues and devoted patriotism will ever be cherished by their grateful countrymen."

On 6th May, General Hooker published his General Order No. 49. Listen to portions of it: "The Major-General-Commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. \* \* \* In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock, before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself and its fidelity to the principles it represents. \* \* \* Profoundly loyal and conscious of its strength, the army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interests or honor may demand. \* \* \* The events of the last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army." And then in a letter to Lincoln, dated May 13th, 1863, Hooker says, near its close, "Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion of my Order No. 49? If so, do not answer me. Jackson is dead and Lee



beats McClellan in his untruthful bulletins." I cannot find that Lincoln ever answered this question.

Aye, my comrades, the battle of Chancellorsville is over. "When written history shall truly record the struggle which ended thus, every leaf may be dripping with the tears of grief and woe, but not a page will be stained with a stigma of shame." It will show nowhere such an example of the steady handling of a small force against a great one, upon plans based upon a profound and accurate judgment of the facts. Risks were assumed apparently desperate, with cool self-reliance and confidence in the army, that never faltered under all dangers and discouragements until all had been accomplished which, under the circumstances, could reasonably be expected. The laurel at Chancellorsville is entwined with the cypress. Brigadier-General Paxton fell while leading his brigade with conspicuous courage in the assault of the 3d. Generals A. P. Hill, Nicholls, McGowan, Heth, Hoke and Pender were wounded, to which must be added many gallant officers and privates, while many more are now "but a handful of dust in the land of their choice. A name in song and story, and Fame to shout with her trumpet voice—Dead—dead on the field of glory."

Chancellorsville is inseparably connected in its glory and gloom with Stonewall Jackson. General Lee officially writes: "I do not propose to speak here of the character of this illustrious man, since removed from the scene of his eminent usefulness by the hand of an inscrutable but all-wise Providence. I nevertheless desire to pay the tribute of my admiration to the matchless energy and skill that marked this last act of his life, forming, as it did, a worthy conclusion of that long series of splendid achievements which won for him the lasting gratitude and love of his country." In my reading of history, Jackson's purely military genius resembled more closely Cæsar's and Napoleon's. Like the latter, his success must be attributed to the rapid audacity of his movements, and to his masterly control of the confidence and will of his men. He had the daring, temper and fiery spirit of Cæsar in battle. Cæsar fell at the base of Pompey's statue, which had been restored by his magnanimity, pierced by twenty-three wounds at the hands of those he had done most for. Jackson fell at the hands of those who would have cheerfully joined their comrades upon many a valley, plain and mountain slope in the dismal, silent biouvacs, if his life could have been spared. Like the little child at the Chandler house, where Jackson breathed his last, who "wished that God would let her die in his stead, for then only her

mother would cry; but if Jackson died, all the people of the country would cry." Sixteen years have passed. God grant that the little speaker then, the woman now, if alive, who wanted to die for Jackson, is beloved and happy! The character of Jackson, while being likened to the unswerving justice of an Aristides, had yet the grand virtues of a Cato. Like the aurora borealis at an autumn's evening close, it will brightly shine in the sky of the future. For he was like Enoch, "A type of perfected humanity—a man raised to heaven by pleasing God, while angels fell to earth by transgression." Immortal Jackson! though like leaves of autumn thy dead have lain, the—

"Southern heart is their funeral urn,  
The Southern slogan their requiem stern."

Sacred Chancellorsville! The sun had gone down behind the hills, and the wind behind the clouds. It was—

"A night of storms, but not like those  
That sweep the mountain's breast;  
Not like the hurricane that blows  
To break the ocean's rest.  
It lightened, 'twas the sheeted flash  
From serried ranks that flew;  
It thundered, 'twas the cannon's crash,  
That tore the forest through.  
Oh! night of horrors, thou didst see  
With all thy starry eyes,  
The holocaust of victory,  
A nation's sacrifice.

"Lo, prostrate on the field of strife,  
The noble warrior fell,  
Enriching with a martyr's life  
The land he loved so well.  
But round the martyred hero's form  
A living rampart rose  
To shield him from the hail and storm  
Of his retreating foes.  
And angels from the King of kings,  
On holiest mission sped  
To weave a canopy of wings  
Around his sainted head."

Upon the occasion of Robert E. Lee's confirmation as a member of the church, Bishop Johns said to him: "If you will be as faithful a soldier of the cross as you have been of your country, when your warfare is over I shall covet your crown."

Rest on Stonewall—faithful to cross and country, your warfare is over, your crown is won.

Let us weep in darkness, but not weep for him—

“Not for him who ascended Fame’s ladder so high,  
From the round at the top, he steeped off to the sky.”

Deep in the affections of the Army of Northern Virginia, Jackson is buried. The mountains of old Rockbridge are the sentinels upon the watchtower.

Then striking the harp of his country, his soldier angels being the choir, may this Society join me as I sing—

“Go sleep, with the sunshine of fame on thy slumbers,  
’Till waked by some hand less unworthy than mine.”

The above address of General Lee was delivered in the State capitol to a crowded audience, who greeted him with frequent and enthusiastically repeated applause.

General Early presided, in the absence of the President (General W. H. F. Lee) and all of the Vice-Presidents of the Association.

The officers of last year, with the addition of General Bradley T. Johnson as one of the Vice-Presidents, were unanimously re-elected.

General Early presented a feeling and appropriate tribute to the memory of General John B. Hood, which was unanimously adopted, and ordered to be spread on the record.

#### THE BANQUET.

After the speaking was over, the Association and their invited guests repaired to Levy’s Hall, where a splendid banquet was spread, and eloquent and telling speeches were made in response to toasts by Colonel Charles S. Venable, Colonel John M. Patton, Jr., D. G. Tyler, of the old Rockbridge artillery; James N. Dunlop, of the old Fourth Virginia cavalry; Judge Theo. S. Garnett, Rev. Dr. J. E. Edwards, William Kean, of the old Richmond howitzers; Major J. Horace Lacy and others.

As a specimen of the character of the speeches, and at the request of a number of comrades, we will give in full in our next number the speech of James N. Dunlop, Esq., in response to a toast to the cavalry.

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### Annual Meeting of the Southern Historical Society.

A large audience assembled in the hall of the House of Delegates Thursday night, October 30th, 1879, in attendance upon the annual meeting of the Society.

Rev. Dr. H. A. Tupper opened the meeting with a most appropriate prayer.

The annual report of the Executive Committee was then read by Dr. J. William Jones, Secretary.

#### *Seventh Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society.*

We cordially greet the members of the Society assembled in annual meeting, and report that we have had during the past year most gratifying evidences of a growing appreciation of the importance and value of our work.

#### MATERIAL FOR OUR ARCHIVES

has been steadily coming in from friends all over the country, while the courtesy of the War Department has enabled us to secure invaluable material which had hitherto been inaccessible. The value of our collection is attested by the fact that both Northern and Southern historians have been consulting it; a distinguished European historian has avowed his purpose of coming to Richmond in order to avail himself of our archives; and the "War Records" office at Washington has had copyists at work for months on important reports, headquarter books, and other original material in our possession and not in their collection.

But we still appeal earnestly to friends of the cause of truth everywhere, to send forward *at once* to our office *everything* which may throw the slightest light upon any part of the story of our great struggle for constitutional freedom; and where persons have material which they are not willing to part with, we beg that they will let us have it *as a loan*, so that we may secure copies both for our office and the War Department.

#### PUBLICATIONS.

Our monthly (*Southern Historical Society Papers*) has been regularly issued, and we have assurances from every quarter that there is a growing appreciation of their value among all who take interest in the vindication of the truth of history. A number of the



leading officers of the United States army, and some of the ablest military critics in Europe, as well as prominent Confederates in every State of the South, have spoken in high terms of our *Papers*. The press generally has echoed the sentiment of the *New England Historical Register*, that "no library, public or private, which pretends to historical fulness, can afford to be without these volumes," and of the *London Saturday Review*, that they "contain a mass of information relative to the late war, without a careful study of which no historian, however limited his scope, should venture to treat any fragment of that most interesting story."

But one of the most emphatic tributes to the value of these publications was contained in a letter from a distinguished Prussian officer, who, after seeing our *Papers*, avows his purpose of *suppressing the first volume of his "History of the Civil War in America," and writing it over again.*

#### OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARCHIVE BUREAU AT WASHINGTON

have continued to be of the most cordial and pleasant character. The Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General, Colonel R. N. Scott, who has charge of the compilation of the records; General Marcus J. Wright, who is agent for the collection of Confederate reports, &c.; Mr. A. P. Tasker, who is keeper of the Confederate archives and has charge of the copying, and indeed all of the officers and clerks of the Department, have shown a cheerful alacrity in affording us every facility desired, and it has been to us a pleasure to reciprocate in every way in our power their kindness.

#### FINANCES.

We regret that we cannot realize our hopes of last year, that we should be able to report at this time that the obligations of the Society have all been fully met. Our receipts *have* met the expenses of the current year, but they have fallen off (owing chiefly to the sickness of our most efficient agent, which deprived us of his services for the larger part of the year) considerably from what they were last year, and we have been unable, therefore, to liquidate our old debt which has *lapped over* from year to year.

The following summary will show our receipts and disbursements from October the 29th, 1878, to October 29th, 1879:

Cash on hand as per last report.....	\$138 70
Received from membership fees, subscriptions and advertisements,	4,995 88
Total funds.....	<u>\$5,134 58</u>

## DISBURSEMENTS.

Paid Geo. W. Gary for printing.....	\$1,392 75
Paid W. E. Simons & Brother, for binding.....	445 00
Paid for clerk, stationery and miscellaneous office expenses.....	718 78
Commissions to Agents.....	961 93
Postage, expressage and telegrams.....	277 81
Paid Secretary on account of salary for past and current years....	1,338 31
Total.....	<u>\$5,134 58</u>

We still owe—

Geo. W. Gary.....	\$1,465 55
W. E. Simons & Brother. ....	532 02
	<u>\$1,997 57</u>

This debt, we repeat, has *lapped over* from previous years, and may be fully accounted for by the statement that in the years 1876 and 1877 we paid for the single items of stereotyping, printing the Confederate roster, and the extra cost of the large number of pages and extra copies of our *Papers*, the sum of \$4,505.86—*i. e.*, if we had run the *Papers* for 1876 and 1877 on the basis of the cost of publishing them in 1878 and 1879, we would have paid every dollar of our liabilities and had a surplus of \$2,508.29.

It should be remembered, too, that out of our receipts from the *Papers* we have had to meet not only the cost of their publication, but *all* of the expenses of the Society as well, and that we now have on hand back volumes worth at least \$5,500 (every one of which can be disposed of in the course of time), and stereotype-plates for nearly the whole of the first year, from which we can reprint *ad libitum*.

But we desire especially to call attention to the fact that beginning and continuing our publication during the worse years for such an enterprise the country has seen, we have not only been able to issue regularly our *Papers*, but to make them a most important auxiliary towards accumulating in our archives material which could readily be sold in the market for thousands of dollars, but which is of *priceless* value for the purposes for which our Society was organized.

We have thought it due alike to the Society and to the Committee to give these details; and we are happy to be able to add that we have made an arrangement by which in the future the *Papers* will be published without risk of indebtedness to the Society. But

the debt of \$1,997.57 ought to be promptly met by special donations, so that the *Papers* may not longer have to carry this burden.

In conclusion, we would express our growing conviction of the importance of an enterprise which has for its object the vindication of as pure a cause as was ever submitted to the arbitrament of the sword, and the furnishing of the material for a true history of as noble a band of patriot heroes as ever marched or fought "in all the tide of time."

By order of the Executive Committee.

J. WILLIAM JONES,  
*Secretary Southern Historical Society.*

General Early, President of the Society, explained that Father Ryan, of Mobile, had first promised to make the oration on this occasion; that his physicians having forbidden him to use his voice, he had promised to send an original poem (telegraphing as late as Monday that it would certainly be here); and that the poem had failed to come by some unexplained cause. General Early submitted a few remarks as to the value and importance of the work of the Society.

Dr. J. L. M. Curry submitted the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted:

*Resolved*, That the past success of the Society, its valuable work in securing the preparation and publication of historic documents, its influence in vindicating truth and correcting erroneous opinions at home and abroad, make its support more important than ever before, and we commend it and the *Historical Society Papers* to the confidence and patronage of all our late associates, and of all who wish the truth of history to be scrupulously preserved.

Dr. Curry sustained his resolution in an earnest and eloquent speech, which was frequently interrupted with applause.

Major Stiles made a strong and very forcible appeal to the audience to take life-memberships and relieve the Society of its burden, which was enthusiastically applauded.

The Secretary said that while it was exceedingly important to raise the amount named at the earliest possible moment, yet a plenty of new subscribers would enable them to work through.

There was a good deal of enthusiasm in the meeting.

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**General Polk's Report of Battle of Taylor's Ridge.**

HEADQUARTERS POLK'S BRIGADE, December 3, 1863.

Captain J. A. BUCK, *Assistant Adjutant-General*:

Captain—In obedience to orders from division headquarters, I submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the battle of Taylor's ridge.

Shortly after daylight on the morning of the 27th ultimo, General Cleburne ordered me to move my brigade through the gap in Taylor's ridge at Ringgold, and place my command so as to defend a road leading to his rear, and at same time place myself in communication with Seventh Texas regiment, placed on top of Taylor's ridge. This move was completed by 9 o'clock A. M. I went in person to the top of Taylor's ridge to see the commanding officer of the Seventh Texas regiment. Before arriving there I met a straggler, who told me the enemy were crossing Taylor's ridge to the right of General Cleburne's position. I immediately ordered up the First Arkansas regiment, and arriving in column at the top of the ridge, found the skirmishers of the enemy in twenty steps of the top, on the Ringgold side of the ridge. Firing commenced before the First Arkansas had formed line of battle, and continued during the entire time of bringing the regiment into position. After a stubborn contest for some half hour, I succeeded in driving the enemy back to the foot of the ridge, where they immediately formed, and, being heavily reinforced, commenced to move up the hill again. I now ordered up the fifth Confederate regiment, and General Lowry coming up with three of his regiments, arrested their approach. The enemy advancing up the hill, continued to oblique rapidly to the left. So I was compelled to move by the right flank to meet them. They advanced in column of regiments, and fought stubbornly, coming in twenty yards of my line. They were again repulsed with heavy loss, and fell back in the greatest confusion some distance beyond the foot of the ridge. In this attack the First Arkansas regiment took some twenty prisoners and two stands of colors. I could now see heavy columns of infantry approaching Ringgold by way of the railroad bridge. After a considerable delay, about 12 M., the enemy commenced moving a column rapidly by the left flank of a road running some two hundred yards from the foot of the ridge. I again moved by the right flank, and watched their movements.



Having moved by the left flank some half mile, the enemy, by a rapid movement, threw their line in a column of regiments and advanced up the hill. They were again met by the same stubborn resistance that before repulsed them.

General Lowry coming to my assistance with one of his regiments, I had it moved in rear of my line until the enemy had advanced within forty yards of my line, when I ordered it up in line with First Arkansas regiment, and at the same time throwing the Second Tennessee down the hill upon the left flank of the enemy. They were again driven back to the foot of the hill in great confusion. The enemy still continued moving over the railroad bridge in heavy column, and about one o'clock commenced moving rapidly to our right in two columns, one coming direct from the railroad bridge, and the other moving some three hundred yards beyond the foot of the ridge. This being reported to General Cleburne, he ordered my command to withdraw, and take a position some two miles to the rear of Taylor's ridge.

This move was made in perfect order. The enemy did not advance upon Taylor's ridge until we have taken our position two miles in the rear. We remained there until 9 o'clock; leaving our bivouac fires brightly burning, moved to Tunnel hill. In this fight, the officers and men all acted with the greatest bravery. Colonel Robinson, Second Texas, was slightly wounded in the arm, and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, First Arkansas, in the leg. Lieutenant-Colonel Cole, of Fifth Confederate regiment was, I fear, mortally wounded. A correct list of casualties has been furnished from my brigade. My thanks are due to all the members of my staff for services rendered.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. E. POLK, *Brigadier-General.*

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## Editorial Paragraphs.

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VOLUME VII IS COMPLETED with this number, and we will be prepared to furnish the bound volume so soon as we can get it from our binders. We sell the bound volume at \$3.50, \$3.75 and \$4, according to binding, and as this volume contains twelve numbers instead of six, it will really save our subscribers the cost of binding one volume—*e. g.*, instead of paying \$5 for the year (bound in half calf), as they have done for previous years, they will only pay \$4.

We beg that our friends will exert themselves to induce others to subscribe to the bound volume, and that they will send on their own orders at once.

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YOUR SUBSCRIPTION EXPIRES WITH THIS NUMBER, AND WE BEG THAT YOU WILL RENEW AT ONCE (we mean, of course, those who have only paid to the close of this year, and that embraces much the largest part of our list). We ask you to RENEW AT ONCE, because we must put our printers to work on our January number, in order that it may be out by the middle of December, and it will be necessary for us to know how many of our subscribers will continue, so that we may regulate the number of copies to be printed. In order to be able to supply subscribers with our *back* numbers, we have been printing a much larger number of copies each month than our subscription list justified. But this has been a source of serious embarrassment, and we must discontinue it.

*We cannot promise a full set of the Papers for next year to those who do not begin with the first number.* We beg, then, that you will at once either send us \$3, authorize us to draw on you, or notify us that you *will do so very soon*. Do not wait for an agent to call on you (we have very few agents), but consider this as a *personal application* for the renewal of your subscription, and send us at once your renewal or your notification that you will do so soon.

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SPECIAL DONATIONS TO RELIEVE THE SOCIETY OF ITS OLD DEBT are earnestly desired, for, while we hope to be able to work through from current receipts, it would be a very great relief to the Society if our friends would liquidate the debt by special contributions and leave the *Papers* free from this burden. Please read our financial statement in our report, and then help us in any way you can :

1. By special contribution, large or small.
2. By taking a *Life-Membership* and paying the fee of \$50, which will entitle you to all future publications free of cost.
3. By buying our *back* volumes, which we sell at \$2, \$2.25 and \$2.50 per volume, according to binding, except the seventh volume, which contains twelve numbers, which we sell at \$3.50, \$3.75 and \$4.
4. By inducing others to subscribe or buy back volumes.
5. By recommending to us reliable and efficient canvassers, to whom we will pay *liberal* commissions.

